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iABSTRACT
This study is a cultural history of danger, disaster, and steam-powered
transportation in nineteenth-century America. The application of steam power to
transportation, a globally transformative innovation, had particular influence in the early
United States. A vast American continent with difficult terrain and poor infrastructure
posed significant challenges, both to individual mobility and to a nation eager to build an
integrated economy, a unified culture, and a functional republican government.
Steamboats and locomotives offered an apparent solution, their speed and power
seemingly shrinking distances between places and expanding mobility and access across
space, a process contemporaries and scholars have described as a sort of space-time
compression. However, these machines that overcame space also blew up, caught fire,
wrecked, collided, derailed, and broke down, killing tens, and often hundreds, of
Americans at a time. This dissertation analyzes the ways Americans encountered,
interpreted, and adapted to these new dangers, all the while making the technology that
created them an ever more essential aspect of their lives. I argue that Americans’
responses to disasters, filtered through the transportation and communication networks
created by steam power, constituted a deep, shared reflection about the nature of
expanded mobility in a fast-evolving modern America. Though few suffered disaster
directly, Americans collectively framed the danger of steam as both a profound national
problem and an evocative symbol of modernity. Through public conversations mediated
by print, Americans identified susceptibility to danger as inherent to high-speed travel,
and, alongside practical safety measures, developed distinctly modern cultural
adaptations to understand and manage that danger. By century's end, Americans had
ii
cultivated a modern mentality on mobility, technology, and danger: though most
Americans never experienced disaster they were intimately aware of it, and though
familiar with catastrophe they understood it as unlikely and accepted it as a feature of
their modern technological lives.
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1Introduction
“In the unlikely event.” Anyone who has ever been a passenger on a commercial
airline has probably heard these words, usually preceding “of a water landing” or “of a
loss in cabin pressure.” They form a standard phrase in the safety instructions presented
to passengers at the beginning of a flight. Passengers board the plane, take their seats, and
begin whatever activity they will use to pass the travel time. For most, the safety
instructions go relatively unnoticed, their familiarity encouraging dismissal. If we
actually think about the words “in the unlikely event,” we know what they mean. These
words confront us with the possibility of mass catastrophe, injury, and death. They also
reassure us – the word “unlikely” emphasizing the remoteness of that possibility. Even
so, many of us still think about the potential disaster. We have seen it happen and we
know what it looks like, from the news and popular culture. A crash is not a possibility
that is difficult to imagine. But it’s also easy to believe that disaster will not happen to us.
For most of us, the unlikely event does not keep us from traveling.
Few moments embody our modern existence as well as those at the beginning of
an airline flight, moments experienced by hundreds of thousands of Americans every
day.1 They represent a launching point from which we reach distant destinations in a
world that is accessible because of the speed, power, and convenience the technology
presents to us. Americans can cross their country in five hours and reach the opposite side
of the globe in fifteen. But this modern luxury is dependent on large, physical objects
using massive amounts of internal power to move through space at high speeds. Thus,
1 Marc Augé also begins his study of “supermodernity” with a prologue posing the spaces and moments
occupied by a man preparing for and taking a flight as emblematic of the modern condition, though he
makes no mention of potential danger, which I see as another crucial feature of modernity. Marc Augé,
Non-Places: An Introduction to Supermodernity, trans. John Howe (New York: Verso, 1995), 1-6.
2they also hold an inherent potential for danger. Modern technologies bring tremendous
progress but also social consequences. Not all technologies have deadly potential, but
living in a technological society requires daily bargains – acceptance of the unease that
accompanies the promise of modern innovations. This is the story of one of those
bargains: the cost of expansive mobility – the ability to abridge space and time – is
unlikely, but inescapable, danger.
To understand this modern bargain we must travel back in time to the early
nineteenth century, when the United States, like much of the world, was undergoing a
technological revolution. Prior to the nineteenth century, there had been little change for
centuries in the ways that humans powered movement. On water, boats were carried by
the current, pushed by wind, or propelled or pulled by human or animal force. On land,
humans relied on gravity and animals to move wheeled vehicles, or they moved with
their own or animal power. Human mobility had gradually improved over the centuries,
particularly when shipbuilding and sailing technologies turned oceans into transportation
highways between continents. Still, mobility was dictated and limited by basic natural
forces.
That changed once humans successfully harnessed steam power and applied it to
water and land transportation. Steam, when utilized in engines on boats and trains,
created a motive power that far exceeded human and animal capability – a power that
could overcome limits imposed by nature. Steam powered boats up rivers and trains up
hills with previously impossible ease. Dramatic increases in power also resulted in
dramatic increases in speed. Within the first generation of steam-powered transportation,
travel times around the United States were more than cut in half. By midcentury
3innovations in communication like the telegraph had joined the steamboat and the train to
transform Americans’ access to people, goods, and places distant from themselves.
Contemporaries of the transition commonly said that “time and space has been
completely annihilated.”2 Their hyperbole reflects the transformative nature of the new
technologies, already apparent to Americans who witnessed their beginning. Steamboats
and trains became sources of pride in American progress, machines carrying the nation
and its citizens into a promising, modern future.
Imagine the collective distress, then, when those same machines repeatedly blew
up, caught fire, wrecked, collided, derailed, and broke down, killing tens, and sometimes
hundreds, of Americans at a time. Steamboat and train accidents were both literally and
figuratively jarring – they physically halted rapid movement through space, but they also
presented a formidable obstacle to pervasive progressive rhetoric about steam power
annihilating space and time. Steam disasters in nineteenth-century America provoked a
widespread and multifaceted public response, reflective of a people striving to make
sense of a serious social problem while making the technology that created it an ever
more essential aspect of their lives. Adapting to the technological reality steamboats and
trains had both helped to initiate and represented required a cultural and psychological
leap – to step fully into this modern era, Americans had to learn to reconcile the
advantages of these technologies with their anxieties about the new dangers that steam
power presented.
The revolution launched by steam-powered transportation and disasters on
steamboats and trains extended beyond America’s borders, and yet the particular
2 This exact phrasing can be found in the Baltimore Sun’s reporting on the telegraph, May 31, 1844, but the
sentiment and language were commonly applied to transportation and communication improvements.
4manifestation of steam transportation and danger in the United States makes this a
significant and distinct national story. Steam-powered transportation had profound
influence for the early United States, where distance and terrain posed major challenges
to social and economic integration as well as to the political ideas upon which the
republic was formed. Steam navigation on inland rivers and railroad transportation took
hold in the United States as nowhere else. The dangers of steam travel also became
especially troublesome in a country that had quickly incorporated technological progress
into its national identity. In the perceptions of many European and American passengers
on steamboats and trains, American travel was uniquely dangerous among Western
countries, and rough evidence suggests this was true.3 The death and destruction wrought
by the much-celebrated, space-conquering machines carried extraordinary weight in the
United States, leading Americans occasionally to reimagine and further articulate the
identity of the American republic in relation to modernity.
Historians of transportation in the early republic have used the concept of the
“transportation revolution” to refer to the series of improvements to America’s
transportation infrastructure and technology which came at an unprecedented pace and
scale in roughly the first half of the nineteenth century. George Rogers Taylor coined the
3 John Burke explains that the switch to high pressure engines in most American steamboats and the need
for more powerful engines and boilers due to high tonnage and passenger loads made American casualty
numbers on steamboats higher than in Europe. Mark Aldrich examines both statistical and anecdotal
evidence that American railroads were more dangerous in the nineteenth century than those in Europe, and
he offers several reasons why, including that the speed and weight of trains quickly outgrew weak rails,
leading to derailments, and that most American railroads were built with a single rather than a double track,
increasing the likelihood of collisions. John G. Burke, “Bursting Boilers and the Federal Power,”
Technology and Culture, 7, 1 (Winter, 1966), 7; Mark Aldrich, Death Rode the Rails: American Railroad
Accidents and Safety, 1828-1965 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006).
5phrase in his 1951 landmark book The Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860.4 Taylor
argued that technological innovations in transportation – namely roads, canals,
steamboats, and trains – facilitated the growth of market capitalism and a national
economy, bringing the young United States into an age of industrial modernity. His
paradigm has justifiably shaped much of the study of transportation and technology in
nineteenth-century America, but its lasting influence means the narrative of technological
innovation as progress created by contemporaries of these developments is embedded in
the dominant historical approach to the era.5 Working within a framework that
emphasizes economic development and technological advancement, scholars writing
about the transportation revolution have generally been less attentive to setbacks and
challenges posed to American culture by technological innovation.6
With an advanced transportation system and technological modernity the clear
end of the story, scholars of nineteenth-century transportation have, in general,
uncritically assumed Americans’ acceptance of the technology and the industry’s triumph
over its associated dangers. In studies of the transportation revolution, danger and disaster
often appear as secondary features of steam technology and manifestations of early
4 George Rogers Taylor, The Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860 (New York: Rinehart & Company,
1951).
5 Twenty-five years after the publication of Taylor’s Transportation Revolution, Harry N. Scheiber and
Stephen Salsbury proclaimed the book’s continued status as the classic of the field. In 2007, Bruce E. Seely
echoed the sentiment, saying “subsequent scholars have fleshed out the details, but the outline still holds.”
See Harry N. Scheiber and Stephen Salsbury, “Reflections on George Rogers Taylor’s ‘The Transportation
Revolution, 1815-1860’: A Twenty-Five Year Retrospect,” The Business History Review, 51, 1 (Spring,
1977) and Bruce E. Seely, “Economic History as Technological History: George Rogers Taylor’s ‘The
Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860,’” Technology and Culture, 48, 4 (Oct., 2007), 828. Notable books
working within the paradigm of the transportation revolution include Carol Sheriff, The Artificial River:
The Erie Canal and the Paradox of Progress, 1817-1862 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1996), John Lauritz
Larson, Internal Improvement: National Public Works and the Promise of Popular Government in the
Early United States (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2001), and Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought:
The Transformation of America, 1815-1848 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
6 Carol Sheriff’s The Artificial River is one of the notable examples that does emphasize such social
challenges that accompanied transportation advancements, with what she calls the “paradox of progress.”
6difficulties with unfamiliar and untried machines rather than as permanent features of
advanced technological systems.7 Throughout the nineteenth century, steam power’s
defenders cited relatively low annual casualty numbers to dampen perceptions of danger.
The fact that these raw numbers look especially low when compared to annual deaths
from automobile accidents in the twentieth century has likely contributed to scholars
likewise downplaying the significance of the disasters, even though statistical studies
evaluating deaths per miles traveled actually show steamboat and train deaths to be
comparable to twentieth-century automobile fatalities.8 Steamboat and train disasters
have often made for an exciting side-story rich with thrilling anecdotes or an interesting
episode in America’s engineering history, but they have enjoyed only a limited role in the
broader history of the transportation revolution. A fundamental premise of this study is
that we cannot fully understand the dynamics and implications of the transportation
revolution, or the larger modern transformations of which it was a part, without attending
to danger as one of its most prominent features.
Nevertheless, the dangers and disasters of American steamboats and railroads
have not gone unexamined. Their study has proven particularly significant in relation to
broader histories of transportation safety and government regulation. As with any study
7 Only a few scant references to steam transportation’s dangers appear in Taylor’s Transportation
Revolution. The same is true for Howe’s What Hath God Wrought, published more than a half-century
later.
8 Louis Hunter notes the tendency to see the risk of death on steamboats in hindsight as minor. Using the
estimate of 7,000 lives lost from steamboat accidents up to 1853 and adjusting for population, Hunter says
the death total “does not appear to have been an excessive price to pay for the advantages of the
steamboat.” Statistical estimates evaluating safety as a ratio of deaths to miles traveled suggest steamboat
and railroad risks were both on par with automobile risks in the twentieth century. Louis C. Hunter,
Steamboats on the Western Rivers: An Economic and Technological History (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1949), 521; Richard N. Langlois et al., “Bursting Boilers and the Federal Power Redux:
The Evolution of Safety on the Western Rivers,” Economics Working Papers, University of Connecticut
DigitalCommons@UConn, May, 1994, accessed online at
http://digitalcommons.uconn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1351&context=econ_wpapers.
7involving the history of steamboats in America, this dissertation owes a great debt to
Louis Hunter’s foundational work of technological history, Steamboats on the Western
Rivers. Hunter’s 1949 book is an extensive examination of the various technological and
economic aspects of steamboats’ rise to dominance in nineteenth-century American
transportation, and a rare example of a study of the transportation revolution (though it
predates Taylor’s work) that takes seriously steam transportation disasters. Hunter
identifies accidents, particularly boiler explosions, as a significant consequence of
steamboat transportation, and his study is a tremendous source for data and technical
information about the various types and nature of accidents that steamboats suffered. He
also explains in detail the debates about the causes of accidents and traces the regulatory
efforts that attempted to combat the problem.9
Since Steamboats on the Western Rivers, other scholars have further elucidated
the debates about steamboat accidents and the resulting political and legal responses. In
an influential 1966 article, John G. Burke framed the regulatory response to steamboat
accidents within a broader argument about the emergence of a federal regulatory impulse
in America. Burke identifies steamboat explosions as “an important factor in altering the
premises concerning the role of government vis à vis private enterprise” and points to
major regulatory acts in 1838 and 1852, which created an inspection service for
steamboats, required licensing for steamboat engineers and pilots, and established strict
rules for operation, as milestone legislation for government regulation of industry.10 More
recently, John Brockmann examined the rhetoric and content of the extensive debates
surrounding the 1838 Steamboat Act in his book Exploding Steamboats, Senate Debates,
9 Hunter’s discussion of accidents is primarily in Chapter 6 and 13 of Steamboats on the Western Rivers.
10 Burke, “Bursting Boilers and the Federal Power,” 2.
8and Technical Reports.11 In particular, Brockmann explains the influence of scientific
investigation and technical expertise on regulatory conversations about steamboat
accidents.12
Brockmann has also contributed significantly to our understanding of responses to
railroad accidents through his examination of steamboat and railroad accident
investigation reports. In his book Twisted Rails, Sunken Ships, Brockmann explores
evolving technical language used in public reports and details the local politics and
policies that shaped major accident investigations, tracing how Americans eventually
developed a consistent investigative system to apply to repeated accidents on both
steamboats and trains.13 Another significant work on railroad accidents is Mark Aldrich’s
book Death Rode the Rails, in which he analyzes the interaction of technological,
economic, and regulatory systems in the effort to make the particularly dangerous
American railroads safer.14 Aldrich demonstrates political and economic motives for
improving safety on railroads, and argues that safety measures evolved within the context
of a distinctly American political economy. His explanation of the dynamics of the
American railroad system and why accidents occurred, like Hunter’s analysis of
steamboat accidents, provides an essential foundation for my study.
These scholars have done much to advance our knowledge of the significant toll
steamboat and rail disasters took on American lives in the nineteenth century, even
11 R. John Brockmann, Exploding Steamboats, Senate Debates, and Technical Reports: The Convergence
of Technology, Politics and Rhetoric in the Steamboat Bill of 1838 (Amityville: Baywood Publishing
Company, 2002).
12 Another significant book exploring government policy relating to steamboat issues is Paul Paskoff,
Troubled Waters: Steamboat Disasters, River Improvements, and American Public Policy, 1821-1860
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2007).
13 R. John Brockmann, Twisted Rails, Sunken Ships: The Rhetoric of Nineteenth Century Steamboat and
Railroad Accident Investigation Reports, 1833-1879 (Amityville: Baywood Publishing Company, 2005).
14 Aldrich, Death Rode the Rails.
9though numbers on passenger fatalities are difficult to calculate with accuracy. National
statistics on steamboat deaths were not kept at all before 1852, nor were they kept for
railroad deaths prior to 1887. For much of the century, evidence is based in newspaper
reporting or limited state efforts to keep fatality records. Nevertheless, Louis Hunter
suggests that as many as 7,000 steamboat passengers may have died between 1807 and
1852, and he roughly estimates that 9,200 more died from 1860 to the end of the
century.15 Aldrich, totaling the reported railroad fatalities from the very few states that
kept records, finds about 2,400 passenger deaths, which he argues is a vast
underestimation. Using alternate data compiled from reporting by the Railroad Gazette,
Aldrich estimates approximately 2,800 passenger deaths just between the years 1882 and
1890.16 More detailed statistics after 1900 suggest that as late as 1912 railroad accidents
were the most significant cause of accidental death in America.17
Such analysis rightfully emphasizes the costs of steam-related dangers. I argue,
however, that the significance of that danger in nineteenth-century America goes well
beyond death tolls and political and legal influence. My study departs from the existing
literature on steam transportation disasters in its exploration of a distinct, many-layered
cultural history. In this study I define culture as a set of mutually intelligible attitudes,
practices, and symbols developed in relation to the experience of a particular moment in
space and time. The most sustained historical attention given to steam disasters has
focused on the history of transportation safety, framed chiefly as a governmental and
business policy concern; my study is a history of transportation danger, which I
15 Hunter, Steamboats, 521; 656.
16 Aldrich, Death Rode the Rails, 309-318.
17 Arwen Mohun, Risk: Negotiating Safety in American Society (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2013), 92.
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understand in this study as a perceptually-driven cultural phenomenon. Scholars of
steamboats and railroads have proven that steam technology was a driver of historical
change, and that steamboat and railroad disasters were constitutive forces shaping the
evolution of the transportation industry and American regulatory structures. My study
demonstrates that steamboat and rail disasters were also drivers of cultural change.
Historians who have studied steamboat and rail accidents have often sensed their
deep embeddedness in American popular culture and the public mind, especially because
the regulatory response to these disasters clearly points to their larger cultural
significance. It has long been clear that media and popular uproar about large disasters
outweighed smaller but more prevalent risks and shaped the evolution of transportation
safety; as Hunter writes, “what aroused public opinion and moved legislative bodies was
less the cold calculation of total losses and relative risks than the shock of individual
disasters.”18 Scholars have occasionally pondered the social and cultural milieu that fed
the drive for high speeds and allowed for a more dangerous transportation system.19
Others have noticed steam disasters’ prevalence in American culture.20 Indeed, the
presence of steamboat and rail disasters in American life is difficult for the historian of
nineteenth-century America to ignore. John Quincy Adams, Cornelius Vanderbilt, and
Ulysses Grant were among the many thousands of Americans who survived
18 Hunter, Steamboats, 522.
19 Hunter includes several pages about the cultural environment that celebrated speed and racing as a
potential cause of danger on steamboats in Steamboats on the Western Rivers, 300-304; Robert Gudmestad
includes a similar discussion of the culture of steamboat racing and explores some popular responses to
accidents as part of his larger analysis of the Southern steamboat industry in Steamboats and the Rise of the
Cotton Kingdom (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2011), 97-116.
20 In Exploding Steamboats, Brockmann illustrates his book with examples of cultural productions
concerning steamboat accidents, including poetry, songs, and games, some of which I analyze extensively
in this study. Brockmann also notes that “just as the fascination with the positive aspects of the engines
entered deep into the American imagination, so did the dangers of these engines.” Brockmann, Exploding
Steamboats, 57.
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transportation disasters; Franklin Pierce, Mark Twain, and Nathaniel Hawthorne were
among the many thousands who lost immediate family members to accidents. Images of
steamboat and train disasters appeared all over – in the illustrated newspapers, on
insurance cards and advertisements, in children’s books, political cartoons, and on some
of the best-selling art prints of the day. Fictional accounts of steamboat and train
accidents can be found sprinkled through some of the century’s best-known pieces of
literature. Useful idioms like “blow off steam” and “train wreck” entered and remained in
the lexicon. Steamboat and rail disasters were ever-present facts of nineteenth-century
American life.
One goal of this study has been to fully reveal this ubiquity of steam disasters in
nineteenth-century American culture, but the salience of steam-related danger lies deeper
than even its strong cultural presence suggests. This study expands on the nascent ideas
about the cultural milieu behind steam disasters that other scholars have pondered, but
unlike other studies it also argues that steamboat and rail dangers were crucial in shaping
Americans’ conception of their modern lives. When we consider danger as a cultural
phenomenon and move it to the center of the analytical frame, the focus necessarily
changes. Thus, for example, while Mark Aldrich rightfully directs attention toward the
more numerous small accidents that contributed to safety regulation and reform within
the transportation industry, my study emphasizes the importance of large-scale disasters
that became visible to a national public and shaped popular understanding of the apparent
threat. Detailed accounts of local politics and responses to accidents and the emergence
of federal interest in regulation and safety become richer stories if we fully understand
the evolution of Americans’ awareness of accidents as a feature of modern American
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culture. While others have answered how American transportation became safer and how
the push for safer travel reoriented American business, legal, and political structures, this
study asks different questions with significant implications for our understanding of the
development of American culture in the nineteenth century. What did it matter that these
disasters were the products of technology, and the death and destruction they created was
thus of human origin? How did steamboat and train accidents complicate cultural
narratives that tied American values and the success of the republic to technological
progress and spatial mastery of the continent? And how did we arrive at the mentality
revealed in those pre-flight moments, which acknowledges the possibility of catastrophe,
recognizes its unlikelihood, and ultimately deems it an acceptable aspect of our modern,
mobile existence?
Answering these questions requires seeing steamboat and train disasters as
particularly tied to the process of space-time compression in the United States. Scholars
who have examined these events have had surprisingly little to say about the crucial fact
that they were transportation disasters. This study spotlights the spatial dimensions of
steamboat and rail disasters; it mattered that steam’s dangers were inherently connected
to the shifting character of travel and mobility, because the perceived annihilation of
space and time by technology represented a fundamental condition of modernity. What
scholars have alternatively labeled as space-time compression, time-space compression,
or time-space distanciation is an old idea. One of the clearest ways many could describe
the revolutionary changes wrought by new technologies in the nineteenth century was
that humans’ relationship to space and time had been forever altered. Writers like Ralph
Waldo Emerson and Karl Marx, as well as a host of lesser-known observers, tied these
13
changes to the onset of a new era and a modern condition in which the challenges
distances posed to the flow of people, ideas, and capital across space had been
substantially limited.21
A number of scholars have further articulated the concept of space-time
compression in relation to the often amorphous subject of modernity. In The Condition of
Postmodernity, David Harvey identifies that condition with the constant acceleration and
intensification of social and economic interactions across vast spaces.22 Anthony Giddens
also privileges “time-space distanciation” as the definitive modern transition in The
Consequences of Modernity. Giddens writes that modernity “increasingly tears space
away from place by fostering relations between ‘absent’ others;” in other words, through
modern technologies and social structures, individuals become connected to distant
individuals and places with whom they have no immediate knowledge.23 Doreen Massey
similarly describes a modern sense of place as a moment in space-time defined by a
particular set of links and interconnections to that beyond itself. Massey illustrates this
with the example of walking down Kilburn High Road in London, from which it is
possible to see traces of connections to distant places through consumer goods,
advertisements, planes flying overhead, and ground traffic heading in divergent
directions.24 In his discussion of “supermodernity,” Marc Augé specifically emphasizes
modern transportation and communication networks, which he says expanded space and
21 Emerson described the concept in a lecture entitled, “The Young American,” (1844), quoted in John F.
Kasson, Civilizing the Machine: Technology and Republican Values in America, 1776-1900 (New York:
Hill and Wang, 1976), 120. Karl Marx used the concept in Grundisse. Karl Marx, Grundisse, trans. Martin
Nicolaus (New York: Penguin Books, 1993), 524; 539.
22 See David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry Into the Origins of Cultural Change
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), especially Part III.
23 Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 17-20.
24 Doreen Massey, Space, Place & Gender (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 4-5.
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time to such a scale that the world seems available at an instant.25 And according to
Wolfgang Schivelbusch, train travel constructed a new geography in which space was
dialectically both compressed, in that it took shorter amounts of time to get from one
place to another, and expanded, in that new distant places were incorporated into existing
networks.26 Historians of the transportation revolution have recently been more attentive
to this tradition of spatial theory in explaining America’s transportation developments.27
Like these theorists, I consider the reorientation of human relationships to space
and time and the stretching of social relations across space as definitive of the modern
condition. This study contends, however, that especially in the nineteenth-century United
States, space-time compression marked the transition to modernity in no small measure
because of its associated dangers. Space-time compression in America was partly a
product of revolutionary transportation technologies, themselves a result of a global,
epochal transition from an era dominated by organic energy and animate power to one
dominated by mineral energy and mechanical power. Lewis Mumford labeled this a shift
from the “eotechnic” phase – a “water-and-wood complex” – to the “paleotechnic” phase
– a “coal-and-iron complex.”28 For all of history humans had relied on organic energy
translated into human and animal muscle power. Once they accessed underground
minerals like coal and iron, humans inaugurated an industrial, technological age,
25 Augé, Non-Places.
26 Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space in the
Nineteenth Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 34-35.
27 Examples include Richard White’s discussion of “spatial politics” in relation to the transcontinental
railroads in Railroaded: The Transcontinentals and the Making of Modern America (New York: W. W.
Norton, 2011). Walter Johnson also analyzes the spatial aspects of the Southern steamboat trade in River of
Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 4;
8.
28 Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization, reprint (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 109-
110.
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harnessing these resources to power civilization to new heights in production and
movement. For transportation, the result was a gradual separation of movement from
nature; iron and coal combined in the steam engine to power motion against natural limits
and to previously unimaginable speeds.29
But in revolutionizing mobility and power, this transition also produced new
sources of danger with capabilities for destruction that were uniquely modern. It was not
that travel was not dangerous prior to steam power; rather, steam altered the actual
physics of power and motion. The expansive potential of steam that enabled the high
speeds that conquered American rivers and rails held within it the potential energy to
create massive explosions; the higher speeds achieved by these machines increased the
force of impact in the event of collisions and derailments. The annihilation of space by
transportation technologies must be understood as a process with the inherent potential
for physical destruction.
The technological revolutions behind space-time compression not only created
new dangers, they also shaped the manifestation of those dangers in American society.
The dangers of steam transportation were not simply experienced by those who
encountered disaster directly, but rather they became commonly familiar to Americans as
features of modern travel. As historian Will Mackintosh writes, studies of the
transportation revolution have focused on changing material conditions of travel and their
effect on social and economic structures but they have often neglected the “lived
29 This transition in energy and power is succinctly and eloquently described in Mark Fiege, The Republic
of Nature: An Environmental History of the United States (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2012),
244-246 and 362-379. Wolfgang Schivelbusch also provides a brief summary of these developments in
relation to the railway in The Railway Journey, 1-5.
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experiences of travel,” which also underwent tremendous change.30 Among these changes
was that travel itself became more frequently collective in nature as individual travelers
on foot or horseback or passengers among a few in coaches became passengers among
many in steamboats and trains. Travelers increasingly shared the same spaces and their
traveling experiences grew more homogenous. Also, much of inland travel especially
shifted from self-directed motion to movement directed by technology and by others.
Travelers on steamboats and trains were passengers, carried to their destinations on a
schedule, pace, and route designed for them. Travel grew to be a commodity – a
standardized service provided to traveling Americans rather than something they
undertook largely on their own.31 These features defined the new “public transportation”
and the standard experience of the public traveler. The standardization of mass
transportation gave rise to a traveling public that shared in the incidents of steam travel,
danger among them. Danger was no longer a personal concern but one shared by fellow
travelers who all depended on technology and its human operators for their safety, and
because travel was an increasingly standard experience, every steamboat or train disaster
revealed the vulnerability of travelers generally.
Just as significant in shaping Americans’ experiences of these new dangers were
space-conquering communication technologies. Running parallel to the transportation
revolution was what scholars have called a “communications revolution” that was
facilitated by faster, more extensive transportation and involved the growth of print
networks, dramatic increases in the quantity and variety of printed material made possible
30 Will Mackintosh, “‘Ticketed Through’: The Commodification of Travel in the Nineteenth Century,”
Journal of the Early Republic, 32, 1 (Spring 2012), 63.
31 See Mackintosh, “Ticketed Through.”
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in part by steam-powered printing, and eventually the emergence of telegraphic
communication in the 1840s.32 Thus steam’s dangers emerged just as communication
technology and infrastructure gained the capability to make them widely known.
Disasters provoked substantial newspaper coverage, published commentary, and visual
representation, and experiencing them indirectly as public, mass spectacles became a
collective activity for a national reading public. Newspaper coverage therefore aided a
process of collective imagining and the creation of a self-aware public along the lines
described by the theoretical work of Benedict Anderson and Jürgen Habermas. Anderson
writes of newspapers that they create imagined simultaneity among distant events and
allow readers an awareness of the shared ritual of reading the newspaper and the common
knowledge gained by that reading.33 Habermas described the role of print in the creation
of a public that “read and debated about itself” and therefore developed mutually
understood public discourses.34 In the discursive arena that disasters opened up, readers
developed a shared familiarity with the dangers of steam travel and, crucially, realized
their common identity as modern travelers. With the aid of print, a diffuse and abstract
reading public coalesced as a traveling public collectively aware of and threatened by the
dangers of steam. Examining danger thus reveals that the transportation and
communications revolutions, which together gave rise to space-time compression, did not
just progress in parallel but were mutually reinforcing – disasters made for compelling
print and print made the dangers of travel a broadly shared national experience.
32 Howe’s What Hath God Wrought is the most significant example of the communications revolution
paradigm.
33 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (New York: Verso, 1983), 22-36.
34 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of
Bourgeois Society (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), 43.
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Americans’ experience of space-time compression through steam power thus
cannot be separated from their experience with steamboat and rail disasters, and in fact,
attending to transportation dangers greatly complicates the dynamics of space-time
compression and modernity that others have identified. Much of the theoretical analysis
of space-time compression suggests that by contracting space and time, modern
technologies create a sense of placelessness, in which local distinctions disappear and
places only carry meaning as origins and destinations.35 Schivelbusch, Augé, and others
have written that modern transportation and communication technologies effectively
eliminate the individual’s relationship to the space that is traversed with such ease and
quickness. Transportation disasters demonstrate, however, that these experiences only
apply to smooth, problem-free journeys. Steamboat and rail accidents physically halted
the process of overcoming space, highlighting the “in-between-ness” of disaster-stricken
travelers whose distance from their origins and intended destinations suddenly became
significant. Modernity undeniably meant expanded mobility and access to distant places,
but it also meant that such access and one’s own progress through space could be
disrupted at any given moment.
Paradoxically, though, while disasters halted the annihilation of space they were
also often the catalysts in the creation of new networks of social relations across vast
spaces. Steam transportation disasters were fundamentally place- and space-making.
When disaster hit, especially in the middle of a standard steamboat or rail route, the site
35 Schivelbusch (like plenty of contemporaries of steam transportation) says that the railroad, in particular,
“knows only points of departure and destination” because the speed and nature of steam travel “destroyed”
the intermediate traveling space for passengers and residents in the towns on either end of the route. Marc
Augé calls these sites of transience “non-places” that lack the defining characteristics of place.
Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey, 38; Augé, Non-Places.
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of the disaster became the locus of new connections across space created by the discourse
about the accident and steam’s dangers that always followed. Though every day
steamboats and trains traversed the continent carrying passengers from one place to
another, it was often a disaster that suddenly brought their movement to the forefront of
national attention. Print networks and later telegraphic connections made a steamboat
explosion on the lower Mississippi national news carried along transportation and
communication highways to be printed in New York and Washington. Thus it was
disasters that often revealed to Americans the expanding connections and accessibility of
distant locales that defined their modern lives. Steamboat and rail disasters highlighted
the separation of victims from loved ones, often confined victims to graves distant from
their homes, and challenged progressive visions of the technological conquest of
American space. And yet because they filtered through expansive, modern
communication networks, disaster responses also made nameless passengers known as
individual travelers, linked places where disasters did or could occur, and constructed
experiences of modern life shared across vast distances.
Only by understanding danger and tracing Americans’ responses to transportation
disasters, then, can we fully appreciate space-time compression’s influence on American
culture in the nineteenth century. The experience of space-time compression and its
associated dangers acquainted Americans with a new, more mobile existence and with
the nature of technology in the modern world, offering a profound lesson in the
possibilities and perils of modern life. Through steamboat and rail disasters Americans
confronted a world in which power traditionally understood as restricted to the realm of
the divine suddenly seemed to be in human hands. Disasters made apparent that
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technology was a powerful tool for mastering nature but it did not necessarily bring a
more controlled and rational world. Instead, Americans saw that in relying on technology
humans gained control of nature but also ceded control to material forces that could not
always be contained.
Faced with this new technological reality, Americans had to adapt and learn to
manage the role of risk and danger in their lives. Here, again, Anthony Giddens is
instructive. Like many scholars of the subject, Giddens writes that modernity is a
“double-edged phenomenon,” and he identifies danger and risk within the “dark side” of
modern development. The concept of risk, associated with the awareness of
contingencies based on “human moral imperatives, natural causes, and chance,” emerged
in the modern era as a way of organizing danger, understood as “a threat to desired
outcomes.” Giddens describes the development of “expert systems” – “systems of
technical accomplishment or professional expertise that organize large areas of the
material and social environment in which we live today” – as modern institutions
designed to manage risk. Among such expert systems he includes the automobile and the
airplane, both “permeated by expert knowledge” that allows users to accept the inherent
risk due to trust that the expert system has minimized it.36
Following Giddens and others, I detail the rise of a conception of risk associated
with travel, by which I mean an evaluation of contingent threats derived from the
conditions of modern transportation – namely the reliance on complex, powerful
technology and its management by human operators. As numerous scholars have
detailed, this was an essential adaptation to the dangers of steam transportation –
36 Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 7; 27-35.
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Americans learned to manage risk and make it acceptable by investing trust in expert
knowledge and a large-scale transportation system that, despite occasional accidents, also
carried millions of people around the country at high speed each year with ease,
convenience, and safety.37 Through government regulation, official investigations of
accidents, safety reforms put in place by the transportation industry, and the rise of the
insurance industry, Americans exhibited a fully modern accommodation of steam’s
associated threats.
My study expands on this narrative by further explaining the role that public
discourse and cultural perceptions of steam’s dangers played in the development of
regulation and risk management. Early on, public ignorance about the workings of steam
engines and boilers forced misguided fixes that obscured more serious engineering flaws.
But it was also public printed discourse that identified a nationwide pattern of
transportation disasters, connected the public to distant tragedies, and heightened the
perceived danger and necessity of action by illustrating the horrific destruction of
steamboat and rail accidents. Lawmakers were not immune from these narratives and the
pressure they brought, and steamboat legislation was enacted despite statistical claims
that steamboat dangers were relatively low. The other major influence of public discourse
on regulation involved the conscious self-identification of modern travelers as consumers
with particular rights that accompanied their access to modern services – in this case,
37 On the management of risk in nineteenth-century America see, for example, Mohun, Risk; Jonathan
Levy, Freaks of Fortune: The Emerging World of Capitalism and Risk in America (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2012); and Dan Bouk, How Our Days Became Numbered: Risk and the Rise of the
Statistical Individual (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015).
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modern public transportation. American travelers were among the first and largest bodies
of consumers to be identified as deserving of government and legal protections.
Nevertheless, the rise of accident investigations, safety measures, and regulatory
structures is only one part of the story of how Americans managed the new forms of
danger created by steam-powered transportation. Alongside the more familiar story of
risk is a story about danger, again understood in this study as the threats that actually
existed or were perceived to exist as features of expanded mobility in the nineteenth-
century United States. The dangers of steam transportation represented not just a practical
problem of public safety but a profound cultural challenge. Political, business, and
scientific attention to transportation safety reduced risk, but as other scholars have noted,
those risks could not be eliminated, so Americans also necessarily had to learn to live
with these dangers. The technologies of space-time compression that brought Americans
in contact with new dangers also created the spatially-expansive social connections that
allowed Americans to respond and adapt to their new shared technological reality. And in
fact it was disaster that typically encouraged Americans to enact these new modern
spatial realities and social possibilities. Disasters brought forth links between a scattered
public and victims suffering in often unfamiliar locations, but not in unfamiliar positions
– disaster responses allowed Americans to call upon their own familiarity with travel to
understand themselves as tied to far-off victims and fellow travelers around the nation.
Rather than seeing a broad, highly functional system, these responses focused attention
on the highly visible and seemingly ever-present disasters of steam transportation and the
victims who regularly suffered injury and death on steam-powered machines.
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The cultural accommodation of catastrophic danger as a feature of modern
American transportation, and modern American life, is at the core of this study. I argue
that even as systems for managing risk emerged, the methods of culturally managing real
and perceived transportation dangers persisted. Though different than the risk response,
the adaptation to danger, involving shared public consumption of spectacular events, the
transformation of disasters into meaningful features of mass culture, and the creation of
social relations across space that articulated a national traveling public, was itself
thoroughly modern. By century’s end Americans’ dealings with steamboat and rail
disasters cultivated a dual-mentality: though Americans were largely removed from real
danger they were intimately aware of it, and though familiar with catastrophe they
understood it as unlikely and therefore accepted it as a feature of their modern lives.
Accessing cultures of the past is a challenge, one I have approached through
critical discourse analysis. I consider the texts in this study as reflections and evidence of
historical reality, but I also ask how they are structured by and reshape the social and
cultural world in which they exist. Unraveling the cultural discourses surrounding danger
and transportation in the nineteenth century necessitates analysis of a wide array of texts,
which I examine as much as possible not in isolation but in relation to the broad
discursive domain they collectively created. The focus on discourse has guided two
significant decisions concerning my approach. First, this study treats steamboats and
steam locomotives together as machines of steam transportation. These two modes of
transportation represent two waves of the transportation revolution and had important
differences, not least in terms of the nature and dynamics of the dangers they presented.
Still, their respective tenures overlapped significantly, and more importantly, in public
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conversations both formal and informal, and especially those about danger and disaster,
steamboats and trains were often discussed together. Second, the nature of public
discourse shaped my selection of and approach to particular events. A steamboat disaster
like the explosion of the Moselle, which killed a large number of people and also inspired
extensive discussion about steam’s dangers on the local and national level, receives more
attention in this study than the more deadly Sultana explosion, which despite still being
the largest single transportation disaster in American history was significantly
overshadowed by news related to the end of the Civil War and Abraham Lincoln’s
assassination. Also, I have chosen to investigate danger and the steam transportation
disaster broadly as cultural phenomena, and I therefore draw upon general discourse and
commentary on many disasters rather than case-studies of a few individual events.38 My
methodology reflects my assertion that the issues related to danger and steam power were
national in scope and that the public did not just see these disasters locally and in
isolation but as a major feature of their modern existence.
This is a story about a particular transportation regime dominated by steam power
and its associated mobile machines – the steamboat and the steam train. Thus the study is
bounded by the steam era, running roughly the length of the nineteenth century, though it
is framed briefly by the transportation systems that came before and after. Chapter One
serves as a prologue to the story of danger and the transportation revolution. It explores
38 There are numerous histories of individual disasters, including several on the Sultana explosion. See, for
example, Jerry O. Potter, The Sultana Tragedy: America’s Greatest Maritime Disaster (Gretna, Louisiana:
Pelican Publishing Company, 1997); Alan Huffman, Sultana: Surviving the Civil War, Prison, and the
Worst Maritime Disaster in American History (New York: HarperCollins, 2009); Charity Vogel, The
Angola Horror: The 1867 Train Wreck That Shocked the Nation and Transformed American Railroads
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013); and Thomas E. Corts, ed. Bliss and Tragedy: the Ashtabula
Railway-Bridge Accident of 1876 and the Loss of P. P. Bliss (Birmingham: Samford University Press,
2003).
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the difficulties of travel prior to steam’s application to transportation and the social,
cultural, economic, and political momentum for improved mobility that led Americans to
herald the arrival of steam as transformative on all fronts. Chapters Two and Three deal
with initial responses and retellings, particularly how print media acquainted the
American public with the emerging phenomenon of steam-related transportation
disasters. Chapter Two describes how and what the public learned about steamboat and
rail accidents and the process by which the dangers of steam travel became an issue of
national importance. As disaster reports exposed an emerging pattern of danger, detailed
descriptions and images brought the disasters to life. Chapter Three analyzes how these
recreated scenes framed steam disasters as distinctly horrifying and fascinating.
Chapters Four and Five deal with interpretations. Once transformed into
narratives, steamboat and train accidents offered important lessons and forced both
individual and national reflection. Chapter Four details how the tragedies of steam power
challenged traditional moralizing narratives about death and disaster, instead prompting
religious observers and secular writers to decipher their distinct lessons and prescribe
human responses to a modern, technological age. Chapter Five dissects a distinct but not
unrelated conversation sparked by disasters about the virtues and dangers of speed, the
hallmark of modern transportation. The final two chapters examine answers and
accommodations. One accommodation, the subject of Chapter Six, focused attention on
the common interests and concerns of a modern collective body, the traveling public, that
could counter the dangers of modern travel by scrutinizing the transportation industry and
asserting the right of the traveler to safe passage. Finally, Chapter Seven details the rise
of another narrative that stressed the relative safety of steam transportation and identified
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its dangers as manageable risks, even as those dangers became entrenched in Americans’
image of modern transportation and modern life.
A final note – from the start of this study I sought to call attention to the
significance and the persistence of individual disasters and to elevate nineteenth-century
Americans’ thoughts, voices, and experiences concerning them. Even so, it is easy to get
lost in the seemingly endless line of destructive accidents apparently distinguished only
by locations and casualty numbers. There was a moment early in my research when I was
sitting in an archive swiftly moving through hundreds of newspaper articles – one “awful
calamity” after another “frightful disaster” – and I started to become desensitized (a
response shared by those reading the daily papers at the time). Then I saw something
different – a story of an 1856 accident on a train carrying hundreds of Sunday School
students to enjoy a picnic away from their city home. Many of the children died, many
more were wounded, and a guilt-ridden employee who survived the crash committed
suicide the following day. This story jolted me out of the monotony, as it is fair to assume
it may have for those opening their newspapers in the days after the disaster. The people
who died in these events were numerous, they were often nameless, and they are now
long dead – but each of them lived, and for each of them there was someone reading the
newspapers for whom this was not just another “awful calamity.” I have tried my best to
write with that in mind.
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Chapter One:
America Welcomes Steam
“Where are You going?”
The traveler who arrived late one night in October 1704 at Madam Billings’s
home near Dedham in the Massachusetts Bay Colony immediately met this and other
questions. “What in the world brings You here at this time of a night?” the eldest Billings
daughter asked, “I never see a woman on the Rode so Dreadfull late… Who are You?”1
The traveler was Sarah Kemble Knight, a widow from Boston on her way to New Haven
and then to New York to help settle the estate of a recently deceased relative.2 Her
interrogator’s surprise faded when Knight was followed in the door by John, her guide,
who knew the Billings family and recommended the lodging. Still, suspicion of travelers
was not uncommon at the time, and the questions directed to Madam Knight suggest
much about the nature of travel in early colonial America. Although significant traffic
moved up and down the North American coast, long-distance journeys on land and
interior waterways were rarely, if ever, undertaken by early colonists. Distances within
and between the colonies were vast, and the continent’s terrain was challenging, making
inland travel and transportation extraordinarily difficult, slow, and often dangerous.
Seeing an unfamiliar traveler on an interior road was surprising; seeing a woman
apparently traveling alone even more so. With travel such a tremendous undertaking, the
question “Where are you going?” may have been as much about why Knight would leave
home as about where she was headed.
1 Sarah Kemble Knight, The Private Journal of a Journey from Boston to New York, in the Year 1704, Kept
by Madam Knight (Albany: Frank H. Little, 1865), 23.
2 Sargent Bush Jr., “Sarah Kemble Knight (1666-1727),” Legacy, 12, 2 (1995), 112-113; A. K. Sandoval-
Strausz, Hotel: An American History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 11.
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In her diary of her journey, Knight frequently used the spelling “travail” as she
referred to her “travails” or fellow “travailers.” The conflation of the terms in the English
lexicon before the nineteenth century is significant. The word “travel” comes the French
“travail” and from the Medieval Latin word “trepalium” – an instrument of torture.3 To
be a traveler was to travail, to labor through a challenging and potentially dangerous
passage. Mobility involved the removal from one’s settled home, a place of security and
refuge, to the unfamiliar and uncertain road. It took Sarah Knight nine difficult travel
days to go from her home in Boston to New York. Her journey, not even a full day’s ride
for later Americans traveling by train, was a considerable one in 1704, and she did not
take it lightly. Knight ended her narrative thanking her “Great Benefactor” for “carying
forth and returning in safety his unworthy handmaid.”4
Prior to the invention of steam-powered transportation, colonists and then early
Americans struggled under the “tyranny of distance.”5 Americans moved their goods and
themselves across space much as people had for millennia – through their own power or
that provided by animals, gravity, current, and wind. The geography and terrain of the
eventual United States made mobility a particular challenge, and as the country grew and
its people spread across the land, the consequences of limited mobility became
increasingly apparent. Americans whose personal or business lives demanded long-
distance journeys saw the nation’s transportation infrastructure gradually improve but the
fundamental difficulty and inconvenience of travel largely remain. On a grander scale,
poor transportation posed a threat to the health of the nation. Hoping to unite a diverse
3 “Travel;” “Travail,” The Oxford English Dictionary.
4 Knight, Private Journal, 85.
5 The phrase is used by Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America,
1815-1848 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
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and dispersed populace, foster an informed public, and draw from it elected
representatives to assemble physically and run a republican government, many of
America’s early leaders considered improved means of transportation a national priority.
Thus, when American inventors used steam to power boats against the current and copied
and improved English experiments applying steam power to land carriages moving on
rails, confidence in the country’s future was high. Americans welcomed steam as a force
that would make travel easy, predictable, and safe, and one that would help ensure the
success of the young nation’s bold republican experiment.
The initial patterns of colonial settlement along the eastern coast of North
America limited the necessity of inland mobility. Because of the colonies’ European
orientation and the difficulty of penetrating the Native-American inhabited wilderness,
early American colonists settled primarily in port towns along the coast and in areas
along inland waterways reachable by ship. Goods and people moved about the colonies
on water, carried by ships along the seaboard and floated downriver on wooden keel
boats, flat boats, and canoes. As the colonial population grew and pushed many further
inland, the continental river system proved advantageous, and rivers became the colonies’
major transportation highways. Land travel was nevertheless inescapable, particularly for
settlers in frontier areas far from rivers. Post roads and others built during wartime
increasingly connected cities in the East, and by the end of the eighteenth century roads
designed for regular stagecoach lines greatly expanded the possibilities for travel in New
England and the mid-Atlantic. Even then, much overland travel took place on a network
of rough country roads and trails, especially in the backcountry. Many of these were old
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Indian trails that frontier dwellers relied on to reach backcountry stores where retailers
had transported goods.6
The colonies’ slow-developing transportation infrastructure meant colonists
traveled primarily out of necessity. The most frequent travelers of the eighteenth century
were those holding positions that demanded it – circuit-riding judges and ministers,
postal carriers, and eventually members of the United States Congress. Many colonists
experienced a transatlantic passage, and as the population expanded into frontier areas,
many more endured the long westward journey to their new homes. Otherwise, long-
distance journeys were rare and they were always significant undertakings. Unless there
were regular stagecoach or coastal packet lines to their destinations, travelers had to
determine their own overland route and typically piece together their transportation along
it. Travelers therefore needed access to a means of conveyance, often a horse or carriage,
and geographical knowledge of the route. If they did not know the route themselves,
travelers often procured local guides familiar with the land and terrain. Finally, travelers
had to secure provisions and overnight lodging. Fortunately for Sarah Knight, post roads
connected various New England towns by 1704, making her route fairly clear. For travel
guides, Knight drew upon relatives and friends, but also volunteering strangers met along
the way. Like many other travelers, Knight also arranged to travel with a postal rider for
several legs of the trip. For lodging, Knight had relatives to stay with in New Haven and
New York, but in between she found accommodation in private homes and public houses.
6 Wolfgang Schivelbusch writes that later European travelers were amazed by the extent of inland water
navigation and traffic in America. Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of
Time and Space in the 19th Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 94; Ruth Schwartz
Cowan, A Social History of American Technology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 94; George
Rogers Taylor, The Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860 (New York: Rhinehardt and Company, 1951),
13.
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Public houses, also called inns or taverns at the time, typically served both traveling
boarders and locals in for a drink. These inns were often the subject of widespread
disdain among travelers frustrated by quality of the accommodations or annoyed by the
tavern’s drunken patrons (some of whom added color to Knight’s narrative).7
Travel in the eighteenth century required such significant planning in part because
it took so long to get anywhere. Travel was almost always a multi-day affair because, by
modern standards, it was so slow. Flatboats and keelboats on American rivers topped out
at about five miles per hour downriver. Travel upriver required boatmen to use poles or
oars, or to pull the boat using towlines connected to trees on the shore that allowed for
slow progress at about two miles per hour. A journey from Pittsburgh to New Orleans
took about four to six weeks by river boat and four months or more in the other direction.
Canals provided smoother, but not faster, travel. Overland journeys, less direct and more
cumbersome, took significantly longer. Stagecoaches, where roads were wide enough to
accommodate them, typically carried passengers at a speed of six to eight miles per hour.
Most Americans traveling any considerable distance had to combine these various forms
of conveyance to get to their desired destinations, with transfers adding to delays.
Knight’s journey was on horseback, though it included several river crossings that often
delayed travelers, as bridges were rudimentary if present at all. The roughly two-hundred
7 Will Mackintosh, “‘Ticketed Through,’: The Commodification of Travel in the Nineteenth Century,”
Journal of the Early Republic, 32, 1 (Spring 2012), 61-89; Sandoval-Strausz, Hotel, 15-20.
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mile trip from Boston to New Haven was short relative to the expanse of the British
colonies, but it still took Knight a week to complete.8
Because it was lengthy and laborious, travel in the colonial and early national
period was also noteworthy, and Knight, like many travelers, produced a detailed
narrative of her trip. Knight’s narrative, which is filled with descriptions of the challenges
and inconveniences of her journey, fits well into the genre of travel writing in the era
before steam-powered transportation. As Carl Thompson has described in his analysis of
European Romantic travel writing, recounting the dangers and suffering one encountered
while traveling was a frequently employed writing convention, so common that accounts
of dangerous situations marked an authentic travel experience.9 John, Sarah Knight’s first
guide, quickly advised her about the troubles she might encounter away from home, and
on their first leg the pair rode through darkness and fog and then through a swamp to
reach the Billings home. Knight and her guides usually traveled between twenty and
thirty miles each day, their progress often stalled by delays at difficult river crossings or
slowed by poor roads “Incumbred with Rocks” which, Knight said, “were very
disagreeable to my tired carcass.” On her return trip, winter storms and icy conditions
made progress even slower. Delays and unforeseen obstacles sometimes foiled travelers’
intended schedules. Knight remarked with despair that accommodations were too far
apart on the most difficult sections of the journey. Then, on what was supposed to be the
final day of her trip, the muddy roads characteristic of a New England March forced
8 Donald T. Zimmer, “The Ohio River: Pathway to Settlement,” in Transportation and the Early Nation,
ed. Harry N. Schieber (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1982), 64-65; Robert C. Post, Technology,
Transport, and Travel in American History (Washington D. C.: American Historical Association, 2003),
12.
9 Carl Thompson, The Suffering Traveller and the Romantic Imagination (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2007).
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Knight to stay an extra night in Dedham, leaving her “tired and dispirited and
disapointed.”10
Sarah Knight’s trying experience with travel was commonplace in the eighteenth
and into the nineteenth century. Travel away from home brought one into contact with
the unfamiliar and exposed one to unpredictable natural conditions, particularly in areas
less developed than the Northeast. Roads were poorly marked and maintained, and many
old Indian trails were no more than a foot wide, making it easy to get lost. Even Iroquois
messengers claimed they often got lost, and one frontier translator’s list of important
phrases included the commonly used “I have miss’d the Way” in various languages.
When it was not frighteningly foreign, travel over land was irregular, uncomfortable, and
downright annoying. Knight’s complaints about the discomfort of a rough day of riding
and the constant confrontation with the elements find echoes in the words of travelers
throughout the century. A messenger on the Pennsylvania frontier told an Iroquois
counterpart, “it was enough to kill a Man to come such a Long and bad Road over Hills,
Rocks, Old Trees, and Rivers, and to fight through a Cloud of Vermine, and all kinds of
Poisen’d Worms and creeping things.”11 At the conclusion of his two-month overland
journey from Boston to New Orleans in 1815, William Richardson wrote, “to sum up the
whole, my journey has been tedious beyond description.”12
Conditions on roads were notoriously poor, making the already slow means of
travel even slower. Bad roads earned the scorn of travelers everywhere, particularly in the
10 Knight, Private Journal, 22; 46; 36; 84.
11 Conrad Weiser, quoted in James H. Merrell, Into the American Woods: Negotiations on the Pennsylvania
Frontier (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000), 130.
12 William Richardson, quoted in Mackintosh, “Ticketed Through,” 61.
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rural areas of the frontier. One traveler put the frustration plainly in a poem composed for
a tavern register in Franklin, Indiana:
The Roads are impassable-
Hardly jackassable;
I think those that travel ‘em,
Should turn out and gravel ‘em.13
Responsibility for road building and improvement usually fell on local communities and
labor provided by residents whose personal obligations to farms and families made public
improvements a low priority. Typically, roads were left narrow, muddy, and full of rocks,
stumps, and sometimes animals. There was rarely much of a state-wide mechanism for
improvement. The legislature of Ohio passed an act in 1804 requiring stumps in roads be
cut to no more than a foot high; obviously the legislature did not envision Ohio’s rural
roads as major highways.14
Travel on land was the most unpredictable, but waterways presented their own
challenges. Rivers were not always passable – changing river conditions or hazards like
falls and rapids could force detours or delays. While winter land travelers could still get
around by sled, freezing conditions could halt river traffic altogether. As artificial
waterways, canals supposedly offered travelers a more reliable experience, but they often
suffered the same problems of low water, obstructions, and freezing winters. The much-
celebrated Erie Canal was beset by seasonal inconvenience from its opening in 1825,
with boats in winter sometimes freezing in the water mid-journey and spring flooding
making the canal unusable for a time.15 Regardless of conveyance, travel in the colonies
13 Zimmer, “The Ohio River,” 61.
14 Taylor, The Transportation Revolution, 15-16.
15 Carol Sheriff, The Artificial River: The Erie Canal and the Paradox of Progress, 1817-1862 (New York:
Hill and Wang, 1996), 75-76.
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and the early nation was difficult and irregular. When travelers left home on an extended
journey, they had reason to expect they would not arrive at their destination when they
meant to.
Nor could travelers be sure they would arrive in the same shape in which they left.
The potential dangers of travel on interior waterways and roads were enough to make
travelers anxious and often fearful. Knight wrote of her first major river crossing that “the
Cannoo was very small and shallow, so that when we were in she seem’d redy to take in
water, which greatly terrified mee.” Later crossings were no less terrifying after the initial
experience: “no thoughts but those of the dang'ros River could entertain my Imagination,
and they were as formidable as varios, still Tormenting me with blackest Ideas of my
Approaching fate–Sometimes seing my self drowning, otherwhiles drowned.” Riding on
horseback presented dangers as well. On a bridge over river rapids, Knight’s horse
stumbled and she nearly fell into the water; she recovered, but was “extreemly
frightened.” Later, Knight was riding up a hill when her horse collapsed dead under her.16
Knight’s perilous journey was typical of many others, especially when travelers
ventured off major thoroughfares. Horses often struggled in the elements and frequently
died from injuries, poison from plants or animals, or exhaustion.17 Bridges, if they
existed, were just as poorly kept up as roads. River crossings were dangerous but almost
always necessary, and in winter they could prove especially deadly as ice was never
totally certain. People traveling on rivers were constantly subject to wrecking from snags,
waterfalls, and rapids. In general, travelers were exposed to the elements, and for long
periods of time.
16 Knight, Private Journal, 26-27; 47.
17 Merrell, Into the American Woods, 133.
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With time came more consistent conveyances like stagecoaches and canal boats,
but hazards remained. A number of casualties occurred on the Erie Canal when
passengers on canal boats collided with bridges. The bridges, prevalent in populated areas
the canal passed through, were low, and passengers had to throw themselves flat on deck
to avoid disaster.18 Poor roads threatened stagecoaches as much or more than travelers on
horseback. Several newspapers reprinted a harrowing accident story told by a passenger
on the stage between Baltimore and Annapolis. The driver fell from his seat and the
horses pulled the coach for a mile before the passenger was able to stop them. The
passenger then heard a groan from the driver, “who had been entangled under the
carriage, and thus dragged over the frozen ground.” Both the drivers’ legs were broken,
and he later died from the injuries.19 Other examples described an axle breaking, leaving
several passengers bruised but alive, or a coach from Providence to Boston upsetting on
the road, severely injuring its eleven passengers.20 These occasional reports likely
underrepresent how common stagecoach accidents were. A 1771 advertisement for a line
from Portsmouth to Boston noted the possibility of “some unforeseen accident,” but said
“a careful driver will always be provided.”21 An 1814 broadside proposing a New York
to Philadelphia route included in the budget “two extra relays, in case of accident.”22 The
Kelloggs and Comstock firm created a lithograph called “Twelve miles an hour including
18 Sheriff, The Artificial River, 70.
19 Hampden Patriot, April 8, 1819.
20 Newburyport Herald, October 2, 1821; Middlesex Gazette, July 17, 1823.
21 New Hampshire Gazette, August 9, 1771.
22 Broadside, “Prospects of a Route proposed to be established between the cities of New York and
Philadelphia,” 1814, Early American Imprints, Series II, Readex.
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stoppages” showing a coach driving another off the road, a comment, perhaps, on the
dangers of reckless coaches.23
Transportation and infrastructure improvements over the course of the eighteenth
century greatly expanded the access travelers had to various destinations and their means
of arriving there. Road-building projects during the Seven Years’ War and the Revolution
and new postal routes enhanced the continental road network. Stagecoach lines facilitated
greater mobility around the Northeast and improved over the century. A line from New
York to Philadelphia established in the 1730s went only once per week and was a
several-day trip, but by 1800 lines offered one-day service. Stagecoaches traveling on
standard routes offered a more reliable form of land transportation than anything that had
come before. Small canal bypasses also made water travel increasingly navigable and
connected cities to inland waterways. These advancements made travel more available
and practicable in the early United States than it had been a century earlier.24
Still, much of the fundamental experience of travel remained the same. Travel
was slow, and poor road conditions often limited stagecoaches’ modest speed. Access to
destinations was difficult and usually involved multiple legs on different modes of
transportation, especially since most of the country lacked the developed network of the
Northeast. Packet ships for traveling along the coast were not always available or
reliable. In 1815 William Richardson grew tired of waiting for a packet in New York and
ended up electing an overland route to New Orleans combining stagecoach, ferryboat,
23 Print, “Twelve miles an hour including stoppages,” Kelloggs and Comstock, 1812, Jay T. Last
Transportation Collection, Box 1, Huntington Library.
24 Patricia Cline Cohen, “Safety and Danger: Women on American Public Transport, 1750-1850,” in
Gendered Domains: Rethinking Public and Private in Women’s History, eds. Dorothy O. Helly and Susan
Reverby (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 112; D. W. Meinig, The Shaping of America: A
Geographical Perspective on 500 Years of History, Volume 1: Atlantic America, 1492-1800 (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1986), 363.
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horse, and foot travel. American roads and rivers would always carry some
unpredictability, as they were very subject to changing weather conditions, flooding,
obstacles, and other sudden hazards. This meant travel was by nature improvisational,
with necessary adjustments to one’s route and delays very common.25 Dangers created by
natural forces and elements continued to plague travelers even as infrastructure improved.
Finally, no matter how one traveled, protection from nature’s elements and security from
injury or death were far from certain. A stagecoach rider going from New York to
Washington in 1796 wrote that his carriage overturned and “some of the ladies, and other
people in it were dangerously hurt.” The traveler then added, broadly summarizing the
status of American mobility: “through a large proportion of the United States, travelling
is alike perilous.”26
Anybody who journeyed through woods and rivers like Sarah Knight knew travel
in America was slow, unpredictable, and dangerous, but even those who did not
encounter danger personally learned to associate traveling with danger. As Carl
Thompson writes, the attention to suffering seen in Romantic-Era travel writing is “not
just a consequence of the fact that travel in early modern times was generally an
uncomfortable and dangerous business. It also reflects an agenda in the reading and
writing of travel writing.”27 For European writers trying to distinguish themselves as
brave and rugged travelers, there was even pleasure to be gained from the adventure of a
difficult journey. Travel in the North American interior was challenging enough that little
pleasure is to be found in the recorded struggles of travelers like Knight and Richardson.
25 Mackintosh, “Ticketed Through,” 61.
26 Quoted in Ruth Schwartz Cowan, A Social History of American Technology (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1997), 95.
27 Thompson, The Suffering Traveller, 71.
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Still, American travel narratives in the era before steam suggest that danger and difficulty
were embedded in cultural conceptions of travel. Danger was not just an actuality of
travel, it was an expectation. Americans of this period were challenged and largely
contained by limited mobility. And yet they wanted and needed to travel, and that need
would increase as the population grew, spread out, and sought connections over
expanding space. Travelers commenting and complaining about slow progress and
delays, the difficulties of the river or road, the lack of developed infrastructure, and the
various perils of the journey spoke for an American public aware that reliable, consistent,
safe transport eluded them. Theirs became part of a rising tide of voices calling for a
transportation system that could accommodate a changing nation.
As James Madison sat down to defend the Constitution in essays published in the
collection, The Federalist, he certainly had on his mind the history of political unions,
particularly republics, and the variety of forces which had brought about their demise.
From the start of the independence movement, there had been questions about the
durability of a potentially independent republic. Even classically-educated colonial
leaders could not recall “a single instance of a nation who supported this form of
government for any length of time or with any degree of greatness.”28 In Madison’s mind,
though, the document produced by the recent convention ensured the lasting stability of
republican government in the new United States, and preservation of the Union depended
on the states ratifying that document. In The Federalist, Madison and his fellow writers
28 Carter Braxton, quoted in Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 142.
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Alexander Hamilton and John Jay were responding in part to critiques of the Constitution
raised by emerging Anti-Federalist writers.
Anti-Federalist writers made the implausibility of a free republic existing over an
expanse of territory like that of the United States a central point of their resistance. The
anonymous “Federal Farmer” referenced the “many great authors” who had shown free
government to be incompatible with expansive territories and then made an exacting
argument about the problem of a consolidated government in a country the size of the
United States. “The United States contain about a million of square miles… and from the
center to the extremes is about 800 miles,” making it impractical to gather representatives
into a single legislature at the center.29 The Federal Farmer went on, noting that central
courts would require significant travel for citizens to find justice. Even if a federal
Supreme Court rotated to each of three regions during the year citizens would need to
travel, on average, “100 or 200 miles to find this court.” “I think it one of the greatest
benefits in a good government,” wrote the Federal Farmer, “that each citizen should find
a court of justice within a reasonable distance, perhaps, within a day’s travel of his
home.”30 Notably, the writer measured distance in terms of days traveled; marking
distance by time made an inherent reference to slow travel speeds. Thus, though the
writer identified the vast distances of the United States as the challenge to good
government, his argument held the implicit suggestion that slow travel, not physical
29 “Federal Farmer,” “Letter I” in Observations leading to a fair examination of the system of government,
proposed by the late Convention; and to several essential and necessary alterations in it. In a number of
letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican (New York: Printed by Thomas Greenleaf, 1787), 10,
Eighteenth Century Collections Online.
30 “Federal Farmer,” “Letter II” in Observations, 11.
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distance, was the prohibitive factor. A “reasonable distance” was relative to the level of
mobility of the population.
Madison responded to this Anti-Federalist argument most directly in Federalist
14. There, the author contended that democracies were limited in the way the Federal
Farmer had described, not republics. If democracies required all citizens to assemble
frequently in the center, republics demanded that representatives be near enough to
gather only as often as necessary. Madison pointed out that, already, representatives of
the thirteen states had been “almost continually assembled.” Then, like the Federal
Farmer, Madison turned to evaluating distance. Tracing the boundaries of the nation,
Madison computed the mean of North-South distance at “eight hundred and sixty-eight
miles and three-fourths” with the mean distance between the Atlantic and the Mississippi
no more than seven hundred fifty miles. This area was not much greater than that of
Germany, Madison noted, where a representative diet was continually assembled.31
Clearly, Madison saw the warnings about the impossibility of central governance
in the vast United States as overblown. Still, the concerns about how practical and
efficient that governance would be were not lost on Madison. Madison recognized that
the nation’s present great size, which was sure to expand, called for a government of very
particular design. The size of the country had been noted as exceptional since before its
birth. In his Summary View of the Rights of British America, Thomas Jefferson asserted
the vastness of the American continent and its distance from England as a reason for
31 James Madison, “Federalist 14,” in The Federalist, ed. Jacob E. Cooke (Hanover: University Press of
New England, 1961), 83-89.
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independence.32 Thomas Paine echoed the sentiment in Common Sense, saying “there is
something very absurd, in supposing a continent to be perpetually governed by an
island.”33 American geography, it was obvious, demanded both independence and a novel
organization of republican government. “But why is the experiment of an extended
republic to be rejected merely because it may comprise what is new?” Madison asked.34
Like the Anti-Federalist Federal Farmer, Madison in Federalist 14 translated
abstract ideas into numbers and reduced the complicated questions of republican
government and political unity to a debate about space, and by extension, the time
required to cover it. How far could representatives realistically travel to assemble as one
legislative body governing national affairs? How far could national representatives be
from their local constituencies and still claim to represent them?35 How would the
government ensure that those citizens farther away from the center benefitted as much
from the federal power as those near it? On one level, Madison knew these would be
questions for later American leaders. He noted that his argument about the absolute size
of the country held a major flaw – the prospect of future states carved from the Northwest
Territory. Madison left that dilemma “to those whom further discoveries and experience
will render more equal to the task.” Madison had faith in the republican system outlined
in the Constitution but he also anticipated further developments that could consummate
the nation’s republican vision:
32 Thomas Jefferson, A Summary View of the Rights of British America (Williamsburg, 1774), Eighteenth
Century Collections Online.
33 Thomas Paine, Common Sense, in Thomas Paine: Collected Writings, ed. Eric Foner (New York: Classic
House Books, 2009), 30.
34 Madison, “Federalist 14.”
35 For an extensive analysis of this question, see Edmund Morgan, “The Founding Father’s Problem:
Representation” in American Heroes: Profiles of Men and Women Who Shaped Early America (New York:
W. W. Norton & Company, 2010).
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The intercourse throughout the Union will be facilitated by new improvements.
Roads will everywhere be shortened and kept in better order; accommodations for
travelers will be multiplied and meliorated; an interior navigation on our eastern
side will be opened throughout, or nearly throughout, the whole extent of the
thirteen States. The communication between the Western and Atlantic districts,
and between different parts of each, will be rendered more and more easy by
those numerous canals with which the beneficence of nature has intersected our
country, and which art finds it so little difficult to connect and complete.36
Republican government would make Americans a united and free people, but expanded
mobility would make sure they remained so.
By the first decade of the nineteenth century, realization of Madison’s vision
seemed finally underway. In 1807, the Senate passed a resolution assigning Secretary of
the Treasury Albert Gallatin the task of compiling information and proposals on the
construction of public roads and canals to improve American transportation. After nearly
a year of work, Gallatin published a lengthy report proposing twenty million dollars of
federally-sponsored internal improvements. Gallatin’s report, a somewhat tedious catalog
of economic costs and benefits of numerous potential projects, was also a grand design
for a transportation system fitted to the American scene:
The inconveniences, complaints, and perhaps dangers, which may result from a
vast extent of territory, can no otherwise be radically removed, or prevented, than
by opening speedy and easy communications through all its parts. Good roads and
canals, will shorten distances, facilitate commercial and personal intercourse, and
unite by a still more intimate community of interests, the most remote quarters of
the United States. No other single operation, within the power of the government,
can more effectually tend to strengthen and perpetuate that union, which secures
external independence, domestic peace, and internal liberty.37
Produced two decades after The Federalist, Gallatin’s report was another answer to the
ongoing questions about how to overcome the vast distances of the American republic.
36 Madison, “Federalist 14.”
37 Albert Gallatin, Report of the Secretary of the Treasury; on the Subject of Public Roads and Canals
(Washington: William A. Davis, 1808), 8.
44
Robert Fulton, whose letter to Gallatin was appended to the report, recalled the earlier
ratification debates: “Others by drawing their examples from European governments…
have conceived these states to be too great an extent to continue united under a
republican form of government.” As a whole, the report argued that faster and more
efficient transportation, via roads and canals, would bring about “mutual interests…
mutual intercourse and mingled commerce” that would bind a scattered people together.38
“Mutual interests and intercourse” encompassed a wide variety of advantages that
proponents of internal improvements foresaw. The most apparent and practical benefits
were economic. For most of the early national period commerce in the United States was,
as it had naturally been in the colonial era, almost entirely Atlantic-focused, and
settlement patterns reflected that. In 1815, the population of the country was 8.4 million
and only fifteen percent of that total lived west of the Atlantic coast states. The country’s
largest urban areas were port cities catering to Atlantic commerce. The nation’s largest
newspapers reflected the “seaward orientation” of commercial life, their coverage
dominated by European affairs and Atlantic shipping news.39 Much was starting to
change, however. Population growth pushed more and more settlers to frontier areas and
the new territory secured by the Louisiana Purchase. Americans’ economic activities
were also gaining a greater orientation toward a market capitalism that would direct the
modern American economy.40 Though American settlers had long been practicing a form
of composite farming mixing production for household subsistence with production for
38 “Mr. Fulton’s Communication,” in Gallatin, Report, 122.
39 Taylor, Transportation Revolution, 5-10.
40 This transition to market capitalism has been detailed extensively in books such as Charles Sellers, The
Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815-1846 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) and John
Lauritz Larson, The Market Revolution in America: Liberty, Ambition, and the Eclipse of the Common
Good (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), among others.
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trade, the impetus to produce for domestic markets was growing.41 Particularly after the
War of 1812, during which Americans had experienced British blockades preventing
Atlantic trade, domestic commerce took on new urgency.
As settlers flowed west and market connections increased between Eastern cities
and western farmers, the condition of American domestic transport took center stage.
Like private travel, most internal commerce took place on waterways because roads were
so rough. At the beginning of the century it cost roughly the same to ship a ton of cargo
over just thirty miles of land as it did to ship it across the Atlantic.42 Rural farmers not
close to rivers often organized trains of pack animals that would take goods through
mountain passes or valleys to eastern centers. The difficulty of travel shaped commerce;
only certain products (those most valuable, least bulky, and unlikely to spoil) could be
carried.43 Commercial transport on inland rivers was easier, but rivers posed the same
obstacles to the transport of goods as they did to the movement of people, including
dangerous natural hazards, climatic variance, and of course the fact that river travel was
almost entirely dependent on a one-directional current. Westerners carrying their goods
downriver to market in New Orleans typically had to brave the long and dangerous
journey back north by foot. Demand for road improvements therefore came from both
western farmers eager to overcome regional isolation and city-dwellers looking to gain
better access to the goods being produced in the expanding West.
41 See Richard Lyman Bushman, “Markets and Composite Farms in Early America,” The William and
Mary Quarterly, Third Series, 55, 3 (July 1998).
42 Howe, What Hath God Wrought, 40.
43 See W. J. Rorabaugh, The Alcoholic Republic: An American Tradition (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1981), 76-88.
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The inconveniences of domestic travel increasingly caught the attention of
American leaders in the first decades of the nineteenth century. B. H. Latrobe, whose
“communication” was published as an addendum to Gallatin’s report, wrote in detail
about challenges to river navigation and suggested that many of the country’s existing
canals suffered the same problems. American geography, he argued, posed obstacles to
canal construction “which in no part of the world exist in so uniform, and certain a
degree.”44 Robert Fulton, in his own response to Gallatin, lamented that poor
transportation infrastructure meant many products that should be contributing to the
nation were restricted to particular regions. Grain, for example, could not easily be
transported over long distances so it was often made into whiskey; thus, in Fulton’s mind,
“the most important and abundant production of our interior country” only got to eastern
centers by being “distilled to brutalize and poison society.” Latrobe and Fulton both
supported Gallatin’s call for sweeping improvements to existing canals as well as new
construction. Though Gallatin’s report presented a number of arguments for internal
improvements, economic development was the focus, with Gallatin including detailed
computations of total cost and weighing the benefits. Fulton addressed the need for canals
that would promote long distance commercial transport and roads that would improve
individual mobility, linking both to national economic growth.45
Exchangeable goods were not the only valuable commodity being carried on
American rivers and roads. Having founded a nation on the principle of a well-informed
citizenry, the United States’ early political leaders often promoted broad access to
information, particularly the political news of the country. Of course, the spread of
44 “Mr. Latrobe’s Communication,” in Gallatin, Report, 82.
45 “Mr. Fulton’s Communication,” in Gallatin, Report, 113; 108.
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information was intimately tied to transportation. Prior to the invention of the electric
telegraph in 1844, communication in the United States almost entirely relied on person-
to-person contact and delivery of written communication. Even more advanced forms of
communication like signaling and optical telegraphy required relative physical proximity.
Communication and transportation were wedded, therefore, and the same challenges of
distance, geography, climate, and physical obstacles that plagued transportation affected
the flow of information around the country.46
Richard John argues that the value placed on spreading such information and the
challenges posed by the country’s size and dispersed population made an efficient postal
system a national priority. For most of the country’s early history, the post office was the
government’s largest agency, employing more workers than the army. Rather than
personal correspondence, though, the mail of the early republic primarily consisted of
newspapers bringing political information and news, often national, to readers around the
country. Shortly after ratification, Benjamin Rush urged Congress to create an integrated
postal network and allow newspapers to pass through the mail free of charge. The Post
Office Act of 1792 made this possible, sparking both a “quantitative” and geographical
expansion of the press.47
Of course, the expansion of the press and the postal service over America’s vast
geography depended on the efficiency of domestic travel, particularly over land. Gallatin
emphasized this point in his report: “A secondary object, but of more importance to
government than to individuals, would be the improvement… of certain portions of roads
46 Howe’s What Hath God Wrought offers the most extensive analysis of the “communications revolution,”
its connections to transportation improvements, and its various effects on American political and social life.
47 Richard John, Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1998), 30; 41.
48
leading to some points on the extremes of the union, intended principally for the purpose
of accelerating the progress of the mail, and the prompt transmission of information of a
public nature.”48 Individuals sought the benefits too, however. Citizen petitions delivered
to Congress year after year asked for local post offices, and by extension, an expansion of
travel networks.49 This demand meant postal roads were among the first long-distance
travel routes in the United States, and the transport of mail became the primary early
funding source for American stagecoach lines. Travelers of the late eighteenth century
often noted that the “mail stage” was the most reliable, or in the case of much of the
western frontier, the only means of overland transport.50
The pursuit of information fed a desire not only for reliable, but also speedy,
transportation, and newspapers tried to print and deliver the news before their
competitors. Packet ships racing to bring European news to New York decreased Atlantic
travel times over the first few decades of the nineteenth century, and eventually New
York newspapers started sending schooners out to meet incoming packet ships and gain a
few minutes’ advantage.51 As early as 1782 Congress defended the expansion of the Post
Office, saying the safety and commercial interest of the country depended on “the
communication of intelligence with regularity and despatch.” It did not take long before
the U.S. Postal Service became a symbol of speed and consistency. In terms of
reputation, then, American transportation lagged behind communication. Early
48 Gallatin, Report, 66.
49 Howe, What Hath God Wrought, 225.
50 John, Spreading the News, 98-102.
51 Howe, What Hath God Wrought, 222.
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stagecoach lines subsidized by the Post Office to carry mail purposefully decorated their
slow-moving carriages with “U.S. Mail,” trading on the mail’s reputation for speed.52
Still, improvements were slow, and Congress’s concerns about regular and fast
communication eventually proved prophetic. Nothing highlighted the need for more
efficient transportation and communication like the War of 1812. Famously, slow ocean
communication due to delays in Atlantic crossings profoundly shaped both the start and
the end of the war. Just two days before the United States declared war on Great Britain,
British Foreign Secretary Lord Castlereagh had announced the suspension of restrictions
on American commerce. President Madison later said news of the announcement, had it
arrived sooner, would have at least temporarily halted the war declaration. Then, in early
1815, American and British forces engaged in the bloody Battle of New Orleans unaware
that two weeks earlier the Treaty of Ghent had supposedly ended hostilities. Storms at sea
meant that the treaty, signed December 24, 1814, did not reach Washington until
February 13, later even than news of the American victory at New Orleans.53
Communication delays were to be anticipated with the slow and unpredictable
nature of ocean travel. Improvements to overland travel, however, were possible and
sorely needed, and long before the War of 1812 wartime had been a driver of
improvements in transportation infrastructure. Some of the most significant roads through
the colonies had been built during the Seven Years’ War, and the 1790s saw acts passed
to build military roads and lighthouses by a government concerned about national
52 “Ordinance for the Regulation of the Post Office” (1782), quoted in John, Spreading the News, 83; John,
Spreading the News, 91. John argues that the Post Office, under John McLean’s leadership, was a
transformative force in transportation, as the establishment of regular stagecoach service helped Americans
conquer space more than many have recognized.
53 Howe, What Hath God Wrought, 16; 70.
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defense.54 The difficulty of moving around the country became particularly apparent and
problematic to United States leaders after the War of 1812. British blockades along the
coast forced American defenses to the interior, exposing the inadequacies of overland
transportation. A House committee reflecting on the war wrote, “the embarrassments of
the nation during [the] war, from the want of good roads and canals, both in relation to
trade and the transportation of cannon and military stores, have been too recently and
sensibly felt to be forgotten.”55 In his annual address late in 1815, President Madison
warned Congress against leaving the nation “unprepared” for armed conflict and
emphasized the need for nationally sponsored roads and canals.56
Madison had also never forgotten the political importance of efficient
transportation for the republic. The president might have felt he was quoting his own
words in The Federalist when he described to Congress the “effect of these facilities for
intercommunication in bringing and binding more closely together the various parts of
our extended confederacy.”57 Madison’s comments looked back to questions about the
process of governance in a vast republic, but also referred to the actual threat of disunion.
Fulton also noted this fear in his letter to Gallatin, suggesting “intrigues [had] been
practiced to sever the western from the eastern states.”58 Earlier, President George
Washington worried that farmers were having so much success with western lands they
54 Harry N. Schieber, “The Transportation Revolution and American Law: Constitutionalism and Public
Policy,” in Transportation and the Early Nation, 4.
55 Douglas E. Clanin, “Internal Improvements in National Politics, 1816-1830,” in Transportation and the
Early Nation, 32.
56 James Madison, Seventh Annual Message to Congress, December 5, 1815, Miller Center, The University
of Virginia, accessed online at http://millercenter.org/president/madison/speeches/speech-3628.
57 Madison, Seventh Annual Message.
58 “Mr. Fulton’s Communication,” in Gallatin, Report, 121.
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felt no tie to the interests of the rest of the country.59 Concerns about regional separation
and disunity were present from America’s founding, but they grew more urgent as the
nation expanded. Encouraging the passage of a proposed 1817 “Bonus Bill” to enact
internal improvements along the lines of Gallatin’s report, John C. Calhoun argued that
ineffective communication between sections weakened the union. It was the
government’s duty to “bind the Republic together with a perfect system of roads and
canals.” James Monroe later echoed Calhoun’s sentiments: “We shall add much to the
convenience and comfort of our fellow-citizens, much to the ornament of the country,
and… we shall bind the Union more closely together.”60
An integrated economy, a better informed citizenry, a more defensible nation, a
durable union – the promise of internal improvements was undeniable. This made it all
the more surprising when Madison vetoed Calhoun’s “Bonus Bill” on his final day in
office. Madison justified the veto with a strict interpretation of the Constitution, even
while reiterating his support for transportation projects. For the federal government,
enacting internal improvements would always prove more difficult than touting them. As
historian John Lauritz Larson suggests, “the possibilities of harmony and Union, liberty
and improvement, on which the hopes of the nation stood, seemed most secure at the
level of abstractions,” but consensus typically broke down when proposals were made to
address specific material needs. When politicians considered actual projects, concerns
about federal authority interfering in state and local affairs, or privileging one state’s
economic development over another, stalled action. Calhoun could call on Americans to
59 Larson, Internal Improvement, 14.
60 John C. Calhoun and James Monroe, quoted in Clanin, “Internal Improvements,” 33-35.
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“conquer space” to almost universal approval, but federal proposals for transportation
improvements would repeatedly founder on constitutional questions and sectional strife.61
One major federal project found success: a road connecting the Potomac River to
western river systems. Construction on the Cumberland Road, which became known as
the National Road, began in Cumberland, Maryland, in 1811, reaching Wheeling, Ohio,
in 1818.62 This was an exception, though, as other major proposals failed in Congress or
met more presidential vetoes. Still, numerous internal improvement projects, including
most of Gallatin’s original proposals, were eventually carried out, even if it was through
funding by state legislatures and private corporations rather than the federal government.
Turnpikes, larger and better roads built by private corporations and operated on a system
of tolls, were among the more common local projects. State legislatures provided
companies with charters to build turnpikes and local shareholders were given a stake,
suggesting the local interest in improving transportation.63 During the first few decades of
the nineteenth century, turnpikes increasingly connected larger cities and allowed for
smoother, if still slow, travel over the mountains. Especially for those emigrants moving
west, turnpikes were essential, but contemporary political enthusiasm for turnpikes may
have outpaced their actual significance.64 While they served emigrants making one long-
distance journey fairly well, most travelers proved unwilling to pay the tolls, and both
travelers and commercial traffic took advantage of “shunpikes” that detoured the traveler
around the toll station before rerouting them back to the road. Turnpikes never became
61 Larson, Internal Improvement, 23. Larson’s is the most comprehensive study of the breakdown of federal
internal improvements.
62 For more on the ideas behind the National Road and its construction, see The National Road, ed. Karl
Raitz (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
63 Howe, What Hath God Wrought, 213.
64 George Rogers Taylor argues that interest in turnpikes has overshadowed the much more essential
network of country roads. Taylor, Transportation Revolution, 26-28.
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the commercial boon many hoped for and were already in decline by the time the railroad
arrived.
By far the most lauded projects of the time were canals, so much so that
transportation historians have simply called the twenty years or so after 1815 “the canal
era.”65 Though a few smaller canals were already in use, enthusiasm for canal
construction took off with the design and success of the Erie Canal, a massive waterway
connecting Lake Erie with the Hudson River, completed in 1825. To many observers, the
terrain seemed perfectly suited for a canal, and once again the War of 1812, by spurring
Northeastern manufacturing to replace trade with Britain, further exposed the necessity of
a canal that could carry raw materials to expanding Eastern cities. Unable to achieve
federal funding for the project, Governor of New York DeWitt Clinton marshaled state
support through the sale of public bonds. Construction on the canal began on the Fourth
of July in 1817, suggesting its promoters’ ideas about the canal as a symbol of republican
progress. When fully opened in 1825, the Erie Canal was praised as an engineering
marvel – in its completed form the Canal stretched 364 miles and included eighteen
aqueducts passing over river valleys and eighty-three locks that covered 680 feet of
elevation change. The effects of the Erie Canal were immediate and significant. Traffic
was consistently high, bringing tolls of over one million dollars annually to the state. The
canal made shipping western raw goods faster and cheaper than ever before. New York
City quickly became the country’s largest port. Western farmers earned higher profits and
65 See Taylor, Transportation Revolution. Others have followed Taylor’s periodization.
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were less isolated than before, as the canal brought eastern luxury goods like tea, sugar,
and oysters, not to mention news and mail.66
The success of the Erie Canal launched a frenzy of canal construction across the
nation, but none would match the Erie’s influence and profitability, and many projects
nearly bankrupted sponsoring states. Canals were a substantial improvement, but like
overland roads, there were certain geographic and climatic challenges that canals could
never overcome. Because travel still relied on animal power, it remained slow – freight
boats traveled about two miles per hour, while passenger boats went five miles per hour.
Depending on weather and climate conditions, canals could become inoperable due to
flooding or low water. Winter typically halted canal traffic too; even the successful Erie
Canal was closed for five months every year as operators never found a way to combat
freezing.67
Better roads, turnpikes, and canals may have had their limitations, but they were
improvements nonetheless, and they would remain essential to inland transportation well
into the nineteenth century. Calls for internal improvements came from numerous
sources. An increasingly dispersed population, particularly isolated settlers in western
regions, desired market connections, the latest news from eastern cities, and a faster,
more reliable, and safer way of moving themselves about the country. National leaders
and those who stood to benefit economically branded transportation projects as the
catalysts that would ensure national prosperity and security and increase regional and
personal intercourse. With such widespread and far-reaching implications, internal
66 This discussion of the Erie Canal is borrowed from Paul Kuenker, “Canal Construction,” in Ideas and
Movements that Shaped America (ABC-CLIO, 2015).
67 Sheriff, The Artificial River, 75.
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improvements lent themselves to lofty rhetoric and took on great symbolic significance.
The Republican political economy taking shape under Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison framed continued territorial expansion as the path to expanded liberty; by
“extending the sphere” of republican governance Americans could secure a free and
lasting republic built on independent, virtuous citizens.68 Advancements in transportation
therefore appeared uniquely fitted to the American condition, holding the promise of
transforming an extended republic of scattered citizens into a fully integrated nation.
Rather than a defect challenging republican governance, the country’s vast size could be
a virtue; mobility would enhance liberty.69
For a time, the scope of that vision remained limited. When most Americans
spoke about improved transportation and technological advancement, they thought about
infrastructure – smooth roads, clear rivers, well-engineered canals – not the means by
which people might be conveyed through them. There were exceptions. As early as 1787,
John Fitch built a small working steamboat but died before receiving any financial
backing. That same year, the Delaware legislature refused a patent to Oliver Evans for a
land carriage powered by a steam engine.70 Latrobe included “a few remarks upon rail
roads” in his response to Albert Gallatin. Feeling that the public had “very imperfect
conceptions” of railroads’ utility, Latrobe described the basic workings of a horse-drawn
carriage on rails. Though he admitted that railroads could allow transport of “astonishing
loads,” Latrobe assured Gallatin they had very limited applicability to the American
68 See Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1980), especially 185-208.
69 Bernard Bailyn notes how Revolutionary political thought transformed many perceived American
“defects” into virtues by the time of independence. Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 160.
70 Cowan, American Technology, 73.
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continent.71 In 1812 John Stevens, who had been instrumental in designing the country’s
first steamboats, wrote Governor Clinton and the New York legislature again and again,
detailing the advantages that could come from building a rail system run by steam
locomotives. In response, Stevens received only respectful but skeptical rejections.72 At
the beginning of the nineteenth century most Americans’ ideas of what travel was and
could be were not much different than those of Sarah Knight and her contemporaries one
hundred years before. All shared the desire for improved means of accessing distant
places swiftly and safely, but there was little basis for imagining any sudden and dramatic
improvement. In their world, speed and power were constrained by the physical limits of
wind, gravity, and animal labor. Experiments with steam engines in England and
America were starting to suggest, however, that those limits could be overcome, and once
they were, the prospects of American mobility would never look the same again.
The possibilities for producing power fundamentally shifted with the harnessing
of steam. In the second half of the eighteenth century, James Watt had created a steam
engine that proved more efficient than earlier attempts, and for the first time allowed for
rotary rather than oscillating motion that could enable smooth motive operation. Watt’s
engine, intended for industrial use, became the model for America’s earliest steamboat
engines. The steam engine operated by developing pressure that could drive a piston.
Water was heated within a metal boiler by the burning of wood or coal, and the steam
produced within the boiler was then channeled into a cylinder that contained the piston.
71 “Mr. Latrobe’s Communication,” in Gallatin, Report, 104-107.
72 John Stevens, “Documents Tending to Prove the Superior Advantages of Rail-Ways and Steam-Carriages
over Canal Navigation,” (New York: T. and J. Swords, 1812), HL.
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The cylinders on early engines were positioned vertically, and steam from the boiler
entered the cylinder beneath the piston, driving it upwards. Exhaust steam then moved
from the cylinder to a condenser, which used a jet of cold water to condense the steam
and create a partial vacuum below the piston, which was then driven back down by
atmospheric pressure. Engines working on this principle had to be quite large to achieve
sufficient power for desired industrial and later motive purposes.73
America’s turn toward steam navigation began in the first decade of the
nineteenth century with Robert Fulton’s successful application of Watt’s engine to a
steamboat run on the Hudson River in August 1807. Fulton’s achievement was the
product of more than two decades of American experimentation with steam-powered
water transport. John Fitch’s boat, built and run in the late 1780s, had used steam-
powered paddles to propel the vessel through the water, but Fitch never achieved
consistency of operation or the necessary financial backing to develop his prototype
further. Another American, James Rumsey, built boats in England around the same time
that used steam power to pump water out of the stern in order to power forward
movement, but the boats still moved at a very slow rate.74 John Stevens similarly failed to
achieve decent speeds. Then in 1803, Robert Livingston joined with Robert Fulton, and
four years later the pair debuted the North River steamboat. Fulton’s design used what
became known as a low pressure steam engine built on Watt’s model. The engine
powered an external wheel that moved the boat through the water. After the boat’s debut,
Fulton wrote to the editor of the American Citizen to describe his trial. The boat had
73 Louis C. Hunter, Steamboats on the Western Rivers: An Economic and Technological History
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), 123-124.
74 Cowan, American Technology, 107.
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averaged five miles per hour over a three-hundred mile round trip from New York to
Albany, without the assistance of sails; “the whole has,” Fulton wrote, “been performed
by the power of the steam engine.”75
Further development of steamboats moved at a moderate pace at first, due in part
to Fulton and Livingston’s monopoly over the trade. They added other boats on the
Hudson, and John Stevens managed to establish a line on the Delaware River in 1809. By
1812 there were ten steamboats in operation, mostly on eastern rivers and bays, but in
1811 Fulton and Livingston ran the New Orleans from Pittsburgh to New Orleans.
Steamboat travel took off after the War of 1812, particularly in the West, where the long
distance and rough waters of rivers made steam power a tremendous advantage.
Steamboat development on western rivers also initiated the adoption of the high pressure
engine. Unlike the low pressure engines that powered Fulton’s boats, high pressure
engines were non-condensing engines capable of much higher pressures, typically forty
to sixty pounds at first as opposed to under twenty for the low pressure engines. In these
engines, designed by Oliver Evans, cylinders were turned horizontal and steam was used
directly to drive the piston rather than simply create a vacuum, then steam was exhausted
into the air. Not relying on atmospheric pressure allowed cylinders to be much smaller
and lighter while creating the potential for very high pressures, which was useful for
overcoming strong western currents.76 Of course, the ability to move vessels against the
current was transformative, especially in the West. The steamboat Enterprise made the
first upriver trip from New Orleans to Louisville in 1815, covering a route that normally
took three to four months in just twenty-five days. By the end of the decade there were
75 Robert Fulton, letter to the American Citizen, in The Republican Watch-Tower, August 25, 1807.
76 Hunter, Steamboats on the Western Rivers, 123-126.
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close to seventy different boats operating on the western rivers. Steamboat operation
began on the Great Lakes with the Canadian Frontenac in 1816 and the American Walk
in the Water in 1818; traffic grew in subsequent decades as canals connected the lakes.77
The development of the high pressure engine opened the possibility of steam
locomotion on railroads because the engine was more compact. Oliver Evans had begun
experiments with steam-powered carriages in the 1780s, and John Stevens experimented
and advocated for steam-powered rail travel in the 1810s and 1820s, but neither found
financial support from private or public sources. Rail transportation, in which horses
pulled carriages over rails, was an established technology in Europe and saw
development in the United States by 1826. Then in 1828, the Delaware and Hudson
Canal Company purchased a steam locomotive called the Stourbridge Lion from a British
builder to assist with the movement of canal freight. The Stourbridge Lion was the first
steam locomotive to operate in America, but it quickly fell out of use when existing
railroad track proved unable to support the heavy new engine. The Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad began construction on its track in 1828 but used horse-drawn rail carriages
initially. American innovators enviously watched experiments in England, where in 1829
several successful runs of steam locomotives had been made reaching speeds of over
twenty miles per hour. The Charleston and Hamburg Railroad launched the Best Friend
of Charleston in late 1830 as the nation’s first steam train providing regular service.
77 Archives of Useful Knowledge, September 1, 1812, 295; Cowan, American Technology, 108; Hunter,
Steamboats on the Western Rivers, 22.
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Within a decade, over three thousand miles of track connected cities and towns
throughout the eastern United States.78
Early advocates for steam transportation framed it as a solution to the challenges
posed to transport and travel by the country’s vast distances and difficult terrain. In his
1828 published account of English railroad experiments, William Wooddy called “the
importance of securing an easy, economical, and expeditious means of communication,
between all parts of our widely extended country” the issue most deserving of popular
and governmental attention.79 The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, urging
Congress to support rail construction, noted the potential for social and cultural
integration – passengers could be conveyed around the country more efficiently and
cheaply, and the mail could “with regularity and certainty, be conveyed from the seat of
the general Government to the State of Ohio, in thirty-six hours.”80 Near the beginning of
the War of 1812, John Stevens identified the military benefit that armies “could be
conveyed in twenty-four hours, a greater distance than it would now take them weeks or
perhaps months to march.”81 In its first issue, the American Railroad Journal quoted an
expert on the principle economic advantage of railroads, “the means of transporting
heavy goods with speed and certainty.”82
The employment of steam for humanity’s ends generally captured the imagination
of observers on both sides of the Atlantic, who identified steam power as a force of near
78 Cowan, American Technology, 112-114; William Wooddy, Experiments on Railroads, in England,
Illustrative of the Safety, Economy and Speed, of Transportation, which this system, as now improved, is
capable of affording (Baltimore: William Wooddy, 1829), HL.
79 Wooddy, Experiments on Railroads, 3.
80 Memorial of the President and Directors of the Baltimore and Ohio Rail Road Company, to the Senate
and House of Representatives of the United States, in Wooddy, Experiments on Railroads.
81 John Stevens, “Documents,” 7.
82 American Railroad Journal, 1, 1, January to July, 1832.
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limitless capability and a symbol of emerging technological modernity.83 A piece of
music by an F. Lancelott of London, called “The Song of Steam,” brims with confidence
about the technology. Steam, personified as the singer, boasts of its power: “They found
me at last, They invited me forth at length, And I rush’d to my throne with thunder blast,
And laugh’d in my iron strength.” The voice of steam describes “a wondrous change On
the earth and ocean wide,” a transformation that extended through several spheres of
human society. “I blow the bellows, I forge the steel, In all the ships of trade… I hammer
the ore, and turn the wheel, Where my arms of strength are made. I manage the furnace
the mill the mind, I carry, I spin, I weave, And all my doings I put into print On every
Saturday eve.”84
In the United States, though, steam power carried special cultural significance
primarily because of the capacity of steamboats and trains to overcome space with
unprecedented speed. Because America’s leaders, businessmen, and travelers so regularly
confronted the limits of mobility, the promise of fast, efficient travel held tremendous
value. Expectations ran high, and well before the effects of steam transportation could be
fully realized, Americans proclaimed its national significance. The groundbreaking
ceremony of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, held on July 4, 1828, continued an
emerging tradition established by earlier ceremonies like the inauguration of the Erie
Canal that directly tied technological advancement to the nation’s foundation. Charles
Carroll, the last remaining signer of the Declaration of Independence in 1828, presided
over the ceremony marking the start of America’s first railroad, saying “I consider this
83 John F. Kasson, Civilizing the Machine: Technology and Republican Values in America, 1776-1900
(New York: Hill and Wang, 1976), 22-23.
84 Sheet Music, F. Lancelott, “The Song of Steam,” London, Jay T. Last Sheet Music Collection, HL.
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among the most important acts of my life, second only to that of signing the Declaration
of Independence, if, indeed, second to that.” David Nye argues that public ceremonies
like this and the Christmas Day 1830 debut of the locomotive Best Friend in Charleston
fostered republican feelings and united Americans around the idea of the nation’s
technological success. Technology, it seemed, might lie at the center of a distinctly
American culture.85
This was especially true with the steamboat, singled out by many as the nation’s
first great contribution to the world. The steamboat validated American ingenuity and its
inventors became national heroes. In 1808 the Hudson, New York, newspaper The
Balance published a poem by John Menshull celebrating “The North River Steamboat of
Clermont.” The poet called Fulton “a Genius of this our Nation” and linked his invention
with American liberty: “In distant regions oppression is known, Men sigh for their liberty
and seek a new home, In our land of improvements Artists are rising…”86 This kind of
praise commonly appeared in American newspapers and periodicals, where writers
rejected American dependence on Europe for art and science.87 In October 1816, New
York Historical Society president Gouverneur Morris delivered an address about
American successes in which the steamboat took a central role: “Be it ours to boast that
the first vessel successfully propelled by steam was launched on the bosom of Hudson’s
85 David E. Nye, American Technological Sublime (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994), 43; 35; John Kasson
explores the emergence of technology as a central facet of modern American culture in Civilizing the
Machine.
86 The Balance, July 26, 1808.
87 Archives of Useful Knowledge, January 1, 1812.
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river.” Morris went on to suggest building monuments to Livingston and Fulton and
noted that “the invention is spreading fast in the civilized world.”88
The expanded mobility made possible by steamboats and trains looked to many
like the fulfillment of American destiny; through technology, the republic could master
space and achieve its distinctive vision of liberty and equality. Ralph Waldo Emerson
described the effect in an 1844 lecture: “Not only is distance annihilated… but when, as
now, the locomotive and the steamboat, like enormous shuttles, shoot every day across
the thousand various threads of national descent and employment, and bind them fast in
one web, an hourly assimilation goes forward and there is no danger that local
peculiarities and hostilities should be preserved.”89 Modern transportation connected
Americans to each other and democratized mobility – as an 1828 travel guide said, “the
wonderful facilities for locomotion furnished by modern ingenuity have increased the
number of travellers to such a degree, that they now constitute a large portion of the
human family. All ages and sexes are to be found on the wing, in perpetual motion from
place to place.”90 Travel was becoming a cultural tradition, and more, a fundamental right
and expression of Americans’ liberty. The French traveler to America Michel Chevalier
witnessed this transformation: “to improve the means of communication, then, is to
promote a real, positive, and practical liberty; it is to extend to all the members of the
human family the power of traversing and turning to account the globe… to reduce the
distance not only between different places, but between different classes.”91
88 Maryland Gazette and Political Intelligencer, October 10, 1816.
89 Ralph Waldo Emerson, “The Young American,” (1844), quoted in Kasson, Civilizing the Machine, 120.
90 James Kirke Paulding, The New Mirror for Travelers (New York: G. & C. Carvill, 1828), 4-5.
91 Michel Chevalier, quoted in Howe, What Hath God Wrought, 242.
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Clearly, Americans made a significant cultural investment in steam transportation
and the technologies of modern mobility, which promised progress for the nation and its
values.92 On an individual level, Americans celebrated modern transportation for the
transformative effect it might have on their daily lives. A cover illustration for an
instrumental song called “The Railroad” cleverly suggests the sense of broadened
possibility inspired by steam transportation. An Ohio couple waves goodbye to family
members as they depart toward a rising sun on an early steam-powered railroad carriage.
The woman shouts “Give my love to all my nine cousins and tell Aunt Polly that I’ll
drink tea with her in Cincinnati tomorrow evening…” Her husband voices his own
request, “Don’t forget to drop my letter in the post office at Wheeling so it may get to N.
Orleans the next day.”93 When Emerson and many others suggested that distance was
“annihilated” by the steamboat and the locomotive, they referred to the common
perception that far-off destinations were suddenly much closer. Errands of a personal or
business nature would no longer entail the painstaking, unpredictable, and often
treacherous journeys experienced by earlier Americans, and Americans of the steam age
looked back at those earlier days of travel with pride in the nation’s progress. An 1825
introduction to Sarah Kemble Knight’s narrative noted, “Over that tract of country where
she traveled about a fortnight on horseback, under the direction of a hired guide, with
frequent risks of life and limb, and sometimes without food or shelter for many miles, we
proceed at our ease, without exposure and almost without fatigue, in a day and a half.”
92 For much more on this cultural investment, see especially David Nye, American Technological Sublime
and John Kasson, Civilizing the Machine.
93 Sheet Music, “The Railroad, A Characteristic Divertimento for the Piano Forte…” (Maryland, 1828).
JLSMC, HL.
65
An 1865 reprint wrote that railroads had decreased this time to eight hours.94 Nineteenth-
century Americans embraced the qualities of travel that, in hindsight, they had previously
lacked: speed, convenience, and safety.95
In light of what was to come, that Americans sometimes included safety in the list
of steam-powered transportation’s celebrated attributes may seem naïve. And yet,
promoters of both steamboats and railroads had anticipated the possibility of various
dangers. Robert Fulton, understanding the potential for pressurized boilers to burst,
quickly moved the engine from the hold of his boats to the deck, lessening the damage in
case of explosion.96 Oliver Evans’s designs for high pressure engines specified particulars
for safe boiler design.97 From early on, steamboats were equipped with safety valves that
would open and release steam if the pressure in the boiler exceeded a set limit. High
pressure engines were understood to be more liable to bursting because of the pressure
involved and the fact that engineers could drive pressures higher than intended. To
achieve higher pressures, steamboat operators could add highly combustible materials
like resin or oil to fuel or weigh down safety valves to prevent excess steam from
escaping and lowering pressure. Even though these practices were quickly seen as
potentially dangerous, their use to overcome the challenges of western river navigation
seemed to outweigh the danger.98 Concerns existed for trains, too. Responding to John
Stevens’ vision for steam-powered trains in 1812, Robert Livingston guessed that “the
means of stopping these heavy carriages without a great shock, and of preventing them
94 Knight, Private Journal, 17-18; xii.
95 “Historical Account of the Application of Steam,” American Medical and Philosophical Register,
January 1, 1812, 263.
96 Cowan, American Technology, 107.
97 Post, Technology, Transport, and Travel, 37.
98 Hunter, Steamboats on the Western Rivers, 131; 165.
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from running upon each other, (for there would be many on the road at once) would be
very difficult.”99
Furthermore, the arrival of steam-powered transportation did not come without its
hitches. Within a few years steam boilers on boats proved their propensity to burst, and
many of the first trials of steam trains produced inauspicious signs of potential dangers.
In its debut, the nation’s first steam locomotive, the Stourbridge Lion, amazed crowds as
it shot down a few miles of track, but the locomotive was too heavy for the rails and its
force and speed tore up the tracks.100 A few months after its own momentous debut on the
country’s first functional steam railroad, the boiler of the locomotive Best Friend burst
outside Charleston. Newspaper reports blamed the explosion on the carelessness of the
fireman, who had supposedly sat on the safety valve to keep steam from escaping.101 This
continued a pattern started in England, where William Huskisson, a prominent citizen and
passenger, was killed at the opening of England’s first railway, the Manchester and
Liverpool.102
Danger was clearly present with steam transportation from the start. Early
steamboats and trains evidenced a danger rooted in excessive power created by contained
steam pressure and massive machines moving at high speeds – a danger with which
Americans had little knowledge or experience. To Americans who had traveled long
distances in the years before steam power, though, steamboats and trains initially
99 Robert Livingston to John Stevens, in Stevens, “Documents,” 21.
100 There may have been more early disasters as well. In a 1998 article, “The Case of the Vanishing
Locomotive,” John Demos and Robert Thayer also introduced a provocative theory that a locomotive
America had been brought to the United States and tested before the Stourbridge Lion, only to have
exploded and then disappeared from the historical record. John Demos and Robert Thayer, “The Case of
the Vanishing Locomotive,” American Heritage, 49, 6 (October, 1998), 91-95.
101 Charleston Courier, June 18, 1831.
102 Charles Francis Adams Jr., Notes on Railroad Accidents (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1879), 6.
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appeared to bring unprecedented safety. Discussions of danger in early descriptions of
steamboats often focused on the common concerns surrounding sailing. One expert
dispelled worry by saying the early Paragon steamboat had no danger of sinking from
taking on water, and “her length and width, with the small proportion of sail she carries,
renders it impossible she can overset.” The boat’s design ensured that “to ease, elegance,
and speed, this vessel unites the most perfect safety.”103 Safety was a clear priority, but
boiler explosions were not part of this evaluation. Passengers on the Hudson River
steamboat Hope wrote to the newspaper the Northern Whig in 1811 describing a race
with the North River boat. They expressed concern and anger over the North River’s
captain pushing the Hope against the shore, where it ultimately ran aground, but showed
no sense of distress about racing and potential explosion common to later steamboat
passengers. Reports on English locomotive trials, republished for American audiences,
noted several small explosions but said there was “as little appearance of danger and even
of undue speed, as is felt in a stage coach travelling on the highway at the ordinary
speed.”104 The earliest observers naturally assessed the dangers of steam transportation in
terms of familiar perils.
Danger also meant something different to early long-distance travelers like Sarah
Knight and William Richardson than it would to later mass travelers. Travel narratives of
eighteenth and early nineteenth-century Americans typically describe long-distance travel
as tedious, unpredictable, and often uncomfortable. These travelers, as Will Mackintosh
suggests, were producers of their own travel experience – they often relied on
103 “Historical Account of the Application of Steam,” 266.
104 Wooddy, Experiments on Railroads, 14.
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experienced guides but also on their own geographical awareness and itinerary.105 Their
journeys were subject to unforeseen delays, necessary detours, and various threats like
poor weather, difficult road and river crossings, and getting lost. Danger and difficulty
were expectations of travel before steam power, but its dangers had as much or more to
do with the condition and nature of the journey as the mode of transport itself. A safe
journey was one with few such external disruptions, so steamboats and trains offering
regular, frequent trips and the ease and comfort of travel unencumbered by nature’s
elements, all in an experience designed and controlled by others, seemed a clear
improvement in traveler safety. Increasingly standard travel experiences were marked as
modern because they seemed less dangerous.106 The expectation of security brought by
the speed, certainty, and ease of steam travel often overshadowed unfamiliar dangers
created by steam power. Americans embraced steam upon its arrival as an added
convenience to their lives, as a harbinger of modernity, and as a realization of the
nation’s republican destiny. Nevertheless the signs of steam’s destructive potential
appeared from the beginning. In the coming years Americans would encounter a new
danger, produced by the power they had harnessed for such progressive ends.
105 Mackintosh, “Ticketed Through,” 63.
106 Thompson, The Suffering Traveler, 43.
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Chapter Two:
Encountering Danger
“It is with pain I inform you of an awful occurrence that took place at 7 o’clock
last evening on board the Steam Boat Aetna, Capt. Thomas Robinson.” Addressing his
family in Philadelphia, the young man thus began a letter telling of his escape from a
terrible explosion on board the steamboat Aetna as it traveled from Washington, New
Jersey, to New York in May 1824. The man wrote that the boat was within sight of New
York when “her boilers burst with a noise like thunder,” dangerously sending debris
toward the area where he had just been standing. The survivor thanked God for giving
him command of his wits in the frightful moments that followed, during which he
assisted the captain’s attempts to save the suffering passengers. Though he claimed he
could “scarcely describe” the scene, the writer’s detailed account provided his family
ample opportunity to imagine the disaster. “One little girl about the age of Mary,” he
wrote, “entreated me to throw water upon her, her agonies were so great.” Later, after the
Aetna had been pulled ashore and the victims removed, the man returned to the boat to
search for missing luggage only to discover “another corpse” hidden under the
wreckage.1
This man’s letter presents one of the early firsthand accounts of a steamboat
disaster in America. More than just a record of disaster and survival, the letter evokes
Americans’ encounters with the dangers of steam-powered transportation in the
nineteenth-century United States. The letter writer of course met those dangers firsthand,
as many others would over the course of the century. Steam-related disasters literally
presented themselves to thousands of others – residents of towns along coasts, rivers, and
1 Unascribed letter, New York Evening Post, May 18, 1824.
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rail lines who, without notice, became the first witnesses to the destruction and often
participated in rescue and recovery operations. Elsewhere, in the places that victims and
survivors called home, loved ones became suddenly and intimately acquainted with the
dangerous potential of steam power. The Aetna survivor’s letter linked his family to the
disaster and even offered them an imagined connection to it when he wrote of the little
girl “about the age of Mary.” The members of the Aetna survivor’s family were far from
the only readers of his letter, however, as it found its way into several newspapers
covering the event. The survivor’s account became part of a flurry of reports that brought
the details of the Aetna disaster to readers around the young nation.
In the early decades of steam transportation, Americans confronted the dangers of
steamboats and trains primarily in print. Print, in the form of the news, made the dangers
of steam-powered travel a national concern. Clipped from nearby papers and reprinted
around the country, descriptions of individual steamboat and rail disasters transformed
tragic events of mostly local significance into headlines and news consumed by readers in
other cities around the country. Printed news of disasters connected readers to episodes
separated from them by time and space and gradually created a public, national
conversation about the apparent dangers of steam travel. Whereas early disasters were
described as isolated, non-threatening incidents, as accidents increased in frequency and
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destruction print coverage framed them as a pattern of danger that was increasingly
difficult to deny.2
Print therefore became the initial arena in which Americans learned about
disasters and debated the causes and solutions of the emerging problem. In the first few
decades of steam transportation, Americans encountered the numerous ways steam power
begat death and destruction. On steamboats the most frightening and concerning disasters
were boiler explosions, but steamboats also collided with each other, wrecked at sea and
on rivers, and caught fire. Trains occasionally suffered explosions, but more often their
machinery broke down, they derailed from the tracks, or they collided with other trains
and obstacles on the track. The problem was widespread and of national consequence,
and as the public pushed various solutions, the federal government took aim at combating
the threat, especially the disastrous explosions on steamboats. As the national discourse
on steam power and danger developed, it both intensified public concerns and affirmed
the centrality of steam transportation to modern life. Printed coverage of disasters and
legislative responses to them did little to threaten America’s embrace of modern steam-
powered mobility, but it quickly became impossible to consider the advantages of steam
power without also recalling the long list of tragedies that demonstrated its destructive
potential.
2 This chapter draws upon and connects to arguments made by John Brockmann in Exploding Steamboats,
Senate Debates, and Technical Reports: The Convergence of Technology, Politics and Rhetoric in the
Steamboat Bill of 1838 (Amityville: Baywood Publishing Company, 2002). In exploring early responses to
steamboat explosions, I look at many of the same sources as Brockmann but ask different questions.
Brockmann, for example, mentions the Aetna letter, but with this letter and throughout this chapter I
consider these sources and debates in terms of space and connections across it. This helps us understand
how a perceived pattern of danger developed that contributed to the impulse for reform that Brockmann
and others have detailed. Expanding on Brockmann, my focus also suggests a cultural foundation for the
regulations that did eventually pass.
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America’s earliest steamboats suffered a few minor boiler explosions in their
initial years of operation, but the first major steamboat disaster came in the summer of
1816, with an explosion on board the steamboat Washington while it plied down the Ohio
River. The Washington was one of the first steamboats operating on the western river
system and was traveling from Wheeling, Virginia, on its maiden voyage. The boat had
attracted significant attention; a newspaper based near Wheeling praised the boat as “the
finest steam vessel on the western waters.” The Washington was awe-inspiring; “in
August, all her timbers were growing in the woods,” declared the local writer, and now
they formed a machine that traveled nine miles in the first forty-five minutes of its
journey.3 Admiring observers in Wheeling watched the Washington speed away as an
example of the progress Americans were making in the realm of steam power. On its
second evening out the Washington landed at Marietta, Ohio, where Captain Henry
Shreve and his crew set about making some adjustments to the boat. The next morning an
issue with the rudders sent the boat across the river to the Virginia shore, where the crew
dropped an anchor to fix the problem. As they pulled the anchor back aboard, one of the
boilers burst, spilling hot water on those nearest to it and throwing several people
overboard. Members of the crew and passengers were scalded to death and at least one
individual drowned. After others died later from injuries, the final death toll rose to
thirteen.4 In a little over a year, the Washington disaster was followed by two other
explosions occurring on boats in different parts of the country – first, on the Enterprise
outside Charleston, South Carolina, and then on the Constitution, on the lower
3 Daily National Intelligencer, June 21, 1816.
4 Evening Post, June 17, 1816.
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Mississippi River. Together, these three disasters killed more than thirty people and
introduced Americans to the fatal potential of steam power.
As the Aetna survivor’s letter suggests, before steam disasters entered the national
consciousness they made deep impressions on the personal and local levels. Beyond the
rare correspondence between victims and families, early reports reveal steam disasters to
be profoundly local events. Local and regional papers typically directed their coverage to
the most interested parties, providing the latest information about victims. Articles after
the burning of the Lexington in Long Island Sound in 1840 included full paragraphs of
items found for relatives to recover, mentioned bodies that were picked up, and instructed
surviving relatives where to go to identify them.5 Papers in Providence and Boston, upon
receipt of the news, published the names of local citizens who had been on board, often
including information about their occupations and connections to living residents of their
respective cities.6 Especially on local routes, so many of the dead came from surrounding
areas that entire communities felt the effects of disaster. Funerals held in New York after
the Aetna explosion brought together “thousands” of friends and family who followed the
dead through the streets to gravesites.7 One city paper reported that the gloom over the
city was worse than “the lamented case of the Albion,” a recent shipwreck that had also
taken New York residents.8
Other communities found themselves face to face with disaster simply because
they were the closest to the scene; residents of port cities and small towns along
navigable rivers were usually the people who took charge of rescue, recovery, and even
5 Evening Post, January 18, 1840; January 22, 1840.
6 Evening Post, January 20, 1840.
7 The Statesman, May 18, 1824.
8 The Spectator, May 18, 1824.
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burial of victims after disasters. An early report from a paper in St. Francisville,
Louisiana, after the Constitution exploded in 1817 illustrates how suddenly an
unsuspecting community could be thrown into chaos when disaster arrived at its
doorstep. The article reveals the immediacy of the circumstances and clearly addresses a
local audience: “The news has just reached us, and several of our citizens are going to
offer relief to the unfortunate sufferers, who are lodged in a house at Point Coupee, near
the plantation of Monsieur Poydras.”9 Similarly, when the Washington exploded outside
Marietta, Ohio, residents of the town saw and heard the explosion first-hand, and many
became directly involved. Some took boats from the shore and rescued those who had
been thrown to the water. The local paper reported that every doctor in town and a large
number of citizens came to the assistance of the injured passengers and crew.10 Later, a
group of citizens of Marietta met and formed a committee to provide support for the
injured and arrange burials for the dead. An initial interment of six victims who had died
quickly was “attended by a very numerous concourse of citizens.”11 The Washington and
its wrecked boiler remained parked offshore for weeks, a physical reminder of the new
reality that river towns like Marietta sometimes saw more directly than the rest of the
nation.12
Even though steamboat tragedies were always first a local matter, the role of these
unsuspecting communities reveals the distinctive ways transportation disasters extended
beyond the local. A steamboat explosion was a local event but usually for more than one
locality – the places that victims had called home, where the disaster was a personally-
9 Daily National Intelligencer, May 31, 1817.
10 Daily National Intelligencer, June 15, 1816.
11 Western American, June 22, 1816.
12 Evening Post, June 17, 1816.
75
felt tragedy, and the places where victims had died, where strangers became suddenly and
intimately involved. Since steamboats and trains carried travelers to areas far from their
homes, their accidents had an inherently wide influence. While other tragedies involving
mass death like epidemics or fires confronted cities and towns with the death of their
own, transportation disasters brought the death and suffering of travelers, often from
somewhere else. This extra-local influence was a byproduct of technological space-time
compression. Though various tragedies involving mass death were all newsworthy, steam
disasters were a natural subject for regional and national news because the spatial
separation between victims and their origins and destinations expanded the geography of
interest in details of the disaster. Steamboat and rail accidents occurred in transit,
between places – by nature, they necessitated a response and held significance that
extended across space.
Print served as the vehicle that brought the details of disaster to affected locales,
and from places like Marietta and St. Francisville, word of accidents filtered out often
along the very transportation routes that had brought the doomed machines to their
doorstep. Local newspaper reports were carried in the mail by steamboats and trains to
city papers with wide readerships. Sometimes news of a disaster was first reported by
travelers arriving in town from a location closer to the accident; Washington’s Daily
National Intelligencer published a report on the Constitution disaster from Norfolk,
Virginia, delivering word “from a gentleman” who had arrived in Norfolk via a ship from
New Orleans.13 These transfers of information initiated a process by which steamboat and
train disasters ceased to be local and entered broader regional and national consciousness.
13 Daily National Intelligencer, June 3, 1817.
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Outside of the several hundred residents of Marietta, Americans learned of the
Washington disaster largely through two local reports from Marietta that circulated
around the nation in the weeks after the disaster. The first, dated June 6, the day after the
explosion, was a short report describing the accident and the expected number of dead.14
Another, printed the next day, added a few more details given by survivors, speculated on
the cause of the explosion, and provided a list of the victims. Carried in the mail around
the country, these two reports were picked up and republished by newspapers up and
down the eastern seaboard. The June 6 story reached Washington D.C. by the eleventh,
Baltimore by the twelfth, and Boston by the twentieth. As late as June 26 the same story
was still appearing in smaller towns like Ballston Spa, New York, and Middlebury,
Vermont.15
Tracking the Marietta reports on the Washington explosion highlights the way
disasters that often occurred deep in the interior of the continent became national news.
The transfer of information was not necessarily smooth; though newspapers could bring
word of disasters even to citizens who lived deep inland, there was still a considerable
delay in 1816. Slow communication meant that events reached American readers in
successive waves moving outward from the story’s point of origin. Published information
was therefore often weeks old and the timeline of events sometimes became skewed. The
disaster reports on the Washington explosion arrived late enough that many eastern
papers published the Wheeling articles praising the Washington’s launch well after its
demise was already known to readers in other places. In some cases, papers published the
14 Daily National Intelligencer, June 11, 1816.
15 Daily National Intelligencer, June 11, 1816; Baltimore Patriot, June 12, 1816; Boston Weekly
Messenger, June 20, 1816; Independent American, June 26, 1816; National Standard, June 26, 1816.
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celebratory article even after becoming aware of the disaster, adding a note such as: “this
is the same boat that met with the accident at Marietta.”16 Besides being a perfect
juxtaposition of steam-powered transportation’s dual progressive and dangerous nature,
this publishing choice also reflects the nature of print culture in Early America and the
state of the nation’s developing transportation and communication infrastructure, which
could disrupt a clear presentation of the news.17
Even if the delivery was imperfect, print culture directly shaped how Americans
confronted early disasters. Boats and trains were not the only revolutionary technologies
powered by steam; in the first half of the century steam presses began churning out
newspapers at record rates to feed the desires of an increasingly literate and informed
population. The transformative effects of an expanding print culture for early American
society have been well documented; print is understood by many scholars of early
America as one of the key elements that enabled Americans to conceive of a united
nation and imagine it into being. Increasing production and spread of newspapers in the
early nineteenth century facilitated greater direct communication between different
sections of the country and consciousness of distant events.18
16 Independent Chronicle, June 27, 1816.
17 The consequences of such delays were famously demonstrated by the Battle of New Orleans, fought in
early 1815 after the Treaty of Ghent had supposedly ended the War of 1812. See Daniel Walker Howe,
What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-1848 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2007), 8-18.
18 See, for example, Michael Warner, The Letters of the Republic: Publication and the Public Sphere in
Eighteenth-Century America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992) and Richard John, Spreading
the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1998). For alternative arguments that suggest print fostered regional difference and pluralism, see Trish
Loughran, The Republic in Print: Print Culture in the Age of U.S. Nation Building, 1770-1870 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2009); Richard D. Brown, Knowledge is Power: The Diffusion of Information
in Early America, 1770-1865 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). On the communications
revolution in America see Howe, What Hath God Wrought.
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As they did for other events, then, newspapers brought Americans in various parts
of the country closer to tragedies and victims far from themselves. With descriptions of
disaster scenes, lists of the dead, and occasional details about funerals for victims,
newspaper reports reenacted for distant American readers the unexpected encounter with
danger experienced by those who had seen disaster arrive in their local community, of
course at a level far removed from the original experience.19 Disaster accounts served
different purposes depending on their audience – details and lists of victims provided
important information for interested locals and gave wider audiences with no connection
to those on board a quick sense of the scale of the accident and its tragic results.20 In a
sense, print culture extended the sphere of the affected community to the bounds of the
nation; though their respective encounters were different, newspaper reporting allowed
American readers to join local communities as observers of steam transportation
disasters.
Print culture also connected American readers who accessed shared information
and knowledge in published disaster reports. Not only did Americans across the country
read of the Washington explosion, they typically encountered it the exact same way.
Newspapers sometimes made slight changes or paraphrased the articles, but more often
than not readers in Washington and New York read the same words as those in Marietta
and Wheeling. After each disaster, the initial narrative, the explanation of cause, and the
various details provided by witnesses and survivors became enshrined in print as the
19 Here I draw on a similar argument made by David Waldstreicher on early American nationalist
celebrations, that printed discourse “surrounded these events and gave them extralocal meaning.” David
Waldstreicher, In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes: The Making of American Nationalism, 1776-1820 (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 10-12.
20 Walter Johnson mentions this dual character of disaster reporting in River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and
Empire in the Cotton Kingdom (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 109.
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“official” story of the disaster that directed Americans’ collective response. Print became
the arena and disasters the moments in which Americans together explored steam
technology and its potential dangers, and a national discourse about the issue of steam
disasters emerged.
The printed responses to America’s first steamboat disasters reveal early
uncertainty and a lack of established knowledge about steam technology. Each new
disaster opened a debate about the causes of the danger and forced a reevaluation of
previously held assumptions. Before an apparent pattern of disasters had emerged, early
incidents could be easily explained away as isolated and insignificant, and supporters of
steam power took to the papers to reassure readers that steamboats were unquestionably
safe. Before the Washington disaster, the steamboat Rariton exploded a boiler in July
1809. A few crew members suffered minor burns in what was, according to one report,
only the country’s second steamboat boiler explosion. Several days after the accident the
New York papers published two different letters, presumably from crew members of the
Rariton, attempting to explain the explosion, as a “service to the public.” The first writer
quickly noted that an explosion could only occur from carelessness, as it had here with
the engineer James Law neglecting to take the weights off the safety valve to release
excess pressure when the boat stopped at Amboy for more passengers. The letter also
emphasized that “Mr. Livingston was close to the boiler at the time, and felt no
inconvenience,” sufficient proof that passengers “cannot possibly receive the smallest
injury” on steamboats even when a boiler burst. The writer appended to his letter certified
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statements from Law and an injured crew member that their burns were the result of
contact with the hot water in the boiler and “not the effect of the steam.”21
This first response to the minor Rariton explosion highlights immediate concerns
about the effect disasters and disaster reporting could have on public faith in steam
technology. If passengers were truly endangered, “it would inevitably destroy all
confidence in this most valuable invention.”22 A second letter published in the Evening
Post alluded to public questions about steam’s safety but echoed the support for steam.
The crew member wrote that he was standing right next to the boiler when it burst and
the noise was so slight he assumed steam had just been released from the safety valve. He
then added that there were about forty passengers on board and though the steam had
blown over and enveloped them, “not one felt any further inconvenience than they would
have done from a warm drizly rain.” This result was enough to convince the writer that
injury to passengers was impossible, and he swiftly dispatched with early public fears:
“this unfortunate accident will assure all those persons who have had great apprehensions
respecting the danger incident to this most eligible mode of travelling, of their safety and
must do away with the ridiculous idea that the steam would in case the boiler burst
destroy like Gun Powder, the boat passengers and all on board.” In this narrative, rather
than an example of danger, the Rariton accident became evidence of passenger safety,
proof that any concern about the new technology was unfounded.23
With the Washington disaster and the other fatal boiler explosions that followed,
the idea that passengers were entirely free from danger fell away. Still, newspaper readers
21 Mercantile Advertiser, July 15, 1809.
22 Mercantile Advertiser, July 15, 1809.
23 Evening Post, July 15, 1809.
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continued to find assurances that dangers were rare and purely coincidental. The clearest
example is in the aftermath of the country’s second major steamboat accident, the
explosion of the Enterprise outside Charleston, South Carolina. Though the explosion
was small and went unnoticed at first, boiling water and steam spilled out from the boiler
and several passengers were scalded to death.24 Public opinion was supposedly “much
divided” on the cause of the disaster, but a dominant explanation emerged that blamed
the explosion on a bolt of lightning striking the boiler. The boat had left Sullivan’s Island
in a storm, and the pilot claimed to see lightning strike the top of the chimney.25 Captain
Samuel Howard and the boat’s engineers agreed; had the explosion been the result of
steam the lower parts of the boiler and much of the deck would have suffered injury.
Instead, only the very top of the chimney, twelve feet from the boiler, was blown away.26
In the rescue efforts, the crew had also discovered the body of one victim with his skin
charred black, an injury that “differed entirely from that of any of his unfortunate
sufferers,” seemingly due to a lightning strike rather than scalding from the explosion.27
Though no one adequately explained the exact science of how the lightning might have
caused the explosion, the Charleston papers mostly accepted the lightning narrative over
a scientifically more plausible suggestion that the use of salt water for steam creation had
weakened the iron boiler.28 Unfamiliarity with boiler mechanics made the lightning strike
seem as likely as any explanation, but it was also a useful narrative for those looking to
allay public fears after the accident. Attributing the Enterprise tragedy to an act of God
24 Daily National Intelligencer, September 24, 1816.
25 Boston Daily Advertiser, September 30, 1816.
26 Connecticut Herald, October 1, 1816.
27 Boston Daily Advertiser, September 30, 1816.
28 This explanation likely had some merit, as the unfiltered and untreated water used by boilers was a
definite source of corrosion. See John G. Burke, “Bursting Boilers and the Federal Power,” Technology and
Culture, 7, 1 (Winter, 1966), 5.
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rather than technology forced away any suggestion that the event exemplified a pattern of
steam-related dangers.
Again, these statements made by newspaper editors and steamboat operators
appear partially motivated by an effort to maintain public confidence in the technology
despite incidents of danger. One writer feared that the Enterprise accident was sure to
“prejudice the public mind against the encouragement of this great and important
invention.”29 After an explosion on the steamboat Constitution killed thirteen, marking
the country’s third significant steam disaster, one troubled writer pronounced
romantically that “since the first savage paddled himself on a log of wood from his native
island to an adjacent shore,” no advancement had been made comparable to the
steamboat, which brought universal feelings of “admiration and pleasure.”30 Another
writer framed disasters as a threat to national identity: “A well founded apprehension
prevails, that a discovery which every American must feel a pride in believing was
perfected in his own country, may be ultimately rendered useless.” Clearly, the level of
America’s cultural investment in steam power made the stakes of public opinion quite
high. The editor argued that the precise causes of steamboat accidents must be
determined and dealt with so as to “insure [steamboats] from suspicion in the minds even
of the most timid.”31
The discourse on early steamboat disasters also simply indicates a level of denial
of steam’s potential dangers that did not easily go away even as disasters continued. This
derived in part from the fact that the science of steam boilers and their explosions was
29 Boston Daily Advertiser, September 30, 1816.
30 The Camden Gazette, March 27, 1817.
31 Poulson’s American Daily Advertiser, June 26, 1817.
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fairly mysterious. Theories like lightning sparking an explosion were easier to understand
than the complicated dynamics of steam pressurized within metal boilers. Even when an
explosion could not be attributed to something external like lightning, editors often
explained disasters as the product of isolated mismanagement or unique problems with
the particular boat – causal theories thus had the effect of minimizing links between
individual disasters. After the Washington explosion, a paper out of Norfolk, Virginia,
blamed the boat’s iron boiler. The writer assured readers that the local boat, the
Powhatan, had a safer copper boiler and that “in the present improved state of the
machinery,” accidents could only result from “deplorable neglect.”32 The writer
anticipated a persistent theory articulated further after the Aetna explosion that iron
boilers were particularly dangerous because, unlike copper, iron was subject to corrosion
and thus weakened significantly over time. The writer’s faith in copper boilers, based in
an over-simplification of boiler explosions, proved tragically misplaced, as nine months
later the Powhatan’s boilers became the first of many copper boilers to explode.33
The Powhatan explosion was relatively minor – only the boat’s fireman was
killed and a few engineers injured – and it was again quickly explained in the press as the
result of negligence.34 There was little doubt in this case that steam pressure had burst the
boiler, but newspaper reports still downplayed the danger. One paper stressed that there
was nothing in the accounts “that ought to alarm the public mind or induce an impression
that it is unsafe to travel in Steam Boats.”35 The explosion had still only affected
employees close to the boiler; even if steamboat crews were at risk from a bursting boiler,
32 American Beacon, June 17, 1816.
33 Burke, “Bursting Boilers and the Federal Power,” 8.
34 American Beacon, March 18, 1817.
35 The Columbian, March 28, 1817.
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the paper said, passengers were safe as long as they stayed in the areas of the boat that
were designated for them.
The Powhatan episode reflects the strength of early resistance to the notion that
steam power was dangerous but also that a perceived pattern of danger was beginning to
emerge. Print coverage of early disasters consistently identified steam power as safe and
disasters as explainable, isolated incidents. New disasters repeatedly proved those
explanations and assumptions incorrect, however, and required a gradual
acknowledgement that disaster was clearly a potential product of steam navigation. After
the Powhatan explosion, an unnamed local expert wrote the Richmond Enquirer to
explain the unique circumstances of the disaster. Still, the observer, seemingly frustrated
by growing public fears, added that steamboats were less dangerous than stages, which
required constant attention at the reins, and even before steamboats “the upsetting of
sloops” killed at least five or six people on the Hudson River each year.36 Rather than a
full denial of steam’s dangers, this argument acknowledged them but downplayed their
significance. All travel had some danger, the writer implied, and steamboats had less than
any other mode. But with continued disasters, the idea that steamboat passengers were
safe took increasing effort to maintain.
After a bit of a break in major disasters, the explosion of the Aetna just off
Manhattan in May 1824 forced a reexamination of disasters in the press. The Aetna had
been traveling from New Jersey and had reached New York harbor when its central boiler
36 The Richmond Enquirer, March 28, 1817. There is no real data to prove that stagecoaches and ocean
vessels were more dangerous than steamboats, but many scholars believe this to be likely. See Richard N.
Langlois et. al., “Bursting Boilers and the Federal Power Redux: The Evolution of Safety on the Western
Rivers,” Economics Working Papers, University of Connecticut DigitalCommons@UConn, May, 1994,
accessed online at
http://digitalcommons.uconn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1351&context=econ_wpapers.
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exploded, quickly killing thirteen of the boat’s passengers. Unlike most eastern boats, the
Aetna operated with a high pressure engine and a wrought iron boiler, and public
response pointed to these features as the clear explanation for the explosion. Public
opinion turned against wrought iron boilers and proved influential, forcing many New
York steamboat owners to concede to public concern and temporarily turn to copper
boilers even as industry consensus had gradually built around wrought iron. Though
copper boilers were less prone to corrosion they proved to be a weaker material, as many
boats with copper boilers exploded over the next decade.37
The Aetna disaster also particularly raised questions about high pressure engines.
High pressure engines were primarily used by western steamboats and had been used on
the Washington and the Constitution, so high pressure became an obvious link between
the Aetna disaster and the country’s disaster record. Almost every published article on the
explosion mentioned that the boat’s engine was built on “the high pressure principle.”
Reports attributed not only the Aetna disaster but all steamboat dangers to the high
pressure engine: “in almost every instance, particularly on the Mississippi, of the bursting
of a boiler, it has been found that it was of engines of this description.”38 An early report
presented readers with a scientist’s description of low pressure engines, which he claimed
were unlikely to burst, “the pressure on the out and inside of the boiler being nearly
equal.” By contrast, high pressure engines, which usually had iron boilers, achieved
steam pressures much higher than the pressure of the atmosphere, and were “much more
liable to have their boilers burst.”39 Apparent scientific confirmation made clear for
37 Burke, “Bursting Boilers and the Federal Power,” 8.
38 The Statesman, May 18, 1824.
39 The American, May 17, 1824.
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readers the cause of the danger and also isolated that danger only to boats operating with
high pressure engines.
In reality, low and high pressure engines were likely about equal in their
propensity to explode, as later explosions on low pressure boats bear out. The apparent
deadliness of high pressure engines probably derived from two factors. First, high
pressure engines did operate at much higher levels of steam, and the evidence suggests
that when they did explode, disasters were more catastrophic and resulted in higher losses
of life – this certainly contributed to lasting skepticism of high pressure engines. Also,
high pressure engines became almost exclusively the engines of western river boats,
which operated in turbid water, against stronger currents, and traveled much greater
distances than eastern boats, all of which likely contributed to a greater propensity for
explosion.40
The editorial remarks made in the press suggest mounting public concerns about
steam’s dangers, but the focus on high pressure engines simultaneously gave voice to
those concerns while once again allowing editors to proclaim the safety of the basic
technology. “The frequency of accidents in boats with high pressure engines, must
naturally tend to lessen the public confidence in steamboats generally,” one report
concluded before stating that the low pressure boats that traveled the Hudson proved
steamboats of good construction “as safe a conveyance as any other.”41 Claiming a duty
to the public to “allay unnecessary fears,” a number of editors listed which local boats
40 Louis C. Hunter, Steamboats on the Western Rivers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), 290-
292.
41 The National Advocate, May 18, 1824.
87
used high pressure engines and advised readers to avoid them.42 Others called on
Congress to prohibit the “infernal machines” altogether.43 Meanwhile, many continued to
stress that no boats operating on low pressure had met with serious disaster, but this
streak soon ended.
The condemnations of high pressure engines were not shared by all. The writer of
a lengthy editorial for the National Gazette, signing his name only as “JUSTICE,”
claimed to present a more rational approach to the disaster now that “violent emotions”
had subsided and the public was capable of receiving “truth and reason.” The writer
noted that there were many citizens who had money in high pressure boats and the public
owed it to them to consider all the facts. He then laid out his own explanation: the
Aetna’s boilers had been cleaned and inspected a few days before the explosion, the boat
was going slower than its normal rate – rather than high steam pressure the explosion
must have been due to a stoppage in the pipe running to the boiler, likely created by the
use of salt water for steam production. More than explaining the disaster, though,
“Justice” sought to exonerate high pressure engines from blame. Countering the
prominent narrative, he claimed that high pressure engines “are at least as safe, and, as
both are now used, probably safer, than the low pressure.” He attested that the “high” and
“low” pressure labels were understandably misleading; in fact, he said (with some
accuracy), low pressure engines actually operated at a much higher ratio of force than
high pressure engines when compared to the strength of the boilers used in each.44
42 Daily National Intelligencer, May 22, 1824.
43 The Spectator, May 18, 1824.
44 The National Gazette, June 1, 1824.
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Some readers might have noticed that “Justice” was not so much claiming high
pressure boats safe as suggesting low pressure boats were also at risk, so the writer went
on to defend the overall safety of steam-powered travel. “Are we to conclude from these
details that all steam boat navigation is so dangerous that it should be discontinued?” the
writer asked. These accidents simply proved that, “as in every thing else,” steamboats
needed to be approached with proper care and attention. A complete survey of
shipwrecks and carriage accidents would likely prove them even more deadly, he said.
Unlike most other responders of the time, though, “Justice” acknowledged the inevitable
perils of travel: “when a man once gets off his legs for transportation, he will be exposed
to more or less danger.” Accidents could never be “absolutely prevented,” he argued, and
in this he anticipated what became a standard defense: that steam-powered transportation
posed dangers but the dangers were rare if users took proper care. He concluded: “let
every caution be used in constructing the engines of both high and low pressure; and
frequent examinations be made of their strength and condition, and steam boats will be
found to be the safest, as well as the most easy, cheap, and expeditious means of
conveyance.”45
Competing theories about the causes of the Aetna disaster reflect the difficulty of
explaining boiler explosions, which mystified both the public and scientists alike. For as
much attention as high pressure engines received in the disaster’s aftermath, no one could
definitively link the explosion to a high level of steam caused by the engine. The writer
of the National Gazette editorial wrote that those assigning blame to the engines had done
45 The National Gazette, June 1, 1824.
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so “without reflecting that coincidence does not always prove cause and effect.”46 Even
as they cited the pattern of high pressure engines exploding, early reports said that it was
“impossible” to determine the accident’s immediate cause. One of the Aetna’s engineers
testified that he could not account for the explosion of the boiler.47 Steam engines were
new and complex machines and the country had few if any true experts on their
operation, so this kind of uncertainty commonly followed early steam-related disasters.
Lack of knowledge about the engines naturally bred the kind of speculation and varying
theories voiced in the debates about high and low pressure engines and iron and copper
boilers. The press thus presented two simultaneous narratives about steamboat disasters:
one said they were not true “accidents” because they could be explained by isolated
circumstances or mismanagement – part of an evolving narrative that affirmed the safety
of steamboats despite frequent accidents. The other claimed the inability to explain
explosions. Unable to locate one clear explanation that could settle the mystery behind
steamboat explosions, the understandable efforts to explain disasters and allay fears likely
enhanced perceptions of danger, as each new disaster seemed to bring greater uncertainty
and reveal more threats plaguing travelers.
The response to the Aetna explosion also reflects the fairly rapid evolution of
expectations about transportation disasters in the first decades of steamboat operation –
an adjustment not only to continued disasters but also to the changing material nature of
disasters themselves. Since the first run of the North River on the Hudson, engineers had
continually drawn more power out of steam engines by increasing the size of engine
cylinders and piston shaft lengths. Boats equipped with bigger engines and multiple
46 The National Gazette, June 1, 1824.
47 Evening Post, May 17, 1824.
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boilers achieved increasing power, especially on western high pressure boats.48 That
increase in power was made evident by greater speeds but also by the contrast between
the kind of barely-noticed explosion that showered a harmless mist on the Rariton’s
passengers and the explosion on the Aetna, “so violent that almost every thing in the
cabins was demolished, the deck torn to pieces, and the vessel rendered a complete
wreck.”49 As steamboat technology developed, explosions became more violent and
destructive, provoking greater interest in their causes.
In their search to locate the causes of early disasters, newspaper writers
continually put forward the belief that it was possible to build a boiler and thus a
steamboat that was accident-proof, and that these disasters would be entirely preventable
with greater knowledge and regulation. Still, the destruction wrought by the Aetna
explosion was difficult to explain away. Each new disaster presented a new version of the
threat and seemed to weaken public confidence, and so attempts to calm public fears
remained even as the implicit reassurance necessarily changed its form from “you will
never die” to “you will not die as long as you stay in designated passenger areas” to “just
don’t ride on these particular boats.” Once low pressure boats joined the list of those
destroyed by boiler explosions, the only explanation that maintained the idea of
steamboats’ overall safety was that “only negligence” created disasters, which virtually
labeled the events entirely unpredictable.
The pressure for legislative solutions was mounting, and the Aetna explosion
marks the point at which the pattern of steamboat disasters became a clear national
48 Hunter, Steamboats on the Western Rivers, 142-143.
49 The American, May 17, 1824.
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concern, triggering congressional response. Prompted by a House resolution, the
Committee on Commerce published a report and a proposed bill on the issue of
steamboat explosions just one week after the Aetna disaster.50 The United States
Congress was not the first governmental body to take up the issue of steamboat
explosions. In the summer of 1817, after a third major disaster, the City Council of
Philadelphia appointed a committee that consulted with scientists and engineers to
recommend possible preventative measures. The committee’s eventual recommendations
included testing boilers at twice the pressure of their intended use and locking up the
safety valve to prevent employees from tampering with it to achieve higher pressures.
While others were denying steam power’s dangers in the press, the committee
acknowledged them, saying “accidents must be calculated upon, to happen to engines of
all and every construction at one time or another.” Still, they argued that high pressure
engines ultimately did more damage when they exploded. Rather than enacting any
reforms, however, the committee suggested that truly effective reform would need to
come from a larger legislative body.51
The congressional committee’s investigation referred to and built on the
Philadelphia City Council’s earlier study. The committee’s report was the start of several
decades of federal concern over the issue of steamboat disasters, and it highlights the
forces that would shape the national debate to come: on the one hand, the influence of
public alarm and on the other, the various political, cultural, and practical obstacles to
significant reform. Reflecting the persistent condemnation of high pressure engines in the
50 “Report of the Committee on Commerce, accompanied by a bill for regulating of steam boats…,”
Committee on Commerce, United States House of Representatives (Washington D.C.: Gales & Seaton,
1824).
51 “Report of the Committee on Commerce;” Burke, “Bursting Boilers and the Federal Power,” 5-6.
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press, the resolution charged the committee with evaluating the possibility of a law “that
no license to navigate any of the waters of the United States, shall be granted to any boat
or vessel, hereafter built, and moved, or propelled by fire or steam, upon the principle of
construction, commonly called ‘high pressure.’” Despite its conclusion that high pressure
engines were more dangerous than low pressure engines, though, the Committee on
Commerce advised against a full prohibition of high pressure engines. Instead, it
suggested regulatory measures to limit danger, including frequent investigations of
boilers and penalties for employees putting extra weight on safety valves. The committee
explained that there were situations, notably on streams of difficult current, where a high
pressure engine was advantageous.52
Though the Committee on Commerce’s report alluded to more specific
advantages of steam power, it mirrored the defenses of the technology that appeared in
newspapers after early disasters. From the start of the report, the committee emphasized
the “prosperity and advancement” brought by steam navigation, which it was reluctant to
dampen: “To what farther application the agency of steam is capable, and to what extent
it may be carried by the science and ingenuity of our mechanicians, cannot be
anticipated; and your committee felt averse to fetter, or discourage the ingenuity and skill
for which the artists of this country are so distinguished.” The committee had even
acknowledged the dangers of high pressure engines, but the danger was deemed not
significant enough to outweigh the engine’s benefits.53
The Committee on Commerce’s proposed measures did not become law, but the
federal government remained interested in studying and debating the issue of boiler
52 “Report of the Committee on Commerce.”
53 “Report of the Committee on Commerce.”
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safety. In early 1825 the Secretary of the Treasury reported the results of an effort to
collect information on boiler explosions from various steamboat captains around the
country. The captains’ diverse responses reveal the difficulty of effectively approaching
the problem. The uncertain and different explanations that filled newspaper articles after
the early disasters were matched by those of industry insiders. Captain Uriah Jenkins of
the Potomac called high pressure engines “dangerous in the extreme,” while Captain
Walter Dubois of the Georgia argued that low pressure engines were just as liable to
burst as high pressure engines since many carried more steam than their boilers could
bear. Others argued that high pressure had little to do with explosions, which were more
often caused by engineers weighing down or neglecting safety valves. Several pointed to
too low a level of water in the boilers, which they argued made the boiler’s metal heat up,
weaken, and eventually burst. At the same time, the captains who responded defended the
safety of steamboats. One captain pointed to the low overall death numbers and labeled
steamboats “the safest mode of conveyance yet used,” while another said disasters had
been a problem based in lack of knowledge, and would decrease as steamboat captains
and engineers learned more about engine operation.54
The narrative that steamboats were safe and disasters an isolated or temporary
problem put forward in the press and by steamboat operators made federal legislation
difficult to justify. Plus, with such disagreement as to the causes of boiler explosion, any
legislation would have been challenging to target.55 Disasters continued to occur across
54 “Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting information collected by the department, upon
the subject of accidents on board of steam boats,” United States Department of the Treasury (Washington
D. C.: Gales & Seaton, 1825).
55 Louis Hunter details the reasoning and sources behind the dominant theories on boiler explosions in
Steamboats on the Western Rivers, 292-295.
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the United States, and once again it took a new level of destruction to reignite federal
action – this time the 1830 explosion of the Helen McGregor outside Memphis, which
killed over fifty passengers, a new high. At this point the government shifted from
information gathering to a more active investigation in partnership with the scientific
community, specifically the Franklin Institute. Founded in Philadelphia in 1824 to study
the mechanical arts, the Franklin Institute devoted much of its early scientific study to
steamboat boiler explosions. Responding to the Helen McGregor and the growing list of
other disasters, the Institute formed a committee in 1830 to perform experiments and
make recommendations for improvement, specifically noting the lack of congressional
action. Secretary of the Treasury Samuel D. Ingham had closely followed the Institute’s
work, and that same year he allotted government funding for the Institute’s
experiments.56
The scientific community had been nearly as puzzled by boiler explosions as
steamboat operators and the public, so the Franklin Institute’s multi-year experiments
meant a significant expansion of scientific knowledge. The Institute’s experiments
produced a wealth of information that likely aided in the prevention of many disasters,
mostly by debunking some of the popular theories, such as one that said boilers exploded
due to their creation of a combustible gas. Among the Franklin Institute’s most influential
findings, though, was the simple fact that the causes of steamboat explosions were
numerous. The response to steamboat disasters from the public and steamboat operators
had consistently been to seek a single cause that would explain away steam’s dangers.
Louis Hunter argues that the focus on any single theory led to a false sense of security
56 Burke, “Bursting Boilers and the Federal Power,” 9-10.
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about other potential causes that probably created more disasters in the early era of steam
power. In reality, there were many complex factors that all likely contributed to
steamboat explosions. Boiler metal was inconsistent and often of poor quality. Water
pumped into the boilers from western rivers especially contained river silt, which wore
down boilers. Pumps also supplied water to boilers only when the engine was running,
while fires stayed lit and kept heating steam; this required captains to keep the engine
running at stops, but many did not, leading to low water in the boilers, excess heating of
boiler metal, and high pressures of steam. Steamboat operators weighed down safety
valves and added combustibles to fuel to drive up steam pressures in efforts to get
through rapids or outpace other boats. Each new disaster had complicated earlier theories,
and the Franklin Institute confirmed the emerging truth that any regulation would require
a multifaceted approach.57
Even so, the Institute’s investigators maintained a belief that these various causes
were fixable and steamboat accidents ultimately avoidable. Despite the evidence of steam
boilers’ proclivity for explosion, the fundamental premise of the Franklin Institute’s
studies was an optimistic one – that dangerous conditions could be limited through
scientific investigation and regulatory action. While recognizing that the power to
regulate “is to be used with extreme caution” and only when “the remedy certain of
success,” the Institute sought through scientific study to determine a set of reasonable
measures that could shape that legal remedy.58
57 Hunter, Steamboats on the Western Waters, 294; Burke, “Bursting Boilers and the Federal Power, 4-5.
John Brockmann provides a detailed accounting of the Franklin Institute’s investigations, arguing that the
institute inaugurated a new style of technical reporting, in Exploding Steamboats, 60-90.
58 Burke, “Bursting Boilers and the Federal Power,” 9.
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As John Brockmann has noted, by the early 1830s steamboat disasters were
receiving national attention, through a House bill to regulate boiler construction and
operation in 1832, and then as part of annual addresses to Congress made by Andrew
Jackson in 1833 and Martin Van Buren in 1837.59 But while attention from the federal
government enhanced the notion that steamboat disasters were a national problem,
Jackson and others were actually just recognizing a pattern already receiving nation-wide
if not yet national attention in print. Government bodies were slow to recognize and then
to act on an issue Americans throughout the nation already understood as a significant
problem. It took until 1838 for an act regulating steamboats to become law. Scholars have
attributed this slowness of federal action to many factors. Until the Franklin Institute
offered some clarity, ignorance about the science of steam boilers and explosions was the
norm, so the government consistently sought more information before acting. There were
also some constitutional concerns about regulating private industry, though these were
fairly quickly overcome by reference to the commerce clause of the Constitution that
gave Congress the right to regulate commerce among the States, and an 1819 precedent
for regulating ocean transport.60 Steamboat owners resistant to regulation also proved
reluctant to provide necessary information about disasters, and both owners and operators
maintained a common position that regulation would actually increase danger by
removing the personal responsibility among captains and engineers that motivated safe
operation.61 Still, Congressional interest in maintaining public safety overcame this
opposition. Another challenge was the inertia of Americans’ national investment in steam
59 Brockmann, Exploding Steamboats, 45.
60 Hunter, Steamboats on the Western Rivers, 526.
61 “Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury.”
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power. The concern expressed in the 1824 report that regulation might hinder further
technological advancement remained present throughout the debate.62
These explanations, however, do not give enough weight to the persistent and
powerful belief that despite repeated disasters, public alarm was overblown and
steamboats were, by and large, a safe mode of travel. The Committee on Commerce’s
report after the Aetna anticipated the optimism of the Franklin Institute when it referred
to “the universal opinion of all persons conversant in such subjects, that Steam Engines,
of a certain construction, may be applied to passage boats with the most perfect
security.”63 Steamboat captains and engineers responding to disasters or to government
inquiries had repeatedly downplayed the dangers of steam. Many inside and outside of
the industry suggested that more Americans died on stages and ships than on steamboats.
As Congressional committees investigated steamboat disasters, they were repeatedly
surprised at the low numbers of steamboat deaths. An 1832 Congressional report found
that up to that year fewer than three hundred people had actually died in steamboat
explosions.64 This narrative about the relative safety of steamboats represented a
departure from early denials that steamboats were at all dangerous. Continued disasters
and the work of the Franklin Institute had made it clear that steam boilers carried a
significant potential for danger. Still, the faith in steam remained, and combined with the
statistical findings of federal studies likely tempered the apparent need for legislation,
especially during years with few significant disasters.
62 These and similar factors have been included in explanations of the bill’s slow development in Hunter,
Steamboats; Burke, “Bursting Boilers and the Federal Power,” and Brockmann, Exploding Steamboats.
63 “Report of the Committee on Commerce.”
64 Burke, “Bursting Boilers and the Federal Power,” 11.
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Nevertheless, the government did act, with the passage of a law to regulate
steamboats in July 1838. The “Act to provide for the better security of the lives of
passengers on board of vessels propelled in whole or in part by steam” approached the
problem from several fronts. The act stipulated rules of operation designed to prevent
collisions and required boats to carry lifeboats as a safety measure for all types of
disaster. It appointed boiler inspectors to check boilers every six months for strength and
recommend maximum pressures. The act also made negligence by owners and employees
a punishable offense and said explosions would be considered evidence of neglect.65
After its passage, the 1838 Steamboat Act received criticism from scientists who
argued it was grossly insufficient. Critics lamented the failure of the act to create a
licensing system for engineers and clear criteria for inspections, and said the law would
generally be a challenge to enforce. The following years would quickly prove the law a
virtual failure in its stated goal of securing the lives of passengers, as disasters continued
killing Americans at an alarming rate. Scholars have echoed contemporary critics that
pointed to the challenges of enforcement and the resistance of the steamboat industry to
such regulation as significant factors in the failure of the law. John Brockmann also
argues that newspaper reports helped create a flawed law because they distracted focus
from systemic technological problems, instead pointing to human incompetence.66 In
fact, while human operators received significant newspaper criticism, disaster reports also
gave significant attention to supposed technological problems – they were just often
incorrect in their assumptions, as with the blame on copper boilers and high pressure
engines. Newspaper reports contributed to the limited success of the law more so in their
65 Burke, “Bursting Boilers and the Federal Power,” 15-16.
66 Brockmann, Exploding Steamboats, 127-128.
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continued support for the widespread perception that steamboats were ultimately safe.
Belief in steam’s inherent safety certainly shaped the type of legislation that finally
passed in the 1838 act. If the technology was fundamentally safe and its associated
dangers circumstantial rather than systemic, then accidents could be avoided and
casualties lowered with various piecemeal regulations that guaranteed basic oversight of
steamboat maintenance and operation.
Echoing the narrative about safety that developed in the press, the investigations
of the federal government effectively reaffirmed the centrality of steam to modern travel,
especially after the 1838 act established a precedent for government intervention to solve
the industry’s minor problems. Complaining that the law encouraged prudent men to
leave the business, steamboat owners wrote in an 1841 memorial to Congress that if the
government had thought steam travel dangerous to the public they would have been
better off banning it entirely.67 The argument was clearly facetious, in part because such
an option was really never a serious consideration. The nation had a considerable
investment in a future that included steam power and the numbers behind steam disasters
offered no compelling case to completely abandon it. The 1838 law had set an important
precedent for regulating the steamboat industry. Calls to amend the act began within
months of it going into effect, but it would take another wave of massive explosions in
the early 1850s before Congress passed a new, more stringent version adding many of the
provisions that critics saw missing from the first attempt. Government action marked the
67 “Memorial of Sundry Proprietors and Managers of American Steam Vessels, on the Impolicy and
Injustice of Certain Enactments Contained in the Law Relating to Steamboats” (New York: 1840), 4,
American Antiquarian Society. Morton Horwitz notes that court decisions quickly became more favorable
to common carriers like steamboat companies, allowing them to contract out of liability for many risks,
sometimes including negligence. Morton Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 202-204
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recognition of a new set of dangers that required national attention, but it was
consistently slow to develop and implicitly suggested steamboat dangers were not
significant enough to halt the ongoing conquest of American space by modern
technology.68
As the federal government and the American public were wrestling with the
problem of steamboat disasters, a new iteration of steam-related danger had arrived. On
November 8, 1833, near Hightstown, New Jersey, an axle broke on a train of the Camden
and Amboy line and the train derailed, killing a North Carolina man, J. C. Stediman, who
became the first passenger fatality on American railroads. The crash received added
attention because one of those who walked away unharmed was former President and
then Congressman John Quincy Adams. In his diary entry for the day, Adams described
the locomotive and the layout of the passenger cars and then recorded the details that
newspapers would soon report to Americans around the country. The train had consisted
of two passenger cars followed by a baggage car. When the axle broke on the forward
car, where Adams was sitting, the car fell to the tracks and the trailing passenger car ran
directly into it and flew off the rail. Stediman was in the rear car, and almost all the other
twenty-five passengers in the car sustained some degree of injury.69
During the 1830s, other accidents joined the Hightstown disaster, including
another derailment in 1836 on the Columbia Railroad in Ohio and an 1837 collision on
68 Burke, “Bursting Boilers and the Federal Power,” 17-18; Hunter, Steamboats on the Western Rivers, 532-
534. Federal regulation of steamboats offers a profound demonstration of an active federal government in
nineteenth-century America, and a very visible one, contrary to the typical activities of the federal
government described in Brian Balogh, A Government Out of Sight: The Mystery of National Authority in
Nineteenth-Century America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
69 The John Quincy Adams Diaries, Vol. 39, entry dated November 8, 1833, Massachusetts Historical
Society, accessed online at http://www.masshist.org/jqadiaries/php/.
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the Portsmouth and Roanoke, both killing three passengers. Like steamboat accidents,
train crashes occurred on the road, killing victims away from their point of origin and
pulling in participants who happened to be close by. The home of Mr. Richard Goodwin,
for example, housed victims after the collision on the Portsmouth and Roanoke Railroad.
The trains collided just one hundred yards from his home, and soon “Mr. Goodwin’s
house presented the appearance of a hospital.”70 Many Americans encountered rail
accidents personally, but, as with steamboat disasters, most confronted this new trend in
the newspapers.
Public outcry about early railroad disasters initially lacked the fervor of the
response to steamboat explosions. Railroad accidents did not rival steamboat disasters for
drama, and disasters, though frequent, killed very few at first. The low death toll was
likely due to several factors; low capacity for passengers early on limited the extent of
potential casualties and collisions and derailments tended to isolate damage to one section
of the train. Boiler explosions were less frequent on trains with smaller engines that did
not require the operating pressures of western steamboats, and, if they occurred, only
employees were generally close enough to be endangered. Unlike sinking or burning
steamboats, wrecked trains did not force passengers to the water, where many drowned.
The absence of major early disasters, writes Mark Aldrich, may also have been just pure
luck.71
It was also the case that two decades into the steamboat era, Americans had
already developed a familiarity with steam-related transportation disasters. After the first
70 The Richmond Enquirer, August 18, 1837.
71 Mark Aldrich, Death Rode the Rails: American Railroad Accidents and Safety, 1828-1965 (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 38-40.
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deadly rail accidents in the 1830s, newspaper reports displayed no illusions that these
modern machines could be entirely accident-proof. “No mode of conveyance is exempt
from accident, or can be made so,” read an article in the American Railroad Journal after
the Camden and Amboy crash. The responses to early disasters portray a sense of the
inevitability and randomness of rail accidents. The Camden and Amboy crash was “one
of those occurrences which scarcely any human foresight or caution can guard against.”72
An article published in the Commercial Advertiser about the Columbia crash made
virtually the same claim: “this seems to be one of those accidents against which it is
difficult to guard.”73 A writer for a local Portsmouth, Virginia, paper seemed unsurprised
by the nearby collision between a passenger car and a lumber train that killed three
women, simply saying “for the first time since the construction of the Portsmouth and
Roanoke Railroad, has it fallen to our lot to record one of those melancholy accidents
which… seem destined at times to visit that as every other mode of travelling.”74 An
accident was bound to happen here eventually, the writer suggested, and it might only
prove the “first time” of several.
The frequent claims that companies had taken all proper precautions and the
accidents could not have been foreseen would seem to intensify public fears. Instead,
even more than with steamboat disasters, the randomness and unique character of each
early rail accident combated notions of any specific, pervasive danger. Addressing the
public after the 1833 crash, the executive committee of the Camden and Amboy Railroad
Company attributed the disaster to what was likely a “latent defect” in the iron of the axle
72 American Railroad Journal, November 16, 1833.
73 Commercial Advertiser, October 5, 1836.
74 Connecticut Gazette, August 23, 1837.
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which caused undue pressure and the ultimate break. Even with the broken axle, they
said, the passenger casualties resulted only from the brakeman being away from his post
for a moment and therefore unable to stop the second car – “a combination of
circumstances that have never before occurred and in all human probability will never
again occur.”75 After the Portsmouth disaster, various reports emphasized that “at no
other point on the road could such an accident have occurred.”76 The rest of the road was
flat and offered visibility for great distances; this fact made the accident a truly “singular”
event.77
Thus, even if observers could in no way deny the possibility of fatal accidents, as
had been common in steam power’s infancy, the impulse to assert the overall safety of an
innovation in which Americans already had so much cultural investment remained strong.
Even though death tolls were significantly lower than those from steamboat disasters, the
early years of railroad travel in the United States suggested that trains presented even
more opportunity for disaster than steamboats. The precarious nature of early railroad
travel was perhaps no better demonstrated than in the chaotic aftermath of the Columbia
and Portsmouth disasters. After the Columbia train derailed in Ohio, killing three and
injuring dozens, the locomotive detached its cars and went alone to nearby Lancaster to
retrieve medical assistance. While it was away, the undamaged cars were set back on the
track, the unharmed passengers reloaded, and the train restarted down the track. As one
report described, “they had proceeded but a short distance, when they encountered the
returning engine, rounding a curve,” meeting in a second crash that left several more
75 American Railroad Journal, November 16, 1833.
76 Richmond Enquirer, August 18, 1837.
77 Richmond Enquirer, August 25, 1837.
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passengers injured.78 A secondary disaster likewise followed the Portsmouth collision,
when the engine, returning to Suffolk for wood and water through darkness and heavy
rain, ran over and killed James Woodward and Richard Oliver, “two citizens of the
neighborhood, who were walking on the track.”79 The engineer was not even aware he hit
the two walkers until the bodies were found.80
These kinds of idiosyncratic accidents resulting in part from a lack of experience
with the technology and its operation initially clouded pervasive issues distinct to the
character of American railroads that would plague the industry for a century to come. The
early railroad tracks laid in the United States were cheaply constructed and prone to
breakage. Even more significant was the fact that, unlike steamboats, multiple lines of
railroad traffic moved along the very same track. Whereas railroads in Britain had been
built with a double track for multiple lines of traffic, most American railroad builders
opted for the cheaper single track, which required good communication and complex
operating procedures to determine right of way. Trains were thus much more likely than
steamboats to suffer collisions, especially before the telegraph and advanced signaling
techniques brought greater coordination among trains on the same track after
midcentury.81
Though early disasters represented a dangerous system, the many discrete
possibilities for rail accidents contributed to an emerging narrative that disasters actually
resulted in safer travel. A couple weeks after the Camden and Amboy wreck, the Evening
78 Pennsylvania Enquirer, October 8, 1836.
79 Evening Post, August 17, 1837.
80 New Hampshire Gazette, August 22, 1837.
81 The numerous hazards of early railroads are thoroughly discussed in Aldrich, Death Rode the Rails,
Chapter 1.
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Post reported that “a very simple contrivance” had been adopted on the rail line that, in
the event of a broken axle, would keep the car propped up and stop the train immediately.
The Post followed the news with this platitude: “It is by experience only, that we are
taught to guard against the accidents to which we are liable in life.”82 In another variation
on the theme, an engineer wrote that railroads were more prone to accidents “but their
security springs from this very cause.”83 The engineer contended that with so many
potential accidents, a train’s workers had to be constantly alert. This rhetorical gambit,
where the train’s propensity for accidents actually made it safer than other forms of
transportation, was a prominent form of positive spin in early rail disaster responses. That
is not to say the claim was false. Railroad accidents often lacked the mystery of early
steamboat disasters, as the mechanics of a derailment or collision were more easily
explained than a boiler explosion, thus a targeted fix was more feasible. Still, fixes were
often localized, made by individual lines rather than system-wide. The necessary
improvement was made on the Camden and Amboy line to prevent a recurrence of the
1833 crash, but this did not prevent the nearly identical accident from happening on the
Columbia line three years later.
What railroad accidents also offered much more than steamboat accidents was a
numbers game – the ratio of casualties to total passengers became the key element in the
narrative maintaining railroad safety. Following the Portsmouth collision, a local editor
made the argument clearly: “The day’s history was one of disaster, yet painful as it was,
and not standing alone in the annals of Rail Roads, there is no cause for the growth of any
prejudice against that mode of travelling. Of two hundred and fifty persons how large a
82 Evening Post, November 23, 1833.
83 Richmond Enquirer, August 22, 1837.
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proportion escaped uninjured.” Even while admitting that accidents were common, the
writer minimized their danger by shifting the perspective away from the few dead to the
much more numerous who escaped alive. Echoing the responses to early steamboat
disasters, the writer then favorably compared the low death toll to other transportation
accidents, except now the record of steamboat disasters aided the effort: “compare with
this the sweeping disasters, in steam navigation, the dreadful stage accidents, which
frequently out of seven or nine persons consign to the grave as many as have now
perished.” Observers, he concluded, could come to no other logical conclusion than that
progress had continued, as railroads were “the most expeditious and secure travelling
instrument known to the world.”84
This point was consistently made to readers after early rail disasters. When the
editor of the Petersburg Intelligencer wrote of the “alarming” frequency of rail accidents
after the Portsmouth disaster, an engineer for another local railroad wrote the paper and
defiantly asked, “we all know that railroads are liable to accidents, but are they more so
than other conveyances?” The engineer answered no, even though later in the same letter
he wrote that “railroads, from their nature, are more liable to accident than other
conveyances.” The self-contradiction perhaps reflected the engineer’s faith that railroad
accidents were preventable. The engineer went on to provide numbers and examples that
suggested rail accidents were “generally less fatal” than other accidents.85 The American
Railroad Journal declared after the Camden and Amboy crash that, in proportion to the
number of travelers carried, railroads were “vastly less hazardous than the dullest stages
84 New Hampshire Gazette, August 22, 1837.
85 Richmond Enquirer, August 22, 1837.
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or the surest sailing vessels.”86 The significance of this argument should not be
understated; by its logic, as railroad traffic increased, as it would soon dramatically do,
deaths on the railroad could become almost negligible – tragic cases, but not signs of a
dangerous mode of travel. The early formation of this narrative therefore helped buttress
railroads against future critique; continued accidents might bring calls for regulation and
reform, but the possibility of a wholesale rejection of the technology, if there ever was
one, would be buried by the rapid advance of a demonstrably progressive industry.
Maintaining faith in the safety of railroad travel was certainly easier when no
truly major accidents had yet occurred. As late as 1849, William Lloyd Garrison
commented on the difference between steamboat and railroad travel, saying “nothing has
yet occurred on any of our railroads so fraught with horrors as the remembrance of the
fate of the Lexington or the Atlantic or so many a similar disaster on the western
rivers.”87 Within the next decade, a wave of railroad accidents produced high fatality
numbers – close to fifty dead in an 1853 derailment near Norwalk, Connecticut; sixty-six
dead in an 1856 collision outside Philadelphia; forty dead after a bridge collapsed in
Indiana in 1859, and more.88 These accidents were more in line with the threat posed by
railroads for most of the century. As steamboats and railroads came to share the traffic
load in the United States, the public identified both railroad accidents and steamboat
tragedies together as perils of modern transportation.
86 American Railroad Journal, November 16, 1833.
87 William Lloyd Garrison, quoted in Arwen Mohun, Risk: Negotiating Safety in American Society
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013), 93.
88 Mark Aldrich discusses the reasons why this wave of major disasters may have occurred, namely larger,
heavier trains and higher passenger loads, in Death Rode the Rails, 38-40.
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After a few decades of steam navigation in the United States, it was quite clear to
Americans that the machines that provided the benefits of speed and power were prone to
disaster. Still, there is some merit to claims that overall fatality numbers were relatively
low. The federal government’s counts on steamboat deaths, done in the 1830s, were
rough estimates, as they were based mostly on newspaper reports, but they likely
represent a fairly accurate accounting of the human consequences of early steamboat
disasters. Louis Hunter estimates an average annual loss of life of 150 for the period
between 1807 and 1852, and 340 for the last twenty years of that period.89 Considering
the United States population of the time, roughly twenty-three million in 1850, this was
not an insignificant total, but still one that seems out of proportion to the level of political
and cultural attention that steamboat disasters received, especially relative to other forms
of danger.
Of course, newspapers were not printing front-page stories about every accident-
free steamboat and rail journey. As Hunter writes, the statistics may have mattered little
to a public aroused by frequent shocking disasters.90 Even if the public accepted the
premise that the threat of steamboat and rail disasters was smaller than it seemed, the
continued appearance of disaster stories in the pages of the newspaper cemented the tie
between steam travel and danger in the public mind. No matter how much Americans
fundamentally embraced steam technology and enjoyed its benefits, this association
resurfaced strongly with each steamboat or train disaster. The influence of this disaster
and anecdote-driven public response was significant, facilitating the understanding of
steam disasters as a frightful national pattern. Newspaper articles contributed to this
89 Hunter, Steamboats on the Western Rivers, 521.
90 Hunter, Steamboats on the Western Rivers, 522.
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perception in the early years with comparisons and references to earlier accidents. The
press placed disasters in the context of a string of other accidents readers had often read
of before, stitching the events together such that they were not just separate tragedies but
evidence of a persistent threat. For example, in the aftermath of a non-fatal accident on
the Baltimore Railroad in 1839, readers of the Daily National Intelligencer were
reminded in a letter to the editors of “the dreadful disaster on the Portsmouth railroad,
some year and a half ago, by which so many persons were killed or maimed.”91
The effects of seemingly continual disaster reporting over the century on public
perceptions were substantial. A published narrative on the 1838 disaster of the steamboat
Pulaski began with the solemn note that “disaster has followed disaster… before the
mind could become tranquil from the sad tidings learned from one, another and yet
another would follow.”92 A woman in Cabotville, Massachusetts, wrote of the wreck of
the Atlantic in Long Island Sound in her diary in 1846, quoting a newspaper report: “The
N.Y. Observer in speaking of it remarks, ‘Not since the loss of the Lexington has it been
our painful duty to record so melancholy an accident upon our inland waters.’”93
Coverage of disasters happening all around the country continued through the century to
make accidents unsurprising and apparently unceasing. Henry David Thoreau included
steam disasters in a list of monotonous news subjects: “if we read of one man robbed, or
murdered, or killed by accident, or one house burned, or one vessel wrecked, or one
steamboat blown up… we never need read of another.”94 A Harper’s Weekly editorial in
91 Daily National Intelligencer, February 11, 1839.
92 “A Minute and Circumstantial Narrative of the Loss of the Steam-Packet Pulaski…” (Providence: H. H.
Brown, 1838), v. AAS.
93 Eleanor Huse Ames Diaries, entry dated November 28, 1846, AAS.
94 Henry David Thoreau, Walden (New York: Signet Classics, 2012), 76.
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1865 said, “people open their papers every morning with the wonder, ‘who has been
killed now?’ There is a special and necessary department in the papers of railroad
slaughters.”95 And near the end of the century, Caroline Barrett White wrote in her diary
that “railroad accidents are so numerous, and fatal that I dread seeing a newspaper.”96
Nor were public figures at the highest level of government immune to the
influence of disaster coverage. In May 1830, Representative Charles Anderson Wickliffe
of Kentucky submitted a resolution that the Secretary of the Treasury gather information
about potential regulations to prevent steamboat boiler explosions.97 A month before on
the floor of Congress Wickliffe specifically mentioned reading an account “of the late
dreadful calamity” – an explosion on board the Helen McGregor that had garnered
national press.98 President Andrew Jackson’s urging of Congress to give “immediate and
unremitting attention” to the “distressing” and “constantly increasing” accidents came
just weeks after the nation’s first fatal train wreck.99 And after years of study and
conversation it was a series of shocking steamboat disasters killing close to three hundred
people in 1838 that finally brought the steamboat bill to a vote. Print culture and the
shared public memory it created about steam-related disasters influenced the
governmental discourse just as it did public opinion, with perceptions often outweighing
determinations of relative danger. For the many Americans who never directly witnessed
95 Harper’s Weekly, September 16, 1865.
96 The Papers of Caroline Barrett White, Volume 21, entry dated September 7, 1893, AAS.
97 Resolution No. 14, United States House of Representatives, 21st Congress, 1st Session.
98 Register of Debates in Congress, Comprising the Leading Debates and Incidents of the First Session of
the Twenty-First Congress,” April 6, 1830, 739.
99 Andrew Jackson, Fifth Annual Message to Congress, December 3, 1833, Miller Center, The University
of Virginia, accessed online at http://millercenter.org/president/jackson/speeches/speech-3640.
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or experienced a transportation disaster, newspapers made steamboat and rail accidents
recognizable, fear-inducing events.
Moreover, at any time the reality of steam’s dangers could shift from an imagined
but distant threat to a close, personal experience, as the survival stories of people like
John Quincy Adams prove. Adams’s account of the Hightstown crash in 1833 is buried
within the fifty-one volumes of his meticulously kept diaries. His entries leading up to
crash describe fairly mundane travel days as Adams made his way from Quincy to
Washington by stage, steamboat, and then on the eighth, rail. The entry dated November
8 opens with Adams’s reflections on the harrowing day: “Blessed! Ever Blessed by the
name of God! That I am alive, and have escaped unhurt from the most dreadful
catastrophe that ever my eyes behold.” “The scene of sufferance was excruciating,”
Adams wrote, with passengers “bleeding, mangled, groaning, writhing in torture and
dying” along the road. It was, he said, “a trial of feeling to which I had never before been
called.”100
In the following days as Adams returned to his family and work, his thoughts still
frequently returned to the accident. “My mind has been in a state of agitation, unable to
think composedly, since the dreadful accident… a danger so extreme – a deliverance so
wonderful.”101 Later, Adams recorded the news that two more “fellow travellers” from
the accident had died.102 The accident was of course just one day in an eventful life for
John Quincy Adams, but it was a significant one. In a separate diary where Adams wrote
just a single line for each day, the exclamatory words “Railway Catastrophe!” shout out
100 Adams Diaries, Vol. 39, entry dated November 8, 1833.
101 Adams Diaries, Vol. 39, entry dated November 9, 1833.
102 Adams Diaries, Vol. 39, entry dated November 12, 1833.
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from the page as a profound interruption of routine.103 The accident surely threatened to
distort Adams’s perceptions of rail technology, an effect he may have been alluding to
when he wrote of the “superstitious impressions which involuntarily arise” from the
disaster.104
The diary of Henry Ballard, an Englishman and Mormon convert who survived an
explosion on the Saluda steamboat on his way to Salt Lake City in 1852, similarly
reflects the significance of his encounter with danger. More than seventy-five passengers
died in the explosion, including much of Ballard’s migrating party. Ballard recorded the
event near the beginning of a journal he kept from 1852 to 1904. If his journal is any
indication, Henry Ballard was likely not a man of many words. His entries are irregular
and infrequent; months, and sometimes years, pass between them. Though the journal
spans fifty-two years it is only one volume, and most entries are just a few lines. Major
events like Abraham Lincoln’s assassination and the death of Brigham Young nearby in
1876 receive the briefest commentary. And yet his entry for April 9, 1852, describes in
intricate detail the explosion aboard the Saluda, his injuries, and his narrow escape from
death. “I was blown about 2 rods and under a bunk with a man with his brains out,”
Ballard recorded. Blood streamed down his face from a head wound. Later, amidst the
wreckage, Ballard wrote that he found “the bread which I had in my hand also my knife
each covered with blood, and the tin cup that I had up to my mouth at the time mashed
103 Adams Diaries, Vol. 23, November, 1833.
104 Adams Diaries, Vol. 39, entry dated November 9, 1833.
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flat as a dollar.” The account forms by far the longest entry in Ballard’s journal – the
written record of a memory not easily forgotten.105
Within the year, on January 6, 1853, President-Elect Franklin Pierce was traveling
with his wife and eleven-year-old son from Andover, Massachusetts, to Concord, New
Hampshire, on the Boston and Maine Railroad when an axle broke, sending the train
crashing into the embankment. Initial rumors said that Pierce had died; in fact he had
survived unharmed, but his son Benjamin was among the deceased victims. Two months
later, the President began his presidency alluding to his grief: “It is a relief to feel that no
heart but my own can know the personal regret and bitter sorrow over which I have been
borne to a position so suitable for others rather than desirable for myself.”106
For most Americans, it was printed stories and lists of dead strangers that
familiarized them the dangers of steam travel, but steamboat and train disasters were
something anyone could suddenly experience on the most personal level. Print connected
readers with distant disasters, illustrated a pattern of danger that could not be ignored, and
revealed an underside of steam-powered mobility that potentially threatened all travelers.
The record of frequent accidents and numbered dead bound steam power and danger
together in the American mind, but so too did personal contact with disaster and the
stories it created – the grief of children lost, the narrow escapes from sure death, the
heroic rescues. Steam disasters were powerfully emotive events, and the narratives that
emerged often overpowered rational evaluations of the problem. As the nineteenth
century rolled on and more powerful steamboats blew up and faster trains crashed, the
105 Private Journal of Henry Ballard, entries dated April 16, 1865; August 29; 1876; April 9, 1852,
Huntington Library.
106 Franklin Pierce, Inaugural Address, March 4, 1853, Miller Center, The University of Virginia, accessed
online at http://millercenter.org/president/pierce/speeches/speech-3553.
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numbers of dead increased but so did the drama, and the cultural salience of the steam
disaster grew not just from exposure but from the very nature of the disasters themselves.
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Chapter Three:
Visualizing Catastrophe
On a very early November morning in 1847, the steamboat Phoenix caught fire on
Lake Michigan. The fire quickly consumed the boat, burning passengers and forcing
others to their deaths in the frigid lake. Almost all those on board, who numbered about
160 passengers and crew, perished in the accident, with only a small group finding rescue
from the water. The story of the Phoenix disaster was colorfully retold in J. T. Lloyd’s
1856 book, Lloyd’s Steamboat Directory, with a narrative pulled from newspaper
coverage and based primarily on the account of a surviving engineer, “Mr. House.” The
narrative described how House escaped to the water and then spent hours floating on
wreckage before a passing boat, the Delaware, picked him up along with other survivors.
Lloyd’s narrative included a small engraved image of the burning Phoenix, but
the written description painted an even more vivid picture: “The hull was a complete bed
of fire, which, bursting in flames from the sides, at times streamed far out over the
waters, and then curled aloft, till flame meeting flame, the combined fiery current rushed
furiously upward till it appeared to be lost in the clouds.” Passengers clung to pieces of
the flaming boat, “their terror-marked features” lit “by the ghastly glare of the flames.”
The narrative imagined the flaming steamboat in a manner familiar to many nineteenth-
century readers, as a “grand, but dreadful object,” a “most awful and sublime spectacle.”
It was a terrifying and dynamic vision of destruction wrought by one of America’s most
beloved machines. But just as House was losing hope of survival, another vision
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appeared: the lights of an approaching steamboat, the Delaware, bringing “deliverance”
to those remaining in the water.1
The narrative in Lloyd’s Steamboat Directory was a fairly standard account, the
broad outlines similar to the scores of stories of other steamboat disasters that Americans
read in newspapers, but its representation of the scenes and images of the disaster
captures the varied perceptions that powerful new steam technologies evoked for the
American public. Just a few decades into the nineteenth century, steam transportation was
ubiquitous, and so were steam disasters. Printed reports of repeated disasters had
acquainted readers across the nation with the dangers of the technology they celebrated,
and even after attempts were made to limit them, disasters continued. Mr. House’s
account of his survival figuratively presented the dual nature of steam with which
Americans had become familiar: side by side, steamboats appeared as both destroyer and
savior. Seen as symbols of modern innovation and national advancement, steamboats and
trains became sublime spectacles in nineteenth-century America, but so too did burning
boats and wrecked locomotives. The Phoenix bathed in flame exemplifies the particular
spectacle of modern disaster, one that had significant public appeal. Throughout the
century, artists, the press, and publishers produced mass numbers of images and
narratives of steam disasters meant for public consumption.
Together, these representations formed the nation’s collective image of the
phenomenon of steam transportation disasters. Scholars of modernity have often
identified vision and spectacle as the most significant sensory experiences of modern life.
In his book, Social Formation and Symbolic Landscape, Denis Cosgrove argues that
1 James T. Lloyd, Lloyd’s Steamboat Directory, and Disasters on the Western Waters… (Cincinnati: J.T.
Lloyd & Co., 1856), 181.
117
modernity involved a spatial reorganization toward visual consumption of the world, in
which humans increasingly became spectators and consumers of their environment.2 In
her study of late nineteenth-century Paris, Vanessa Schwartz argues that popular culture
became strongly oriented to mass visual entertainment. Schwartz goes further to contend
that visual spectacles became collective experiences of modernity, offering viewers the
opportunity to identify with their urban place, Paris, and with their fellow Parisians who
shared in those visual experiences.3 In other words, she says, “modes of representation
constituted rather than merely characterized modern urban culture.”4 This chapter argues
that the transition to modernity in the early United States was marked by the creation of
collective experiences and a shared sense of belonging through predominantly visual
representations, and that the sublime spectacles of steam transportation and its associated
dangers were central to that creation. Written and visual depictions of disasters, spread
throughout the country, constituted shared public experiences of a modern technological
nation and became the basis for new social relations and a collective conception of
modern travel that stretched across vast distances.
Visualized in words and images, steamboat and rail disasters like the Phoenix fire
turned into near mythological dramas. The sets of those dramas were visually spectacular
scenes of steamboat fires and explosions, train collisions and derailments; their plots
were the compelling human moments that played out amidst terrible tragedy and chaos.
Artists, writers, and publishers, relying on an expanding American print culture and new
2 Denis Cosgrove, Social Formation and Symbolic Landscape, revised edition (Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1998).
3 Vanessa R. Schwartz, Spectacular Realities: Early Mass Culture in Fin-de-Siècle Paris (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1997).
4 Schwartz, Spectacular Realities, 4.
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methods of image production, presented steam disasters to the public with sublime
images, artful language, and storytelling technique that magnified the horrific and
attractive qualities of catastrophe. Thus, initial newspaper reports with death tolls, victim
lists, and attempts to determine cause had introduced American readers to disasters,
highlighted a widespread pattern of danger, and brought disasters to national
consciousness, but the narrative accounts and vivid representations that grew from those
initial reports brought the disasters to life for the American public.
Representations of steam disasters offered the public an imaginative and
sometimes emotional connection to the disaster and its various thrilling scenes. Written
and visual imagery confronted individuals with distant disasters and also further
developed America’s cultural consciousness of transportation technology and its
associated dangers. Steam disaster narratives and images formed a recognizable, coherent
genre that enhanced awareness of a widespread problem and made steamboat and rail
accidents mutually intelligible and easily-imagined features of an emerging modern,
technological society. At the same time, although words and pictures brought the
American public closer to the excitement and fear of disaster, they also reduced
Americans’ encounter with disaster to a predominantly visual experience separated from
any actual threat. The form and delivery of these representations of disaster thus
profoundly shaped Americans’ relationship to the dangers steam technology presented.
Allowed to envision disaster from a position of safety, readers and viewers could absorb
the stories and images of destruction as elaborate, exciting dramas and displays of
sublime modern technological power rather than simply as reflections of a harsh reality.
Steam disasters continued to reveal an extensive problem of public safety, but they also
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became colorful visions of modern life that Americans feverishly consumed. The Phoenix
disaster was a horrific tragedy, but it was a compelling story. Befitting its name, the
Phoenix met its demise enveloped in fire, but when the flames subsided, what remained
were dramatic representations of its fearful end and a prevailing vision of technological
power.
When observers called the Phoenix fire and other disasters sublime, they invoked
an emotional experience traditionally associated with humans’ relationship with nature
and the divine. The philosophical concept of the sublime, which framed the term’s most
common usage in the early United States, was defined most thoroughly by eighteenth-
century European thinkers, notably Edmund Burke, who explored the sublime at length in
his 1756 work A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and
the Beautiful.5 Burke argued that the sublime and the beautiful represented distinct
aesthetic qualities – whereas beauty described objects that inspired feelings of pleasure,
sublime objects and scenes overwhelmed the senses, provoking both fascination and fear.
The Burkean sublime captured the profound experience one might have when faced with
an awesome display of God’s power and nature’s grandeur. Immanuel Kant further
developed the idea of the sublime, dividing it into two types: the mathematical sublime,
which arose from a contemplation of vast, seemingly limitless nature, like a mountaintop
vista, and the dynamic sublime, which described scenes of tremendous and terrifying
power, like a storm or natural disaster.6 Dynamic sublimity derived from a quality of
5 Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2015).
6 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987).
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fearfulness, but crucially a fearfulness accompanied by little actual threat. Kant wrote of
sublime scenes that “we are all the more attracted by their aspect the more fearful they
are, when we are in a state of security,” and thus it was possible to “view an object as
fearful without being afraid of it.”7 The pain and pleasure of the sublime came from
contemplating terrifying power and mastering that power through reason.
These particular qualities made the sublime a prominent subject for representation
by eighteenth- and nineteenth-century artists, particularly with the rise of Romanticism in
painting. Artists visually captured the sublime through paintings of vast landscapes and
scenes of humans overwhelmed by nature, forcing viewers “to confront the helplessness
of humanity before uncontrollable natural forces.”8 In the early United States, the concept
of the sublime acquired particular force, as suggested by the ten different editions of
Burke’s A Philosophical Enquiry published in the United States between 1800 and 1856.9
American thinkers like Thomas Jefferson, who wrote of the sublime in Notes on the State
of Virginia, located in the American landscape a source of nationalist identity, and artists
followed suit. American painters of the Hudson River School like Thomas Cole and
Frederic Edwin Church took up the project of depicting the sublime landscape as an
American symbol. Their large-scale paintings of the country’s most astonishing natural
7 Immanuel Kant, quoted in David Nye, American Technological Sublime (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994),
7.
8 David C. Miller, “The Iconology of Wrecked or Stranded Boats in Mid to Late Nineteenth-Century
American Culture,” in American Iconology: New Approaches to Nineteenth-Century Art and Literature, ed.
David C. Miller (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 186.
9 Robert Doak, “The Natural Sublime and American Nationalism: 1800-1850” Studies in Popular Culture,
25, 2 (October 2002), 13.
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features, often displayed in ways intended to overwhelm the viewer, presented visions of
divine majesty that stunned audiences with their terrifying beauty.10
Simultaneously, though, Americans began finding new sources of sublimity in
technological marvels like steamboats and trains. Steam power, applied to transportation,
inspired such amazement and awe in American viewers that their experiences could
easily be characterized by the sublime, and contemporary descriptions often used the
term. In January 1812, a New York periodical called The Casket published a brief story
entitled “Alarm on the Ohio.” It described a scene from a few nights before along the
banks of the Ohio River, where a sudden “lumbering noise… resembling the roar of a
rushing torrent” frightened and confused nearby inhabitants. The story continued: “as the
noise approached it became more terrific, some-what similar to the deep peals of distant
thunder.” Then came “the sublimest part of the scene,” when the river seemed on fire and
“some phenomenon, which vomited fire and smoke with tremendous noise, darted along
the surface of the stream with the rapidity of a meteor.” The onlookers feared for their
lives and thought the end of the world had arrived, but “were not a little relieved” to find
that this was only a steamboat passing down the river.11
The story may have been fictitious, or was at least given a colorful flair by the
writer, but the emotional response it describes was common to early encounters with
steam technology. One author depicted the response through the perspective of children
in an 1850s storybook called “The Steamboat.” “Many years ago,” the story begins, Mr.
10 Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia (London: Stockdale, 1787). On the Hudson River
School and American landscape painting, see Barbara Novak, Nature and Culture: American Landscape
and Painting, 1825-1975 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980) and Andrew Wilton and Tim
Barringer, American Sublime: Landscape Painting in the United States, 1820-1880 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2002).
11 The Casket, January 4, 1812.
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Reed and his two granddaughters Harriet and Sallie, none of them having ever seen a
steamboat, went to have a look at one. The children were immediately frightened.
Harriet, the older child, comforted Sallie, “telling her it would not hurt her, though by no
means quite sure of that herself.” Harriet and Sallie soon agreed that it was alive, and the
smoke was surely its breath. Harriet explained, “it makes such a noise, I guess, because it
is tired going so fast!” In the end, the children overcome their initial fears when Mr. Reed
explains that the steamer was just a very big boat.12
The combined fearfulness and attraction of steamboats was not restricted to first
encounters either.13 Take this tribute from a steamboat passenger in 1837:
A Mississippi steamer of 700 tons burthen, with adequate machinery, is one of the
sublimities of poetry… and if you have a soul that makes you a man, you cannot
help feeling strongly alive to the mightiness of art in contrast with the mightiness
of nature. Such a scene, and hundreds such have been realized with an intensity
that cannot be described, always make me a better man than before.14
The passenger’s admiration is especially striking considering he was describing the Ben
Sherrod, from which he had just barely escaped alive. Few captured the beauty of
steamboats better than Mark Twain; as he writes in the voice of Huckleberry Finn: “Once
or twice a night we would see a steamboat slipping along in the dark, and now and then
she would belch a whole world of sparks up out of her chimbleys, and they would rain
down in the river and look awful pretty.”15
Trains garnered even more wonder, their power and speed provoking near-
obsessive interest for many observers. A New York man recorded an 1839 encounter in
12 Cousin Grace’s Pretty Story Books, No. 4, “The Steamboat” (Lowell: Joshua Merrill, 1856-57),
American Antiquarian Society.
13 David Nye writes that “the mark of the truly sublime object” was “that it grows in significance with
repetition.” David E. Nye, American Technological Sublime (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994), 15.
14 S. A. Howland, Steamboat Disasters and Railroad Accidents in the United States… (Worcester: Dorr,
Howland & Co., 1840).
15 Mark Twain, The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn (Dover Publications, 1994), 90.
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his diary, describing the train’s “whizzing and rattling and panting, with its fiery furnace
gleaming in front, its chimney vomiting fire smoke above, and its long train of cars
rushing along behind like the body and tail of a gigantic dragon – or the d-l himself – and
all darting forward at the rate of twenty miles an hour. Whew!”16 Transcendentalist
writers like Henry David Thoreau offer some of the most elegant expressions of the
train’s sublimity. Though Thoreau disdained the machine’s intrusion on his peaceful
escape at Walden Pond and mused on the railroad’s unfortunate consequences for
American society, his words still reflect an overwhelming sensory experience not easily
grasped:
When I meet the engine with its train of cars moving off with planetary motion, –
or, rather, like a comet, for the beholder knows not if with that velocity and with
that direction it will ever revisit this system… when I hear the iron horse make the
hills echo with his snore like thunder, shaking the earth with his feet, and
breathing fire and smoke from his nostrils… it seems as if the earth had got a race
now worthy to inhabit it.17
The same frightful amazement comes through Walt Whitman’s ode “To a Locomotive in
Winter” when he calls the train “Fierce-throated beauty!” and admires its “piercing,
madly whistled laughter” and “echoes, rumbling like an earthquake.”18 The examples
abound – for many Americans, steamboats and trains evoked the fear and fascination that
were common elements of sublime experiences of nature that Burke and Kant described.
Alongside the American landscape, American technology increasingly evoked a
distinctive national culture. A Swedish traveler visiting the United States at midcentury
noted that American schoolboys across the country were constantly drawing trains and
16 Nye, American Technological Sublime, 55.
17 Henry David Thoreau, Walden (New York: Signet Classics, 2012), 95.
18 Walt Whitman, “To a Locomotive in Winter,” in Leaves of Grass (Philadelphia: David McKay, 1900),
260.
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steamboats on their slates.19 Naturally, more accomplished American artists found in
them subjects of interest as well. At first, American painters integrated steamboats and
the railroad fairly seamlessly into their landscapes; in many paintings steamboats and
trains are small details of a larger pastoral scene. Quickly, though, the powerful
technologies became the focus of many visual studies that took on a sublime character.20
Though speed was difficult to represent in still images, images of moving boats or trains
played on viewers’ familiarity with the experience and the idea of speed. Pictures of
racing steamboats with smoking chimneys displayed the capability of steam power.
Artists also developed a visual convention of orienting the boat or locomotive’s motion
directly toward the picture plane, which maximized the sublimity of the machine by
giving it a monumental presence and revealing it as a potentially threatening force to the
viewer.
Americans’ various conceptions of these powerful machines embody what some
scholars have called “the technological sublime.” David Nye characterizes the
technological sublime as a “social construction of certain powerful experiences in
industrial society,” and he identifies the railroad as the first major American example.
Like mountain vistas and other examples of the Kantian mathematical sublime, new
technologies like bridges and dams astonished Americans with their enormous scale,
strength, and engineered beauty. The speed and power demonstrated by transportation
innovations gave Americans a technological experience of Kant’s dynamic sublime. With
steamboats and railroads, the sense of technological sublime was closely related to the
19 Frederika Bremer, quoted in Nye, American Technological Sublime, 56.
20 For more on the railroad and American visual culture, see Susan Danly and Leo Marx, eds., The Railroad
in American Art: Representations of Technological Change (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988).
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rhetoric tying expanded mobility to national progress and republican identity. Like
Thoreau, many Americans saw steam transportation as a marker of a new age, a
perception reflected in the grand celebrations that often launched the opening of a new
railroad line. Nye writes that such celebrations reflect the extent to which Americans’
amazement at technological marvels became a “defining ideal,” a sort of national religion
for a modern, pluralistic society. Indeed, technological experiences served as a substitute
for experiences of the divine in nature, inspiring a shared emotional response among
American observers.21
The pace and character of technological innovation provided Americans a
consistent source of new sublime experiences. Of course, Nye argues, though the
psychological reaction provoked by technology was characteristically sublime, it was
also distinct from the sublime in nature:
Because the overwhelming power displayed was human rather than natural, the
“dialogue” was now not between man and nature but between man and the man-
made. The awe induced by seeing an immense or dynamic technological object
became a celebration of the power of human reason… The sense of weakness and
humiliation before the superior power of nature was thus redirected, because the
power displayed was not that of God or nature but that of particular human
beings.22
In other words, Nye says, the feelings of the natural sublime could eventually be
overcome by human reason, but the sublime technological object was human reason
itself, given life. While the natural sublime revealed profound human limitations, the
technological sublime suggested limitless human capability. Expressions of the
technological sublime shifted praise and awe away from divine power and toward
humanity.
21 Nye, American Technological Sublime, xiv-xvi.
22 Nye, American Technological Sublime, 60.
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As Nye demonstrates well, this perceptual construct tying technological progress
to the possibilities of human reason has been pervasive in American culture since the
early nineteenth century. Nevertheless, it insufficiently describes American responses to
technology, especially steam transportation. As significant as Americans’ experiences
with the power and speed of steamboats and trains were their perceptions of the massive
disasters that befell these machines.23 Transportation disasters produced a distinct version
of the technological sublime – a profound picture of technological might manifested in
destruction rather than mobility, but no less dynamic. Steamboat accidents in particular
complicate the concept of the technological sublime because they actually reinserted
natural forces into the observer’s sublime experience. Steamboats may have been an
emblem of human design, but when they exploded, wrecked, or caught fire, they thrust
passengers into direct confrontation with powerful natural elements. Together, steamboat
and rail disasters both challenged and reaffirmed the notion of limitless human capability.
Disasters presented scenes of humans overcome by the combined power of nature and of
technology out of human control, and yet because these disasters involved technology
observers ultimately associated them with human creation. The dialogue remained
between man and man-made, but here the immense power of human design was
evidenced not by technological triumph but by technological destruction.
Written descriptions of steamboat and rail disasters often begin with exclamations
that the scene was so terrible it “beggared description.” The perceived impossibility of
23 Though he does not explore the sublimity of disasters themselves, David Nye notes that the potential for
danger was an important part of the sublime for these technologies. Nye, American Technological Sublime,
55.
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capturing the horror in words was the first marker of sublimity, but, of course, writers
always went on to describe these scenes, and their narratives further highlight the
appalling character of technological disaster. The physical consequences of a steamboat
explosion were probably the most striking examples of the power of the steam engine.
When the Moselle exploded outside Cincinnati in 1838, one report said, “fragments of the
boilers, and other portions of the boat, were thrown from fifty to two hundred yards on
the shore, some of them having passed entirely over the two rows of buildings on the
street, and a portion of the boilers tearing away the gable end of a stable, situated high up
the steep hill in the rear of the houses, at least one hundred yards from the boats!”24 A
visitor to the boiler room after the Helen McGregor explosion near Memphis similarly
described the wreckage as “ample testimony of the tremendous force of that power which
the ingenuity of man has brought to his aid.”25
Even more striking was the demonstration of force enacted on human bodies. The
Moselle explosion not only sent wreckage flying but also its victims. “Heads, limbs,
bodies and blood, were seen flying through the air in every direction;” one man was
blown across the river “through the roof of one of the neighboring houses.”26 Observers
described awful scenes of carnage: “we also saw several with their heads and arms
entirely blown off; others with their lower extremities shivered to an apparent jelly.”27 An
1849 explosion aboard the Louisiana supposedly shot one passenger through the walls of
another nearby steamer, “making a hole through the panels, which looked like the work
24 Yankee Farmer, May 12, 1838.
25 Howland, Steamboat Disasters, 134.
26 Ohio Statesman, April 27, 1838.
27 Yankee Farmer, May 12, 1838.
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of a cannon ball.”28 Such gruesome and astounding details were central to every
explosion account, illustrating a power nearly beyond human comprehension but
produced by human innovation.
Train accidents, because they often involved passengers getting crushed between
cars or under wheels, produced injuries that were similarly shocking. A survivor’s
account of the early Columbia Railroad wreck in 1836 detailed the discovery of a female
victim, “the top of her head cut off, and the brains lay on both sides of the rail; the body,
feet, arms and legs broken to atoms.” Nearby lay another victim who had been run over,
the train’s wheels cutting off his legs, “grinding the dirt and clothing into the mangled
flesh.”29 In the wreck of a train in New York City, the engineer was “blown to pieces,”
his “intestines scattered over the road.”30 Reports after a horrific accident outside Camp
Hill, Pennsylvania, mentioned stray bones as the only remnants of perished victims.31
Each scene of injury and death further revealed the terrifying power of the technology
and the overall horror of the event.
Physical wreckage, whether machinery or bodies, contributed to the spectacular
nature of steamboat and rail accidents; steamboat disasters in particular had aesthetic
qualities, both horrible and attractive, that were often noted by observers. An explosion or
fire did not diminish the sublimity of a steamboat, it enhanced it and made it dynamic,
framing the vessel’s impressive visage in flame and astounding destruction. The “solitary
and sable” chimneys of the Lexington became even more striking “standing as
28 Lloyd, Lloyd’s Steamboat Directory, 229.
29 Commercial Advertiser, October 5, 1836.
30 Howland, Steamboat Disasters, 255.
31 Baltimore Sun, July 21, 1856.
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monuments over some mighty moving catacomb of death.”32 An eye witness to the
explosion of a different Lexington in 1855 described the water littered with victims and
fragments of the boat, “lit up by the blazing timber, which, in that dead hour of the night,
cast an unearthly gleam on the hideous spectacle.”33 As the steamboat St. James burned
on Lake Pontchartrain, “the space between the boats was lighted up by the blazing
conflagration to the brightness of midday.” Passengers on board the nearby boat
California saw drowning bodies “caught in the flashes of the moonlight which sparkled
on the ripples.”34
Clearly, then, Americans found in steam disasters qualities that were not entirely
horrifying, but appealing and even beautiful. Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote of “the
occasional alarm of frightful accident” as one of many features of the railroad that “keep
the senses and imagination active.”35 Twain’s sense of the aesthetics of steamboats again
resurfaces in A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court, but here in reference to
disaster. When the character Hank detonates a dynamite bomb that kills enemy knights he
explains it to the king as a miracle and remarks in the narration, “Yes it was a neat thing,
very neat and pretty to see. It resembled a steamboat explosion on the Mississippi; and
during the next fifteen minutes we stood under a steady drizzle of microscopic fragments
of knights and hardware and horse-flesh.”36 These aesthetic attributes of steamboat and
rail disasters and the stated difficulty of capturing the scenes in words made disasters an
32 Howland, Steamboat Disasters, 169.
33 Lloyd, Lloyd’s Steamboat Directory, 330.
34 Daily Picayune, July 5, 1852.
35 Ralph Waldo Emerson, quoted in John Kasson, Civilizing the Machine: Technology and Republican
Values in America, 1776-1900 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1976), 121.
36 Mark Twain, A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court (New York: Penguin Books, 1971), 259.
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appealing subject for artistic depiction, and a visual genre of disaster images blossomed
alongside the prevalent written descriptions.
In the early nineteenth century, as steam power revolutionized transportation,
innovations in printing and printmaking transformed the method and capacity of
producing images. The production of images in colonial America was fairly limited, in
part because artists lacked the technological means to reproduce images for mass
consumption. The colonial elite imported paintings from Europe, and by the second half
of the eighteenth century a tradition of American painting was emerging around
portraiture and history paintings largely depicting scenes from the Revolutionary era. The
Revolution had also prompted the creation of political prints, mostly etchings and
woodblock engravings, in which artists carved images into metal or wood blocks to be
used to make numerous reproductions. By the end of the eighteenth century, printers
developed a type of wood engraving block that could be used alongside movable type,
thus allowing for cheap and efficient printing of images with text. This, along with the
steam press, dramatically increased the reproduction of illustrations.37
Lithography emerged around the turn of the century as another method of image
reproduction alongside wood engraving. Rather than carving an image into a block,
artists produced lithographs by drawing images onto a limestone block and applying a
chemical process that ensured ink only stuck to the drawn image. The block, more
durable than woodblocks, could then be used to reproduce an image in significant
numbers. Printers initially created lithographs primarily for book illustration and sheet
music. In the 1840s lithographers like Nathaniel Currier began using the technique to
37 Joshua Brown, Beyond the Lines: Pictorial Reporting, Everyday Life, and the Crisis of Gilded Age
America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 9-11.
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illustrate current events.38 Black and white lithographic prints were often hand-colored,
and by 1840 different blocks could be used to create a color lithograph, a process known
as a chromolithography, which enabled inexpensive, mass-reproduction of fine art for
public consumption. Chromolithographs, or “chromos,” either original images or art
reproductions, decorated American homes through the end of the nineteenth century.39
The concurrence of a rapidly expanding American visual culture and rising public
interest in steamboat and rail disasters was significant for both, as each contributed to the
other. Mass-produced illustrations exhibited steam disasters for the American public, and
the public’s fascination with disasters made steamboat and rail accidents a lucrative
subject for the growing image printing industry. Both Lloyd’s Steamboat Directory and S.
A. Howland’s earlier, similar collection of disaster narratives, Steamboat Disasters and
Railway Accidents, included engravings, but these were small and lacked detail. The
sublimity of steam disasters found its grandest representation in color lithographs. Once
Nathaniel Currier began producing lithographs of major current events as an early way to
illustrate the news, he recognized the appeal of disaster images and created several prints
of major fires. Then in 1840, three days after the Lexington burned in Long Island Sound,
he released an illustration of the catastrophic steamboat fire.40 Currier’s Lexington print
was his first major success, selling thousands of copies and making Currier a known
brand. It also demonstrated that there was a market for similar disaster images. Selling
prints out of a retail store and through agents around the country, Currier eventually
38 Jay T. Last, The Color Explosion: Nineteenth-Century American Lithography (Santa Ana: Hillcrest
Press, 2005), 15-17; 66.
39 The popularity and prevalence of chromolithographs is explored in Peter C. Marzio, The Democratic Art
- Pictures for a 19th-Century America: Chromolithography, 1840-1900 (Boston: David R. Godine, 1979).
40 Print, “Awful Conflagration of the Steam Boat Lexington” (New York: Nathaniel Currier Lithography,
1840), AAS.
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joined with James Merritt Ives and their firm, along with many others, continued making
popular prints of steamboat and rail disasters.41
Currier’s Lexington lithograph is a stunning example of the sublimity of a
steamboat disaster. Lines from the vivid descriptions in newspapers found their visual
echoes in Currier’s scene. A cloudy but moonlit sky drawn with a romantic flair backs the
scene, but the rest of the frame is filled by the burning Lexington and the water, dotted
with passengers dead and alive. The Lexington, its full starboard side in view, sits at the
center, still whole, but engulfed in flames that reach to the top of the frame. Aboard the
boat, passengers leap into the water, while in the foreground those already in the water
seek refuge on cotton bales and pieces of wreckage. Like most lithographs of the day, it
was printed in black and white and typically hand-colored – meaning the coloring is
different from print to print. Surviving copies are bathed in rich color, predominantly the
bright yellows and oranges of the enormous fire. The light from the fire stands out in
front of the dark night background and casts a glow over the figures struggling in the
water. Other prints and illustrations of the burning Lexington joined Currier’s lithograph.
Many included the same details or were virtual copies, though typically less finely
drawn.42 The number of prints executed and the Currier print’s commercial success
reveals both the national attention given to the Lexington disaster and the appeal of the
scene itself as an artistic memento of the event. This was a colossal tragedy and Currier’s
representation was a horrific display of death, yet it clearly had visual appeal.
Though few prints match the Currier Lexington for beauty, many lithographs of
other steamboat disasters have a similar aesthetic. A colorful 1856 lithograph of the
41 Last, The Color Explosion, 66.
42 Examples of several near-copies of the Currier print are housed at the American Antiquarian Society.
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burning steamboat New Jersey, published by A. Pharazin of Philadelphia, shows the boat
at center, its smokestack still prominent but surrounded by thick black smoke coming
from the fire. In this image, the boat is shown much closer than in the Lexington image,
so the anguished figures leaping into the water to escape the flames are even more
intelligible. The expressive faces in the water reveal the extraordinary horror of the
event.43
Train accidents produced different sublime scenes, predominantly of twisted
wreckage and gruesome bodily remains. An 1855 lithograph by the Sinclairs firm shows
in many colors the recent accident on the Camden and Amboy Railroad near Burlington,
New Jersey, a wreck that killed twenty-one and injured dozens more. The train cars are
all separated from one another, and a few are tipped on their sides and significantly bent.
Pieces of track lie scattered all over the image. The print depicts the large crowd that
gathered after the accident to watch and aid rescue efforts. Bodies are shown being
carried away. The artist refrained from detailing any grotesque human injury, but a dead
horse lies prominently on the left side of the image, its insides spilling onto the hill. Like
the steamboat pictures, it is a striking image of powerful machines and tremendous
destruction, represented for public consumption.44
Beyond lithography, the flourishing of illustrated newspapers brought large-scale,
detailed disaster engravings to the public eye. These were black and white images, but
quite intricate and often more dramatic even than lithographic prints. Though news of
Lincoln’s assassination overshadowed the Sultana disaster, Harper’s Weekly included
43 Print, “Terrible Conflagration and Destruction of the Steam-Boat ‘New Jersey’” (A. Pharazin, 1856),
AAS.
44 Print, “Accident on the Camden and Amboy Railroad” (Sinclairs Lithography, 1855),  AAS.
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one illustration showing the once stately riverboat overcome by fire. No representation
could do justice to the shocking story, in which nearly two thousand released Union
prisoners packed onto an overcrowded boat heading north died after the boat’s boilers
exploded. Still, the Harper’s illustration evokes the scale of the disaster by the sheer
number of tiny figures packed onto the boats decks and in the water.45 An illustration of
the exploding Princess, published in the March 19, 1859, issue of Frank Leslie’s
Illustrated Newspaper, is representative of many scenes of exploding steamboats. The
image shows the very moment of explosion, resulting in a giant cloud of smoke. The
power is evident by the detail of the boat’s smokestacks blown into the air along with
bodies and other wreckage, visually verifying the scarcely believable written accounts of
steamboat explosions.46
Two railroad illustrations exemplify the ways artists conveyed the sublimity of
rail disasters. Leslie’s primary illustration of the 1856 Camp Hill disaster imagines the
scene moments after the trains collided.47 The result is a pileup of rail cars so misshapen
they are hardly discernible. Near the center of the image, the sun glints off the metal in
two places, drawing the viewer’s eye to a locomotive turned on end, its pilot (or cow-
catcher) on the front is visibly mangled. Just above center the stack of the other
locomotive, separated from its engine, shoots upward. Close by, three bodies fly into the
air. Debris from the wreck scatters toward the edges of the frame. This is a representation
intended to evoke extraordinary power, capable of ripping apart these marvels of
engineering. A Harper’s illustration of an accident on the Erie Railroad in 1868 takes a
45 Harper’s Weekly, May 20, 1865.
46 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, March 19, 1859.
47 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, August 2, 1856.
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distinct but no less effective approach.48 The image shows evidence of the train’s
derailment; high atop a steep embankment other train cars are visible on the track, but
below all that remains are pieces of debris that figures wade through as they search for
victims. Here, the artist capitalizes on the nighttime recovery scene to maximize visual
drama. The scene is bathed in darkness, and the only source of light is a burning fire at
the bottom of the embankment that silhouettes the figures working their way through the
wreckage. In both images, the artists’ choices frame an awesome spectacle created by
technological might.
The particular sublimity of transportation disasters found its fullest development
in this kind of visual imagery, which brought to life the most frightening and the most
alluring elements of the events. The inclination toward illustration was natural both
because visual imagery was becoming so ubiquitous in nineteenth-century America and
because the character of the disasters lent itself to visual depiction. In fact, even the
written language used in disaster narratives had a strong visual orientation. Textual
descriptions of steamboat and rail disasters, nearly without fail, speak of “scenes” and
“spectacles,” which they work to imagine for the reader in words. The National Advocate
wrote that the Aetna explosion in 1824 presented “a scene of death and terror… which
may be imagined, but cannot be described.”49 “The scene on the burning vessel is
represented as one which would have agonized any spectator,” an observer wrote of the
G.P. Griffith fire in 1850. The sight of steamboats burning from the St. Louis shore was
48 Harper’s Weekly, May 2, 1868.
49 National Advocate, May 18, 1824.
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“awful but magnificent; a spectacle to which no pencil could do justice, but not the less
dreadful and horrifying to every spectator.”50
Written accounts therefore encouraged readers to imagine the scene as spectators,
and they typically privileged the eye-witness spectator’s view, often over that of the
survivors, as the most accurate representation of the scene. The detailed description of the
powerful Moselle explosion came from “a gentleman, who was sitting on his horse on the
shore.”51 The Daily Picayune recounted the St. James disaster from the perspective of the
nearby California, where spectators “could see the terrified men and women on board of
the St. James hurrying to and fro, wringing their hands.”52 And again, from a writer after
the Glencoe explosion outside St. Louis: “the spectators on the shore beheld men, women
and children running, with phrensied gestures, from one part of the burning steamer to
another.”53 Victims who escaped disaster often provided heroic or tragic stories, but the
view from the shore or from some distance was all-encompassing, providing a true
picture of the captivating spectacle. Though illustrations occasionally took viewers inside
a sinking steamer or a wrecked train, most visual portrayals took the spectator’s view.
Many images included non-participant spectators in the foreground of the scene, placing
the viewer of the illustration among them in the eye-witness position, ready to take in the
full scene.
The technological sublime of steam disasters was thus a sublime that was
characteristically visual, and crucially so, for in visual representations viewers came face
to face with a vivid scene of indescribable horror but maintained the safety of a
50 Lloyd, Lloyd’s Steamboat Directory, 261; 276.
51 Ohio Statesman, April 27, 1838.
52 Daily Picayune, July 5, 1852.
53 Lloyd, Lloyd’s Steamboat Directory, 288.
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spectator’s distance. In Kantian terms, disaster images could be frightful without making
viewers afraid. Though written accounts primarily conveyed sights, they often described
a multi-sensory experience – the heat of the flames, the frigidness of the water where
victims struggled for life, the screams of passengers pinned beneath train wreckage.
While the visual scene could be reproduced, the other sensory experiences of disaster
could not, so in illustrations only the sights remained. The terror was palpable, but not
overpowering; the danger was evident, but not actually threatening. Representations
made the viewer into what Denis Cosgrove suggests is the characteristically modern
individual consuming the scene as an external observer.54 Even as they shocked and
horrified Americans, then, visualizations of steam disasters distanced viewers from the
actual experience of the dangers of steam travel, allowing them to consume the images in
a voyeuristic fashion. Aware of danger but not immediately threatened by it, Americans
could delight in the absorbing images of disaster filling their newspapers and hung on
their walls.
Of course, visual imagery of disasters was not wholly new but rather embedded
within an established tradition, as were descriptions of disasters as sublime. Natural
disasters had long been considered sublime and earned visual attention.55 Even more
significant, though, was the pattern of American responses to shipwrecks.
Representations of steamboat disasters often drew upon the tradition of shipwrecks as the
events most akin to a steamboat accident, but the differences in portrayals of shipwreck
54 Cosgrove describes this visual orientation in terms of “landscape,” and argues that modern landscape
viewing is “above all an appropriation of the visual scene by sense and intellect rather than an active
engagement with it in the processes of organic and productive life.” Cosgrove, Social Formation, 140.
55 Kant, Critique of Judgment.
138
and steamboat accidents are instructive about the specific and novel character of
technological disasters.
As a centuries-old form of disaster, shipwrecks carried a set of iconographical
associations understood by audiences of the period’s art and literature. Shipwrecks were a
common literary subject marking suffering and trial.56 As David Miller writes, well into
the nineteenth century, politicians, religious leaders, and other cultural figures evoked
shipwrecks to describe the crisis of human civilization pitted against external forces.57
Shipwrecks were definitive examples of the natural sublime, as they demonstrated the
catastrophic power of natural hazards. This traditional response is epitomized in the
shipwreck narratives S. A. Howland appended to his book on steamboat disasters and
railroad accidents. Howland’s book presented one shipwreck story after another as
examples of the awesome power of nature and the impossibility of human resistance to it.
A reprinted sermon reflecting on the 1839 wreck of the Gloucester resounded with the
language of the natural sublime, describing the event as awe-inspiring, “the power of God
displayed in the extraordinarily excited action of the elements.” The scene evoked
“human impotency” in the face of the “terrible majesty and strength” of the deadly storm.
These descriptions mirrored those of the Mexico shipwreck two years earlier – a
“dreadful, frightful scene of horror.” One observer reimagined from the recovered bodies
a haunting image of the victims’ end, passengers frozen to death as they clung to the
rigging for life, or a little girl who “had raised herself on tiptoe, and thus was frozen, just
in that position.” “How powerless and feeble are all human efforts,” the writer concluded,
56 Carl Thompson, The Suffering Traveler and the Romantic Imagination (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2007), 62.
57 Miller, “Iconology,” 187-188.
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“when contending against the storms and tempests, which sweep with resistless violence
over the face of the deep.”58
An illustration of the ship Byron meeting an iceberg depicts with even more
clarity the natural sublimity shipwrecks so often evoked. The accompanying written
narrative tells how the ship actually narrowly avoided the iceberg, but one would not
know it from the image. The iceberg takes on a monstrous form of a giant gaping mouth
with sharp icy teeth bared, the whole form curling up and over the dwarfed Byron as it
threatens to swallow the ship entirely. In this vision the natural is massive and violent, a
force which the diminutive ship, humanity’s representative in the encounter, appears to
have no chance of overcoming.59
Howland clearly saw a link between shipwrecks and steam-related disasters, as he
chose to include them in the same book, but his engravings of steamboat disasters, like
other steamboat disaster images generally, have a visual character different from the
Byron image. Artists commonly made doomed ships small, instead focusing most of the
visual weight on the waves or natural obstacles overpowering the vessel. In steamboat
images like Currier’s Lexington lithograph, however, the boat dominates the scene,
despite its destruction. When artists imagined the moment of a steamboat explosion, they
revealed technological power, not the force of nature.
That being said, images of steamboat disasters do not represent a clean break from
the tradition of the natural sublime as do some other responses to technology. As
transatlantic travel shifted toward steam power, many oceangoing steamers wrecked at
sea, and artistic representations of these events bear closer resemblance to shipwreck
58 Howland, Steamboat Disasters, 347; 273-275.
59 Howland, Steamboat Disasters, 293.
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images than those of river and coastal steamboat disasters. A Leslie’s illustration of the
wreck of the Central America in 1857 shows a sinking ship over halfway under the water
as towering waves from all directions are about to cascade over it.60 With the high
horizon line of vast ocean, the viewer can easily imagine the ship becoming completely
engulfed and the ocean returning to its restful state with no sign of disturbance. In a
similar 1854 lithograph image by Nathaniel Currier, the wrecked steam ship San
Francisco is shown as a small, powerless vessel in a turbulent ocean.61 Even though these
images depict steam-powered ships, the ships are entirely devoid of technological
strength – in fact, in the Currier image, it is three sailing vessels that come to the San
Francisco’s rescue.
Even in images like Currier’s Lexington, the awesome power revealed is not
entirely technological. The steamboat is at the center of the image and the drama, but this
is an image featuring a pair of fearsome natural elements – the raging fire and the icy
water. Of course, the image’s context reinforced the fact that here, at least, the fire was a
product of technology. Steamboat disasters reflect a gradual shift from the natural to
technological sublime as a dominant emotional force in American culture. Steamboat
disasters displayed natural and technological power and demonstrated both human
limitation and the terrifying capacity of human reason.62 In depictions of railroad
accidents like the Leslie’s and Harper’s images of the Camp Hill and Erie disasters,
respectively, the transition appears more complete. The forces of danger to fear in these
60 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Weekly, October 3, 1857.
61 Print, “The Wreck of the Steam Ship ‘San Francisco’” (New York: Nathaniel Currier Lithography,
1854), AAS.
62 This peculiar quality made it possible in many cases to interpret steamboat disasters as the consequence
of either divine providence or human pride in technology, as discussed further in Chapter Four.
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dramatic incidents are not natural or divine but rather human-created: speed and
mechanical force. In steamboat and rail disasters, Americans experienced a vision of
modernity distinct from a sense of technological sublime that exclusively celebrated
human ingenuity. This vision exhibited destructive capacities of steam power just as
awesome as the annihilation of space and time.
Sublime scenes of burning steamboats, exploded debris, and twisted train
wreckage brought the fearful and fascinating nature of steamboat and rail disasters to the
American public, but it was the stories of human drama that animated those scenes,
making them even more compelling. After initial reports provided the basic narrative and
statistics of a disaster, subsequent articles sometimes added colorful details of heroic and
tragic episodes. Headlines often labeled these “thrilling incidents” or “affecting
incidents.” These common labels suggest that writers understood the emotional responses
such stories could provoke and tried to target them. The genre of disaster narratives grew
out of this recognition of their general appeal and emotional power. That appeal was not
unique to transportation disasters; especially with the rise of the sensationalist penny
press, nineteenth-century Americans devoured thrilling and affecting narratives of all
sorts of dramatic crimes and accidents.63 Among these, however, steamboat and rail
disasters were often paramount. Newspapers regularly commented on the public’s desire
for details; several days after the Camp Hill railroad disaster the Trenton State Gazette
63 For an interesting analysis on written and visual portrayals of crime, see Michael Ayers Trotti, The Body
in the Reservoir: Murder and Sensationalism in the South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
2008). On sensationalism in the press generally, see John D. Stevens, Sensationalism in the New York Press
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1991) and Chapter 6, “The Sensational Press and the Rise of
Subversive Literature” in David S. Reynolds, Beneath the American Renaissance: The Subversive
Imagination in the Age of Emerson and Melville (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).
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reported that “the most eager interest is still shown in all that relates to the awful
tragedy.”64 That apparent interest led to follow-up stories and then to published
pamphlets devoted to every aspect of a single disaster, with titles like A Minute and
Circumstantial Narrative of the Loss of the Steam-Packet Pulaski, “with many affecting
incidents connected with that disastrous event,” and A Full and Particular Account of All
the Circumstances Attending the Loss of the Steamboat Lexington.65 Finally, some
publishers capitalized on public interest with book-length collections of disaster stories.
S. A. Howland of Worcester, Massachusetts, compiled several hundred pages of
steamboat and railroad accident narratives, also adding a few “recent shipwrecks, fires at
sea, thrilling incidents, etc.” in his 1840 book that would go through several editions.66
James T. Lloyd marketed his 1856 “steamboat directory” as a guidebook for western
travelers and a history of steam transportation, but it was primarily a compilation of
steamboat disaster narratives.67
Howland and Lloyd and publishers of individual narrative pamphlets clearly
realized the commercial potential of feeding disaster stories to the American reading
public. In his preface, Howland expressed the purpose of his book: to offer a full
accounting of the many disasters that had befallen Americans in steamboat and trains,
and to provide a memorial to those lost. He also wrote, however, that what most “excite
feelings of interest in the human mind” are the stories of those individuals “suddenly
64 Trenton State Gazette, July 21, 1856.
65 A Minute and Circumstantial Narrative of the Loss of the Steam-Packet Pulaski… (Providence: H. H.
Brown, 1838), AAS; A Full and Particular Account of All the Circumstances Attending the Loss of the
Steamboat Lexington… (Providence: H. H. Brown and A. H. Stillwell, 1840), AAS.
66 Howland, Steamboat Disasters.
67 Lloyd, Lloyd’s Steamboat Directory.
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plucked from their usefulness in society.”68 While Howland sought to memorialize the
dead, Lloyd claimed his own grand goal of inspiring a solution to transportation disasters:
“Our object in the presentation of these narratives is not to gratify a morbid taste for the
horrific, but to suggest, in a practical way, the means of abating an evil which is
acknowledged to be of immense magnitude.” Still, like Howland, Lloyd recognized that
there did perhaps exist a morbid taste for the horrific – this might also explain his
inclusion of numerous engravings illustrating the disasters, to which he in part attributed
an increase of the original price of the book from one to two dollars.69
The thrilling and affecting incidents that filled these volumes and daily and
weekly newspapers provided a form of entertainment that could not be found in fiction.
Writers framed steamboat and rail disasters in the conventions of fiction, building an
enthralling plot and heroic or tragic characters, but bolstered the stories’ emotional
weight by emphasizing their authenticity.70 Under the headline “A Thrilling Incident,”
one paper wrote of a near-disaster “equalizing in interest the most highly wrought tale of
fiction.” Late in 1838 the steamboat Constitution was traveling through a storm on Lake
Erie when the Captain realized the need to outpace the dangerous weather. The writer
described the pivotal moment in gripping language: “Life or death hung on the issue.
Certain destruction awaited the boat and her devoted crew, in a few brief minutes, if she
did not gain upon the driving storm.” In an act of “the most daring heroism,” the engineer
sat on the safety valve, risking explosion to bring the boat to safety. “We give it as it was
68 Howland, Steamboat Disasters, v.
69 Lloyd, Lloyd’s Steamboat Directory, iii.
70 Vanessa Schwartz describes a similar blending of authentic stories with literary modes of representation
in the news coverage of faits divers’ in late nineteenth-century Paris. Schwartz, Spectacular Realities, 33-
39.
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told to us,” the paper read, “as one of those frequent scenes of real life, whose actual
realities are indeed ‘stranger than fiction.’”71
Thrilling stories of survival and bravery offered readers a view of the fearful
nature of steamboat and railroad disasters and created heroes that drove the most
compelling parts of the narrative. In retellings of the Lexington fire in Long Island Sound,
Captain Chester Hilliard’s survival became the disaster’s signature tale. Hilliard, one of
only four survivors, escaped to the water and took refuge on a bale of cotton from the
boat, where he remained for days before another boat found him near death. The story
came from Hilliard’s testimony before the coroner’s jury that followed the disaster,
which Howland quoted directly, but framed within the larger narrative and illustrated in
Howland’s book with an engraving showing Hilliard floating in the Sound, it became the
key plotline in the true and awe-inspiring drama of the Lexington fire.72
Writers and compilers of disaster narratives gave similar treatment to the
“affecting incidents,” often peripheral details that writers highlighted to capture readers’
attention and elicit their emotions. Howland’s narrative of the 1838 Pulaski disaster
turned from a tragedy to a romance with the story of Mr. Ridge and Miss Onslow. Ridge
had supposedly seen Onslow on the boat before the disaster and she had “arrested his
attention.” After the boiler exploded, Ridge escaped to the water where he found Miss
Onslow. When she urged him to save himself, Ridge responded, “we live or we die
together.” According to the narrative, Ridge’s heroism “kindled that passion which burns
nowhere as it burns in a woman’s bosom,” and “there, upon the ‘waters wild’… did they
pledge their mutual love.” But the story did not end there – Ridge informed his
71 Niles’ National Register, December 1, 1838.
72 Howland, Steamboat Disasters, 180.
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companion that he had lost all his wealth in the accident and they would have to suffer
through a life of poverty together. Once married, however, Ridge learned that Miss
Onslow was the heiress to a large fortune.73
Other details represented the tragic mood of disasters. After the Moselle
explosion, several papers reported a boy on shore “wringing his hands in agony,” his
family all lost in the water.74 A reprinted letter from a survivor of the Columbia Railroad
disaster in 1836 recalled a Mr. Gibson rushing to his dead wife’s side: “Heavens what a
sight! The distracted man tenderly dragging from the spot the remains of his ‘Julia,’
calling upon her in frantic exclamations; but she could only answer by an expiring look
of agony.”75 Howland’s and Lloyd’s narratives were filled with stories of anonymous
mothers cradling dying children and lovers meeting death together.
Often the most affecting aspect of the story derived from the nature of the
characters involved. In July 1856 a train collision on the North Pennsylvania Railroad
near Camp Hill (often called the “Camp Hill disaster”) received particular attention
because the majority of those killed were young children. The train was full of Sunday
school children and their teachers from St. Michael’s Catholic Church in Kensington on
an out-of-town excursion. When their train collided with another locomotive, more than
sixty were killed. Newspapers focused on the train’s “living freight of happy children”
and the “innocence and helplessness” of the victims. These children “should have called
73 Howland, Steamboat Disasters, 67-71.
74 Ohio Statesman, April 27, 1838.
75 Commercial Advertiser, October 5, 1836.
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forth extra care,” one paper wrote, and their death made the accident even more tragic
and startling than most.76
Amidst the long list of steamboat disaster stories one that stands alone is the
collision of the Monmouth and the Tremont on the Mississippi River in October 1837.
The Monmouth had been chartered by the U.S. government to carry nearly seven hundred
Indians, mostly of the Creek tribe, to western lands along the Arkansas River designated
for their resettlement. Proceeding upriver from New Orleans on a foggy night and on a
reportedly improper course, the Monmouth collided with the Tremont, sending its human
cargo into the water. Rescue boats were able to save about half of the passengers, but
more than three hundred Creeks drowned in the river.77
The fact that the victims of the Monmouth collision were Creek Indians
undergoing forced removal made what would have been an exciting but typical scene an
exceptional story of civilizational demise. Reflections in Howland’s and Lloyd’s disaster
books provided commentary that dramatized the event as a racial confrontation.
Howland’s summary is worth quoting at length:
On their way to the spot selected by the white man for their residence, -
reluctantly leaving the graves of their fathers, and the homes of their childhood, in
obedience to the requisitions of a race before whom they seem doomed to become
extinct, - an accident, horrible and unanticipated, has brought death upon three
hundred at once. Had they died as the savage would die, upon the battle field, in
defence of his rights, and in the wars of his tribe, death had possessed little or no
horror for them. – But in the full confidence of safety purchased by the
concession and the compromise of all their savage chivalry, - confined in a vessel
strange to their habits, and dying by a death strange and ignoble to their natures,-
the victims of a catastrophe they could neither foresee nor resist,-their last
moments of life, (for thought has the activity of lightning in extremity,) must have
been embittered by conflicting emotions, horrible indeed: regret at their
submission,-indignation at what seemed to them wilful treachery, and impotent
76 Delaware State Reporter, July 22, 1856; Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, August 2, 1856.
77 Lloyd, Lloyd’s Steamboat Directory, 126.
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threatening of revenge upon the pale faces, may have maddened their dying
hour.78
The narrative concluded with an illustration of a tomahawk and bow and arrows.
Unexpected and unnatural death, tragic in every circumstance, was made even more so
here by the explicit contrast made between Creeks’ “savagery” and white civilization,
represented by steam technology. Besides being a remarkably potent example of the
tragic consequences of Indian removal, the Monmouth disaster reveals how the inherent
drama of steamboat disasters could become riveting theater when writers encased it in a
meaningful narrative context.79
Written narratives and visual depictions emphasizing the horrific, the beautiful,
and the emotional aspects of disaster transformed steamboat and rail disasters into
enthralling spectacles for the American public, and they came together fully in the
illustrated press. By the time the illustrated papers became a major news medium in the
United States, disasters were already a frequent subject of the daily press, publishers had
sold pamphlets and books detailing their intricacies, and a visual culture of disaster
images was growing around prints mass-produced by firms like Currier’s. Naturally,
then, illustrated newspapers, which could combine written description with visual
representation in unprecedented ways, found tremendous success covering steam
accidents for an interested public.
78 Howland, Steamboat Disasters, 150.
79 Robert Gudmestad discusses the Monmouth disaster within an important broader analysis of the role
steamboats played in the Indian removal process. Robert Gudmestad, Steamboats and the Rise of the
Cotton Kingdom (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2011), 78-96.
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Popularized first in England with the Illustrated London News, the illustrated
press arrived later in the United States because American publishers lacked the necessary
talent and resources to execute fully an illustrated newspaper on the English model.
Producing wood engravings for illustrating the news was a lengthy and expensive process
that precluded any major use of images in the daily papers. Editors sent artists to the site
of an event, where they would make rough sketches and notes that would later be used in
the studio to make a completed drawing. The artist then transferred the drawing in
reverse onto a wooden block, a process that might take three or four days. An engraver
might then take another week or more to carve the block for printing, meaning
illustrations of an event only appeared well after it occurred.80 Early penny papers like
the New York Herald often included images, but these papers eventually found the cost of
producing many images too high, and images virtually disappeared from the daily press
for the next generation.81
Fully illustrated papers came to the United States only once certain publishers
established enough trained artists and financial resources to produce timely illustrations.
The American illustrated press came to be dominated by two papers, one established by
the Harper Brothers’ publishing house and the other by British immigrant and engraver
Frank Leslie. Harper’s Monthly Magazine began printing images alongside text in 1850,
primarily illustrating literature. By the end of 1855, Frank Leslie had combined
illustrations with the weekly news, and in 1857 the Harper brothers followed with
Harper’s Weekly. Harper’s Weekly and Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper both
quickly became a popular supplement to the daily press, particularly with their extensive
80 Howland, Steamboat Disasters, 20.
81 Brown, Beyond the Lines, 14.
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coverage of the Civil War. During the war, the illustrated newspapers reached peak
readerships, with the Leslie’s audience estimated at 140,000 and the Harper’s readership
close to 200,000.82
As a news format, the illustrated press is a product of a particular window in the
technological evolution of image production. A perfected block for wood engravings had
only made the printing of illustrations alongside movable type possible at the end of the
eighteenth century. A century later another new technology – the half-tone process –
enabled photographic reproductions in newspapers, replacing engravings with
photographs and bringing an end to the novelty of the illustrated press.83 For a few
decades in the second half of the nineteenth century, illustrated newspapers were among
the most significant modes by which Americans consumed visual images, and they
offered the public an experience of current events unparalleled by the daily, non-
illustrated papers.
The height of the illustrated press thus marks a fascinating transitional moment in
the history of American media and visual culture. Though photographs would not
regularly appear in newspapers until the 1890s, photography was already in use by
midcentury and quickly became the standard for accurate visual reporting. The
representative technique that illustrated newspapers were founded on – the woodblock
engraving – was thus a somewhat antiquated visual technology, and yet creating and
delivering timely illustrated news on the scale that Harper’s and Leslie’s achieved
required an advanced and extensive system of production. Frank Leslie boasted in his
paper’s first issue, “we have completed an organization of artist agencies throughout
82 Brown, Beyond the Lines, 22-48.
83 Brown, Beyond the Lines, 234-235.
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most parts of the American continent. By their aid we shall have pictorial delineations of
every remarkable event that occurs over its vast extent.”84 Illustrated newspapers joined
an older representational technique to modern, mass print culture. Their union created a
news genre with an unparalleled capacity to animate the events it covered, surrounding
accurate reporting with the aesthetic of dramatic storytelling.
This distinctive character of the illustrated press made all kinds of disasters and
accidents natural subjects, none more so than frequent spectacular transportation
disasters. In just the second issue of Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, the burning of
the steamer George Collier received lengthy coverage and a large illustration.85
Transportation disasters appeared often in both major illustrated papers and sometimes
found their way to the front page. In the 1860s, Leslie’s began printing a weekly section
called “Home Incidents, Accidents, &c.” detailing various odd accidents and deaths – one
week readers got short descriptions of a crazed killer, a man found dead in a blizzard in
the West, a man run over by a horse, and a train wreck. Like the daily coverage, the
content of the illustrated papers reflected the fact that accidents, and large-scale
transportation disasters especially, made for great press regardless of the presentation.
Pictorial reporting, though, added a significant new element to the coverage of
transportation disasters. The non-illustrated press had made steam disasters national
news; now illustrated newspapers brought them to life and made visual imagery a regular
feature of Americans’ encounters with disaster. The illustrated press was thus particularly
designed to create shared spectacles for its audience. As Vanessa Schwartz writes of late
nineteenth-century Paris, the newspaper “served as one of the most powerful forms of
84 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, December 15, 1855.
85 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, December 22, 1855.
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modern mass cultural urban entertainments in the sense that it constituted a collective and
then aimed to please it through newspaper reading.”86 Similarly, Frank Leslie’s paper
aimed to create a national audience for dramatic events, arguing that its method would,
without fail, bring readers images of all the important events to deepen their
understanding:
From his long experience in his business, and an intimate knowledge of every part
of the Union, [Leslie] has established an unrivalled corps of artist correspondents,
and has folios groaning with magnificent views of all the cities and distinguished
places of the thirty-one States, ready to be used at any moment: so that no great
event can happen, no accident take place… of which Mr. Leslie in some way has
not anticipated…87
In other words, Leslie’s system prepared for the unpredictable, granting its readers an all-
seeing eye that could view various events happening simultaneously across the country.
Illustrated papers enhanced the abridgement of space already achieved by written reports
of disasters by envisioning the events for the public. The sights of distant steamboat or
train disasters were no longer reserved for in-person observers but available to anyone
with a subscription.
Illustrated coverage of steam disasters combined the various effects of written
reporting and visual representation, with each enhancing the other. Written descriptions
mirrored those in the daily press in their visual orientation, but now could be partnered
with an image, often on the same page. A Leslie’s writer detailing a fire on the George
Collier could say “the flames cast a lurid glare over the face of the bluff, the thousands of
spectators, and the buildings that towered in silent majesty above” and know that an
86 Schwartz, Spectacular Realities, 27.
87 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, August 2, 1856.
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illustration would support the description.88 In fact, the vivid description may have come
from the same sketches the engraver used to make the final image; reporting could draw
from artist’s views rather than verbal eye-witness testimony, making descriptive imagery
more accurate. Images, usually labeled as “drawn on the scene,” therefore also verified
the often unbelievable written account as true.
The process of artistic production for the illustrated press itself enhanced both the
reliability and sublime effects of the disaster scenes presented. Illustrated papers,
certainly proud of their unique format, often commented on the process of image
production. A year into publication Leslie’s printed an article detailing the process by
which illustrated newspapers were made, with illustrations showing the very stages of
their own production. The article happened to appear alongside illustrated reports of two
separate steam-related accidents, making readers very aware of the reporting method.89
The artist-reporters involved were not left behind the scenes but often thrust into the story
and the action itself, as in an 1856 report on the New Jersey disaster: “While the flames
were still raging, a Philadelphia correspondent and artist sketched the appalling
catastrophe… and to further accomplish our design, one of our best resident artists at
once proceeded to the scene of disaster.”90 The artist actually became the subject of a
front-page image in the Leslie’s issue of February 23, 1878, which depicts “our special
artist and correspondent, on their way to the scene of the disaster, discovering the body of
one of the victims.”91 The illustration shows three men, their carriage stopped, glancing
back at the foreground figure – a dead man washed up on the beach. Called by the paper
88 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, December 22, 1855.
89 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, August 2, 1856.
90 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, March 29, 1856.
91 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, February 23, 1878.
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“an incident of the wreck of the steamship ‘Metropolis,’” the image in effect breaks down
the divide between public and victim. The captured moment reveals the artist, the
public’s representative, as a participant observer – a bridge between the viewer and the
actual horror of the disaster. By traveling to disaster scenes and sometimes embedding
themselves in the episodes of disaster, artists helped bring viewers closer to the events
covered in the newspapers while also allowing viewers to experience dangerous events
from a removed position of security.
Artists also maximized sublime effects through their imagination and
embellishment of the scenes they encountered. Stationing correspondent artists in
different areas of the country allowed for their fairly timely arrival to a disaster scene, but
artists sketching the scene were, of course, never witness to a climactic moment of
explosion or train collision. Artists nonetheless reimagined these moments for readers.
Leslie’s lead image for the Camp Hill collision is a prime example. The caption reads
“drawn on the spot by our own artist,” and it likely was, but the artist certainly did not see
bodies and wreckage flying through the air. The scene that presented itself on the artist’s
arrival probably looked like the next published image, showing the smoking pile and a
large gathering of passengers and others recovering bodies and helping the wounded
behind a makeshift shelter. The illustration is devastating, but it lacks the sublimity of the
one the artist necessarily drew from the imagination. Together, the images reflect the dual
dynamic achieved so often by the illustrated press: accurate news and high drama.92
Illustrations of disasters added, in the words of Leslie’s, “their charms and their
horrors” to the accounts of disasters many readers were already familiar with by the time
92 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, August 2, 1856.
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the illustrated papers covered them. The illustrated news also gave life to those familiar
stories with narrative imagery. The signature affecting incidents of a given disaster
typically appeared in images – carefully composed by artists as visual referents to the
narrative and emotional symbols of tragedy. Another image from the Camp Hill disaster
illustrated a moment from the aftermath when a woman who was lodging nearby nursed a
hungry infant she found alone among the ruins.93 The artist composed the woman, infant,
and another child pulling at her dress in a triangular formation, the woman’s head dipped
toward the child that lies wrapped in her arms and flowing garment. Reminiscent of
Madonna and child iconography, the figural grouping accentuates the maternal
compassion of the woman and the tragedy of the likely orphaned child. Similarly, a large
image of the Long Island Railroad accident in April 1869 shows a woman kneeling by a
dead man and child, her expressive gestures of grief suggesting they may be her family.94
Dressed in white, she stands out against the darker figures that surround her as the
physical and emotional center of the image. Illustrations thus complemented the stories
that made up such powerful narratives, leaving viewers with memorable symbols of the
tragedy.
Because they often included several images, illustrated newspapers could also
virtually retell entire disaster stories solely in pictures. Issues covering railroad disasters
often showed separate images of the crash, the recovery of bodies from the wreckage, and
the care for the wounded in a nearby building, or even combined these into a single
image that allowed viewers to track the development of the scene. Leslie’s coverage of
93 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, August 2, 1856.
94 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, May 8, 1869.
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the explosion of the St. Nicholas in April 1859 included four front-page images.95 The
largest image, occupying the bottom half of the page, has a fairly standard backdrop of
burning wreckage and in front shows the “horrible fate of Captain MacMullen.” As the
accompanying text described, the explosion had trapped MacMullen’s legs under heavy
debris, and his companions, unable to free him, watched as the captain was consumed by
flames. Another image shows “Miss Kennedy clinging by a ringbolt to the wreck,” where
she remained until “the flames actually burned the hair and skin from her head.” The
remaining engravings show frightened women cowering from the flames and a nameless
woman leaping from the boat with her children in hand. With multiple images depicting
specific scenes and characters, disaster coverage was sometimes hardly distinguishable
from the fictional stories and literature the illustrated papers often published.
The illustrated press played a central role in recounting and representing steam
transportation disasters to the American public. The way Americans imagined and
envisioned disaster was largely a product of this moment and its particular visual culture.
Fittingly, the decline of the illustrated press coincided with the end of the steam era. As
the century progressed, artists and engravers increasingly worked from photographs
rather than on-scene sketches, which made for mostly person-less scenes of wreckage
rather than more dynamic and sublime images. After the invention of the half-tone
process, newspapers turned to photography, which could present a real, seemingly
unmediated, image but could not provide the same visual narrative that artists had
achieved in illustration. An 1893 photograph printed in a transitioning Frank Leslie’s
Illustrated Newspaper demonstrates a new vision, showing with stark realism a close-up
95 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, May 21, 1859.
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view of a wrecked train, a frozen moment with no figures remaining and no sign of the
chaos that created such destruction.96 In the decades when the dangers of steam
transportation shocked the nation, though, illustrated newspapers inundated Americans
with images of steamboat and rail disasters, sometimes even in the same issues.
Illustrated newspapers capitalized on existing interest and an emerging visual culture, but
cemented visual representation and sublime imagery as an essential feature of
Americans’ experience of disaster in the nineteenth century.
Like other spectacular events – natural disasters, city fires, shipwrecks –
steamboat and rail disasters captured public interest and became the subject of narrative,
artistic, and literary representation. Depictions of steam disasters grew from traditional
conceptions of the sublime and an existing visual culture of disaster scenes, but they also
embodied something new – a vision of modernity dominated by awe-inspiring
technological power. The particularities of technological danger, combined with new
media enabled by expanding print culture and advancing techniques of image production,
generated a profusion of written and visual representations that brought the fear and
horror of disasters to the American public but in the trappings of entertainment and
fiction. In visualizing disaster, artists and writers made steamboat and rail disasters an
intelligible category of modern experience. Collectively, their renderings constitute a
narrative genre that displayed the destructive power of the machine while softening the
actual experience of danger and made frightening disasters into emotional dramas full of
potential meaning.
96 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, September 28, 1893.
157
Knowing how exactly the reading public responded to disaster representations is
difficult, though the success of narratives, prints, disaster books, and press coverage
suggests a high level of public consumption. What is clear is that writers, artists, and
publishers recognized the potential influence of their depictions and anticipated a
significant response. S. A. Howland believed his collection of affecting stories would
have a moral influence, awakening “better feelings” and thoughts of charity in readers.97
He and others also saw the potential for change. Again, the preface to Lloyd’s Steamboat
Directory noted the goal of “abating an evil.” James T. Lloyd recognized this growing
evil in American life and determined that thrilling stories and emotional narratives might
be the best weapon against it. His own narrative summary of the Monmouth tragedy and
the death of several hundred Creek Indians seized upon the helplessness of the “unhappy
red men” as a device to lament the “massacre” of passengers aboard steamboats.98
Lloyd’s hopes of creating influential representations were frequently echoed in
the press, where horrific or tragic description often prefaced condemnations of the
industry’s dangers.99 The publishers of the illustrated press were likewise aware of their
images’ emotional power. Leslie’s published one of its most gruesome images after the
Angola railway disaster, in which a train derailed off a bridge, crashing and catching fire
at the bottom. The front page of Leslie’s January 11, 1868, issue showed blackened forms
spread out on tables – “the charred and unrecognized remains of the victims.”100 An
editorial printed the following week expressed the wish that the blackened bodies
themselves could have been sent around the country to arouse public feeling; instead, the
97 Howland, Steamboat Disasters, vi.
98 Lloyd, Lloyd’s Steamboat Directory, iii; 126-127.
99 See, for example, the Daily Ohio Statesman, September 2, 1855.
100 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, January 11, 1868.
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visual images of them distributed across the country accomplished a similar goal.101
Leslie’s coverage after the Camp Hill railroad tragedy noted, “it is not until we see
pictorial representations, until we see the terrors of the scenes brought vividly before our
eyes by the genius of art, that we can fully comprehend the magnitude of evils…”102
For some, the potential influence of disaster representations was harmful. In an
1853 letter to a New York paper, a writer signing only as “Philadelphia” defended the
Pennsylvania Railroad line against a perceived attempt to “injure” it with a sensationalist
engraving “purporting to be a correct representation of the late accident.” The writer
criticized the “wonderful exaggeration” of the scene and questioned whether, in general,
the American public “must be treated to weekly illustrations of railroad accidents,
explosions, &c.” Other railroad lines, the letter charged, suffered more accidents that
were not illustrated. The writer suggested that papers employ a large number of artists
“and station them at intervals of not less than a mile apart” just so that the public could
“feast upon daily reports of the ‘hairbreadth escapes from collision.’” This sarcastic
suggestion was not all that dissimilar from what Frank Leslie and others would establish
just a few years later. To this critic, the effect that illustrations could have was significant,
and the letter concluded with the writer’s refusal to “suffer misstatements and beautifully
colored illustrations of ‘frightful accidents’ to lead the public astray.”103
Certainly there was some justification for complaints about dramatic, sensational
storytelling and imagery. Artists for the illustrated press purposely created spectacular
scenes by imagining the exact moment of collision or explosion. They linked anecdotes
101 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, January 18, 1868.
102 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, August 2, 1856.
103 Philadelphia Enquirer, March 30, 1853.
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together to make compelling overall narratives, and they included depictions of disasters’
most heart-rending moments to cast a tragic mood over the coverage. Writers sometimes
commented on their own peculiar power and admitted there might be an unsavory
element to their coverage. Their descriptions occasionally pause to suggest that “to detail
the facts would be revolting,” or “it would be harrowing the feelings without reason to
describe all the painful and heart-sickening incidents,” but the writers usually described
those incidents anyway.104 An article in Frank Leslie’s questioned the so-called accurate
accounts of all chaotic disasters, especially steamboat boiler explosions. “In the
newspaper accounts of such a catastrophe we are regaled with ‘Mr. John Smith’s
account’ and ‘Mr. William Jones’s statement,’ both dressed into something like an
agreement of style, and both bearing upon their face evidence of the fact that these
gentlemen, in the excitement of the moment, saw little or nothing.” The writer then
playfully mocked the practice with an extremely vague, invented disaster narrative. The
sudden overwhelming terror of these accidents meant that newspaper correspondents
almost always worked “from hearsay and imagination,” stringing together details and
adding in narrative flourishes – this was, in some ways, simply the nature of the
reporting.105
And yet as eye-witness accounts made apparent, the gruesome, the shocking, and
the tragic details were real, products of the tremendous scale and force of technological
disaster. After the explosion aboard the steamboat Saluda, survivor Henry Ballard really
did find the breakfast he had been eating covered in blood, “and the tin cup that I had up
104 Trenton State Gazette, July 21, 1856; Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, July 11, 1857.
105 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, October 17, 1863.
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to my mouth at the time mashed flat as a dollar.”106 Observers of other disasters watched
as bodies were blown a hundred feet into the air. This was the character of these events; a
sensationalist press may have brought them to public attention and made them appealing
objects for popular consumption, but the process had less to do with exaggeration and
more to do with selection and framing. Artists, writers, and publishers took new episodes
of terrifying destruction and made them sublime but ultimately palatable stories. As
stories, they could be fearful without being frightening. As stories, they could be
contemplated as instructive tales and even reasons for action.
106 Private Journal of Henry Ballard, entry dated April 9, 1852, Huntington Library.
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Chapter Four:
The Lessons of Disaster
“REMARKABLE & SHOCKING DEATHS” – the large, bold letters appeared at
the top of a two-page broadside published in New York in 1829. Framing the headline
was a patterned border made up of black coffins. In the increasingly sensationalist
American press of the nineteenth century, words like “remarkable” and “shocking”
appeared frequently as descriptors for dramatic deaths, so much so that it is a wonder
those deaths continued to be remarkable and shocking at all. What made them so were the
stories told and retold about them in spoken and printed form. In this case, an anonymous
author presented to readers four lyrical ballads describing and lamenting four different
fatal tragedies. The broadside united these events under the shared headline, but the
grouping is striking. The first three poems relate oddly similar incidents: a mother and
her three children burned to death in their home, the death of three sons and one daughter
of Mr. William Lewis, victims of a house fire, and the burning in their home of the four
children of Mr. Cyrus Hall. Then there’s the last poem – an account of a steamboat
explosion that killed some “30, or 40 men.”1
The unidentified steamboat disaster (likely the Car of Commerce explosion in
May 1828) loosely fit the theme, death by fire, but in many other ways it does not seem
to belong. The first three poems all describe events that occurred locally in New York,
the last details an explosion on the Mississippi River. The first three events happened
within a three month period in 1829, the explosion took place in 1828. The scale of the
steamboat disaster, in death toll, likely influence, and press coverage, vastly outreached
1 Broadside, “Remarkable and Shocking Deaths,” 1829, American Antiquarian Society.
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the others. Nevertheless, the poet apparently saw in the steamboat explosion many of the
same qualities shared by the numerous other dangers that Americans faced daily. In a
similar manner, the American public at large worked to fit the increasingly frequent and
notable steam transportation accidents into a familiar concept – remarkable and shocking
deaths.
Aiding that process were orators and writers who acted as translators, forming
instructive narratives from the details of specific disasters that drew universal moral
lessons that Americans could live by. As recognized authorities traditionally charged with
interpreting tragic episodes of mass death for the public, American clergymen delivered
and published sermons about individual steamboat and rail disasters that found audiences
beyond their congregations. Steam disasters became fodder for lessons about humanity’s
relationship to the divine and the importance of living by Christian values. Secular
lessons emerged as well. In the aftermath of disasters, writers gave the events a narrative
form that revealed to reading audiences examples of good and bad moral character. In a
few cases, disaster stories were assembled and published in popular collections that
reveal much about the values and aspirations of the American reading public. The lessons
of transportation danger and disaster even found their way into morally instructive stories
for children and young adults. These disparate responses all sought to interpret these
events in a way that allowed audiences to comprehend easily the significance of steam
transportation dangers to their own lives and experiences.
This task – making sense of these horrific events through recognizable patterns
and forms – would not prove easy. The early efforts often looked like the 1829 broadside,
as authors awkwardly grouped disasters of steam technology with older tragedies even
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when the distinctions were startling. Though accidents aboard steamboats and trains bore
enough similarity to earlier catastrophes that they could reveal standard theological
lessons, religious authorities also soon recognized that steam disasters presented
something new. As a pattern of steam disasters developed, ministers struggled to explain
technological dangers with traditional narratives about divine power. Instead, they turned
to material explanations and potential solutions to what they increasingly identified as a
human problem. Similarly, secular writers found in steamboat and rail disaster stories
moral lessons about human character that reinforced emerging middle-class values.
Writers also necessarily crafted new lessons out of the particularities of steam
transportation technology. From the perils of steam travel, writers assembled a set of
prescriptions for how Americans should face modern dangers and relate to modern
technologies.
Thus, while steamboat and rail disasters fostered the thoughtful reflection and
moralizing impulse that followed any tragedy, the lessons learned also spoke to the
distinct challenges of a modern, mobile life. What emerges from the many instructive
interpretations of steam-related dangers is evidence of a complex but coherent, shared
cultural framework through which the American public could understand and relate to
steam disasters and their victims. Alongside other public responses to the dangers of
steam, sermons, disaster narratives, and fictional stories made explosions, collisions, and
derailments comprehensible features of modern travel.
The poet of the 1829 broadside viewed both the steamboat disaster and the fatal
house fires in religious terms. Each event was a visitation from a powerful God and a
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reminder to humans that their temporary lives on earth were entirely subject to his will
and his mercy. This understanding reflected an attitude about death and disaster that had
a long tradition in American Christian culture by the time deaths by steam transportation
accidents became frequent. The impulse to view tragedy through a Christian lens was
nearly automatic for most early-nineteenth-century Americans, and the kind of sudden,
horrible deaths described in the broadside poems received particular attention. Fire,
natural disasters, disease, shipwreck, and other large-scale fatal accidents were dramatic
and usually unanticipated. These were public, community tragedies with widespread
influence; the victims were many and typically diverse in age and social station. The
scale of such events signaled divine significance, so members of the affected community
often looked to clerical authorities to explain the meaning behind God’s sudden show of
divine power. Clergymen were typically among the first to facilitate what became a
public mourning process and to interpret the disaster’s moral significance for their
audiences.2
Large-scale tragedies offered ministers unusual opportunities to call attention to
God’s power and offer spiritual and moral instruction to an audience that was eager for it.
The more unexpected, dramatic, and horrific a tragedy was, the more urgent and powerful
the religious message could be for the living. Episodes of mass death underscored major
theological principles, demonstrating both the incomprehensibility of an all-powerful,
2 For manifestations of this religious impulse to explain and interpret disaster, see Kevin Rozario, The
Culture of Calamity: Disaster and the Making of Modern America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2007), Chapter 1; Lauri Bauer Coleman, “Rain Down Righteousness: Interpretations of Natural Events in
Mid-Eighteenth-Century Boston” in Remaking Boston: An Environmental History of the City and Its
Surroundings, eds. Anthony N. Penna and Conrad Edick Wright (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
Press, 2009), 233-258; Maxine Van De Wetering, “Moralizing in Puritan Natural Science: Mysteriousness
in Earthquake Sermons” Journal of the History of Ideas, 43, 3 (Jul. – Sep., 1982); Adam Jortner, “Cholera,
Christ, and Jackson: The Epidemic of 1832 and the Origins of Christian Politics in Antebellum America”
Journal of the Early Republic, 27, 2 (Summer, 2007).
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mysterious God and the revelation of his will in the natural forces of the world. Ministers
also tied catastrophe to human behavior, and because an event like a natural disaster or a
disease epidemic affected an entire community, they often called for renewed faith and
broad spiritual reform.3
Religious leaders also directed their spiritual instruction toward individuals,
specifically regarding one’s approach to his or her own life and death. The suddenness of
these various public tragedies made them especially troubling to nineteenth-century
Americans who placed enormous cultural value on the Christian notion of a “good
death.” As Drew Gilpin Faust argues, “dying was an art” for Americans of the antebellum
era, and that art was based in centuries-old Christian attitudes about the proper way to
meet one’s earthly end. By midcentury, Faust explains, a set of guidelines for dying had
seeped beyond religious doctrine and into American middle-class culture. A good death
took place at home, surrounded by family, and, most importantly, the dying person met
death well-prepared to accept and even welcome it. The role of kin was also essential;
family members were to be by the deathbed and hear last words in order to understand
the dying person’s spiritual readiness. Sudden fatal accidents of any kind therefore
robbed their victims of a good death and challenged the standard mourning process for
those left behind.4
Sudden tragedies not only complicated traditional mourning, they also reminded
the living of their own mortality. Ministers recognized that much of the potential moral
influence of tragedy rested in the sudden, frightening manner in which the victims had
3 Van De Wetering, “Moralizing in Puritan Natural Science,” 417; 429.
4 Drew Gilpin Faust, This Republic of Suffering: Death and the American Civil War (New York: Vintage
Books, 2008), 6; 10-11.
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perished, and their sermons typically emphasized the implications of such death for their
audiences. The 1829 broadside exemplifies in poetic form the typical interpretive
formula. First, there were often lengthy lamentations emphasizing the depths of the
tragedy:
How heavy a stroke it must be,
So suddenly called to Part,
The Parents methinks I still see
Wipe the tear with a sorrowing heart.
The suddenness of death often became the event’s most tragic aspect, but it also provided
the primary lesson: death could come to anyone at any time and God was the ultimate
judge whose plan humans could neither understand nor change. The poet reinforced both
the transitory nature of life and the inability of humans to alter their fate:
Tho’ the Parents may sorrow & mourn,
Their Foot-steps they cannot Retrace.
Your children can never Return,
to sweeten your journey below;
they dwell in eternitys bourn-
But thither you shortly must go.
Finally, the prospect of a sudden end and the desire for a good death led to a recurring
warning to live morally and be ready for death:
O speedily may you Prepare;
For Death is pursuing His Prey;
And Conscience now bids You be ware,
Lest he suddenly call You away!5
Together, these various themes formed a fairly common narrative applied to a variety of
incidents of sudden, mass death.6
5 “Remarkable and Shocking Deaths.” Commonly cited scriptural examples of this theme include “For
yourselves know perfectly that the day of the Lord so cometh as a thief in the night,” (1 Thes. 5:2, King
James Version) and the parable of the ten virgins (Matt. 25: 1-13, KJV).
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Thus, when steamboats started exploding and catching fire, American clergymen
already had a category in which they could place these shocking new events. After the
1824 Aetna steamboat explosion, one of the first steam disasters to garner national
attention, minister John Stanford delivered a sermon in the New York City Hospital
where some victims had been taken. Stanford situated the event among the host of other
terrible tragedies that had always visited humankind. “War, Pestilence and Famine, are
public calamities, which, age after age, have destroyed millions of the human race,”
Stanford said. Some of these had befallen his own community; Stanford referred to a
“dreadful pestilence,” yellow fever, present in New York City starting in 1795, which
during two months of 1798 had killed close to two thousand people. To such disasters
Stanford added earthquakes, storms, and other events created by the “elements of nature;
Earth, Air, Fire, and Water.” Under God’s direction these elements could become
“instruments of destruction,” and in the case of the Aetna, fire and water combined to
cause explosion and death. Both the means and scale of destruction made clear to
Stanford that the explosion was another visitation of Providence upon a sinful human
world, and thus in a familiar way, he turned his efforts toward interpreting its divine
meaning for a grieving community.7
Steam transportation disasters presented an ideal subject for the kind of religious
interpretation applied to other forms of accidental and catastrophic death. A steamboat
explosion or train derailment killed Americans in large numbers, suddenly and without
6 On the origins of this traditional narrative, see David E. Stannard, The Puritan Way of Death: A Study in
Religion, Culture, and Social Change (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977) as well as David E.
Stannard, ed. Death in America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1974).
7 John Stanford, “Aetna, A Discourse Delivered in the New-York City Hospital…” (New York: E. Conrad,
1924), 8-9.
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warning, and in dramatic fashion. Like Stanford, many ministers delivered sermons after
major steam disasters to interpret God’s visitation and to reinforce traditional theological
lessons. “When the circumstances of death are most terrific,” one minister said after a
steamboat disaster, “they are commonly only the circumstances of an hour to the
sufferers, but they smite upon the bosoms of those who hear, and constrain them to ask if
they would be ready for such a scene.”8 For listeners who had lost a friend or family
member, sermons were personal, but ministers also directed their discourses to larger
audiences, seeing in its scale and drama profound religious importance.
The potential influence of “disaster sermons” grew significantly when the
sermons found their way into print. The fact that many sermons about steamboat and rail
disasters were published suggests the appeal of such discourses. In some cases,
congregations requested that a sermon be published. After he gave a sermon on the
burning of the Lexington steamboat in Long Island Sound in 1840, George Burgess,
minister of Christ Church in Hartford, Connecticut, acquiesced to requests for
publication, noting he felt compelled by “the same feelings” that “constrained him to
speak of this distressing visitation” to make his words available to those who might find
lessons therein.9 Days after William M. Rogers delivered a similar sermon on the
Lexington in his Boston church, six members of his audience wrote the minister
expressing their eagerness to see his discourse published. These clergymen and others
who published disaster sermons sensed that interest and potential influence were
widespread. “That good may be done” was the stated reason for Rogers’s listeners
8 George Burgess, “A Sermon, Preached in Christ Church, Hartford…,” (1840), 8. AAS.
9 Burgess, “A Sermon Preached in Christ Church.”
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requesting publication, and it seems published sermons often had the desired effect.10 The
American Quarterly Register published a review of the sermon by Rogers and another by
John S. Stone, claiming that “these affecting visitations of Providence are intimately
connected with the revivals of religion which are now gladdening our cities and towns,”
and the sermons had “awakened a solemn feeling in bosoms, which before had been
strangers to penitence and prayer.”11
Clearly, religious leaders believed sermons on steamboat and rail disasters, like
those about earlier forms of mass, public tragedy, offered valuable lessons to Christians
everywhere. Ministers had often published the sermons they gave about specific
tragedies, but with American print culture expanding in the early nineteenth century,
printed sermons on steam transportation disasters likely found even larger audiences.
Even if the published sermons themselves were not circulated widely, newspaper
coverage of disasters often included portions of sermons, and many sermons appeared
again in popular published disaster narratives and collections like S. A. Howland’s
Steamboat Disasters and Railroad Accidents.12 Printed sermons widened the circle of
mourners from the original congregation hearing the sermon to a broader, abstract
mourning public. Once put into print, sermons on steam disasters joined other printed
responses that were all being read by many who had no direct connection to the actual
10 William M. Rogers, “Rev. Mr. Rogers’s Sermon, Occasioned by the Loss of the Harold and the
Lexington” (1840), 2.
11 American Quarterly Register 12 (1840), pp. 396-397, quoted in Ken Kurihara, “The Voice of God Upon
the Waters” CORIOLIS, 2, 1, 2011, 10.
12 S. A. Howland, Steamboat Disasters and Railroad Accidents in the United States” (Worcester: Dorr,
Howland & Co., 1840).
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event.13 Like other printed responses to steam disasters, religious interpretations therefore
formed another widely shared narrative that became a major aspect of the emerging
public discourse about steam’s dangers.
Especially early on, religious interpretations followed traditional models. Steam
accidents brought sudden, unanticipated death on a mass scale. Sermons and news reports
alike frequently lamented how disaster victims had been ushered into eternity in just a
single moment. In his sermon on the Lexington disaster, the Reverend S. K. Lothrop of
Boston commented extensively on this unpredictability, saying “no warning was given to
prepare the thoughts, no omen of peril had been noticed.”14 Steam disasters offered the
same lessons that earlier catastrophes had about God’s will and the necessity of early
preparation for death. The many sermons delivered and then published after steamboat
and train disasters varied from one to another in perspective and tone, but their
overwhelming message was nearly universal and quite familiar: death was unpredictable
and unavoidable.
The message was often employed to greatest effect when targeting the young, as
author C. Wield did shortly after the fire aboard the Lexington.15 Although not a sermon,
Wield’s published pamphlet, “A Warning Voice from a Watery Grave,” applied the
common Christian interpretation, indicated by its alternate title: “A Solemn Proof of the
Uncertainty of Life and Importance of An Early Preparation for Death.” To develop this
13 Though mourning practices were moving from communal rituals to private individual family rituals in
the nineteenth century, printed sermons suggest one way in which mourning remained communal, though
on the level of a dispersed, abstract reading public.  For more on nineteenth-century mourning as middle-
class ritual, see Karen Halttunen, Confidence Men and Painted Women: A Study of Middle-Class Culture in
America, 1830-1870 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 124-152.
14 S. K. Lothrop, “A Sermon, Preached at The Church in Brattle Square…” (Boston: John H. Eastburn,
1840), 10.
15 On Christian narratives about death directed toward children, see especially Stannard, The Puritan Way
of Death, 44-71.
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idea Wield detailed the premature death of Miss Sophia W. Wheeler, a personal
acquaintance. The eighteen-year-old Wheeler was returning from a southern visit and was
scheduled to be married in a week when she died in the Lexington disaster. Wield
stressed that Wheeler was a devout young woman, but her faith had not saved her, nor
had her age. Life was to be spent preparing for death and contemplating mortality, Wield
reiterated over and over, and yet most people neglected to consider and prepare for their
inevitable end. The young were subject to this forgetfulness more than most, “too
generally prone to expect a long life” and to think of themselves as immune from death’s
grasp. Tragedies like the Lexington, Wield said, showed the folly of such beliefs as so
many young victims lay at the bottom of Long Island Sound.16
Though Wield’s “dear youthful readers” were the audience to which he directed
his primary warnings, the author was clear that “the grave opens and reduces all to
perfect equality.”17 The fact that steam disasters were so sudden and unpredictable meant
their destruction was disturbingly indiscriminate. Religious interpretations frequently
emphasized the diversity of victims and described for audiences the different types of
people among the dead, noting death had come to all equally.  Minister Orren Perkins
wrote about the numerous victims of the Arctic, which collided with another boat and
sank at sea: “The wise and simple, the mighty and the mean, the lordling and the slave…
sleep together, without a coffin or a shroud to separate their mingling dust.”18 Others
16 C. Wield, “A Warning Voice from a Watery Grave! Or a Solemn Proof of the Uncertainty of Life, and
Importance of an Early Preparation for Death!” (New York: Sackett & Sargent, 1840), 10, AAS.
17 Wield, “A Warning Voice,” 8-9.
18 Orren Perkins, “Lessons of the Sea: A Sermon on the Loss of the Atlantic Steamer Arctic…” (1854), 3,
AAS.
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similarly described a leveling effect. The final lines of a published poem written for the
Lexington disaster summed up the sentiment:
The grades and distinctions subsisting below,
That raise or depress us, -O! where are they now?
The noble, the ignoble, the coward, the brave.
Are lying, all equally low, in the grave;
The highest, the proudest, the wealthiest bow
As low as the poorest, the lowliest, now.19
These observations demonstrated the insignificance of earthly circumstances and
also warned audiences that no one was exempt from the prospect of early death. In a
tactic repeated by many ministers, Wield took his readers on an imaginary tour through
the Lexington victims’ underwater grave, highlighting representatives of different shades
of humankind. John Stanford concluded his sermon on the Aetna by noting the “variety
of character and station” among the victims. The minister grouped them into five
categories, each offering a particular lesson. “Mrs. Furman, aged 44,” a mother of seven,
represented the first, revealing the importance of “family virtue.” The recently married
Mrs. Merserole, age twenty-two, showed all to “give your warmest love to a Saviour’s
hand.” For the children, Stanford mentioned ten-year-old Caroline Furman. In the fourth
category the minister placed young businessmen. Finally, Stanford noted the “people of
colour” on board the Aetna, to whom the disaster taught “that they share alike in [God’s]
mercies and his judgments.” “Under these five classes of sufferers you may arrange
yourselves,” Stanford told his audience. Stanford’s categorization transformed the
individual sufferers into general archetypes of American society. His message was clear:
among the victims of the Aetna explosion there was represented every American. Such
19 Howland, Steamboat Disasters, 221.
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events proved that God’s administration of death was indiscriminate; it could strike
anyone at anytime, regardless of their position in life.20
Clergymen certainly hoped to illustrate for audiences the enormity of God’s
power over human life, but they also worked to reveal his saving grace. Minister George
Burgess told his congregation after the Lexington disaster that uncertain death was a
blessing from God; if all knew the circumstances and moment of their death, “the most
stirring impulses” of our souls, namely the impulse to call upon the Lord, would lose
their strength.21 To underscore the idea, John Stanford told the story of a woman who had
inhaled a large amount of steam and in her final moments thanked God for the accident
that was to bring her to him sooner. Stanford challenged his audience to consider if they
were prepared to meet their own deaths in such a manner.22 Ministers implored their
audiences to turn to God, declaring that preparation could remove the fear of death; for a
faithful Christian, one pastor told his congregation, “sudden danger will be perfect safety.
Sudden death, but ‘going home.’”23
Because steam disasters revealed such familiar lessons, ministers often put them
into direct comparison with other forms of mass destruction. As Stanford had when
discussing the Aetna explosion, some referred to earlier calamities like disease or
shipwreck to provide context for audiences and establish a pattern of Providential
visitations. While placing steamboat and train disasters into the larger category, however,
clergymen also often labeled them as more tragic and horrifying than anything that had
20 Stanford, “Aetna,” 19-20.
21 Burgess, “A Sermon, Preached in Christ Church,” 7.
22 Stanford, “Aetna,” 15-16.
23 F. Reck Harbaugh, “The Burlington Disaster. A Sermon Preached in the Presbyterian Church, in
Burlington, N.J…” (Philadelphia: Henry B. Ashmead, 1855), 20.
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come before. The sentiment that the recent disaster was the worst calamity in public
memory was a frequent refrain.24 Some of this was surely intentional overstatement
meant to focus attention on the subject of the day; as Stanford pointed out, a steamboat
explosion typically killed on a much smaller scale than something like an epidemic of
yellow fever. Still, in those qualities that made for rousing spiritual discussion –
gruesome destruction, sudden death, the diversity of potential victims – steam disasters
appeared as extreme as anything.
Ministers’ descriptions of the particular severity of steam disasters might also
have been a product of an early confrontation with an unfamiliar, mysterious technology.
The dangers produced by steam technology quickly presented a more profound and
complete challenge to the concept of the good death than other familiar tragedies. Drew
Gilpin Faust argues that the destruction of the Civil War disrupted the standard
requirements for a good death in unprecedented fashion. Soldiers not only died suddenly
but away from home and families, and their bodies were left unrecognizable or never
recovered to allow for the mourning of close kin.25 Earlier, however, albeit on a much
smaller scale, steam-powered transportation killed in a similarly troubling way, and
ministers were quick to identify these disturbing tendencies. All accidental deaths were
sudden, but something like a steamboat explosion was even more so, literally ending
multiple lives in a single moment. Tragedy could always strike anyone, but accidents
involving steamboat passengers often killed, in one blow, a vast array of humanity.
Ministers saw in steam disasters a higher degree of sudden catastrophe, and the
24 See, for example, Wield, “A Warning Voice,” 23.
25 See Faust, “Dying,” in This Republic of Suffering.
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profundity of these new events was likely enhanced by the mysterious nature of boiler
explosions in particular, which awed and mystified Americans for years.
Ministers also noted the particular consequences of tragedies that combined this
powerful new technology with transportation. By their very nature, transportation
disasters like shipwrecks and steam disasters occurred on the road, leaving victims
physically distant from any permanent locale, be it their origins or destinations. Steam
disaster victims typically died among strangers, away from family and the comforts of
home. Worse yet, victims’ bodies were often left mutilated and unrecognizable, making
the traditional mourning process impossible. Rescuers sometimes buried recovered
bodies right on the shore of the lake or river where an accident took place; more often,
bodies were never recovered at all.26 Narratives of steamboat disasters are filled with
references to the “watery graves.” The absence of bodies and the thought of them buried
underwater, their graves “unmarked,” intensified the sense of loss.27 Speaking of victims
of both the sailing vessel Harold and the burned steamer Lexington, the Reverend
Lothrop of Boston stressed this finality: “No tomb shall plead to their remembrance. No
human power can redeem their forms. The white foam of the waves was their winding
sheet, the winds of the ocean shall be their eternal dirge.”28
Ministers underscored the severity of steam disasters through extended
comparisons to other kinds of mass death. “To be shipwrecked is terrible,” Lothrop
noted, “but in a shipwreck there is room for action, and consequently for hope.” He
continued, “to die in battle is terrible… but in the battle there is action, and to the very
26 J. T. Lloyd, Lloyd’s Steamboat Directory, and Disasters on the Western Waters (Cincinnati: James T.
Lloyd & Co., 1856), 265.
27 Howland, Steamboat Disasters, 202.
28 Lothrop, “A Sermon, Preached in the Church in Brattle Square,” 9.
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last there is hope… and if at last death come, sudden and violent, there is, it may be, the
consciousness of a noble duty nobly done.”29 Struggling to find a comparison for an 1855
rail disaster near Burlington, New Jersey, a local pastor named F. Reck Harbaugh
likewise turned to war, but concluded that “the slaughter of the battlefield lacks its chief
terror – Its unexpectedness.”30 George Burgess emphasized the widespread nature of the
new threat: “for the first time, our waters, which are weekly and daily traversed by some
of us, were lighted by the blaze of that most awful and most fatal destruction, which can
meet the path of the traveller.” To Burgess, a steamboat disaster like that of the Lexington
was more unexpected and frightening because it occurred “on the very way which so
many of us are accustomed to pass… without any circumstances of danger.”31 Other
episodes of mass destruction were substantial and terrifying, and yet to these observers,
steam-powered transportation and its associated dangers expanded the probability that
victims would have no chance to prepare for death and widened the circle of people who
could potentially meet such a troubling end.
If steam disasters were a more extreme tragedy than what had been witnessed
before, this only made the proverbial lesson that humans should prepare for death that
much more urgent. But the distinctions many drew between steam disasters and other
tragedies were not just a matter of degree, but of kind; many clearly thought they were
contending with a form of disaster that raised questions about the meaning of life and
29 Lothrop, “A Sermon, Preached in the Church in Brattle Square,” 10-11.
30 Harbaugh, “The Burlington Disaster,” 16.
31 Burgess, “A Sermon, Preached in Christ Church,” 8; 11.
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death, in the words of pastor W. H. Furness, “with new force.”32 As a whole, while
sermons following steam transport disasters reflect an established religious tradition, they
also lay bare the fact that these events created distinct interpretive impulses. In particular,
clergymen interpreting the disasters increasingly struggled to fit them within the
paradigm that said tragic, sudden death was unavoidable, incomprehensible, and divinely
ordained. The idea that earthly life was temporary and proper preparation for death
necessary was a deeply embedded religious and cultural response to tragedy that long
remained influential, but religious interpretations show that this response eventually
competed with, or at least existed alongside, another conversation about danger, modern
technologies, and the role of humans in controlling them that arose from assumptions
about the way technology revolutionized mobility.33 Danger may have been unavoidable
and expected in an earlier age, but a modern era defined by space-time compression had
heralded travel that was fast, convenient, and safe; steam disasters challenged these
expectations of modern travel and thus inspired conversations about reform.
Boston minister William M. Rogers’s sermon on the Lexington disaster evidences
this shifting response. The sermon began with a familiar refrain about Providential
design: “there are no accidents in the government of God, no calamities which come
unforeseen.” Nevertheless, Rogers’s sermon became a lengthy discourse about the
difference between older sea disasters and steamboat accidents like the Lexington fire.
32 W. H. Furness, “A Discourse Delivered on the Morning of the Lord’s Day, January 19, 1840…”
(Philadelphia: C. A. Elliott, 1840), 9-10.
33 Ken Kurihara’s essay “The Voice of God upon the Waters” successfully demonstrates that “sermons on
steamboat disasters agreed with the sentiment and the emotional need of people in the mid-nineteenth
century” by connecting them to established ideas about the fragility of human life and the necessity of
proper preparation for death. The essay does not, however, identify or explain the shifting attitudes about
Providential design and human responsibility that marks these interpretations as distinct from those
responding to shipwrecks or other disasters. Kurihara, “The Voice of God upon the Waters,” 11.
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Rogers’s address was intended to cover both the burning of the sailing ship Harold and
the steamboat Lexington, so the subject lent itself to comparison. Beginning with the
Harold, Rogers discussed the difficulties faced by sailors on the ocean, frequently
repeating the biblical line “there is sorrow on the sea.” Sailors were often subject to early
death, Rogers said; “they live in their coffins and their graves are beneath them.” Then
the sermon took a turn: “But these are the common and expected casualties of the sea,”
Rogers said. The sea had always been a known danger, so much so that it had become
“natural” for a sailor to meet his death on the water and the public was rarely affected by
these events. The Lexington reflected a new moment – unnatural death, Rogers implied.
Steam power had increased the number and diversity of daily travelers, so accidents no
longer killed “the nameless and homeless sailor,” but instead “the known, the loved, the
honored, the pride and joy of many hearts.” Rogers thus characterized steamboat disasters
as a new category of transportation accidents, and he placed the Lexington in that
category among other well-known steamboat disasters. Rogers identified the apparent
pattern of steamboat accidents as a “dismal history” of tragedies bearing national and
public significance, and as a problem sure to continue into the future.34
Rogers’s sermon suggests how steam’s dangers, because they were technological,
offered new avenues of religious interpretation. The qualities of steamboat disasters
strengthened the traditional divine message Rogers interpreted for his audience, but the
minister also identified a new sin that had contributed to the disaster – human pride in
modern technology. Man, Rogers said, had “imprisoned the fire,” and made air and water
“toil for him like bondmen.” Rogers then used these modern circumstances to show
34 Rogers, “Rev. Mr. Rogers’s Sermon,” 3-8.
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God’s power to be even more profound. “In the very midst of [man’s] triumphs over
nature,” Rogers said, God had revealed his strength. Technological progress had given
humans a false sense of security and control, but in fact life was more uncertain than
ever.35
George Burgess similarly maintained the standard line, reminding his audience
that God employs “agents which can neither be controlled nor escaped.” While Burgess
held strong to the belief that death and destruction were the inescapable consequences of
sin, his sermon also reveals a minister wrestling with the implications of new, modern
conditions. He referred to “the continual troubles of a world of change” and suggested
that in the modern world, which was “more populous, and full of ambition, bustle and
gaiety” than ancient times, life was “apparently made more uncertain, and subject to a
wider variety of mournful contingencies.” Like Rogers, Burgess did not directly attribute
these new dangers to humans, but he clearly saw in the example of the Lexington fire a
new modern threat that potentially necessitated new responses. Even while warning
against ignoring the hand of God, Burgess partially exempted steamboat accidents from
the “inescapable” category, acknowledging that the public naturally would, and should,
look to “human precautions.”36
In his Lexington sermon, W. H. Furness referred quite strongly to the possibility
that such disasters could be prevented. Like the other clergymen, Furness explained the
event’s clear divine significance: “it is as if the angels and ministers of God descended
upon the wave, to remind us all of the solemn conditions upon which we exist.” This was
not, however, simply a reminder of God’s power. Such disasters (and he noted their
35 Rogers, “Rev. Mr. Rogers’s Sermon,” 13.
36 Burgess, “A Sermon, Delivered in Christ Church,” 6-10.
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frequency) could be prevented through each individual’s effort to foster Christian morals
in themselves and others. The Lexington fire, Furness said, was a direct result of a
modern sensibility growing in its prominence and danger. Carelessness caused the fire,
and carelessness resulted from “selfish principles,” the “predominant springs of a large
portion of our modern improvement.” Furness questioned progress itself, fully aware that
doing so had become near blasphemous in a society that so celebrated it. The
advancement of civilization, according to the pastor, was moving too swiftly. Selfishness,
greed, and recklessness had become hallmarks of the age, threatening the true Christian
spirit, which was “always collected, sober, never hurried and impatient.”37
In sermons responding to natural disasters, disease epidemics, and other
catastrophes, American clergymen frequently attributed the tragedies in part to human
actions. Creating moral lessons required ministers to connect human behavior to divine
intervention. In their sermons, human and material causes were so-called second causes
that helped explain the event alongside references to the first cause, God’s extraordinary
power.38 Furness and others followed this tradition, but they also adapted it to the
particular character of steam disasters, identifying new “second causes” based in modern
circumstances. While calling shipwrecks and other tragedies natural and even expected,
they associated steamboat accidents with modern technology and human advancement.
These associations led many to view steam disasters with a skepticism about human
vanity and overreach that had not been applied to earlier forms of transport.
37 Furness, “A Discourse Delivered on the Morning of the Lord’s Day,” 5; 11-15.
38 Van De Wetering, “Moralizing in Puritan Natural Science,” 420; 429. See also Coleman, “Rain Down
Righteousness,” 245.
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Others went further, turning this broad skepticism into more specific, full-fledged
critiques that looked to explain and prevent the events they still simultaneously called
acts of God. Even John Stanford in his early, traditional treatment of the Aetna disaster
acknowledged the mechanical and technological failures that surely caused the explosion,
though he claimed no authority to speak on such matters.39 Pastor Thomas Smyth of
Charleston had no such objections. In his reflections on the loss of the steamboat Home in
1837, Smyth assigned blame without hesitation to the human operators of the vessel. The
Home’s captain received the weight of Smyth’s censure; the pastor suggested that the
captain had been negligent and reckless, and he insinuated that drunkenness was the
likely culprit. Smyth buoyed his own claims through the authority of witness testimony,
specifically an account of the events prepared by a survivor, Mr. Hussey, and apparently
approved by other surviving passengers. Hussey’s account became Smyth’s text,
verifying the claims he had made in his sermon. Smyth argued that if the captain were to
be proven guilty the condemnation of the entire community should come down upon him
as well as any others found responsible. Smyth’s screed ultimately had a Christian lesson,
that the sins of “unbelief, of intemperance, of gambling, or their kindred vices” tend to
pollute others as well as ourselves, and God will ultimately hold such sinners
accountable.40 Like Furness and Rogers, Smyth identified a widespread human sin for
which God had delivered appropriate punishment, but he also traced the disaster to a
specific person’s failures.
39 Stanford, “Aetna,” 11.
40 Thomas Smyth, “The Voice of God in a Calamity: or, Reflections on the Loss of the Steam-Boat Home”
Fourth Edition (Charleston: Jenkins & Hussey, 1837), 19; 23.
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Smyth could justifiably claim some authority to so clearly assign blame; the
pastor was himself a member of the Charleston committee that investigated the Home
disaster, and his sermon blended the voices of pastor and investigator. When Smyth and
his publishers reframed the sermon for print, it became even more detached from a
traditional religious interpretation. It also became quite popular, with several editions
finding publication. In published form, Smyth’s discourse was no longer just a sermon
but a pamphlet meant to serve as both “a record, as well as an improvement, of the
disaster,” a change the pastor justified through his uniquely privileged position. He added
an appendix featuring a survivor’s account and a list of the Home’s passengers, both the
dead and survivors. Smyth lent empirical support to the sermon itself with footnotes
expanding on stories alluded to in his verbal address, likely borrowing details from
newspaper accounts or other witness testimony. Finally, Smyth provided introductory
remarks describing the purpose of the sermon and the circumstances of its publication
and reiterating his censure of the captain.41
Again, the identification of material second causes was a common aspect of
religious interpretations of disaster, but traditional explanations were still always
attributed to God’s design. Steamboat and rail disasters made the human and material
explanations difficult to ignore, however, and even religious leaders increasingly
separated those explanations from the divine.  What is striking about Smyth’s publication
is the way the author so quickly, and perhaps even unwittingly, moved between these
modes. In his preface to the fourth edition, Smyth referred to the Home disaster as a
“dispensation of Providence,” and throughout the sermon, he followed the familiar
41 Smyth, “The Voice of God in a Calamity,” 5; 23.
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patterns of a divine interpretation. “Does not God speak to us from amid this whirlwind?”
Smyth asked. The pastor called the sermon “nothing more than a commentary upon this
dreadful disaster as its text, and an application of it to the heart,” and yet it had clearly
become something more. The clergyman hoped primarily to decipher the “hand writing
which the finger of God has traced,” but amidst the religious interpretation and the
exploration of God’s will, Smyth made human error and human operation of the boat
central to the disaster’s meaning.42
S. K. Lothrop’s Lexington sermon similarly displays two incongruous voices.
Lothrop connected the recent disaster to other events around the country; disease, fires,
and storms were bringing massive destruction with frequency. He lyrically described the
tragic fire that had taken the Harold at sea and then did the same for the Lexington. Then,
Lothrop’s tone shifted from sadness to indignation as he seized the opportunity to
expound generally on steam transportation accidents, which he saw as a dire problem
facing the country. Without hesitation, Lothrop explained that “gross recklessness or
carelessness” had caused the Lexington disaster. His critiques were specific and pointed;
the Steamboat Act passed by Congress in 1838 to improve safety had, in just two years,
proven “feeble and inefficient.” Every day, Lothrop noted, American public
transportation exposed an “immense amount of life and property” to death and
destruction. In Lothrop’s account, the accident (among the long line of others) was itself
sufficient evidence of a pervasive problem. This was a problem of human origin, and it
demanded a human response. Lothrop called on the public to voice its displeasure and
encourage stricter legislation from Congress; simply accepting this as a sorrowful tragedy
42 Smyth, “The Voice of God in a Calamity,”  3-4; 11-12.
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(as Lothrop implied was the norm) would be “false to our own interests and safety.”
Then, at the end of his sermon, Lothrop pulled back to a familiar refrain: in the focus on
the “secondary cause” of the Lexington fire, he said, the public must not forget the “First
Cause.” God permitted this disaster to happen, and it was above human power to
comprehend such mysteries. Instead, those affected must have faith in the designs of
Providence and “gather lessons of duty and instruction.”43
The message of Lothrop’s sermon shifted sharply as he moved between the
secondary and the “First” cause, and examined as a whole, the interpretation is
paradoxical. The Lexington fire was simultaneously an unacceptable act of human
recklessness and a “wise and gracious design.”44 It was an event beyond human
comprehension and also one with clear causes that called for deep social reflection and
decisive political action. These contradictions are symptomatic of the distinct challenge
that modern technological power posed to traditional religious explanations of death and
tragedy. A steamboat disaster or a railroad accident resembled other episodes of mass
destruction and allowed for religious reflection, but with the technology so closely linked
with human art and creation in the public mind, technological and human failure joined
explanations that pointed only to divine intervention.
The traditional interpretive blueprint received its most significant challenge in
pastor Orren Perkins’s sermon on the 1854 Arctic steamship disaster. In explaining the
steamer’s collision with another boat and its subsequent sinking, Perkins almost entirely
dismissed the idea of Providential design. Perkins’s sermon begins like a standard
exposition on God’s power evident in nature with a lament about the sea and its
43 Lothrop, “A Sermon, Preached at the Church in Brattle Square,” 17-21.
44 Lothrop, “A Sermon, Preached at the Church in Brattle Square,” 21.
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propensity to claim lives, but then Perkins shifted the narrative with a big question: were
these disasters really all God’s doing? Was it “fixed as the laws which rule the spheres”
that so many would die aboard ships, the clergyman asked, or were humans to some
extent responsible for the long series of disasters at sea and on rivers? The progress
represented by steam technology made the death toll that much more appalling to
Perkins. He referred to the explosion of the steamboat Henry Clay a few years earlier and
to frequent dangers on the Collins and Cunard transatlantic lines, and said this pattern
was particularly disturbing. “When men sailed in small vessels, at the mercy of wind and
waves” occasional wrecks were understandable, but “when steamers float upon the seas,
which fear not to face the tempest and battle with the storm” tragedy was more
unexpected and jarring.45
Perkins’s meditation on the role (or lack thereof) that God played in directing
transportation disasters signals an interpretive shift due, at least in part, to the nature of
the technology itself. The clergyman, giving his sermon in 1854, was familiar with a
pattern of steam transport accidents that was reaching its peak. Still, Perkins found
disasters like the Arctic collision shocking, and his sermon reveals the surprise of
expectations unmet. There had been a time when the sea was dangerous, when sailors and
Atlantic travelers necessarily conceded some control and security to the power of nature’s
elements. Perkins clearly considered that era over. Now humans had built “ocean
palaces,” and daily “plied a power which defies the fury of the elements.” In an age
where humans seemingly triumphed over nature, tragedy at sea just seemed out-dated.
The fact that it still occurred was unnatural – out of nature’s and God’s order. Perkins
45 Perkins, “Lessons from the Sea,” 4-5.
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implicitly cast travel in his own time as an arena of human influence. His “Lessons of the
Sea” still directed the audience to faith in God and Christian morality as the proper
approach to life and death, but another lesson was there too: humans had created a
problem and needed to solve it themselves.46
Perkins made his sermon on the Arctic a cultural critique; the impulse to explain
away disasters through references to divine mystery had the consequence of denying
human responsibility and preventing change. “We call such evils Providential
Dispensations,” Perkins said, but “be they so or not, they rarely occur where proper
human care and forethought are observed.” Human recklessness could not be overlooked,
and exploring human causes led the clergyman to several culpable parties. Captains of
steam vessels consistently displayed carelessness; owners encouraged such behavior in
their drive to outpace rival lines; the press praised vessels for speed and not for safety;
and the public was “ever ready to hazard all” in the name of progress. All parties
involved shared in the creation of dangerous circumstances, and yet when disaster struck,
Perkins noted, all “arise to theorise on the incrutable [sic] Providences of God.”47
Perkins’s critique has echoes in newspaper editorials addressing the problem from a
secular perspective; two Harper’s Weekly articles in 1871 argued against the narrative
that disasters were a visitation of Providence, as it distracted from the real problem at
hand.48
By contrast, F. Reck Harbaugh’s 1855 discourse on the Burlington rail disaster
suggests how deeply rooted older religious interpretations still were. “Calamity and
46 Perkins, “Lessons from the Sea,” 4.
47 Perkins, “Lessons from the Sea,” 4-6.
48 Harper’s Weekly, September 9, 1871; September 16, 1871.
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catastrophe such as has astounded us, are the evidences of His displeasure,” Harbaugh
claimed. The pastor identified the hand of God in every aspect: “His eye was upon the
train at the moment of its ruin. His providence directed every splinter. His wisdom
checked every wheel.” Harbaugh’s sermon is surprisingly insular and neglects the
national context; at a time when significant rail disasters were not infrequent, he
emphasized the “uncommonness of the disaster” as its distinctive feature and said “no
catastrophe ever was more unlooked for and unexpected.” The local orientation of his
message perhaps explains Harbaugh’s interpretation. Rather than fit the Burlington
disaster into a national pattern of public calamities, he was interested in the divine
message held in the “locality as well as the manner” of the wreck, a message specifically
intended for the affected community. This particular disaster occurred as it did for a
reason, he argued, and the congregation should look inward for reform.49
Harbaugh’s sermon is clearly set up as a counter to the discussions going on in the
press about culpability and criminal recklessness. The pastor understood the need to
evaluate and reform “regulations and restrictions in the manner of running trains” to
prevent recurrence of events like the Burlington wreck, but he also saw the importance of
deeper reflection. “To regard this visitation as nothing more than a theme for talk,
disputation, and wonder… to clamor for the punishment of the culpable, for alterations in
present regulations… the visitation of that displeasure is not because of these,” Harbaugh
said.50 Here was the traditional disaster interpretation employed again, but now confined
to a local spiritual matter removed from the national conversation.
49 Harbaugh, “The Burlington Disaster,” 17.
50 Harbaugh, “The Burlington Disaster,” 6; 11-13; 17.
188
Together, Perkins’s and Harbaugh’s sermons suggest the way that traditional
Christian interpretations of tragedy and the national discourse about steam disasters
diverged. Perkins argued that older narratives that labeled disasters as inexorable
visitations from God prevented full assessments of the particular threat posed by steam-
powered transportation; Harbaugh felt that such investigations of technological dangers
distracted from needed religious reflection. Responses to transport disasters that focused
on divine intervention were not going away, and religion of course continued to shape
how Americans understood death. An 1871 published tribute to George S. Benedict, a
victim of a train accident, included numerous letters written in consolation to Benedict’s
parents that are filled with statements about divine will and declarations of faith in God
despite hardship.51 Faith in God also certainly directed many Americans’ attitudes about
danger; an 1876 print by J. R. Vail called “Gods Protection Over His People” quotes
scripture and depicts a host of angels descending from the heavens to fight away hellish
demons bent on derailing passenger-filled trains.52 Religious narratives continued, but
they became increasingly removed from the dominant discourses surrounding
technological danger, and though faith provided comfort, Americans looked elsewhere
for answers and solutions to a disturbing human problem.
Religious leaders were not the only ones interpreting steam disasters and drawing
out their lessons for the American public. Even before ministers delivered their sermons,
their audiences had likely learned the particulars of the tragedy from newspaper reports.
The ministers themselves relied on these reports in framing their narratives, and the
51 Pamphlet, “George S. Benedict,” (1871), AAS.
52 Print, J. R. Vail, “God’s Protection Over His People,” (Clinton, Connecticut: J. R. Vail, 1876), AAS.
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disaster’s details similarly became the basis for other writers’ interpretations. Like
religious leaders, these writers recognized the potential influence of disaster stories, and
they crafted moralizing narratives that cast the disasters in familiar terms. Once translated
into narrative form, steam disasters became stories with characters audiences could
recognize and either admire or admonish. Over time steam disaster narratives became a
patterned genre with stock characters and lessons readers could easily relate to. Episodes
where humans interacted with steam technology and its associated dangers often
reinforced core values of the emerging American middle class, including self-restraint
and behavior according to separate, prescribed gender norms, while also instructing
Americans about the proper way to approach modern transportation and technology.53
Newspaper stories began this process, but the greatest displays of the genre are
two published collections of disaster narratives, S. A. Howland’s Steamboat Disasters
and Railroad Accidents in the United States, first published in 1840, and James T.
Lloyd’s 1856 Lloyd’s Steamboat Directory. Both Howland and Lloyd drew from
numerous (often unattributed) sources; they recopied newspaper descriptions and
significant sections of coroner’s inquests and quoted at length many of the popular
disaster sermons. Though it is often difficult to detect what material is original, both also
added commentary of their own, as Howland said, to give the work “moral influence.”54
The individual narratives helped explain and make sense of horrible tragedies for readers,
and as a whole, these “disaster books” served as extended guides to the dangerous
circumstances modern transportation could present.
53 For more on the nineteenth-century American middle class, see Stuart M. Blumin, The Emergence of the
Middle Class: Social Experience in the American City, 1760-1900 (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1989).
54 Howland, Steamboat Disasters, viii.
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As Howland and Lloyd clearly observed, steamboat and train disasters lent
themselves to moralizing interpretations because of the diversity of figures involved and
the extremity of the situations they found themselves in. Like published sermons, disaster
narratives often included a survey of the various types aboard the vessel: on the
Lexington, for example, “there was the husband of a devoted wife, and the father of seven
daughters… there was the young bride… There were the mothers to whom offspring
clung for safety with all the confidence and hope of childhood.” As forms of
transportation serving a diverse public, a steamboat or a train was “a world in miniature.”
“Let us look in upon them,” Howland’s account encouraged readers; “the passions and
purposes of the human bosom are at work, and even in this thoroughfare, we may read
something of human character.” Tragedy revealed “the hopes and fears, the love and hate,
the ambition and despair, the mirth and sorrow of the millions of our race,” and if it did
not do so clearly enough, those interpreting the event were there to make sure it did. In
their retelling, disasters included characters that reinforced a set of ideal qualities through
their various heroic or cowardly behaviors.55
The most obvious heroes and villains were the operators of the steamboats or
trains. One of the effects of human-centric explanations for steam disasters was that
captains and other employees became the focus of praise or blame, leading to
assessments of their strong or weak moral character. Just as pastor Thomas Smyth found
fault with the Home’s captain, disaster narratives exposed the evil or cowardly actions
that had caused the accidents or made them worse. Examples of such behavior were
plentiful: an account of the 1836 Royal Tar steamboat explosion told of a prideful
55 Howland, Steamboat Disasters, 201-204.
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engineer who claimed that “he knew his own business best” and ignored the pilot’s
warning about low water in the boiler just minutes before it exploded.56 On the steamboat
Ben Sherrod the crew was reportedly drunk, and later when the boat was burning the
deck hands “basely left their posts and ran for the yawl, without giving the alarm to the
passengers.”57 The story of the Ben Sherrod provided even better villains in the captains
of nearby boats that failed to assist the drowning victims. Captain Littleton of the steamer
Alton had supposedly driven his boat through the wreckage and dangerously past
“exhausted sufferers” in the water, “turning a deaf ear to the cries and pleadings of all.”58
The captain of the steamer Prairie also passed by offering no assistance, and was called a
“monster” in Lloyd’s account.59
Disaster narratives juxtaposed such horrible actions with stories of captains and
employees bravely sacrificing self-interest for others. Howland and Lloyd praised heroic
figures like Captain Holmes of the steamboat Clarksville, who saved his wife and other
passengers “in the honorable discharge of his duty,” and “Poor Davis,” the pilot of the
steamer Ben Sherrod who burned to death, “preferring to die rather than leave his post in
the hour of danger.” Lloyd used Davis as an example of many others who “perished
rather than flinch from their duty.”60 The quintessential hero emerged from the burning of
the Phoenix on Lake Champlain in September 1819. The boat’s regular captain had been
ill, so his son of only twenty-two years took charge of the boat that night. Captain
Sherman was thus an unlikely hero, making the story even more magnificent. Howland’s
56 Howland, Steamboat Disasters, 91.
57 Lloyd, Lloyd’s Steamboat Directory, 97.
58 Howland, Steamboat Disasters, 98.
59 Lloyd, Lloyd’s Steamboat Directory, 98.
60 Lloyd, Lloyd’s Steamboat Directory, 171; 101.
192
account described how the young Captain Sherman’s cool head and refusal to leave the
ship before others were safely off, qualities rarely found “even among those of riper
years,” ensured that no lives were lost. Howland included the remarks of an observer of
the similar Lexington fire who referred back to Sherman to highlight the effects of strong
character. Printed in Howland’s collection among other narratives of disasters that
occurred decades later and featured significant loss of life, the story of this victimless fire
stands out – present, it seems, only to reveal “one of the most heroic acts on record.”61
Heroes and villains were present among the passengers as well. In the aftermath
of the Ben Sherrod disaster (an event apparently full of evil figures), a nearby man in a
canoe passed through the floating passengers picking up items from the wreckage and
refusing aid to anyone unless they promised payment. According to Lloyd’s account,
when one Mr. Cook hailed the man from the water and asked for help, the “wretched and
despicable character” dismissed Cook, leaving him to fend for himself in the water.62
Such nameless villains were often the best examples of treachery, and their immoral
actions may have been exaggerated or invented. Once again these stories were countered
by tales of brave deeds. Stories of the 1838 Pulaski disaster praised a Mr. Couper for
rescuing Mrs. Nightingale and an infant from the water. They also relayed the story of
Mr. Ridge saving Miss Onslow from certain death. Howland included the detail that the
two fell in love and Miss Onslow turned out to have a huge fortune, as if to demonstrate
the potential reward for self-sacrificing bravery.63
61 Howland, Steamboat Disasters, 151-154.
62 Lloyd, Lloyd’s Steamboat Directory, 101.
63 Howland, Steamboat Disasters, 208.
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Stories like Mr. Ridge and Miss Onslow’s suggest that the good or bad qualities
that designated who was heroic or depraved were often inseparable from gendered
expectations about proper behavior that were becoming part of dominant middle-class
cultural norms.64 Ridge exemplified bravery and self-sacrifice, but perhaps demonstrated
an even more significant manly ideal admitting to Onslow that his fortune had been lost
in the disaster and he would not be able to support her.65 Exemplary manhood was made
apparent in disaster sermons too – Lothrop said that “if ever any situation required
manhood… it must have been this;” Perkins questioned the “unmanly” behavior of those
who deserted the sufferers and thought only of their own security; Harbaugh wondered
“what kind of principle of manliness” it was to offer aid and respect to a dying enemy
“and yet withhold both from a living enemy?”66 In disaster narratives throughout
Howland’s and Lloyd’s books, the bravest deeds often involved men taking care of
suffering women or facing their own potential death without fear. An account of a
collision on the Portsmouth and Roanoke Railroad mentioned two female victims, both
soon to be married: “The accepted of one of them was by her side when the death blow
came upon her, and he could have escaped unhurt by leaping from the car, which he
refused to do unless he could save her.”67
The middle-class manly ideal is best seen in the figure of Major Heath, a survivor
of the Pulaski disaster, who stands out as the hero of Howland’s account. Heath found
64 See Halttunnen, Confidence Men and Painted Women.
65 Gail Bederman writes that middle-class men were encouraged to delay marriage until they could
adequately provide economically for their families. Gail Bederman, Manliness & Civilization: A Cultural
History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880-1917 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995),
12
66 Lothrop, “A Sermon, Delivered at the Church in Brattle Square,” 12; Perkins, “Lessons from the Sea,” 7;
Harbaugh, “The Burlington Disaster,” 13.
67 Howland, Steamboat Disasters, 241.
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himself aboard a floating piece of wreckage along with twenty-two other survivors for
several days. The major arose as a natural leader, keeping his fellow survivors safe and
refusing to risk any lives. When others considered the potential necessity of casting lots
and sustaining themselves on one of their fellow survivors, Heath dismissed the idea and
offered a portrait of Christian manhood. “We are Christians,” Heath reminded his
companions, urging them to cling to life and “manliness.” “We have all our thoughts
about us, and should face death… with the spirit that becomes us as Christian men.”
Heath then vowed to lay down his life for the safety of his companions if necessary.
Major Heath supplied his own testimony for his actions, so exaggeration is likely, but in
the printed record of the disaster he became the model of manly self-control and bravery
in the face of crisis.68
Writers revealed clear expectations for women’s actions as well. As other scholars
have contended, nineteenth-century vessels of public transportation, both steamboats and
trains, became prototypical modern spaces where new social constructions of gendered
behavior, particularly for women, were worked out.69 Disasters created extreme scenarios
where those norms could be performed. Narratives often included references to women
panicking and needing rescue, so when they behaved otherwise it was noteworthy.
Howland quoted the account of a passenger aboard the steamboat Helen McGregor who
was careful to note that “in this scene of terror, the ladies exhibited a degree of firmness
worthy of all praise.” Although Mrs. Nightingale of the Pulaski owed hers and her infant
68 Howland, Steamboat Disasters, 54.
69 See, for example, Amy G. Richter, Home on the Rails: Women, the Railroads, and the Rise of Public
Domesticity (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005) and Patricia Cline Cohen, “Safety and
Danger: Women on American Public Transport, 1750-1850” in Gendered Domains: Rethinking Public and
Private in Women’s History, eds. Dorothy O. Helly and Susan M. Reverby (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2012).
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child’s life “to the coolness, intrepidity, and firmness of Mr. Couper and his assistants,”
she and another woman received praise for seconding those efforts and displaying “the
highest qualities of fortitude and heroism.” Typically, the most heroic female figures
were mothers who showed the willingness to sacrifice all for their children. Howland’s
Lexington narrative provided an extended sketch of motherly love based on a recorded
fact that a lady’s veil was found wrapped around the body of a dead child. From this
detail, the writer imagined an entire scene of a nameless mother retreating from the fire,
her heart “centered on her child,” masking the child’s face with the veil in an effort to
keep out the flames. “For herself she had not a thought,” the writer went on, and while
the weak screamed and ran in terror her only concern was shielding her child from harm.
This story typifies the way disaster narratives turned even insignificant details into lasting
moral lessons. In this case, the writer urged readers to recall their obligations to their
mothers, “that to her thou art still a child.” The writer closed the story telling readers, if
they grew impatient with their mothers, “think of the burned threads of the gauze veil.”70
Many readers probably did remember this touching story and its moral lesson, and
this was precisely the intention of those retelling steam disaster stories to the public.
Creating disaster narratives involved some level of invention, as Howland demonstrated
with the story of the gauze veil. Writers seized on captivating moments and images, and
like illustrators who depicted these moments in visual form, they made those moments
symbols of the disaster’s lasting significance. Tragedy had long offered moral lessons,
and by transforming particular tragedies into instructive stories writers made the events
meaningful within a broader set of values and morals embedded in nineteenth-century
70 Howland, Steamboat Disasters, 132; 51; 206-208.
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American culture. Steam disaster stories were particularly effective, however, not only
because of their intensity, but even more because they presented readers with so many
relatable figures. This was the nature of modern, public transportation; steamboats and
trains were “worlds in miniature” because they often carried travelers of all kinds,
meaning nearly all readers could connect to these scenarios. As writers turned disaster
victims from anonymous individuals into recognizable types, those empathic connections
grew easier. One can imagine the interested reader putting down the newspaper and
thinking – what would I have done?
Some people would even find out. H. A. Kidd, editor of the New Orleans
Crescent, survived an 1850 explosion on the steamboat Anglo-Norman in the New
Orleans harbor, and went on to write an account – “The Experience of a Blown-up Man.”
In it Kidd described being suddenly lifted into the air and thrown into the water, but there
he swam “with greater ease” than he had ever before, and when another steamer
approached the passengers in the water, scaring others, he “had no fears… and made no
effort to get out of its way.”71 With his own written record joining so many similar others,
Kidd transformed himself from observer to victim, placing himself among the ranks of
others who had bravely faced great peril. Like the artists for Frank Leslie’s Illustrated
Newspaper who visited disaster scenes and interpreted them for the public, Kidd
positioned himself as a link between victims and readers, most of whom would remain
distanced from the real danger.
Kidd’s account recalls the literary tradition of Romantic-era travel writing in
which travelers expounded upon their sufferings to gain credibility as travelers and
71 Lloyd, Lloyd’s Steamboat Directory, 191-193.
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adventurers. Particularly in an era when travel was so circumstantially dangerous, Carl
Thompson writes, narratives framed travel as a performative act, and writers attempted to
“shape both the experience and the self so that they fit a desired paradigm or template.”72
The spatial and technological conquest of modern transportation had seemed to eliminate
many of the dangers that had plagued earlier travel and therefore precluded opportunities
for travel to become a performance of the Romantic self. By halting spatial conquest and
the smooth transition from origin to destination, however, disasters brought back this
performative element, exemplified here by Kidd. As a writer, Kidd used his experience to
verify his own character in print; writers had made the moments of crisis in a steamboat
disaster a test of manhood, and in his own estimation Kidd lived up to the ideal of
fearlessness and bravery in the face of danger.
H. A. Kidd’s experience with the Anglo-Norman suggests how steam disasters
stories spoke not only to general values but also prescribed proper behavior for uniquely
modern circumstances. As these stories piled up, enough to fill books like Howland’s and
Lloyd’s and more, they collectively offered a guide to steam transportation and its
associated dangers and a set of lessons that could theoretically be applied to any such
incident. Those lessons started early. Howland published a version of his disaster volume
for young children which included significantly abridged tales of three disasters complete
with miniature engravings.73 But with the blueprint of transportation dangers and
disasters well-established, it was also easily transferred to fiction. Children’s books,
72 Carl Thompson, The Suffering Traveller and the Romantic Imagination (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2007), 7-8. For a sociological exploration of travel as performance, see Judith Adler, “Travel as
Performed Art,” American Journal of Sociology 94, 6 (1989): 1366-1391.
73 S. A. Howland, Disasters by Steam, Fire, and Water (Dorr, Howland & Co., 1839-1842), AAS.
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drawing on familiar stories of steamboat and train disasters, extended the lessons of
modern transportation to young readers. Rollo’s Travels was a multi-chapter volume and
one of a series of “Rollo” books written by Jacob Abbott in the 1830s and 1840s and
published in several editions over the course of the century. The series, which included
titles like Rollo Learning to Read, Rollo at Work, and Rollo at School, was intended to
provide educational and moralistic learning in a form appealing for young readers.
Abbott included a preface in Rollo’s Travels informing parents that although moral
instruction would not be direct, the book and its main character would “exert a
considerable influence, of a salutary character, upon the mind of a child.”74 The note
likely worked – one surviving volume bears an inscription marking the book as a
mother’s gift to her son in 1849.75 Rollo, the fictional boy at the center of the series,
served as a young reader’s companion, moving through the process of growing up and
navigating his surroundings, all the while modeling “docility and gentleness.”76 Travels is
not driven by any substantial plot, instead Rollo simply embarks on a fairly mundane
steamboat journey, learning as he goes from his parents and others about the workings of
the steamboat, and, more significantly, the proper behavior of a traveler, all lessons that
mirrored those being taught to American adults through disaster narratives.
The lessons Rollo learns are numerous, but one primary rule for travel appears at
the beginning of the book, voiced by Rollo’s father, Mr. Holiday, as he gives the boy
“general orders” aboard the vessel: “always keep a quiet mind.” Mr. Holiday stresses the
value of self-restraint: “travellers break this rule by fretting and worrying themselves,”
74 Jacob Abbott, “Preface” in Rollo’s Travels (Philadelphia: Hogan & Thompson, 1845), AAS.
75 The inscription is in the copy housed at the American Antiquarian Society.
76 Abbott, “Preface” in Rollo’s Travels.
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the father tells his son, especially in regards to three things. First, travelers were always
worried about time. Bad travelers were eager to “get along faster than we are going” and
constantly inquired about arrival time and urged greater speeds.77 Mr. Holiday
encourages Rollo instead to “give [himself] up to the pleasures of the present hour.” Mr.
Holiday also warns Rollo about the hardships and inconveniences of any journey and
stresses patience and self-control. Finally, travelers fretted about danger. “You must
avoid that,” Rollo’s father says, “do not let your imagination run upon dangers and
disasters.” Mr. Holiday then explains that older passengers were generally more guilty of
this and offers a profile of the offending type:
Some whom I have known are always apprehending some accident or trouble;
picturing it to themselves, as they ride along, upsettings in coaches, or explosions
in steamboats, or running off the track in the cars. They are always looking out at
the window in search of hills or steep banks, or listening to the clanking of the
engine, to hear if something is not going wrong.
“Banish all these things from your mind,” Mr. Holiday urges his son, or at the very least,
“never talk about them.” Even if one’s imagination was prone to straying to such ideas –
Rollo’s mother expresses her own difficulty avoiding such thoughts – self-discipline and
steady practice would eventually train the mind not to do so.78
Throughout the journey, Rollo’s father repeatedly demonstrates proper traveling
behavior. While on the main deck, Rollo hears a “sudden burst” and sees steam floating
up from the side of the boat. Thinking that the boiler has exploded, Rollo runs to his
father but finds relief when Mr. Holiday, sitting calmly, tells him the boiler was just
letting off steam. Another night the engine stops and a concerned Rollo asks if they
77 This concern about time and eagerness for speed reflected a broad cultural concern provoked by
steamboat and rail disasters, discussed in Chapter Five.
78 Abbott, Rollo’s Travels, 11-12.
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should go inquire. His father replies, “our wisest course is to lie quiet” and wait for
further notice. Targeted at a younger audience but applicable to others, Rollo’s Travels
reassures readers, or more appropriately, would-be passengers, that they are safe and in
good hands aboard steamboats and trains. Rollo becomes familiar with the technology
itself – Abbott spends several pages detailing, in straightforward terminology relayed
through the voice of Mr. Holiday, the mechanics of a steamboat – and then his father says
to leave “the boiler to the engineers and firemen.” Rollo’s father, and by extension Jacob
Abbott, looked to allay fears by inspiring confidence in both the technology and its
operators. In this way, Abbott suggests a particular version of middle-class self-restraint
fitted to modern technology and transportation; ideal travelers were aware of the
technology but they relied on others for its operation.79
That overcoming fear of danger aboard steam transportation becomes a primary
lesson for Rollo hints at the effects of repeated disasters and public awareness of them.
Fearful behavior and anxious thoughts, like Mr. Holiday described, were not uncommon.
No matter how reassuring voices like Mr. Holiday’s were, the public attention given to
disasters meant that travelers inevitably remained, much like Rollo, aware of their
potential to occur unexpectedly. A person’s behavior in such an environment, where
consciousness of potential danger was high but actual risk of disaster was low, became
revealing of particular character traits. As Mr. Holiday acknowledges, steamboats and
trains were places where avoiding fear was difficult, but because it was difficult, learning
to do so was an excellent marker of self discipline and control.
79 Abbott, Rollo’s Travels, 75; 99; 79-85; 12.
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Another popular children’s author, William Taylor Adams, wrote under the
pseudonym Oliver Optic and published dozens of books in the 1860s and 1870s,
including many using steam travel as a setting and theme. Optic highlighted moral
lessons even more directly than Abbott, often titling his books with some idiomatic
phrase that was then proven valuable throughout the story. Optic’s books typically
formed series with common characters; the stories are more plot-driven and directed to a
slightly older audience than the Rollo books, using primarily adolescent or young adult
protagonists to model the central lesson while others demonstrate the consequences of
poor character.
Haste and Waste or The young pilot of Lake Champlain was the final volume of
Optic’s “Woodville” series, six independent volumes connected by shared characters and
the Woodville setting. Haste and Waste follows the exploits of fourteen-year-old Lawry
Wilford, who, Optic writes, “overcomes difficulties by a strong faith in himself, and
redeems his family from poverty, in spite of the bad example and the bad conduct of his
father and his older brother.” Lawry exemplifies good moral character throughout the
book, as when he challenges his father to be honest after he learns his father has stolen
six thousand dollars from another man’s jacket. The boy’s most important lessons,
however, come when he is learning his craft as the pilot, and later the captain of a
miniature Lake Champlain steamer called the Woodville. The young pilot faces a number
of dangerous situations aboard the Woodville, and through them he learns and
exemplifies the title lesson – “haste and waste.”80
80 Oliver Optic, “Preface,” in Haste and Waste; or, The Young Pilot of Lake Champlain (Boston: Lee and
Shepard, 1867).
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Lawry’s first test comes early in the book when the boat’s owner, Mr. Sherwood,
pilots the Woodville and its small group of passengers across the lake, unaware he is
headed straight for a dangerous rocky section. Lawry, not aboard the boat, recognizes the
danger and rows out near the boat to signal Sherwood of the impending rocks. Sherwood
misinterprets Lawry’s signal and crashes the boat into the rocks, and the Woodville
quickly sinks, leaving its owner and passengers scrambling in the water. At this moment,
Lawry reveals his courage; “The young pilot did not pause an instant to contemplate the
scene of destruction. He saw only the helpless persons struggling for life in the water.”
Upon reaching the wreck Lawry immediately dives into the lake, rescuing several of the
passengers. Lawry receives recognition, “never was a young man more earnestly and
sincerely thanked,” and Sherwood even offers him a monetary reward, which the selfless
Lawry of course turns down. Sherwood instead gives him valuable advice. Admitting that
his impatience to run the boat nearly cost the lives of his wife and friends, Sherwood
warns Lawry against haste, “if you are going to be a steamboat man,” Sherwood tells
Lawry, “let me give you this maxim for your government – ‘Haste and Waste.’”81
Sherwood’s wife Bertha (the star of the first Woodville book) then confirms the
maxim, and in the process, draws on lessons from an actual disaster – the 1854 collision
of the Arctic at sea. Bertha tells Lawry that her father has often spoken of “the folly of
unconsidered action and blind haste,” especially after he lost a friend “in the steamship
Arctic, which was sunk, and hundreds of lives sacrificed, by running at full speed in a
dense fog.” In the case of the Arctic, Bertha said, “haste was not only a terrible waste of
81 Optic, Haste and Waste, 66; 69; 75.
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property, but of life.”82 Bertha’s reference to the 1854 Arctic disaster is enlightening as to
the diffusion of disaster narratives. Adams, the author, had surely read news coverage of
the disaster. He may have even read Orren Perkins’s published sermon on the disaster;
Bertha’s summary certainly mirrors Perkins’s critique of human recklessness. Young
readers of Haste and Waste would have had little or no personal memory of the event, but
it is easy to imagine them hearing of it from parents, much as Lawry hears of the disaster
from Bertha Sherwood. In this intersection of the fictional and the real, the character
Bertha Sherwood alludes to a disaster embedded in American public memory and then
reenacts the moralizing process that followed the Arctic disaster and others as she and
Mr. Sherwood instruct Lawry on the character traits that would have saved the Woodville.
Later in the book, Lawry’s character and his new maxim are fully realized. After
seeing the Woodville restored, Lawry becomes the boat’s captain. Notably, at the time of
the wreck Sherwood had vowed to have nothing more to do with the boat, but Lawry’s
skill and good character later convince him, along with many ladies who had been in the
original accident, to overcome their terror and ride in the Woodville again. The story
concludes with one final demonstration of the central lesson. Lawry is now running the
Woodville on a regular excursion route, and is scheduled to take out a party of
businessmen. Due to a dark, foggy night (much like the Arctic faced) Lawry decides to
delay the start and wait for safer conditions. The passengers insist on departing
(embodying the “bad traveler” of Rollo’s Travels) and question their young captain’s
competence. After another boat departs into the fog, the passengers grow even more
impatient: “The other steamer has gone, and if she can run, you can, if you know your
82 Optic, Haste and Waste, 77.
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business,” one man says. Lawry nevertheless stays firm in his decision. When they are
finally off, the Woodville catches the other boat, only to find it run aground. The
passengers admit their error and Lawry once more repeats his motto – “Haste and
Waste.”83
In another Optic novel, Brake Up, a Colonel Wimpleton builds a steamboat line
across a lake to compete with a nearby railroad. The story, told by the steamboat captain
Wolf Penniman, follows the rivalry of the rail line, controlled by the Toppleton family,
and Wimpleton’s steamboat line, which eventually results in the union of the two
companies for what all determine to be the better for the traveling public. The major
moral lesson is provided through the character of Colonel Wimpleton, a frequent drinker
whose drunkenness is becoming more extreme and problematic as the story begins.
Wimpleton’s drunkenness causes numerous challenges for himself and other characters,
but by the end of the story, the colonel resolves to stop drinking, a reform that aligns with
the successful union of companies. Again, Adams provides in the title a maxim to
embody the lessons of the story, in this case, “brake up.” As the author writes in the
book’s preface, “brake up” is a railroad phrase that here “figuratively indicates how the
wrongdoer should proceed when he becomes conscious of his error.” Colonel
Wimpleton’s reform of his drinking habits leads to the final statement of the book:
“When you find yourself indulging as he did in a bad habit, when you find your course of
life is wrong in any respect, do as he did – ‘BRAKE UP.’”84
Adams therefore builds his story’s primary lesson through a transportation
metaphor, using the idea of a train disaster to explore the potential costs of an immoral
83 Optic, Haste and Waste, 191-192; 310-312.
84 Oliver Optic, Brake Up; or, The Young Peacemakers (Boston: Lee and Shepard, 1870), 6; 303.
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life. He plays with this metaphor in the preface, urging readers young and old to follow
Wimpleton’s example when they “find themselves on the ‘wrong track.’” With an
audience well familiar with steam transportation accidents, the language and outlines of a
train wreck were an easily intelligible framework through which Adams could
communicate notions of good and bad character. It also likely helped that the concept
was not entirely metaphorical. Early in the novel, Wolf Penniman is riding on a train with
an intoxicated Colonel Wimpleton when the train stops abruptly. Penniman inquires and
learns that a cow is blocking the tracks, but when he returns to his car he finds
Wimpleton gone. Fearing the worst, Penniman convinces the conductor to slow the train,
then hears the whistle to “brake up” and the train screeches to a halt. Colonel Wimpleton
had somehow ended up on the tracks and was almost run over. Here the book’s extended
metaphorical device is played out in front of readers, aided by accompanying engravings.
But, as in Haste and Waste and other texts, the actual near disaster, along with other
transportation incidents in the book, reveals to observers clear examples of proper
behavior. Wolf Penniman, with a clear head, saves Colonel Wimpleton’s life, while
Wimpleton endangers his own and others’ with his drunkenness.85 Danger and
transportation served Adams both as a figurative and literal arena wherein he could
explore and explain morality in the modern United States.
Children’s books like Rollo’s Travels or the Oliver Optic stories suggest the
extent to which the lessons of steam disasters became part of a recipe for modern living.
Interpretations of the dangerous incidences of steam transportation, in the form of
85 Optic, Brake Up, 6; 29-30.
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sermons, embellished retellings of disasters, or children’s stories, made up a remarkably
extensive body of literature that was constantly growing and increasingly self-referential.
Sermons relied on detailed newspaper reports and the small but significant moments
highlighted by disaster narratives. On their own or in collections like Howland’s and
Lloyd’s, disaster narratives referred to popular sermons, borrowing lines and further
enshrining their messages into the meaning of the event. In fictional children’s stories,
descriptions of invented disasters mirrored the real ones that were so prevalent.
Collectively these texts constituted a genre with established patterns and recurring themes
that helped construct an emergent cultural framework of shared understandings about the
meaning of steam disasters and how one should live in the modern world.
By retelling disaster stories and illustrating their lessons for the American public,
the authors of these texts helped make the always shocking and remarkable steamboat
and train disasters normal and intelligible. In one form or another, Americans were likely
to come across these stories, and from the time they were children the stories prepared
them for a world where such dangers existed – readers grew familiar with the nature of
steam disasters, what those disasters meant, and even how they ought to behave if faced
with such a scenario. Most of course would never find themselves involved in a
steamboat explosion or a train crash, but they could imagine it, which made steam
disasters a useful tool through which Americans could explore modern values and
condition themselves to the realities of the modern world.
The ability to imagine transportation disasters was aided by the fact that the
distance between readers and victims was not very large to begin with, which writers and
ministers consistently pointed out. With a technique frequently used by other religious
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leaders, Thomas Smyth encouraged his congregation to imagine the scene of the Home
disaster from the victim’s perspective: “We can accompany them as they cheerfully
endured all the trials of their way… We can enter into their fears… We can sympathise
with their distress… We can weep with them, when they remembered home, and
children, and friends, and felt that they were theirs, probably, no more.” Smyth was
encouraging public sympathy for the dead, but he was also in a unique position to
illustrate this scene for his audience, as he and his family were in fact survivors of an
earlier shipwreck.86 Smyth could literally identify with those who suffered on the Home,
and he hoped to build a similar link between the victims and his audience. Echoing the
warnings of early death prevalent in sermons, Howland’s account of the Lexington broke
through the wall separating reader and victim: “No one has a right to be indifferent and
unconcerned because the disaster has not come near him. Let such an one remember, that
there is danger, and that among the next victims may be reckoned his own father, brother,
sister, or child.”87
Traditional Christian warnings that “in the midst of life we are at death” and
“death comes equally to all” were common after all kinds of tragedy, but in the context of
steamboat and rail disasters the words meant something different. The lessons of steam
disasters were especially powerful because of the nature of modern transportation. As
steam-powered transport served an ever-broader swath of the population and the reading
public became ever more in touch with the circumstances the technology had created, the
shock of disaster hit closer to home. Americans were not reading about distant, bizarre
tragedies; they were becoming acquainted with a new reality in their own lives. Every
86 Smyth, “The Voice of God in a Calamity,” 9.
87 Howland, Steamboat Disasters, 202.
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person who lived with these machines and chose to use them knew intimately of their
destructive potential. This was probably the most significant lesson of all: that despite
their diversity Americans shared something – not just that they as children of God all
faced death equally, but that they were all travelers, and were therefore subject to the
same dangers that had so viciously claimed the lives of the people they mourned.
The various texts produced in the aftermath of steamboat and rail disasters were
gradually defining a significant aspect of what it meant to be a modern traveler: the
subjection to potentially catastrophic danger. Realizing that modern identity required a
significant discursive transition that morally instructive texts reveal; in their responses to
steamboat and rail disasters Americans moved away from the mentality that these
tragedies were Providential visitations and opportunities for spiritual reflection in favor
of interpretations that articulated a new set of modern conditions created in part by steam
technology. Tragedies of steam transportation increasingly required thoughtful reflection
and public conversation, less about humanity’s relationship to God and more about the
implications of humanity’s advancement into a modern age.
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Chapter Five:
The Consequences of Speed
Some boats are fast and others slow,
Stern wheel boats on the Ohio,
With five feet scant on all the bars,
This boat can beat the Rail Road Cars;
Oh! Now’s the time for a bully trip,
Then shake her up and let her rip.
These lines come from the first verse of an 1856 song, “Mississippi Boat Race.”
The tune is upbeat and fast-paced, a perfect fit for its subject – a steamboat race. The
song is written from the perspective of those on board, either passengers or crew. They
praise the boat’s extraordinary quickness, claiming it rivals trains and then, calling for a
“bully trip,” demand that the engines be fired up and the boat let loose to reach its highest
speeds. Later verses echo the excitement of the first and continue to boast the boat’s
power, placing it in the context of other technological innovations: “telegraph wires are
much too slow, When safety valves are tied below.” This reference to a tied safety valve
hints at various techniques captains and engineers sometimes used to drive steam to
extreme levels. The potential consequence is there too, at the end of the second verse:
“On board we’ve wood and grease enough, To win the race or blow her up.”1
The surviving sheet music bears no signature, but a note at the top, “By Our
Pilot,” suggests “Mississippi Boat Race” may have actually been written by the crew of a
particular boat or the passengers on board a racing steamer. It is easy to imagine
passengers of other boats knowing and singing the song while on board. If it were 1856,
the year the song came out, passengers on the same boat may have been reading from the
recently published Lloyd’s Steamboat Directory. The book served as a guide for travelers,
1 Sheet Music, “Mississippi Boat Race” (St. Louis: H. Pilcher & Sons, 1856), Jay T. Last Sheet Music
Collection, Huntington Library.
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with maps of western river systems and profiles of port cities, but disaster stories filled
most of the pages. Passengers reading the book flipped through one description of
destruction after another and read criticisms of the reckless speeds and excessive strain
placed on engines that had led to disaster. After perusing the details of an 1852 explosion
on the Saluda and a deadly collision between the Sultana and Maria in 1846, readers
turned the page and found lists of the fastest trips ever made on the western rivers and
celebratory statements about the record-setting boat.2
“Mississippi Boat Race” and these few pages of Lloyd’s Steamboat Directory are
quintessential products of the nineteenth-century cultural environment manifested by
modern transportation and speed – its most defining feature. On the one hand, they reveal
the popular enthusiasm for high-speed travel made possible by steamboats and trains in
the nineteenth-century United States. The jump in potential speeds provided by steam-
powered transportation facilitated the abridgement of the country’s vast spaces and, for
many, symbolically marked the progress of the United States into a new, modern age. As
the technology and infrastructure improved, the speed of travel consistently increased,
and steamboat and train companies, captains and crews, and passengers all enjoyed the
benefits of a faster, more mobile reality. Simultaneously, Americans witnessed with some
frequency another of steam transportation’s definitive attributes – its propensity for
danger and destructive accidents. Speed could win races or “blow her up,” and fast-
moving boats became legendary both for their record times and their horrific accidents.
Speed and danger seemed inextricably linked – twin offspring of the steam revolution.
2 J. T. Lloyd, Lloyd’s Steamboat Directory, and Disasters on the Western Waters (Cincinnati: J. T. Lloyd &
Co., 1856), 292-293.
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The speeds made possible by steamboats and trains had real effects on mobility in
America, but they also were at the core of a broader cultural revolution. In the nineteenth-
century United States, speed and the abridgement of time and space defined not only
steam transportation but also the expanded possibilities and qualities of modern life. For a
culture intent on traveling across space and progressing into the future, speed seemed an
undeniable good. Deadly steamboat and rail disasters therefore presented a conceptual
problem. As the public looked for the explanations for why steamboats exploded and
trains derailed, it naturally looked toward steam transportation’s signature attribute.
Throughout the century, transportation disasters provoked a spirited public conversation
about the merits and costs of high-speed travel and, by extension, speed as a broader
feature of modern America. Danger proved a significant obstacle to the nation’s pursuit
of ever-greater speeds. However, not unlike a fast-moving train, Americans’ obsession
with speed would not be easily stopped. Though debates about speed frequently
reappeared following major disasters, Americans continued embracing advances in
transportation technology. Analyzing their various conversations about speed and danger
reveals that Americans developed an intricate logic that often shifted blame away from
speed itself – instead, that logic identified the apparent dangers of high-speed mobility as
problems created by human operation and the material conditions of travel.3 Speed
therefore remained a virtue as long as conditions were right for it. By the final decades of
the nineteenth century, most Americans agreed that the dangers of steam travel could and
3 My analysis in this chapter builds on important earlier observations about American fascination with
steamboat speed made by Louis Hunter and Robert Gudmestad. Both scholars briefly explore debates about
speed created by steamboat disasters without extensively describing the lasting implications of the debate
for perceptions of steam transportation and modern life. Louis C. Hunter, Steamboats on the Western
Rivers: An Economic and Technological History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), 300-304;
Robert Gudmestad, Steamboats and the Rise of the Cotton Kingdom (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 2011), 97-116.
212
should be limited, not by returning to a slower pace but by properly managing the speed
of modern life.
Speed is a measure of distance over time, so for a nation searching for a means to
overcome its vast territory, it was also measure of progress. From steamboats’ beginning,
the benefits of faster travel speeds were immediately apparent; higher speed derived from
greater power meant faster trips between population and market centers, meaning more
passengers and goods moved along faster and more efficient routes for travel and
transport. Quicker travel also meant more trips could be completed by a single boat in
any given year, increasing the number of passengers and the tonnage of goods traversing
American space. Speed therefore meant financial success to steamboat owners based on
the patronage of shippers and passengers who enjoyed the convenience of quick, efficient
travel. The desire for speed directed the evolution of the steamboat industry in the first
half of the nineteenth century. Shipbuilders continually made improvements, like
lengthening hulls and adding extra boilers, to increase power, maximize efficiency in the
water, and drive up top speeds.4 The quest for ever-greater speeds also prompted state
and federal infrastructure improvements to western river systems to reduce encumbrances
to smooth travel such as debris, snags, and shallow riverbeds. Expanding river
infrastructure, including wood yards for supplying fuel, decreased the frequency and
length of necessary stoppages. These changes in design and infrastructure combined with
4 Hunter, Steamboats on the Western Rivers, 62; 87.
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refined steamboat operating techniques and accumulated experience of steamboat pilots
to increase steadily potential speed and efficiency of water navigation.5
The results were substantial, as reflected in the sharp decline of travel times
between major cities over the first half of the century. By midcentury, travel times had
been reduced by a four to one ratio on average throughout the interior of the United
States.6 Steam power had shrunk the country’s distances with decreased travel times and
made speed and efficiency the hallmarks of modern travel. Steam transportation’s success
fed the demand for speed. Ambitious steamboat owners and operators adopted a variety
of methods to increase speeds and build up well-publicized reputations for swift
transport. Owners often identified their boats as fast before they even entered the water,
playing on associations with quickness with names like the Falcon, the Gazelle, or the
Flying Cloud.7 A group of steamboats running from New Orleans to Louisville was
called the “Lightning Line.”8 More valuable were observed and recorded demonstrations
of high speeds and efficient travel. Owners often encouraged crews to achieve great
speeds in an effort to establish a boat’s reputation. High pressure engines in particular,
due to their ample reserve power and capacity for high levels of steam, held the potential
for greater than normal speeds if engineers pushed the machinery for that purpose. Doing
so could be advantageous for crew members too. Former steamboat captain Wilson
Daniels recollected, “a man’s pride and reputation and popularity was to be known as a
5 For an extensive study of western river improvements in the antebellum years, see Paul F. Paskoff,
Troubled Waters: Steamboat Disasters, River Improvements, and American Public Policy, 1821-1860
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2007).
6 Hunter, Steamboats on the Western Rivers, 23-34.
7 Lloyd, Lloyd’s Steamboat Directory, 280-286.
8 Gudmestad, Steamboats and the Rise of the Cotton Kingdom, 99.
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hot and fast engineer.”9 Captains and engineers who managed steamboats on swift
journeys received public praise from both owners and passengers. Captains and crew
commonly proved a boat’s abilities outside major river ports, where they departed with
full heads of steam as townspeople watched in amazement from the riverbank. This
practice became infamous in the wake of the 1838 Moselle explosion outside Cincinnati,
which newspapers attributed to just such a boastful start.
It was in this environment where speed determined status that steamboat racing
developed into a popular craze among owners, crews, and the public alike. Nothing
established a boat’s fame like a race, against the clock or a rival steamer, and throughout
the steamboat era, the fastest boats became known through record times achieved along a
particular route and through racing victories covered avidly by the press. The vast
majority of races were informal – spontaneous contests sparked on the river between
longstanding rivals who competed for business. One rival passing another with a head of
steam could easily be interpreted as an insult and provoke a race. Other times races were
simply competitions for business. Two boats engaged on the same route sometimes found
themselves literally racing to get to a port first and pick up passengers or freight awaiting
transport. Larger steamboats backed by wealthy owners often raced weaker boats out of
business. In the 1840s the United States Mail Line dominated the route between
Louisville and Cincinnati. When rival boats tried to cut into the line’s business by
departing at different times the Mail Line rescheduled its boats to place them into direct
competition with its new rivals. Other companies employed similar tactics, and the results
9 Hunter, Steamboats on the Western Rivers, 299.
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were typically informal races won by the stronger boats. The proliferation of steamboats
and competition among them encouraged efforts quite literally to outpace the field.10
Steamboat owners eager for broader public attention turned to formal speed trials
and scheduled races to demonstrate their boat and crew’s superiority. In a speed trial, a
steamboat’s operators avoided most normal stoppages on a route and instead looked to
post a record time. Racers often posted record times, though they also sought the pride
and honor of besting a rival, represented materially with the traditional trophy – a pair of
deer antlers. After winning a famous 1853 race from New Orleans to Louisville,
operators of the steamer A. L. Shotwell displayed a set of antlers that held a sign
challenging other boats to “take us if you can.” As boat owners and crews developed their
own internal racing culture, the public followed suit. The excitement of such contests
made them regional events, scheduled in advance and attracting significant press
coverage and public involvement. Interested followers of the A. L. Shotwell’s race with
the boat Eclipse apparently wagered up to forty thousand dollars on the event. Unlike the
smaller, spontaneous races that occurred over shorter distances, a major race like this one
was a multi-day contest over an established long distance route. For days, local residents
turned up at various points along the route to watch the boats pass by, and many more
read of the competitors and the race in newspapers. With both boat and captain’s
reputations on the line, winning the press battle was part of winning the race. Passengers
even took part with published denunciations of opposing boat operators, and when the
10 Hunter, Steamboats on the Western Rivers, 506-507.
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1853 Eclipse and A. L. Shotwell race turned controversial, owners and supporters of both
boats argued in the press for weeks over the disputed outcome.11
Mark Twain’s nostalgic recollections of old “racing days” in Life on the
Mississippi are suggestive of steamboat racing’s cultural significance. “Racing was royal
fun,” Twain wrote. As anticipation grew for an upcoming race, the route was stocked
with readymade fuel in the form of chopped and bundled wood that could be quickly
hitched to the boats while they were in motion. Crews prepared boats especially for
racing, stripping them of excess weight. Twain vividly described the typical scene as if it
were in front of him: “the two great steamers back into the stream, and lie there jockeying
a moment, and apparently watching each other’s slightest movement.” The shores were
filled with raucous crowds cheering on the racers, and on board busy crews sang and
urged the boats to faster speeds.12
The popularity of these formal steamboat races and their lasting place in
nineteenth-century American lore makes it clear that speed took on cultural significance
beyond the practical advantages it offered the business of transportation. A steamboat
race or a trip in record time was a thrilling display of modern technological capabilities.
The catalog of speed trials and steamboat races is one of the clearest records of the
advancement of high-speed mobility over the course of the century. Newspapers printed
record times and the results of high-profile races. In almanacs, travel guides, and other
publications, readers often found tables of “fastest times” that listed the most prominent
routes and traced a series of record times from the introduction of steamboat travel to the
11 Gudmestad, Steamboats and the Rise of the Cotton Kingdom, 102-105.
12 Mark Twain, Life on the Mississippi (New York: The Heritage Press, 1944), 107-108.
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current time.13 Twain included one in Life on the Mississippi, giving statistical credence
to his lyric descriptions of the fast-moving boats.14 The succession of record times
effectively charted for the public steam technology’s victory over the vast distances of
the continent.
These tables and published stories of racing and speed trial results also raised the
profile of particular boats to near legendary status. The table printed in Lloyd’s Steamboat
Directory labeled the Eclipse the fastest boat in the world, and celebrated its
extraordinary power by listing its specific travel times to various stops along its route.
Twain’s table included similar details for the Robert E. Lee’s victorious trip over the
Natchez in a race from New Orleans to St. Louis in 1870. Boats like the Eclipse and the
Robert E. Lee were perfect symbols of speed and power that betokened the triumph of
American technology. Popular representations invested racing boats with lives of their
own. Twain called racing steamers “stately,” “sentient creatures” that eyed one another as
they moved.15
Steamboat races were occasionally celebrated in commemorative prints produced
by major lithographers for public sale. An 1866 Currier and Ives print called “The
Champions of the Mississippi – A Race for the Buckhorns” shows at least three boats,
including the Queen of the West and the Morningstar, flying down the river with
spectators cheering along the bank.16 In 1870 the firm published a commemoration of the
much-promoted race between the Robert E. Lee and the Natchez.17 In the image the boats
13 Lloyd, Lloyd’s Steamboat Directory, 292.
14 Twain, Life on the Mississippi, 110-112.
15 Twain, Life on the Mississippi, 108-109.
16 Print, “The Champions of the Mississippi” (Currier and Ives, 1866), American Antiquarian Society.
17 Print, “The Great Race on the Mississippi” (Currier and Ives, 1870), AAS.
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travel from the right side of the image to the left foreground, vaguely toward the viewer.
The Robert E. Lee is closer on the left side of the image, seemingly outpacing the
Natchez on its way to eventual victory. Crews aboard both boats scramble to achieve
faster speeds. Barely visible but clearly perched on the front of the Natchez are the
symbolic antlers associated with racing victories, which would soon be passed to the
faster boat. The adjoined text below the image informed viewers that the Natchez had
held the previous record for the trip between New Orleans and St. Louis: three days,
twenty-one hours and fifty-eight minutes, a time the Robert E. Lee had now eclipsed a
month later by more than three hours. The text broke down the Robert E. Lee’s record
trip just like Twain’s chart in Life on the Mississippi, recording the times achieved at each
major stop along the route. The print then prominently listed the captains’ names, casting
them as praiseworthy combatants.
Once again, the real heroic figures were the boats themselves. Racing prints like
the 1870 Currier and Ives presented viewers with another powerful version of the
technological sublime.18 The Robert E. Lee and Natchez dominate the picture plane; both
drawn intricately and shown in much splendor. The fire and black smoke pouring out of
their stacks underscores steam’s tremendous power, verified by the record travel times
posted below. A simpler 1871 image drawn by Thomas Kelly, clearly modeled on the
Currier and Ives lithograph, similarly shows the Danna and the Fulton belching fire and
smoke into the midnight sky as they cut swiftly through the water toward the viewer.19
Passengers and crew play a negligible role here; instead, a bright red glow within each
boat makes the vessels appear active and alive. An 1875 print by lithographers Haskell
18 See David Nye, American Technological Sublime (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994).
19 Print, “Midnight Race on the Mississippi” (Thomas Kelly, 1871), AAS.
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and Allen of Boston entitled “Midnight Race on the Mississippi” shows the Natchez
again behind a competing boat.20 In almost every print of this kind, the racing boats move
toward rather than away from the viewer – a visual convention marking the abridgement
of space and reinforcing the power of the boats. In popular imagery and written texts,
Americans identified steamboats and steamboat racing with the nation’s technological
progress.
Of course, while steamboat racing remained popular through the century and
maintained the public’s association of steamboats with speed, trains surpassed steamboats
not long after their arrival both in terms of possible travel times and symbolic power as
objects of speed. Railroads offered nothing quite like the excitement and competition of a
steamboat race, but they achieved new heights of speed that thrilled passengers and
furthered their expectations that travel should be fast and efficient.21 Competition among
steamboat companies had driven the pursuit of high speeds and provoked racing culture,
but railroads represented a much more profound threat to steamboat’s supremacy in travel
and in the American mind. Top train speeds quickly surpassed those of the fastest
steamers. Trains also cut more directly across terrain than steamboats did on meandering
rivers; thus they represented more profoundly than steamboats the conquest of the
topography and also covered the distance between cities in far fewer actual travel miles.
A traveler going from Cincinnati to St. Louis, for example, covered 702 miles on the
river but only 339 by rail. This made for drastic differences in travel times: by the late
20 Print, “Midnight Race on the Mississippi,” (Haskell and Allen, 1875), AAS.
21 Passenger responses to railroad speeds are discussed in Nye, American Technological Sublime, 45-76.
The various effects of railroad speed on passenger experiences are best analyzed in Wolfgang
Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space in the Nineteenth Century
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).
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1850s the trip between the two cities averaged two days, twenty-two hours by steamboat
and sixteen hours by train, less than a quarter of the time.22
Competition from railroads in their early years compelled steamboat companies to
push for higher speeds and faster trips to keep up, but the effort was ultimately fruitless.
Steamboats tended to have the early advantage in comfort, but as railroads expanded and
drove up passenger expectations, steamboats struggled to match the potential for high-
speed mobility railroads offered. Tracing this transition, Louis Hunter notes that
“steamboatmen had to bear the humiliation of having exceptionally fast packets described
as ‘going through with railroad speed’ or ‘swift as a locomotive.’”23 While river transport
remained essential for a mobile, developing nation, railroads fulfilled American
aspirations for speed overcoming distance to an even greater extent than steamboats.
Finally, railroad speeds had significant cultural influence beyond travel. Trains
accelerated a transformation that steamboats had begun in which physical space, the
American landscape, and daily life became increasingly organized by speed and time.
Mirroring route breakdowns like those printed in Lloyd’s Steamboat Directory and
Twain’s Life on the Mississippi, captains occasionally marked their times on the river
with physical signposts. These markers, like one on the Mississippi River where the A. L.
Shotwell was after three days on its record trip, sometimes made it onto maps, measuring
distance for future crews and travelers not in miles but in steamboat time. As travel times
decreased and trips could be measured in hours rather than days or weeks, the traveling
public confronted a world broken down into ever-smaller units of time. Steamboat
22 For a table comparing steamboat and rail mileage and travel times, see Hunter, Steamboats on the
Western Rivers, 490.
23 Hunter, Steamboats on the Western Rivers, 491.
221
competition had made steamboat companies more attuned to timely departures and
arrivals, and owners advertised their boats based not only on speed but on punctuality.24
Scheduled departures shaped passengers’ expectations and increased their own
attentiveness to time.
Because railroads cut travel times even more drastically, travelers necessarily
dealt with finer measurements of time after their introduction. Many destinations that
were previously several days’ journey away could now be reached the day of departure.
Departure and arrival times were typically scheduled to a precise hour and minute, and
railroad companies published time tables for passengers detailing where trains would be
at the same time every day of service. This further necessitated regular high speeds so
that trains could make up delays and stay reliably on time. Time tables linked cities and
towns based on rail routes and defined them in relation to the time it took a train to pass
between them. Clocks and personal timepieces became ubiquitous in a society organized
this way. Regular, frequent railroad traffic also necessitated a new structure for time
itself. For much of the nineteenth century, time was measured locally – individual towns
and cities, even within the same small region, kept their own times that were all slightly
different from each other. Railroad companies started keeping their own different times
as well, such that in larger railroad stations several clocks all showed different local
times. Rising speeds and the expansion of railroads in the United States necessitated
24 Gudmestad, Steamboats and the Rise of the Cotton Kingdom, 100-102.
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standardized time, and by 1889 the United States was split into four time zones, first just
for railroad time but eventually broadly adopted.25
The speeds achieved by steam transportation technology had wide-ranging effects
for passenger travel and commercial transportation but also for Americans’ daily
experiences of space and time. Speed was the catalyst that made the celebrated
“annihilation of space and time” so stunning.26 Speed was an indispensible feature of
modern life, even definitive of American national identity. Consequently, with the
sublime machines that moved so swiftly around the nation continuing to explode, collide,
and derail, Americans confronted both a challenge to public safety and to the accepted
ideas about technological progress itself.
In September 1852, in a remarkably perceptive address to an assembled grand
jury of the U. S. District Court in New York, Judge Samuel Betts described the
emergence of America’s obsession with speed driven by technological advancements in
steam transportation. “You are aware,” the judge began, “that since the introduction of
steam-navigation, there has been an increasing desire and anxiety to attain the utmost
speed.” The proprietors of steamboats had a natural incentive to achieve high speeds and
therefore success, but the desire was widespread: “there is a spirit manifested on the part
of the people, to encourage, countenance, and to stimulate them to attain the greatest
speed.” Judge Betts continued the history lesson by charting the technological
25 On the effects of railroad travel on conceptions of space and time, see Schivelbusch, The Railway
Journey, Chapter 3. A broader study of modern technology’s role in reshaping space and time is Stephen
Kern, The Culture of Time & Space, 1880-1918 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983).
26 Americans not only celebrated the increasing speed of transportation, but also of communication,
resulting from new technologies like the telegraph. See Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought:
The Transformation of America, 1815-1848 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
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improvements made to the river boats of the East that had enabled them to increase
speeds from five to twenty-five miles per hour in a few decades. The introduction of the
steam locomotive, he noted, had only spurred “fresh exertions” to advance steamboat
power. But rather than a praiseworthy account of American progress, the judge’s address
was a cautionary story. “In this state of things there is no doubt great hazard,” Betts said.
Whatever its advantages, steam power was “an immense force,” whose use was “attended
with great danger.”27
Judge Betts’s comments came in the summer of 1852 in the aftermath of a deadly
fire aboard the steamboat Henry Clay that sent dozens to their death in the Hudson River.
The assembled grand jury was to evaluate and decide whether the owners and operators
of the Henry Clay had violated existing state or federal laws and “neglected to do what
was incumbent upon them for the safety of the passengers.” In his address to the jury, the
judge had placed the case in the context of a complex cultural problem long in the
making: a powerful desire for travel at high speeds that had seemingly contributed to
catastrophic disaster and loss of life.28 Seeking explanations for this pattern of death, the
American public often looked toward speed. Within a society that praised speed and
demanded it from public conveyances, steam transportation disasters provoked moments
of critique and collective national reflection, as the public questioned the high speeds
achieved by steamboats and trains and also a broader modern culture that seemed to be
valuing speed over safety.
American agitation over steam disasters had reached an initial apex in 1838, when
several significant steamboat accidents killed hundreds and prompted the passing of the
27 New York Evening Post, September 8, 1852.
28 Evening Post, September 8, 1852.
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nation’s first major steamboat safety legislation. When steamboat disasters continued,
public alarm remained high. An article on steamboat disasters in the North American
Review of January 1840 – the same month of the Lexington fire in Long Island Sound –
epitomizes the critique of speed. The author lamented that the popularity of particular
steamboats was based on “a reputation for speed, which promises a progress of a few
more miles a day,” rather than safe construction and experienced captains. Criticizing
both passengers and crews, the author noted that “to gain these few hours a great majority
of those concerned will sacrifice every consideration of prudence.” “Excited passengers”
and “ambitious captains” shared a mania for speed that led to unsafe decisions (including
racing) by which they put themselves and others in danger. The author also told of a
personal experience on a Mississippi steamboat engaged in a “brag trip.” As the boat
pushed for higher speed and passed other boats on the water, some passengers expressed
alarm, but most charted the progress excitedly, “estimating from time to time her rate of
speed.” When the journey finished, “all tongues were loud in applause of our captain and
his fast boat” and newspapers recorded and praised the time. Such sentiments, the author
said, undoubtedly served to challenge other captains to match the effort. With a touch of
drama, the author finally revealed that the boat had been the Moselle, which had
famously exploded just one week later.29
The much-publicized explosion of the Moselle outside Cincinnati in April 1838
sparked significant dialogue about speed because of the tremendous scale of the disaster
and its reported cause: witnesses suggested that the captain, “desirous of showing off her
29 North American Review, 50 (January, 1840), 22; 28-30.
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great speed as she passed the city,” had left the port carrying excessive levels of steam.30
This was not an unexpected or uncommon practice. Looking to save or make up time,
steamboats often kept engines running during stops and held onto accumulated steam in
order to depart with greater speed.31 The captain on the Moselle also had further reason to
show off its power to onlooking crowds – the Moselle was a new boat, and newspapers
reported it was a “brag boat” that had made several record trips since it started service. A
passenger on the Moselle’s upriver trip to Cincinnati told the same story as the author of
the North American Review article: the captain sought a speed record, and had gone to
great lengths to secure it, including adding rosin to the fires and not letting off steam at
stops.32 Upon arriving at Cincinnati in record time, the passengers gave the captain a card
praising his “skill and prudence” and recommending the boat to other travelers.
Newspapers, far from the region, echoed the commendations. A brief note in the
Columbian Centinel of Boston read “The Moselle, a splendid new steamboat, made a trip
from St. Louis to Cincinnati last week, in the very short space of two days and sixteen
hours! This is literally overcoming space, and bringing distant places together as near
neighbors.”33 It was an unfortunate irony that, as sometimes happened, delays in the
spread of news meant the Centinel’s comment appeared in the April 28 issue, two days
after the Moselle had actually exploded; clearly, the challenges of distance had not
entirely disappeared.34
30 Ohio Statesman, April 27, 1838.
31 Cincinnati Daily Gazette, May 2, 1838.
32 Evening Post, May 5, 1838.
33 Columbian Centinel, April 28, 1838.
34 Other examples of transportation delays affecting the timing of news are given in Chapter Two.
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In the aftermath of the Moselle disaster, the press focused much of the blame on
the captain (who had been found dead, apparently blown from the boat into the streets of
Cincinnati). The circumstances of the explosion provoked widespread condemnation of
the captain’s bravado in his apparent attempt to display the boat’s speed. The Cincinnati
Daily Gazette tied his actions to a culture of “recklessness, on the part of captains and
engineers, that induces them to run any risk to accomplish their trips in the shortest
possible time, knowing that for this they are trumpeted to the world through the public
press, their boat acquires a reputation for speed, and consequently an acquisition of
custom.”35
Even though direct responsibility seemed to reside with the captains and
engineers who pushed the boat to an unsafe speed, a disaster like the Moselle prompted
conversation about the impulse for speed itself. In an honest moment following the
Moselle explosion, the Cincinnati Daily Gazette accepted some culpability for the
disaster, “having praised the speed and power of the boat” in its columns. The reports in
the Gazette and other papers of the Moselle’s reputation as a fast boat “doubtless
contributed to inflate the ambition of its captain and owners, to excel others in rapidity,”
the paper admitted. With its admission of guilt, the Gazette acknowledged the profound
power of the press to shape the public reputation of steamboats and therefore the
expectations of the travelers who used them. The press bore responsibility for creating the
expectation of ever-greater speeds, and thus “the press must change its tone.” “Boats
35 Cincinnati Daily Gazette, May 3, 1838.
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must be praised for their comfort, convenience, and the care and discretion of their
managers – but, not for their speed,” the article continued.36
In actuality, as engineers and the scientific community were finding out, the
technical causes of boiler explosions were various and complex.37 An official citizen
committee in Cincinnati led by Dr. John Locke examined the Moselle case and produced
a technical report about the causes and possible measures for reform. After performing an
extensive series of experiments, Locke argued that several forces contributed to boiler
explosions like that on the Moselle. Poorly constructed machinery and engineers who
lacked sufficient technical knowledge to operate it safely were at the top of Locke’s list.
Low levels of water in boilers could allow the metal of flues and boilers to become
overheated, which in contact with water could produce sudden high pressures of steam.
The most direct cause of the Moselle explosion, he surmised, was simply a greater build
up of steam than the boilers could withstand; the failure to release steam at Cincinnati in
an effort to start fast, he said, certainly would have created that pressure.38 There were,
then, technical explanations for why pursuit of high speed could produce excessive
pressure and explosion. Amidst the mystifying science of steam boilers and explosions,
the idea that high speed created explosions was perhaps among the easiest for the public
to understand.
The narrative about the dangerous quest for speed was also often the most
compelling. Even Locke, in the middle of intricate scientific description, commented on
the “moral causes” of explosion. “We are not satisfied with travelling with a speed of ten
36 Cincinnati Daily Gazette, April 27, 1838.
37 See John G. Burke, “Bursting Boilers and the Federal Power,” Technology and Culture, 7, 1 (Winter,
1966), 4-5.
38 “A Report on Explosions and the Causes of Explosions…” (Cincinnati: 1838), 36-40; 54.
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miles per hour, but we must fly,” Locke wrote; “A steam boat must establish a reputation
of a few minutes ‘swifter’ in a hundred miles than others.” Locke attributed the speed
obsession to the pursuit of economic gain on the part of owners and consent on the part of
passengers. While regulatory and scientific efforts dealt with what Locke called the
various “immediate causes” of steamboat disasters, the public found it impossible to
ignore the apparent signs that American progress had likely outstripped care and
prudence.39
In this higher level conversation that disasters provoked, the public’s expectation
for speed continued to come under fire. The North American Review criticized the public
for encouraging speed trials and races and extended the commentary to a larger cultural
reflection on “this frantic desire to get ahead, no matter at what risk, or for what object, or
haply for no object at all.”40 The 1875 wreck of an ocean steamship, the Schiller,
similarly became cause for broader commentary in a Harper’s editorial. “The public
itself is largely responsible for these dire events. If a railway train is detained for five
minutes, there are scores of passengers who are bursting with impatience, and urge the
conductor to push on.”41 The writer went on to suggest that when boats went full speed
through fog and arrived safely at their destinations, passengers praised the skill of the
captain, but when a boat was delayed or slowed because of threat of fog or ice, restless
passengers (like those aboard Lawry Wilford’s Woodville in Oliver Optic’s story)
complained and the press denounced the company as behind the times. Public impatience
encouraged dangerous speeds, the writer said, and a more reasonable public that
39 “A Report on Explosions,” 28.
40 The North American Review, 50 (1840), 28.
41 Harper’s Weekly, May 29, 1875.
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demanded safety over speed would be the first step toward more secure travel. After an
1868 railroad accident, another Harper’s writer noted that reckless management
coincided with a “general eagerness of railroad travelers.”42 The writer gave an example
of passengers who had grown indignant at a Hudson River Railroad train traveling slowly
due to a snowstorm; “they seemed solely anxious to go fast, whatever would probably
occur.” The writer suggested that had the train gone faster and derailed because of it, the
passengers would have denounced the managers.
The unreasonable expectations of modern travelers were symptomatic of a much
larger problem, according to many observers. Minister Orren Perkins’s sermon on the
1854 Arctic disaster found fault with a culture that sought speed and progress at any cost.
Public sentiment encouraged the “reckless haste” so often seen from steamboat and train
operators. “All hands on board, all men on shore lift up their voices in praise of the
fleetest vessel, and the press takes up the strain and echoes it all through the land, until
awakened by the crash of a collision, or an alarm of fire, and the wails of hundreds
perishing,” Perkins told his congregation. Commentary like Perkins’s sermon made
steamboat and rail disasters more than individual tragedies; these events represented
evidence that Americans had perhaps too eagerly embraced the advantages brought by
steam technology.43
The intense desire for speed shared by owners, operators, press, and public
manifested itself most clearly in the arena of travel, but to many observers, it was
endemic to a modern American culture built on the pursuit of gain. In an 1853 lecture,
Ralph Waldo Emerson said, “Everything is sacrificed for speed, - solidity and safety.
42 Harper’s Weekly, January 4, 1868.
43 Orren Perkins, “Lessons of the Sea: A Sermon on the Loss of the Atlantic Steamer Arctic” (1854).
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Americans, Emerson claimed, “would sail in a steamer built of Lucifer matches if it
would go faster.”44 Foreign travelers touring the United States on river and rail often
commented on the reckless national spirit supposedly revealed by America’s record of
disaster. One French traveler visiting the country in 1836 said the danger of explosions
“makes little difference to Americans provided they can go fast.”45 Arthur Cunynghame,
an English tourist writing of the Mississippi River region in 1850, said that “the constant
struggle which is here going on, as to who shall ‘go-ahead’ at the greatest speed, certainly
engenders an amount of selfishness.”46 Europeans riding on American railroads often
complained of their lack of safety. Englishman Charles Weld was on a Baltimore and
Ohio train in 1855 that derailed when crews had increased speed to overcome earlier
delays; Weld noted that passengers nonetheless applauded the attempt to make up time.47
Evidence suggests that American railroads were, in fact, comparatively more
deadly than those in Britain, and there are several clear reasons why. On most American
railroad lines, trains operated on a single-track system, increasing the likelihood of
collisions. Signaling was also fairly rudimentary on American rails. The rails themselves,
often built quickly with flimsy materials, sometimes broke under the pressure of
increasingly heavy American trains. In Britain, a Board of Trade began investigating
railroad accidents in 1842 and required numerous safety measures; no comparable
regulatory body existed in the United States until Massachusetts created a Board of
44 Ralph Waldo Emerson, quoted in John F. Kasson, Civilizing the Machine: Technology and Republican
Values in America, 1776-1900 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1976), 129.
45 Quoted in Gudmestad, Steamboats and the Rise of the Cotton Kingdom, 112.
46 Quoted in Hunter, Steamboats on the Western Rivers, 301.
47 Mark Aldrich, Death Rode the Rails: American Railroad Accidents and Safety, 1828-1965 (Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 15.
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Railroad Commissioners on the state level in 1869.48 Nevertheless, Europeans traveling
in America typically commented on speed and saw in transportation disasters the
consequences of the fact that Americans were “always in a terrible hurry.”49
“Undue haste, unwarrantable exposure of life, unwise risking of property – any
thing to ‘get on’ in life” – this was the “spirit of the age” in America, one writer for
Harper’s Weekly said after another deadly rail accident in 1868. “People are not content
to be moderate and sure; they want to hurry to the end of their journey, to hurry to
become rich, to hurry to gain repute, and thus they soon hurry through life.” Each new
disaster offered Americans a chance at least momentarily, to evaluate American
technological advancement and question whether it was an absolute good. The Harper’s
editorial offered a reflective and somewhat nostalgic response to the ongoing pattern of
destruction: “One is almost tempted, as he reads the daily records of accidents on
railroads and steamboats, to wish for a return of the old times when slow-going coaches
were the fashionable vehicles for public travel.”50
Almost tempted. Even as Americans regularly questioned speed in the aftermath
of transportation disasters, their reflections furthered the notion that speed was an
acceptable feature of modern life. Though Americans’ responses to speed and danger
appear ambivalent, their critiques rhetorically separated safe speed from unsafe speed.
Speed became unsafe when it was deemed unreasonable, reckless, or excessive.
Meanwhile, faith in the technology remained. As John Locke wrote in his report on the
48 Aldrich, Death Rode the Rails, 15-22; 71.
49 Michel Chevalier, quoted in Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey, 112.
50 Harper’s Weekly, November 14, 1868.
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Moselle explosion, “these causes are only an excess of those things which are in
themselves laudable.”51 In other words, speed was a fundamental feature of a progressive
modern life, and it only became dangerous when human carelessness, or occasionally
external forces, made it so. Complaints about excessive speed were driven largely by
disasters, as steamboat explosions typically suggested to the public clear evidence of
unnecessary speed. Especially with death tolls mounting, steamboat racing seemed a
particularly egregious case of gratuitous speed and dominated much of the discourse.
As the lines from the song “Mississippi Boat Race” suggest, steamboat racing was
exciting and popular, but it also carried associations with danger which grew as disasters
became more frequent. The extent to which steamboat racing actually was dangerous was
questionable, especially for those inside the industry. In Life on the Mississippi, Twain
rejected the popular notion that racing was dangerous, and argued that it was actually
safer than standard travel. “No engineer was ever sleepy or careless when his heart was in
a race,” Twain remembered; “the dangerous place was on the slow, plodding boats,
where the engineers drowsed around and allowed chips to get into the ‘doctor’ and shut
off the water-supply from the boilers.”52 Louis Hunter likewise argues that the danger of
racing was probably overstated.53 Even if this is true, Americans’ responses to disasters
suggest that the perception that racing was dangerous was powerful and any disaster that
occurred while boats were supposedly racing only reinforced it in Americans’ minds.
However, in the conversations that followed these disasters, participants divorced racing,
51 “A Report on Explosions,” 28.
52 Twain, Life on the Mississippi, 107.
53 Hunter, Steamboats on the Western Rivers, 303.
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a dangerous activity they blamed on reckless steamboat operators, from speed, which
remained a celebrated feature of steam technology.
Some of the nation’s most significant steamboat accidents became linked with
racing. On May 8, 1837, the boiler on the Ben Sherrod exploded and set the boat aflame
on a trip from New Orleans to Louisville, killing nearly one hundred fifty passengers and
crew members. Newspapers cited survivor testimony suggesting that the Ben Sherrod had
been racing the steamer Prairie throughout the journey, and they wholeheartedly
condemned the actions of the boat’s captain and crew. “When is this system of racing to
cease?” the New Orleans Times-Picayune asked; “thousands and thousands of lives have
been lost on the Mississippi by the racing of boats and the culpable carelessness of the
officers.”54 A committee of citizens of Natchez, Mississippi, including several survivors,
formally echoed these sentiments, stating “that the practice of steamboat racing is in the
highest degree dangerous to the lives and property of individuals travelling or passing on
them… and ought to be condemned and discountenanced by the whole community.”55
More than a month after the fire the Times-Picayune urged an end to the “savage cruelty”
still apparent as boats continued to race.56
Fifteen years later, after those traveling on the St. James enjoyed a Fourth of July
outing off the Mississippi coast, the boat’s boilers exploded, killing several dozen
passengers. Reports quickly surfaced that the St. James had left with the steamer
California and the two boats were racing to reach their shared destination first.57 Later
that same month in 1852, over fifty passengers burned or drowned in the Hudson River
54 New Orleans Times-Picayune, May 18, 1837.
55 Albany Argus, June 6, 1837.
56 Times-Picayune, June 27, 1837.
57 Times-Picayune, July 5, 1852.
234
when the Henry Clay caught fire. The claim that the Henry Clay had been racing
appeared in the first sentence of the New York Evening Post’s coverage the following
day. Relying on survivor and witness testimony, the Evening Post reported that the boat
had set off in company with the steamer Armenia and racing was apparent from the start.
For one stretch of nearly an hour, the two boats ran alongside one another, employing
fenders on their sides to prevent a damaging collision. After the fire was noticed, the pilot
ran the flaming boat to the river’s eastern bank. With the aid of observers on shore, many
passengers survived, while numerous others drowned after the fire forced them into the
water. Reports from several surviving passengers offered suspicion and evidence of
racing, which newspapers confirmed. Readers of the Evening Post learned that “all
seemed to be actuated by but one miserable ambition, and that was to beat the rival
steamer.”58
That the public associated racing with danger is clear from the fear and anger
displayed by some passengers aboard boats that supposedly engaged in races. Testimony
in the Henry Clay case revealed that numerous passengers had expressed apprehension
about the boat’s apparent contest with the Armenia. Rumors of a rivalry with the
Armenia, unusual behavior from the boat’s crew, skipped landings, and other signs of
racing sparked objections among passengers on board. One passenger, fearful “the boat
would blow up,” took shelter at the bow of the boat, placing his baggage between himself
and the boiler as a precautionary shield (this story drew laughter from those present at the
inquest who recognized the futility of the attempt).59 A frightened couple asked to get off
at Bristol and were refused. Concerns peaked as the boats nearly came into contact with
58 Evening Post, July 29, 1852.
59 New York Weekly Herald, August 7, 1852.
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one another. “Several ladies shed tears” and others fainted, a passenger remarked, and the
alarmed women urged their husbands and any willing “gentleman” on board to force an
end to the racing.60 Several passengers claimed to take action or witnessed others
approaching the captain and other crew. John L. Thompson commented on the apparent
high level of steam to the engineer and said “I hope you will not blow us all out of the
water.”61 Isaac McDaniels, perhaps the same passenger elsewhere reported to have
“seized” the arm of the captain, said he “remonstrated against the racing of the boats,”
telling the captain he “did not wish to risk the lives of [himself] and family.”62 In
response to their distress, the passengers received assurances that there was no danger
and the crew valued their lives as much as any of the passengers.
For these passengers, danger had become real and racing was no longer a
spectacle but a perceived threat to their lives; in the moment concerns for safety
overcame the desire for swift travel. Isaac McDaniels told the captain “I would rather get
into New York later than have any racing by the boat.”63 A public that relied on and
expected timely transportation increasingly drew the line at racing, which stood out as a
frivolous and dangerous activity. A Harper’s Weekly editorial highlighted the root of the
problem – traveling by steamboat clearly presented some peril, but racing created an
unnecessary danger, serving the ambitions of the boat’s owners and crew rather than the
goal of efficient travel. The writer offered the Hudson River steamer Drew as an
example: the Drew left New York in the evenings at six o’clock and “without any
difficulty” arrived in Albany roughly twelve hours later, in ample time for passengers to
60 Evening Post, July 29, 1852.
61 Evening Post, July 30, 1852.
62 Weekly Herald, August 7, 1852.
63 Weekly Herald, August 7, 1852.
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transfer to the morning’s outbound trains. “But we understand that something has been
said of the slowness of the Drew,” the editorial continued, and thus each time its
opposition appeared the Drew “is pressed to tremendous speed,” reaching Albany several
hours earlier. Thus “under the influence of the passions,” the crew pushed speeds past
normal levels and often to “the fatal point.” The editorial’s critique rested on racing,
however, not on speed. Speed was a necessary condition of modern life – the Drew had to
get passengers to Albany for the morning train. Racing was reckless, a product of the
“passions,” an act carried out by greedy, vain men worthy of public disdain.64
As public opinion about racing grew more negative, accusations of racing became
serious enough that they often warranted public denials written by the accused parties.
After the Ben Sherrod disaster, the captain published a statement refuting charges of
racing and other wrongdoing.65 Captain Thomas Clark of the St. James felt it necessary to
defend himself publicly with a statement published in the Times Picayune, even though
he was officially cleared of culpability. After hearing from witnesses, the coroner’s jury
found insufficient evidence to attribute the cause of the explosion to negligence on the
part of any on board. Engineers, a former captain, and the state inspector testifying before
the jury suggested that a lack of water in the boilers was to blame, but made no link to
racing or excessive speed.66 Though Clark was cleared of official culpability, he still had
to defend himself from charges leveled in the press, pleading that such
“misrepresentations and falsehoods” relating to both his moral and professional character
64 Harper’s Weekly, August 3, 1867.
65 Rhode Island Republican, July 4, 1837.
66 Times-Picayune, July 10, 1852.
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quickly cease.67 The three owners of the Henry Clay similarly recognized the significance
of public opinion and the power of the press. Within days of the disaster, the owners
addressed a statement “To the Public” asking “at your hands a suspension of opinion for
a few days” during which they would prove that no racing had occurred.68 These defenses
reflect their authors’ awareness of racing’s salience in the public mind. A suspicious
public could do significant damage, even after a jury’s exoneration. Reputations were
built on speed but could just as easily be destroyed by public consensus that a boat had
been racing.
This suggests the predicament steamboat operators could potentially find
themselves in. With so much at stake, the debates in print over racing are understandable,
but they reveal significant disagreement about what actually constituted racing and
excessive speed. One captain expressed fear after an accident that “the traveling
community may be misled by some remarks” – such concerns seem justified considering
the uncertainty that followed steamboat disasters where racing was accused.69 Though the
Weekly Herald concluded that the Henry Clay had been racing before it took fire, the
paper noted that “people differ very much as to what racing is, and what amount of steam
may be regarded as excessive.”70 Countering the testimony of others in the Henry Clay
case, passenger John L. Thompson said he “noticed nothing unusual in the speed of the
boat,” and though aware of the rivalry he saw no indication of racing.71 Other passenger
testimony used as evidence was tentative, based in rumor, or betrayed a lack of
67 Times-Picayune, July 11, 1852.
68 Evening Post, July 31, 1852.
69 Daily Missouri Republican, April 30, 1852.
70 Weekly Herald, August 7, 1852.
71 Evening Post, July 30, 1852.
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familiarity with common experiences of steamboat travel. Survivors of the Henry Clay
fire spoke vaguely of an “apparent anxiety” among the crew and rumors before boarding
about a possible race. Many said at times the boat “appeared to go faster,” while others
pointed to the “uncommon jarring about the boat,” though the light frame of many boats
created a vibration even at normal speeds.72
There was certainly reason to be unsure, as the high speeds achieved by boats and
the nature of competitive river transport could appear like racing when perhaps it was
not. Steamboat operators described several such scenarios. Captain Clark of the St. James
responded to accusations that his boat was racing the California with the claim that it was
natural that the California would frequently fall behind and then again pass the St. James,
as the boat’s design made it faster in deep water and slower in shallow water. Thus the
normal traveling speeds of the two boats over the route could mislead observers to
believe a race was on. Clark certainly seemed aware of the damage any perception of
racing could cause and claimed he purposefully avoided it, choosing to remain at Biloxi
until the other boats had gotten ahead “as to prevent the possibility of creating any
excitement.”73
William Radford, a part-owner of the Henry Clay, described similar precautions
taken prior to the boat’s ill-fated trip down the Hudson. On trial for allegedly racing and
endangering passenger lives, Radford had reason to firmly deny that the boat was racing
the Armenia; instead his testimony only made the situation more unclear. Radford told
the jury that after learning that the Armenia would be running the same route as the
Henry Clay, he approached the Armenia’s captain, Isaac Smith, to express concerns about
72 Evening Post, July 30, 1852; Hunter, Steamboats on the Western Rivers, 81.
73 Daily Picayune, July 11, 1852.
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competing with one another. Smith said he had chartered the boat to a Mr. Bishop, who
refused to delay the scheduled trip. Smith told Bishop that there should be no racing, and
Bishop agreed. Radford then described a conversation he and Thomas Collyer (another
Henry Clay owner) had with Smith about how to run the two boats “so as not to create
any excitement or have any racing.” They agreed that the Henry Clay would start ahead
of the Armenia and run at “regular speed.” Radford was not on the Henry Clay when the
fire occurred, but he had suggested Collyer ride along and report on whether the
agreement was kept. Though the owners often rode on the boat, Radford said they had
never taken charge, leaving the captain “fully accountable” for his boat. Radford did not
explicitly deny that the boat had been racing, but noted that it was capable of reaching
twenty to twenty-two miles per hour and had only been going about sixteen or seventeen
miles per hour during the stretch before it caught fire.74
If accurate, Radford’s account of the owners’ agreement offers a fascinating
illustration of the ambiguity about racing. Like Clark, Radford and his fellow steamboat
owners clearly understood that even rumors about racing could attract public criticism.
Despite declaring his faith in his employees in his testimony, Radford and others also
seemed aware that two rival boats running alongside one another might spark a race, so
they took precautions to avoid the temptation. Still, it is easy to imagine a scenario in
which such an agreement to avoid the perception of racing could actually create it. The
papers stated that the Armenia eventually caught and passed the Henry Clay after
skipping the landing at Hudson. Under instructions to stay ahead of the Armenia for the
purpose of avoiding racing, the crew of the Henry Clay would possibly have increased
74 Evening Post, August 4, 1852.
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steam to move back out ahead, and all of the sudden the two boats would appear to be
racing. In all likelihood the Henry Clay was indeed involved in a contest of speed – other
testimony certainly made it probable enough that the jury rendered a guilty verdict. Still,
the disparate accounts of what happened aboard the boat seem less indicative of a false
denial or cover up and more suggestive of the indefinite line dividing acceptable, much
desired quickness and excessive or reckless speed.
Steamboat racing did happen, and with frequency – both scheduled races and
spontaneous contests are well-documented. On the other hand, the explanations of some
employees about why their actions might appear like racing even when they were not
engaged in a contest of speed seem plausible. The blurred line between racing and speedy
travel was in many ways a natural product of the modern transportation culture that steam
technology had produced, where passengers expected punctuality and praised steamboat
lines for shaving time off a journey, where the boats with a record of fast times earned
popular approval, and where the first boat to port received the reward of the best
business. Those in charge of operating steamboats faced pressures to achieve high speeds
desired by owners, urged by passengers, and celebrated by the press, and thus in a very
real sense, everybody was racing.
Despite the ambiguity, juries still made decisions and the public made their
judgments about what was reckless and what was admirable, and typically the evidence
that proved speed was “excessive” was the occurrence of disaster itself. As a Harper’s
writer stated, “it is not easy to prove that on any occasion this steamer has strained her
powers unreasonably. Indeed it is never very easy to prove such a fact under such
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circumstances until it proves itself by an explosion.”75 Disasters proved public suspicions
of unreasonable speed, and when boats did not meet disaster, their swiftness generally
received praise. Amid pages of disaster stories in Lloyd’s Steamboat Directory, many in
which the author spoke of operator recklessness, the author lauded the General Pike, a
passenger boat of the United States Mail Line. The boat made the trip “from the Falls of
Ohio to St. Louis in from thirty-nine to forty-four hours, almost rivaling the iron horse in
speed,” any yet it and the other Mail Line boats had never suffered a disaster. The
conclusion was clear: “we have it demonstrated that the greatest speed in steamboat
travel may, under proper management, be consistent with the most perfect security.”76
When they labeled disasters the results of carelessness and excess, writers actually
encouraged the belief that speed was itself safe. Each successful steamboat trip suddenly
proved that high speeds could be achieved without danger if boats were managed with
discipline and control.
Again, racing and high speeds had a definite relationship to exploding boilers.
The pressures boilers produced to power steamboats against currents and to even regular
operating speeds were significant enough sometimes to burst boilers with extreme force.
When engineers or captains overloaded safety valves or added highly combustible
materials to the fuel in order to maximize speed steam could reach extraordinarily high
pressure. But the level at which steam pressure became excessive and burst a boiler was a
direct function of the boiler’s design and condition, which itself depended on a number of
conditions including water level in the boiler, the metal used for the boiler and its
construction, and so on. Though various technical attributes of steam technology
75 Harper’s Weekly, August 3, 1867.
76 Lloyd, Lloyd’s Steamboat Directory, 129.
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contributed to the possibility of explosions, observers could more easily identify the
actions of human operators than the mechanics of the technology, and apparent
recklessness with passenger lives was so clearly immoral that it often sufficiently
explained the problem.
Racing in particular was thought so clearly reckless that it typically absorbed the
weight of public censure to the extent that it obscured other potentially dangerous
circumstances. The day after the St. James explosion in 1852, the Times Picayune noted
that extensive investigation would be required to determine the cause. Engineers, the
paper reported, had suggested there was probably a lack of water in the boilers, and that
“the signs were more those of gas than of steam.” Then, the Times Picayune quickly
moved past these more technical explanations: “Be that as it may, it is not denied in New
Orleans that the boat was engaged in a race, or, as it is commonly called, a ‘head of
speed’ with the California.” Despite having earlier noted the lack of good information,
the writer said the “inevitable deduction” would be that passenger safety had been
sacrificed in the eagerness to beat the other boat.77 Later that week the paper informed
audiences that “it was rare indeed that a boat ever explodes her boilers when she is under
full headway.” The Times Picayune said, incorrectly, that an explosion was really only
possible with low water or defective boilers. The paper implicitly labeled steamboats
safe, even at speed, then it equated racing with “holding men over a volcano with the
probability, we may say the certainty, of its bursting forth.”78
In the weeks following the Henry Clay disaster, accusations and evidence of
racing were so prominent that the direct cause of the fire went virtually unexamined in
77 Times-Picayune, July 5, 1852.
78 Times-Picayune, July 8, 1852.
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the press. The New York papers reported on the disaster extensively, and from the
beginning racing was the implied cause. Yet neither the Evening Post nor the Herald
explained or speculated as to how the fire started in the first place, or ever made the direct
link between the boat’s supposed high speed and the fire. Witness testimony given before
the coroner’s jury dealt only with various evidence of racing, and owners and employees
from both the Henry Clay and the Armenia responded publicly to accusations of racing.
A discussion of the cause of disaster was such a standard part of disaster coverage that its
relative absence here is revealing. Racing was believed to be so dangerous that it became
the only necessary evidence of wrongdoing. The coroner’s inquest set about proving that
the Henry Clay’s operators had been racing, and therefore reckless with human life, not
how high speed was specifically to blame for the deadly fire, or if other dangerous
conditions including poor design or defective technology contributed. That only those
company men on board the boat at the time of the fire were charged highlights the jury’s
assumption that the disaster was the product of the reckless behavior preceding it rather
than any latent dangers.
In the subsequent grand jury investigation, the judge ordered the jury to take into
consideration the boat’s condition and management along with evidence of racing, but
still made racing sufficient evidence for conviction.79 The judge asked the jury to
evaluate the case based on the 1838 Steamboat Act, which made steamboat operators
whose actions were deemed reckless and had contributed to loss of life guilty of
manslaughter, as well as a New York state law which stipulated financial penalties for
anyone “creating or allowing to be created an undue or unsafe quantity of steam for the
79 Evening Post, September 8, 1852.
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purpose of excelling any other boat in speed.”80 In other words, racing was proof of
recklessness, rendering other considerations moot.
Of course, none of this precluded steamboat racing’s continued appeal. The
popular prints made by Currier and Ives of famous races and the nostalgia of Twain are
enough to demonstrate that racing could still excite audiences as displays of speed and
power, and the thrill of potential danger may have even added to the allure, at least until
disaster actually happened. Speed prompted admiration and awe, but when it could be
called excessive, speed prompted revulsion, not at the fact of high speed itself but at the
human behavior that led to mishandling speed. When the public discussed the issue of
speed in the aftermath of steamboat disasters, their critiques were not of technology but
of human flaws and ambitions. Speed was safe and desired, and only human recklessness
could make it dangerous.
As with steamboat disasters, American responses to rail accidents reinforced the
notion that the speeds achievable through steam technology were safe under the proper
conditions. Though charges of recklessness arose, the absence of a racing culture in the
railroad industry made claims of excessive speed more difficult. Speed on steamboats had
tangible benefits, but racing had also made it thrilling – a spectator sport. With railroads,
their unmatched speeds were a source of amazement, but that amazement related entirely
to the practical advantages – railroads achieved their speeds for the purpose of efficient
transport. In the case of railroads, then, accidents linked to unsafe speed turned public
attention to material and incidental factors – poor track conditions, not enough employees
80 Evening Post, August 3, 1852.
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on the track, mechanical problems, weather issues or obstacles on the road – which were
more obvious to the untrained observer than those contributing to steamboat explosions.
Even more than with steamboats, speed absolutely contributed to and made more
destructive the common accidents that happened to trains – derailments and collisions.
Nevertheless, industry and regulatory efforts reflected the public’s concern and sought
not to reduce speeds but to make higher speeds consistently safer. With consistent
improvement of external conditions, trains could theoretically be made safe at any
speed.81
When speed was a factor, blame typically fell on operators who were expected to
slow trains when conditions demanded it. After an Erie Railway train derailed off a cliff
on April 15, 1868, the train’s “extraordinary speed” came under fire. An engineer
testified that the train was traveling between twenty-five and thirty miles per hour when it
derailed. In an earlier report, however, the railroad’s superintendent stated that several
months of severe winter conditions had necessitated slower travel, about twelve to fifteen
miles per hour, over the worn-out and rotted sections of track. “We can not and do not
attempt to make the schedule time with our trains,” the superintendent said; “nearly all
lose from two to five hours in passing over the road, and it has been only by the exercise
of extreme caution we have been able thus far to escape serious accident.” Rather than
arrive late, the conductor testified that he had made up time, as he was free to do at his
discretion, and said he did not believe it dangerous to “run twenty-five miles an hour
81 Robert Reed attributes the rise of major railroad accidents in part to excessive speed. Mark Aldrich
counters this idea, saying that while speed could and did make what might have been minor accidents into
major ones, the rise in major disasters (killing more than six) is likely more a sign of increased traffic and
trains carrying more passengers and, in fact, overall safety was likely improving. Robert C. Reed, Train
Wrecks: A Pictorial History of Accidents on the Main Line (Atglen, Pennsylvania: Schiffer Publishing,
1997); Aldrich, Death Rode the Rails, 38.
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around that place.” The coroner’s jury disagreed, concluding that the derailment would
not have happened “had the train run at less speed, owing to the unsafe condition of the
road.”82
A Harper’s Weekly editorial criticized the Directors’ neglect and the conductor’s
recklessness, arguing they deserved “the moral reprobation of the community.”83 And yet
both the jury’s verdict and the editorial treated high speed only as a circumstantial
danger. In this narrative, it was only the broken and rotten rails that made a typical rate of
travel suddenly dangerous, as the same speed would have been perfectly safe under
normal road conditions. A similar explanation emerged for an 1882 collision at the
Spuyten Duyvil stop on the Hudson River Road. The direct cause of the destruction was
that one train traveling at high speed ran into another stationary train, crushing passengers
and upsetting internal stoves that started fires and burned other trapped passengers.
Newspapers focused on “an almost total absence of attempt to flag the approaching
train.” Signaling methods were in place to provide ample response time, and they had not
been implemented. Once again, then, decisions by human operators and an inadequate
signal system were the expressed source of the problem, making a safe technology
unsafe.84
This common response to rail disasters reveals the extent to which railroads relied
on careful human operation to maintain safety. Much more than steamboat travel, trains
running at high speeds and making frequent trips, often over the same tracks, required a
well-organized system with precise schedules and intricate communication techniques, all
82 Harper’s Weekly, May 2, 1868.
83 Harper’s Weekly, May 2, 1868.
84 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Weekly, January 21, 1882.
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controlled by human operators.85 The details of the Spuyten Duyvil crash capture well the
complexity of the rail system and the hazards of running off schedule. Newspapers
recorded that the Atlantic Express train was due in New York at seven o’clock but left
Albany thirty-five minutes late. Though it made up much of the initial delay, the train
stopped again just after Spuyten Duyvil for about six minutes to repair a broken air brake.
Meanwhile a local passenger train had left Tarrytown at 6:35, passed Spuyten Duyvil at
7:07, and soon crashed into the stopped express train at full speed.86
Similar circumstances caused a collision near Revere, Massachusetts, in 1871. An
accommodation train left Boston at 7:50 for Beverley, twenty minutes behind schedule. A
second express train headed to Bangor was scheduled at eight o’clock, but left Boston at
8:05. The accommodation train had just dropped off a few passengers at the Revere
station and started again when the express train flew around a corner and crashed into the
rear passenger car, killing at least twenty people instantly. Several more died from
scalding or burning in the ensuing fires. Thus, the combination of high speed travel and
the danger of collision meant that a world of travel precisely ordered by time was a
necessity. This had several important consequences. First, it placed greater responsibility
in the hands of brakemen, engineers, signalers, and other railroad operators, increasing
the likelihood that they would be deemed culpable in the event of an accident. It also
encouraged faster speeds. Unlike with steamboats, making up time from delays or late
departures rarely received criticism, because running off schedule was so often a source
85 Development of the railroad system is best explored in Alfred D. Chandler, The Visible Hand: The
Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977). Also see
Richard White, Railroaded: The Transcontinentals and the Making of Modern America (New York: W. W.
Norton & Company, 2011).
86 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Weekly, January 21, 1882.
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of disaster. Timeliness and the high speeds sometimes required to maintain it were
necessary for greater safety.
Lower speeds were occasionally recommended, but as in the Erie Railway
accident the suggested restrictions were often temporary or seasonal in nature, based on
dangerous external conditions like weather. A Harper’s editorial written after an accident
on the Lake Shore Railroad in the winter of 1868 argued that during extreme cold, when
the rails were brittle, “a very different rate of speed should be enforced.” The writer even
pointed out that “an accident which is horribly destructive when a train is flying at thirty
or forty miles an hour is very sure to be comparatively unimportant when the speed is
reasonable.”87 That notion was incontrovertible, and could have materialized into an
argument for permanent mandated speed restrictions. Even though engineers steadily
improved braking technology over the second half of the century, both the rate and
damage of collisions rose steadily, because of the increased weight of trains but also
because of increasing speeds. Top train speeds rose from 20-30 miles per hour in the
1850s and 1860s to 50-60 miles per hour by the 1890s. Higher speeds undoubtedly led to
many disasters. In 1892 The Railroad Gazette ran experiments that proved increased
speed disproportionately increased required braking distance; a train going twenty miles
per hour stopped at 179 feet while a train going double the speed, forty miles per hour,
took 539 feet, or about three times the distance, to come to a halt.88
Examples of limitations on railroad speed were available. “There are railroads in
Europe upon which there have never occurred any serious accidents,” one writer noted.
Perhaps speed was the difference, the writer suggested, offering the explanation that on
87 Harper’s Weekly, January 4, 1868.
88 Aldrich, Death Rode the Rails, 71-76.
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the railroad from St. Petersburg to Moscow the Russian Government limited speeds to
twenty miles per hour. Rejecting the idea “that Government should manage our roads,”
the writer quickly dismissed such a sweeping, restrictive reform.89 The reluctance for
significant regulation of railroads in the United States has been well-documented.
Scholars have explained that even as regulation increased in the late nineteenth century it
was typically “soft” regulation that urged railroad companies to adopt safety measures
rather than mandating them. Also, as much as American culture valued speed, limiting
the pursuit of ever-higher speeds would certainly have been unwelcome to passengers as
well as companies.90 Overlooked, but just as significant a factor in the comparatively lax
regulation of American railroads, was the logic developed in response to rail disasters –
that they were products of external conditions rather than high speed. That response
enabled a theoretically unlimited advancement of speed because it suggested that there
were ways of improving safety that did not infringe upon the beneficial speed and
convenience of modern travel. If companies refined human operation of trains and made
technical improvements to machinery and rails, speed could keep increasing without an
associated increase in danger.
Americans looked for numerous ways to eliminate danger and maintain speed, as
demonstrated by an 1868 editorial entitled “Easy Prevention of Railway ‘Accidents’.”91
The writer specifically mentioned the recent horrific derailment at Angola, New York,
89 Harper’s Weekly, January 11, 1868. For differences in early railroad regulation see Colleen Dunlavy,
Politics and Industrialization: Early Railroads in the United States and Prussia (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1994).
90 These factors contributing to the slow and limited nature of American railroad regulation are explored in
Steven W. Usselman, Regulating Railroad Innovation: Business, Technology, and Politics in America,
1840-1920 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), as well as Aldrich, Death Rode the Rails,
especially Chapter 3.
91 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Weekly, January 18, 1868.
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and alluded to others as tragedies that a few simple reforms could have easily prevented.
Among these fixes, the writer included double-flanged car wheels to prevent breaking,
stronger coupling of cars to avoid rear cars swinging loose and flying off the track, brakes
under the control of the conductor rather than often neglectful brakemen, and so on.
According to such commentary, railroad disasters did not reveal some major flaw making
modern travel dangerous; the problems were obvious and the fixes – well-maintained
rails, small design changes, competent employees – were simple. In England, the writer
noted, “cars are coupled together with powerful compression, and are consequently free
from the annoyances and dangers of oscillation, even when at the highest rate of speed.”
In the Angola disaster, the train traveled nearly half a mile with the wheels off track
before coming to a stop; but “with proper brakes, under perfectly feasible control, it could
have been and ought to have stopped within two hundred feet.” High rates of speed, a
braking distance of two hundred feet – these were the necessary conditions of modern
travel, deemed safe when basic precautions were taken. This was the pattern that
continued through the rest of the century. The various small safety measures suggested by
experts, required by legislation, and eventually adopted by railway companies were all
designed to ensure that high speeds remained safe.
After his travels through the United States in the 1830s, relying in part on steam
transportation, Alexis De Tocqueville reflected on American progress and the potential
American future:
The Americans contemplate this extraordinary progress with exultation; but they
would be wiser to consider it with sorrow and alarm. The Americans of the
United States must inevitably become one of the greatest nations in the world;
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their offspring will cover almost the whole of North America; the continent that
they inhabit is their dominion, and it cannot escape them. What urges them to take
possession of it so soon?92
De Tocqueville was not speaking of steam transportation, but he might as well have been.
In the nineteenth-century United States, speed became a national obsession, created by a
need and desire to conquer the vast distances of the continent and fed by technological
advancements that made greater speeds seem constantly in reach. That obsession met a
significant obstacle in the pattern of disasters on steamboats and trains. Disasters forced
Americans to contemplate more than just the treasured effects of this transformative
innovation. Though a broad cultural critique of Americans’ desire for speed and progress
emerged, that discourse explained steamboat and rail disasters as the products of other
attendant forces. Americans identified human operators and external conditions as the
culprits that occasionally made speed unsafe while maintaining an enduring faith in the
safety of the speeds steam technology permitted. Americans turned their energies to
limiting the dangers of modern travel while maintaining speed as its most fundamental
feature. In regard to speed, then, Americans tended toward exultation more than sorrow
and alarm. In spite of this, these moments of cultural introspection were not without
influence. In debating speed, Americans recognized that even though progress was worth
pursuing, its unlimited pursuit was untenable, and a society that better balanced speed
and safety was perhaps within reach.
92 Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America: Volumes I & II, trans. Henry Reeve (The Floating Press,
2009), 371.
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Chapter Six:
The Rights of the Traveling Public
The September 16, 1865, issue of Harper’s Weekly included a strongly-worded
editorial addressing the incessant pattern of railroad accidents plaguing American
travelers. Published a month after a deadly collision on the Housatonic Railroad in
Connecticut and just a few weeks after another on the Long Island Railroad, the article
expressed frustration over the apparent lack of concern for human life evidenced by such
disasters. The “first and obvious purpose” of railroads, the writer said, “is the safe
transport of passengers,” a purpose at which they were clearly failing. Addressing readers
across the nation, the writer said, “let every reader bring it home to himself. Let him
imagine that he sees his wife’s, his mother, his child’s name in the list of massacred.”
The issue affected all public travelers, and they would not be silent. “It is clear that if the
law and public opinion do nothing to right railway passengers they will right themselves.
We are a tame public in such matters, but at last people will not consent to have their
wives and children and friends crushed and mangled.” The writer suggested that
passengers would “constitute themselves a committee for their own safety.” It would be
the public’s responsibility and the public’s right to halt the overwhelming dangers and
secure their own safe conveyance. The headline at the top of the article, printed without a
question mark, accentuated the assertive statement: “How Shall We Save Ourselves.”1
The Harper’s editorial reveals a particularly significant response and adaptation
of Americans to the deadly transportation disasters that continued throughout the
nineteenth century, one focused on the concept of “the traveling public.” The notion of a
traveling public – a collective body made up of all Americans who traveled on public
1 Harper’s Weekly, September 16, 1865.
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conveyances – was a product of the emerging system of mass, public transportation. The
changing nature of transportation in America, dominated by the effects of steamboats and
trains, invested the modern identity of the traveler with particular meaning and shared
experiences, and danger was among the most prominent. In the aftermath of steamboat
and train disasters, the imagined body of the traveling public often became real, as
citizens met in person and debated in print possible solutions to one of the troubling
issues of the time. With an understanding of steam-related dangers created by various
public responses to disasters, Americans acknowledged their shared susceptibility to
death on rivers and rails and claimed a collective authority as travelers to intervene in the
matter of public safety. As Americans expressed their concerns publicly they increasingly
did so on behalf of a broadly affected traveling public.
In the effort to “Save Ourselves,” Americans identified transportation on
steamboats and trains as a public service and travelers as consumers with the expectation
of safe conveyance. As they responded to disasters, Americans developed a clear vision
of their rights as travelers and as citizens of the republic, combining the two identities
into one fit for a modern technological United States. The conversations of the traveling
public drew their force from highly visible disasters and their victims and the dominant
perception of steam’s dangers. As the transportation system grew more intricate and
railroad companies became more powerful, this discourse cast the individual human
traveler as the paramount concern of mass, public transportation. Working with the tools
of representative government and the press, Americans in the nineteenth century
fashioned themselves as an activist traveling public that, joined with a vigilant press,
could counter the dangers of steam and ensure the safety of modern travel.
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The term “traveling public” began to show up in American newspapers in the
early 1820s, at the start of the steam era. Early on the group was invoked in discussions
of stagecoach travel as well as in advertisements for hotels. References to the traveling
public spiked in the 1830s and 1840s, when steamboat travel was dominant and railroad
travel was emerging, and rose continually throughout the century. In the late 1830s,
alongside a rise in large-scale steamboat disasters like the Moselle explosion, the term
began appearing frequently in stories and editorials on steamboat and rail disasters. More
often, newspaper articles spoke of the traveling public when they commented on or
advertised tourism and comfortable travel, identifying, for example, destinations the
traveling public might enjoy and rail lines in which they might find the most pleasure.2
The concept of a traveling public, a sector of Americans united by their identities
as travelers, was the product of a new form of travel – the type of modern, mass
transportation that developed fully with steam power. Steamboats and trains not only
expanded mobility and quickened the pace of travel, they also altered the nature of travel
itself in a number of significant ways. Perhaps the most radical transformation was the
extent to which the speed and power of steamboats and railroads reshaped the experience
of movement. Wolfgang Schivelbusch writes that steamboats, and trains even more so,
destroyed the “mimetic” relationship between traveler and landscape. Travel by earlier
modes of transportation that depended on natural forces like wind and current or animal
power forced travelers to follow the dictates of the landscape, but steam powered boats
2 These observations come from a sampling of results obtained searching the phrase “traveling public,” or
alternately, “travelling public,” in the Readex database Early American Newspapers, 1690-1922. My
search, though not exhaustive, found no uses of the phrase prior to 1820.
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and trains against the current and up hills, meaning travel was much less restricted by
natural limits. The high speed of railroads also disoriented early travelers, making it
difficult to see and comprehend the space that had been passed over. Separated from the
physical experience of movement and lacking control over their mobility, railroad
passengers frequently compared themselves to packages being shipped across the land.3
The sense of control over space and natural forces that steam technology created
contributed to what Will Mackintosh calls the “commodification of travel.” Before the
nineteenth century, he notes, inland travel over long distances was improvisational.
Individual travelers largely produced their own travel experience, securing a means of
transportation, finding a guide or learning a route, and obtaining the various provisions
needed for the journey. Beginning with stagecoach travel but especially with steamboats
and trains, travel became a service individuals purchased and an experience directed and
controlled by others.4 On steamboats and trains, travelers became passengers –
consumers of travel carried around the country at the will of the technology and its
operators. Whereas long-distance journeys had once been idiosyncratic and irregular,
technology and commodified travel allowed greater replicability of results – a quality
advertised to travelers directly and indirectly through timetables and posted rates of
speed.
These changes in the character and design of the individual’s travel experience
aligned with a shift in the way people traveled in relation to one another. Rather than
traveling on horseback or stages alone or with a few close travel companions, Americans
3 Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space in the Nineteenth
Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 9-10; 54.
4 Will Mackintosh, “‘Ticketed Through’: The Commodification of Travel in the Nineteenth Century,”
Journal of the Early Republic, 32, 1 (Spring 2012), 61-63.
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in the nineteenth century increasingly traveled among strangers on steamboats and trains.
Steam travel was mass travel, typically marked by anonymity. Mass travel was also more
democratic than earlier modes. Steam-powered transportation increased the number of
travelers and also expanded the types of people who could travel. Even though
steamboats had separate pricing levels for deck versus cabin travel, and railroads quickly
separated classes and races into different train cars, steam travel expanded access to long-
distance mobility and brought Americans from all walks of life together in the same boats
and trains.5
Finally, the mass, fairly democratic nature of steam travel derived from its public
character. Steamboats and trains were not designed as private machines to be owned or
chartered by individuals for personal travel, but rather as public conveyances, meant to
make up a national transportation system and theoretically open to any who could afford
the price of a ticket. Public transportation meant that travelers, instead of driving
themselves, were carried as passengers among large numbers of others unknown to them
and often of different social station. Until the advent of the personal automobile, these
qualities defined modern travel. The concept of the traveling public could only arise out
of this mode in which diverse Americans shared common experiences and expectations
of travel. Rather than a personal matter, travel in this form was a public, collective
practice. The nature of public travel, then, meant the construct of the traveling public
could be applied to practically any situation faced by American travelers in the nineteenth
5 Fascinating analyses of the social experience inside nineteenth-century trains appear in Schivelbusch, The
Railway Journey, 80-88, Amy G. Richter, Home on the Rails: Women, the Railroads, and the Rise of
Public Domesticity (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), and Patricia Cline Cohen,
“Safety and Danger: Women on American Public Transport, 1750-1850” in Gendered Domains:
Rethinking Public and Private in Women’s History, eds. Dorothy O. Helly and Susan M. Reverby (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2012), 109-122.
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century. As disasters abounded, the rhetoric of the traveling public became integral to
discussions of the dangers of steam transportation.
As demonstrated by the various printed and visual responses they provoked,
steamboat and rail disasters, unlike so many smaller accidents and tragedies, were public
disasters. By nature, an accident aboard public transportation involved often large
numbers of individuals of different stations, generating a wide circle of those directly
affected. Because travelers were solely passengers and not drivers, disasters affected
them collectively and created a shared enemy out of the forces that had directed their
movement – sometimes steam technology, and more often the operators and owners of
steamboats and rail lines. These disasters were also public because they were
technological. As already shown, technological disasters produced a distinct response that
challenged traditional ways of interpreting danger. Steam disasters demanded public
discussion because they could not simply be attributed to the mystery of divine power.
Instead, steamboat and rail disasters involved complex technologies, multiple possible
causes, as well as human engineers and operators whose actions might warrant blame,
and they inspired a belief that the problems at the root of the danger could and should be
fixed. The United States’ expansive print culture enhanced the disasters’ public quality
by identifying a national pattern of danger that provided the context for each new
accident. Though the concept of the traveling public was invoked in numerous situations,
steamboat and rail disasters, unlike anything else, created a reason for that public to meet,
actually and virtually, and to conceive of itself as a collective body with specific
concerns.
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Public organization and action started at the local level. Major steamboat disasters
tended to hit river towns particularly hard because those towns often witnessed disasters
and because their citizens were invested in steamboats for both travel and business. The
residents of towns closest to steamboat disasters became participants in the event when
they aided rescue operations, housed the injured, and mourned the loss of fellow local
citizens.6 Having already come together to provide assistance in the immediate aftermath
of disaster, affected citizens often assembled publicly to produce a more formal response.
After the Ben Sherrod burned in June 1837, residents of nearby Natchez, Mississippi,
formed a committee to investigate the accident and held a public meeting in the town
court house to issue the committee’s report. Public meetings like this were a frequent
second step for affected communities, moving from a recovery effort focused on a
specific event to an organized response to a broader problem that demanded public
action.
In a number of resolutions, the citizen committee in Natchez contextualized the
Ben Sherrod disaster within a threatening pattern of danger and outlined a plan for
community action. The “sympathy and alarm of this community have been excited,” the
committee noted, by “the most appalling and heart rending disasters occurring on the
Mississippi river,” events that had “become, and are every day becoming, common
occurrences.” In the Ben Sherrod fire the committee saw evidence of a pervasive danger
that “every moment” threatened the “many thousands travelling these waters.” Steamboat
racing in particular received the committee’s censure as not only a danger to travelers but
actually “an infringement on their rights.” The committee failed to explicate what exactly
6 The participation of local citizens in disaster relief is discussed in Chapter Two.
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were those rights, but the vague assertion of traveler rights justified the call for legislative
protection. The time had come to “call up the active exertions of all persons interested…
to produce a change in the system.” The citizens issued a memorial to the state legislature
to consider legislation to combat the evil, and, recognizing the regional scale of the
problem, recommended that neighboring states undertake similar legislation as well. If
the problems could not be solved on the state level, the committee suggested that a
memorial be sent by the legislature to the United States Congress. Finally, the committee
resolved that “the proceedings of this meeting be published in the city papers” and in
journals published across the region.7
Similar public meetings took place in Cincinnati and Boston after the Moselle
explosion in 1838 and the Lexington fire in 1840. Within a day of the Moselle disaster the
mayor of Cincinnati called a meeting of citizens to consider appropriate actions. The
assembled group formed committees of three from each city ward to investigate and
publish a statement on the disaster, as well as a separate committee of five to examine
possible causes of the explosion and to report “preventative measures as may be best
calculated hereafter to guard against like occurrences.”8 The citizens then requested that
Congress consider the subject of steamboat dangers for federal legislation. A few weeks
after the Lexington burned, citizens of Boston met at Faneuil Hall and asked the mayor to
chair a discussion of the disaster. Those present passed a number of resolutions; some
addressed specific issues of the Lexington, notably the transport of combustible freight
like cotton, while others referred to the larger pattern of steamboat disasters “in various
7 Albany Argus, June 6, 1837.
8 Cincinnati Daily Gazette, April 28, 1838.
260
parts of the United States.”9 The group called on the state’s senators and representatives
to address the subject in Congress, and like the Natchez citizens, recommended the same
be done in other states.10 In the view of the Boston citizenry, the Lexington disaster was
not an isolated problem; danger plagued steam travel, “against the consequences of which
every man is interested to ensure a protection.”11
Such meetings represented the emerging body of the traveling public in its actual
and most fundamental form: citizens assembling in physical space, addressing their
common concerns as travelers, and publicly working for safer travel through the tools of
representative government. The meetings acknowledged the shared interest the town’s
residents had with other affected communities around the region and the nation. As
assembled citizens produced reports and drafted resolutions, they reified the concept of a
broad traveling public. Individuals who were appointed as or seized the position of
spokesmen embraced the identity of the traveler, claimed equality and shared interest
with other travelers, and asserted the authority of citizens over issues related to safety and
public transportation.
The committee of five formed to investigate the Moselle explosion brought
together scientists, engineers, and steamboat captains, and their report is primarily a
scientific and technical document. Dr. John Locke, a scientist and author of the report,
performed numerous experiments on boilers and provided designs for potential safety
equipment. He also emphasized the need for greater technical education for engineers and
9 New York Spectator, February 13, 1840.
10 Zion’s Herald, February 5, 1840.
11 This kind of local organization and the effort of various communities to engage the federal government
reflect what Brian Balogh calls a “central dilemma in American political development – how to hold distant
public officials accountable.” Brian Balogh, A Government Out of Sight: The Mystery of National Authority
in Nineteenth-Century America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 6.
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steamboat captains. The committee completed the report at the same time as the passage
of the 1838 Steamboat Act, and while the authors approved of the act’s requirements for
inspection and owner liability, they argued for further legislation to improve boiler
construction and educate engineers on safe boiler operation. Though the document’s
content was largely technical, it was framed with rhetoric that emphasized a public role in
the process of reforming steamboat travel. Notably, the report was published “by request
of the citizens of Cincinnati.” Initially, the committee requested that the City Council
publish the report, but according to a statement from Locke, the Council declined
publication, objecting to a part of the document in which Locke cited facts “to show the
impositions practiced on travellers, and the caution necessary on the part of the public in
exacting evidence of the adoption of safety measures.” The exact nature of the City
Council’s objections is unclear, but Locke’s statement reflects the report’s implicit claim
of public authority in the matter of steamboat safety.12
The citizenry of Cincinnati reinforced that authority in a letter to Locke requesting
release of the report for citizen publication. A group of prominent Cincinnatians, among
them a young future city councilman named Salmon Chase, noted the “high degree of
excitement in the public mind” caused by the Moselle disaster and “numerous” others.
The citizens of Cincinnati, and of other cities along the western rivers, had a particular
interest in steam travel, and thus, they said, it was necessary “that here, upon the scene of
one of the deepest of these tragical events, some attempt should be made to arrest the
evil.” When Locke responded and presented the report for publication, he reiterated the
point: “It must be done in Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Louisville and St. Louis… No part of
12 “A Report on Explosions and the Causes of Explosions, with Suggestions for Their Prevention”
(Cincinnati, 1838), 70-71; 10.
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the earth has more interest in the subject of Steam navigation than the cities just named,
and the world, already in horror at our frequent and terrible disasters, has a right to expect
at least an effort from us to ‘arrest the evil.’” As John Brockmann demonstrates with his
deep analysis of the Cincinnati committee’s report, this published response was a product
of a particular scientific community and intricate local politics.13 Looking at the response
in relation to a larger pattern and network of disasters, though, it becomes clear that the
report also represented something more – an emplacement of the Moselle disaster within
a regional and national pattern and an identification of Cincinnati’s affected citizens and
their cause with an extra-local effort at reform. The citizens of these cities and the region,
the report suggested, were united not just by their investment in steamboats but by their
collective experience with the horrific disasters that occurred so close to home. As a
voice for that body, Locke felt a strong sense of public duty and described his compulsion
to “sacrifice something to suffering humanity.”14 Locke envisioned himself as a servant
to both a local citizenry and a larger traveling public seeking significant reform.
A similar sensibility emerged from the meeting of Bostonians at Faneuil Hall after
the Lexington disaster, as reflected in a letter written to Daniel Webster by a participant in
the meeting, Henry Russell Cleveland. Cleveland’s “letter” (it totaled more than forty
pages) included lengthy quotations of witness testimony along with commentary on
possible causes and potential safety measures. The letter was printed by a Boston
publisher, its title page stating simply, “By a Traveller.” Cleveland cast himself as an
anonymous representative of the traveling public, and he referred to the interests and
13 R. John Brockmann, Twisted Rails, Sunken Ships: The Rhetoric of Nineteenth Century Steamboat and
Railroad Accident Investigation Reports, 1833-1879 (Amityville, New York: Baywood Publishing
Company, 2005), Chapter 3.
14 “A Report on Explosions,” 11; 17; 9.
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responsibilities of that body throughout his discourse. The Lexington fire was a “solemn
warning to those who now travel in steamboats,” Cleveland averred. Echoing the
statements made at the public meeting, Cleveland described in stark terms an
unmistakable pattern: “the ignorance of the existence of danger has passed away,” he
wrote, adding that danger threatened all travelers. In the close of his letter, Cleveland
referred to “the thousands who have perished by the frightful accidents of travel in this
country,” and “the thousands more, who, I fear, are yet marked to die.”15 This statement
was not unlike the warnings ministers preaching on the Lexington disaster were giving
their congregations of the universal susceptibility to death in such circumstances.16
Cleveland linked current travelers with disaster victims and invoked a future that would
surely include many more victims. For Cleveland, though, the probability of more tragic
steamboat deaths derived not from mysterious divine power but from the deeply rooted
dangers of steamboat travel that threatened passengers similarly across the country every
day. Reflecting the shifting mentality on disasters and their causes, Cleveland’s letter was
a call for decisive, tangible action.
Though distressed by the threats facing the public, Cleveland, like Locke, was
ultimately confident in the possibility of reform, and he charged the public with the task
of sparking change. “Travellers must remember,” he wrote, “that if they don’t assert their
own rights, no one will do it for them.” Cleveland saw extraordinary power in the public
voice: “The only law which the Company will reverence is the law given by the public…
The only committee, whom they will listen to, is the public who travel.” Cleveland
15 Henry Russell Cleveland, “Letter to the Hon. Daniel Webster, on the Causes of the Destruction of the
Steamer Lexington…” (Boston: Charles C. Little and James Brown, 1840), 30-33; 44, American
Antiquarian Society.
16 See Chapter Four.
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recognized the challenges; cheap fares and “a superior degree of swiftness” tended to
“stifle the sense of danger,” but public silence was no longer an option.17
Cleveland’s letter modeled one way in which concerned travelers learned to speak
– through democratic assembly and conscious appeal to republican government. The
“Traveller” closed his letter to Webster by entrusting the senator with “the cause of
travellers in this country” and entreating him, “and all who have it in their power,” to
enact laws to protect public safety.18 Of course, Congress had done just that two years
earlier with the 1838 act, the title of which – “An Act to provide for the better Security of
the Lives of Passengers on Board of Vessels propelled in whole or in part by Steam” –
explicitly aimed at public safety. The landmark legislation, enacted after more than a
decade of investigation into the subject, was in part a response to the public outcry
reflected in newspaper debates and formal complaints by local committees. As
Cleveland’s plea further demonstrates, however, the frequency and intensity of steamboat
disasters and calls for legislation increased after 1838, and most interested parties soon
considered the law a failure.19 A report produced by the New Orleans Chamber of
Commerce in 1851 on the subject of continued steamboat explosions commented on the
1838 law, noting that by 1840, the Senate’s Committee on Commerce had said the law
“falls far short of shielding the public from these disasters.”20 Another spike in steamboat
disasters in 1852 brought forth repeated urgings for congressional action and finally
forced discussion of a new, stricter, steamboat bill. Disasters like the burning of the
17 Cleveland, “Letter to the Hon. Daniel Webster,” 37; 43-44.
18 Cleveland, “Letter to the Hon. Daniel Webster,” 44.
19 See Chapter Two.
20 “Report and Resolutions  Adopted by the New Orleans Chamber of Commerce…” (New Orleans:
Printed at the Office of the Picayune, 1851).
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Henry Clay, one concerned citizen said, “must awaken Congress to realizing a sense of
the glaring dangers that beset the travelling public.”21 Another newspaper responded to
the Henry Clay with hopes that Congress would act on the bill being considered; “the
country looks to their wisdom and humanity for a measure that will give ample protection
to the whole travelling community of the United States.”22
On August 30, 1852, Congress passed the “Act to Amend an Act entitled ‘An Act
to provide for the better Security of the Lives of Passengers on Board of Vessels
propelled in whole or in part by Steam.’” The 1852 act was specifically aimed at
passenger safety, and in fact only applied to passenger boats. The most significant
additions included new limits on maximum steam pressure, a more rigorous inspection
system overseen by a new expanded inspection service, stipulations requiring safety
equipment like fire hoses and lifeboats be carried, and defined rules for passing other
boats and for carrying combustible materials targeted at preventing collisions and fires.
The act also provided for more extensive training and licensing for engineers and pilots,
along the lines that the citizen committee reporting on the Moselle explosion had
suggested.23
In their various efforts to advocate for steamboat legislation, individual citizens,
citizen committees, and members of the press consistently used the concept of the
traveling public to describe the steamboat issue as a national concern that threatened the
American citizenry as a whole. With its legislative actions, the United States Congress
further legitimized the traveling public as a collective body. The 1838 and 1852 acts were
21 Daily National Intelligencer, August 7, 1852.
22 Weekly Herald, August 7, 1852.
23 Louis C. Hunter, Steamboats on the Western Rivers: An Economic and Technological History
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), 537-539.
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the federal government’s first efforts to regulate private industry for the purposes of
public welfare, an adaptation to the particular features of mass, public transportation.24
Designed specifically to protect passengers on steamboats, the laws implicitly recognized
a new category of consumers with particular rights that required government protection.
Assembly and appeals to representative government constituted one avenue for
the public to air its grievances. The other significant public tool was the press. Even as
they gathered in meeting halls in towns across the country, citizens affected by steamboat
disasters recognized the power of the press as a means to propagate their message and
shape public opinion. The residents of Natchez made sure their resolutions would be
published in local and regional papers after the Ben Sherrod disaster, and after the Henry
Clay burned, survivors met and expressed faith in the role of the press. “I think the only
power to which we can apply for redress is to the Press,” one survivor said, asking that
“the editors of our respectable journals would publish the names of such vessels as are
addicted to racing” and hold them up to public censure.25 In this effort to expose injustice
and bring publicity to the apparent dangers of travel, these local groups anticipated what
would become a dominant national strategy in the second half of the century.
The citizens who met publicly in the aftermath of nearby steamboat disasters
asserted their collective power over their own travel and their own safety and also
imagined a more broadly-conceived traveling public that was similarly concerned. When
newspapers published the proceedings of these meetings, they extended the conversation
to a larger imagined public that could only meet in print. Already the means by which
24 See John G. Burke, “Bursting Boilers and the Federal Power,” Technology and Culture, 7, 1 (Winter,
1966), 9-10.
25 Evening Post, July 29, 1852.
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Americans learned of the dangers of steam power, newspapers also quickly became the
virtual meetingplace of the traveling public, where citizens debated with each other and
with industry insiders the issue of public safety on steam-powered vessels.26 For over a
month following the Lexington fire, for example, Washington’s Daily National
Intelligencer published letters to the editor from two writers who simply went by “S.”
and “J.E.D.” in which the two engaged in a spirited and biting debate over the meaning of
the disaster. While S. defended the company and suggested passengers were aware of the
risks they faced, J.E.D. blamed the disaster on the recklessness of the Lexington’s owners
and operators, arguing that “those who fly by steam have a right to see that they fly
safely.”27 Letters to the editor printed in newspapers, often anonymous or only signed as
“a passenger,” elevated public voices and suggested to readers that concerns about danger
were widely-held. Newspapers were a site where the opinions of the public gained
authority and resonance; public statements blaming steamboat officials often forced
responses, as when Captain Alton wrote to the Times Picayune to address publicly the
citizens of Natchez after their meeting had laid out his supposedly careless actions.28
Newspaper reports and editorials echoed the idea of a victimized traveling public
put forth by local committees and made it an oft-repeated national message: the lives of
all travelers were endangered by the current state of steam-powered transportation in the
United States. It was a message that aligned with the interpretations of disasters being put
forward in disaster narratives and printed sermons. By midcentury the various printed
26 The theoretical concepts that help explain this trend are in Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities
(New York: Verso, 1983) and Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An
Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989).
27 Daily National Intelligencer, January 27, 1840.
28 Times Picayune, June 2, 1837.
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responses to steam disasters had already identified a reading public that was universally
affected by these dangers and had made the visual scenes and potential meanings of those
disasters intelligible. Newspaper articles invoking the traveling public took advantage of
these mutually understood realities: “we notice so many accidents from sheer
carelessness on steamboats and railroads… so many scenes revolting to humanity… that
some imperative legal enactments are loudly called for,” read an editorial following the
Ben Sherrod disaster. “Who can think of the awful calamities” of the previous few
months, the writer said; “who can call to mind the sudden deaths and mutilated limbs…
and not feel a lively concern for the passage of some statute by which indirect murderers
might be reached and punished?”29 Much as sermons and narratives rhetorically united
readers with victims, editorials identified readers as travelers and emphasized their shared
susceptibility to disaster. “Who among us are secure from the like distressing calamity,”
an initialed writer said after the Henry Clay; “these appalling catastrophes are becoming
quite too frequent and alarming of late to be longer tolerated in silence.”30 Print had
exposed Americans to the threat of steam-related dangers and also gave voice to an
aggrieved public with common concerns and an interest in sparking reform.
Even after more expansive and stringent legislation, steamboat disasters
continued, and even as steamboat traffic was increasingly lost to railroads, the next
decades included some of deadliest steamboat disasters the nation had seen.31 Starting in
29 Times Picayune, June 27, 1837.
30 Daily National Intelligencer, August 7, 1852.
31 These include, for example, the 1852 collision of the Atlantic, killing a couple hundred Norwegian
immigrants,  explosions on the Pennsylvania and Princess in 1858 and 1859 that both killed more than one
hundred, and of course the massive disaster of the Sultana, killing near two thousand in 1865.
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the 1850s, large-scale railroad accidents joined steamboat disasters killing American
travelers in significant numbers.32 The middle of the century marked an era when both
forms of transportation were active and shared dominance.33 Disasters were common on
both steamboats and rails, and public dialogue about the threat to travelers increased
accordingly, frequently combining steamboat and rail accidents into a general problem.
The concept of the traveling public made the connection between steamboat and train
disasters an obvious one. Though newspapers often discussed steamboat and rail travel
separately when it came to other issues of travel, the dangers of the two transport modes
were often addressed together. An editorial in Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper
asked in 1856, “Will not the rapidly increasing chapters of terrible accidents on railways,
and on our rivers and lakes secure us, the travelling community, efficient laws for our
protection?”34 Responses to rail accidents echoed earlier notions of an endangered public
that needed protection. “It is not alone of this frightful murder that we would speak,”
another Leslie’s article read after an 1859 railroad accident, “it is of those that have gone
before, of those that are to come after, for come they will… It is something that appeals
to us all.”35 While continuing the narrative themes established after steamboat disasters in
the first half of the century, the public discourse after midcentury presented an even more
potent vision of traveler rights and an assertive role of a vigilant citizenry in assuring its
own safety.
32 Mark Aldrich explains this rise of major disasters as a result of higher occupancy in cars and increased
traffic rather than a more dangerous railroad system. Mark Aldrich, Death Rode the Rails: American
Railroad Accidents and Safety, 1828-1965 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 38.
33 Though railroads had risen to prominence and began taking away traffic from steamboats, Louis Hunter
notes the 1850s marked the high point of steamboat service, speed, and prestige. Hunter, Steamboats on the
Western Rivers, 481.
34 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, August 2, 1856.
35 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, August 13, 1859.
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Newspapers continued to give a voice to public concerns and weekly national
papers in particular published strong editorials that furthered the claim of the public’s
authority on the issue of safe travel. After a crash on the Long Island Railroad, Oliver
Charlick, the president of line, rejected the idea that the collision occurred because there
was no signalman at the spot of the crash, which he said was unnecessary. Harper’s
Weekly quickly responded: “we trust that the public will let Mr. Oliver Charlick
understand, in the most emphatic manner, that it does think a signal-man necessary at that
point.”36 Many started calling for direct citizen supervision of boats and rail lines. “Let
passengers observe the management of the boats. Let the authorities learn that they carry
every day a Committee of Vigilance, who will rigorously report the dangers and the
follies of the passage.”37 Travelers, it was widely stated, had been invested with such
authority based on the shared risks they undertook each day as passengers on steamboats
and trains, but as the century progressed the claim went even further. As the concept of
the traveling public gained clarity, Americans increasingly employed rhetoric about
rights and citizenship, ascribing to travelers certain rights and liberties that demanded
preservation against the forces that threatened to take them away. In discussions about
transportation and danger, the passive identity of modern travelers as victims of the
industry’s dangers fell behind a more active vision that identified transportation
companies as public servants and saw travelers as empowered citizens who could
consciously defend their rights and collectively effect change on a grand scale.38
36 Harper’s Weekly, September 16, 1865.
37 Harper’s Weekly, February 9, 1867.
38 The reassertion of the idea that steamboat companies and railroad corporations were extensions of the
public may in part have been a reaction to the increasing privatization of corporations in the latter half of
the century. See Balogh, A Government Out of Sight, 314.
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The tone of this evolving discourse is exemplified in a public debate that took
place in print after an 1855 accident on the Camden and Amboy line near Burlington,
New Jersey. When the train from Philadelphia was just beyond Burlington, its operators
noticed a train from New York coming down the same track. The conductor of the
Philadelphia train was reversing into a turnout to let the New York train pass when it
backed into a carriage driven by a Dr. Heineken. The train immediately killed the horses
and crushed the carriage, and the impact threw the rear car from the track. As the rear car
pulled the other cars off the track, they collided into each other, killing about twenty
passengers. After the accident Commodore Robert F. Stockton of the Camden and
Amboy Company and the Reverend C. Van Rensselaer, a self-described representative of
the public, discussed the nature of the accident and the company’s response to it before a
public audience. Rensselaer responded to an official company report on the accident with
an anonymous pamphlet, but his identity soon became public and the two figures
exchanged several letters in the press. Their public correspondence, along with an
account of the accident and the verdict of the coroner’s jury, were collected together and
republished as a pamphlet by Joseph M. Wilson of Philadelphia, entitled “Documents and
Papers Relating to the Late Camden and Amboy Railroad Accident.”39
Like the print debate between “S.” and “J.E.D.” after the Lexington disaster,
Rensselaer’s and Stockton’s exchange was one of the public battles that sometimes took
place in print following a steamboat or rail disaster. The debates were a byproduct of the
public character of these disasters, which, because they involved complex technology and
questions of responsibility that were human rather than divine, practically demanded
39 “Documents and Papers Relating to the Late Camden and Amboy Railroad Accident” (Philadelphia:
Joseph M. Wilson, 1855), AAS.
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public discussion that sometimes rose to the level of individual confrontations. Printed
battles like this were not new – the extended public contests between the political leaders
of the early nation are an obvious predecessor.40 As John Brockmann describes in detail,
this “combative exchange” represented a clash over company responsibility between
prominent personalities familiar with each other.41 Rensselaer and Stockton, though, were
driven to public debate less by personal attacks that necessitated public rebuke than by an
awareness of the weight of public opinion and investment in the issue. The publisher
Joseph Wilson’s notice on the cover to “Hear both Sides” acknowledged the public’s
interest and investment in the matters being discussed. “I have no private ends to
answer,” Rensselaer began his review. This was an issue of public concern that should
rightfully be debated in the public’s view.42 The result was a conversation that reflects
Americans’ shifting understandings of travel and the public interest in it.
Following the verdict of the coroner’s jury, an Executive Committee of the
Camden and Amboy Company produced a report about the disaster which was approved
by the company’s directors and published. The report was largely a defense of the
company against any accusation of carelessness or neglect causing the accident. The
Committee assigned primary blame to Dr. Heineken, the driver of the wagon that the
reversing train hit, and spent several pages commenting that responsibility for safety had
to rest with those individuals crossing the tracks. In the Committee’s estimation, a train
could not be expected to sound alerts constantly and stop for every possible crosser.
Invoking the collective traveling public in its own defense, the company said “The law of
40 For a discussion of the role of print in politics and public debate, see in particular Joanne Freeman,
Affairs of Honor: National Politics in the New Republic (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001).
41 Brockmann, Twisted Rails, Sunken Ships, 139-145.
42 “Documents and Papers,” 11.
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the land, the dictates of common sense, and the demand of the travelling public, alike
forbid the necessity of checking the train for every wagon that can be seen in the
neighborhood of the track.” The public demanded speed and convenience as well as
safety, and railroad travel would be crippled by such regulation, the committee suggested.
With the current technology and speed of travel, the company argued, “there can be no
absolute safety.” The company then advocated a broad solution to maximize safety; limit
restrictive regulations on railroads and “consider them as useful public conveniences
entitled to the liberal support and just consideration of the people.” The Committee fully
believed that the “wisdom of the Company’s regulations, and the faithfulness of their
employees, will stand vindicated before the considerate judgement of an enlightened and
moral people.” Their vision was of a public transportation system that, despite some
unavoidable dangers, received the full support of public confidence.43
The Reverend Rensselaer had a different understanding of the public’s
relationship to the transportation system, one he modeled in his review of the company
report. Rensselaer took issue with the company’s lack of sympathy with a suffering
public and its denial of all responsibility. The company had insisted that a single-track
railroad line was safe and their operating procedures sound, against what Rensselaer said
was the near “unanimous judgment” of the traveling community. “They persist in
exposing the public to the hazard of their present mode of managing this great single-
tracked thoroughfare,” Rensselaer wrote, and instead of tightening rules for public safety
the company only laid blame on others. The author extensively detailed the dangers
inherent in the company’s existing regulations and countered its denial of responsibility
43 “Documents and Papers,” 8-10.
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in the Burlington accident, concluding that the company should “revise their regulations,
in conformity with public opinion.”44
At this point, the debate shifted to direct, published correspondence between
Stockton and Rensselaer, his identity now revealed publicly. In their letters, the two
continued to argue about the accident’s details and the operation of the railroad line, but
more remarkable is that their debate became just as much about the nature of the public’s
role in regards to the safe operation of railroads. In his first letter, Stockton defended the
tone of the Committee’s report and said no public sympathies were expressed because the
report was for the company directors. Stockton then assaulted Rensselaer’s pamphlet as
un-Christian and attacked its merits: “I am not aware of any particular qualification
possessed by the clergy, which enables them to instruct railroad Companies with regard
to the construction and management of railroads.”45
Rensselaer continued to position himself as a public representative, suggesting
that the public would expect a reply from him. His response reads like a manifesto for a
traveling public conscious of itself and confident in its collective power. Setting aside the
details of the Burlington crash, the clergyman instead assailed Stockton’s improper
approach to public debate. Rensselaer called the crash a “public disaster” and again
criticized Stockton for still not offering condolences. Within a dominant culture that
understood the expression of sympathy for the dead and their mourners as a sign of social
benevolence and sincerity, this was not an insignificant attack; Rensselaer’s assault
44 “Documents and Papers,” 12; 22.
45 “Documents and Papers,” 23.
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further exposed Stockton’s lack of awareness of the public nature of the tragedy.46 “Your
document for the Directors was also intended for the public,” Rensselaer wrote, noting
that the report had been sent out in the mails and published in regional papers. In contrast
to Stockton’s letter, Rensselaer’s called attention to its public audience with frequent
references to a reading public that demanded information and would eagerly learn of the
company’s wrongdoing. He then turned to Stockton’s question about a clergyman
critiquing railroads, condemning Stockton’s slander of the clergy. Clergymen, Rensselaer
told Stockton, “are as liable to be killed as others,” “have the same civil rights as other
persons,” and “have not divested themselves of any of those rights, as citizens, which you
yourself enjoy.” Though he never abandoned his clerical voice, Rensselaer claimed the
increasingly prominent and more effectual voice of the citizen. As others had before him,
Rensselaer claimed his own susceptibility to death while traveling, a central piece of the
emerging identity of the modern traveler, as a qualification to judge the industry and push
reform.47
Rensselaer then broadened his statement to assert the rights of all citizens to
discuss public affairs. “I shall claim my right, as a Jerseyman,” he wrote, “to discuss the
subject of railroads… whenever I may see fit, and especially whenever a great emergency
arises.” Again noting the public nature of the company’s report, Rensselaer insisted that
Stockton had “no right to find fault with any person for venturing to review it.” The letter
46 Karen Halttunen, Confidence Men and Painted Women: A Study of Middle-Class Culture in America,
1830-1870 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 124-152.
47 “Documents and Papers,” 25-27. Rensselaer’s shift to his citizen identity, his assertion of citizen
authority, and his effort to hold company officials accountable stand in stark contrast to his fellow
clergyman F. Reck Harbaugh’s insular religious interpretation of the same disaster, discussed in Chapter
Four. The contrast highlights the shifting dynamics of disaster response, which was increasingly oriented
toward material explanations and the authority of the public and technical experts over the clergy. On the
decline of clerical authority in nineteenth-century America, see Ann Douglas, The Feminization of
American Culture (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1977), especially 17-43.
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consistently used the language of rights, saying the traveling public had the right as
citizens to comment on public matters, to pursue efforts to maintain their rights to safe
travel, and to protect the lives of their fellow citizens. In a last move to equate himself
with Stockton, Rensselaer signed his letter “Your fellow-citizen of New Jersey.”48
Stockton’s next letter was fairly brief, written, it seems, to end the debate.
Stockton mostly repeated his critique of Rensselaer’s character and his defense of his
own, but he did take particular issue with Rensselaer’s apparent hypocrisy, asking, “Have
you a license by virtue of your profession to excite prejudice against and defame
individuals, and are they adjudged to silence?” Rensselaer saw no contradiction; in his
response he reasserted the clergy’s right, a citizen’s right, to criticize railroad companies
while also rejecting Stockton’s right “to intrude into apostolic functions.” Railroads were
different – they were public roads that belonged to the people. “The people will insist
upon the laying down of a double-track,” Rensselaer confidently said. “This is the
people’s plan.” The clergyman ended the correspondence with another noteworthy
signature: “I am, in the rights of citizenship, your fellow-Jerseyman.”49
Rensselaer’s focus on traveler rights and the rights of citizenship is indicative of a
larger theme in the discourse on danger and modern transportation: the assertion of rights
for a traveling public and the quest for safe conveyance was an effort to fulfill the
nation’s republican promise. Out of Americans’ responses to steamboat and rail disasters
emerged a clear delineation of the rights of the individual as a traveler, a central identity
in modern American life: “the first thing that he may justly demand of every company
48 “Documents and Papers,” 28.
49 “Documents and Papers,” 28-30.
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that undertakes to transport him is proper provision for care of life and limb.”50 After a
series of rail accidents in 1865, A Harper’s Weekly editorial succinctly outlined a vision
of transportation in a republican society: “there is a contract between the companies and
the people… If it is broken by the privileged party, the party that grants the privilege may
properly take the steps necessary to secure the fulfillment of the conditions.” In other
words, the American transportation system belonged to the people, and the companies
that directed transport, the “privileged party,” did so at the will of the people. The
statement continued, in language recalling the Declaration of Independence, “whenever a
company established for the public convenience becomes a public danger, the public will
very properly insist upon taking care of itself, by imposing new conditions upon the
company.”51 In response to an apparent public danger, Americans declared their
sovereignty and aired their collective grievances in an act to secure their rights as
travelers and as citizens of the republic.
Framed in such terms, steam-related disasters represented a threat to American
liberty, and many editorials proclaimed the incompatibility of steam’s dangers and
republican values. “We claim for ourselves a degree of personal independence in this
country nowhere else enjoyed,” a Leslie’s Weekly writer said after the Camp Hill railroad
disaster in 1856. “The theory is, that we are personally valuable… and in fact, are
sovereigns,” and yet when it came to “protection of life and limb” American government
had fallen far short.52 Newspapers frequently called the loss of life aboard steamboats and
trains a “national disgrace” and argued that no other government in the world so
50 Harper’s Weekly, November 13, 1869.
51 Harper’s Weekly, March 18, 1865.
52 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, August 2, 1856.
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disregarded human life.53 Even totalitarian governments seemed to take better care of
their traveling citizens. In Russia and France, “public conveyances are under especial
surveillance,” one writer said; “it is a crying shame that under monarchical and
autocratical governments there is a safety of person that is not enjoyed in this, our
otherwise superior country.”54 In the press, safe travel became associated with republican
civilization, and danger a sign of its failure. Harper’s Weekly’s “How Shall We Save
Ourselves” editorial voiced the increasingly common criticism: “our daily slaughter-roll
justifies the sneer, that the model republic holds human life cheap.”55 Another after the
Angola rail disaster suggested that “until the details of life can be as carefully adjusted
here as elsewhere, our claim to the highest civilization will be unfounded.”56
Some assessments linked the apparent widespread disregard of human life and
dignity to the nature of mass transportation and the push for profits. The disorienting
feeling identified by early railroad passengers that they were like packages flung across
the country at high speeds later became a way to critique railroad companies’ low
valuation of human life. “If the Central Road treats its passengers like dogs, when it can
only charge them two cents a mile, it will treat them like pigs when it can charge them
three,” noted one writer.57 The same sentiment appeared after the especially tragic Camp
Hill disaster; the responsible employee’s recklessness proved “he had long ceased to
consider the thousands intrusted to his care in any other light than merchandise, that was
53 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, August 13, 1859.
54 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, August 2, 1856.
55 Harper’s Weekly, September 16, 1865.
56 Harper’s Weekly, January 11, 1868.
57 Harper’s Weekly, March 18, 1865.
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to be transported from point to point.”58 This critique responded to a transportation
system that entailed travelers ceding control of their movement to others, but also to a
railroad system that was growing in size and intricacy in order to manage dramatically
increasing traffic. Corporations necessarily managed their expansive rail networks by
viewing the system of travel in the aggregate; the rhetoric of the traveling public
therefore called for renewed attention to the individual traveler and the fundamental
purpose of transporting people safely and comfortably from one place to another.59
The nation’s advanced transportation system seemed to make travelers powerless
while investing great power in corporations, a reality often revealed in the legal battles
that followed disasters. Newspaper editorials commented on the ability of railroad
companies in particular to escape responsibility or suffer little when they were deemed
culpable. An editorial after the Camp Hill disaster noted that “few individuals have
purses long enough to compete with these irresponsible corporations” and thus the odds
of success in a legal battle always favored the company. The law made companies liable
for damages, but “we can neither imprison or hang a corporation whatever may be the
amount of murder it commits.” Only railroad companies could buy off murder rather than
face punishment, the writer suggested, and “this is the reason that murder is so rife.”60
Even if individuals received some payment, the company’s officers “would be none the
more careful, its employees none the less reckless.”61 With the pattern of rail disasters
showing no sign of ending, writers lamented a system that privileged corporate power.
58 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, August 2, 1856.
59 On the development of the railroad system, see especially Alfred D. Chandler, The Visible Hand: The
Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 79-205.
60 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, August 2, 1856.
61 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, September 16, 1865.
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“The truth of the matter is this,” read an editorial following the Henry Clay disaster,
“both railroads and steamboats in every part of this country, exercise, through their
managers and owners, an amount of influence far more active and potent than any mere
abstract idea of public indignation that may grow out of such startling disasters.”62
Those commenting on disasters identified at least one more significant anti-
republican threat: an indifferent, or worse, a self-interested public. Public inaction was
the focus of much concern in the press. Americans were known to proclaim individual
rights, a Harper’s writer said, but they sometimes showed an unfortunate apathy toward
the public right of safety.63 Noting the alarming number of railway deaths during the
previous year, an 1865 Leslie’s editorial wrote that “people are aghast,” but they “wait
motionless for some interposition, from some source, between them and the danger
involved in traveling.”64 Meanwhile, they continued to celebrate the speed and progress
brought by steam-powered travel. The press also criticized the public and its own
reporting pattern, which drew extensive attention to and commentary about the issue of
danger primarily after large-scale disasters. “There is something astounding in the patient
submission of the public to these slaughters,” one writer said after an accident on the Erie
Railway in 1869. After a crash, “indignant editorials and demands for justice” filled the
papers and “a vague expectation of justice” grew among the public, “and then nothing
62 Weekly Herald, August 14, 1852. A comprehensive treatment of railroad law is James Ely, Railroads and
American Law (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 2001). Morton Horwitz briefly traces the evolution of
railroad liability in The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1977), 201-210. For a cultural and literary analysis of evolving notions of blame and liability and
steam disasters, see Nan Goodman, Shifting the Blame: Literature, Law, and The Theory of Accidents in
Nineteenth-Century Transportation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), Chapter 4 and Chapter 6.
A fascinating study of railroads and streetcars and their influence on protective legislation is Barbara
Young Welke, Gender, Race, Law, and the Railroad Revolution, 1865-1920 (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2001).
63 Harper’s Weekly, November 13, 1869.
64 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, September 16, 1865.
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more until the next burning.” This writer lamented the frequent disappearance of public
outcry during stretches that were relatively free of disaster and argued that silence was
acquiescence to the danger.65
Americans faced a public crisis that necessitated a public solution. That solution
involved a judiciary that held steamboat and rail owners accountable for dangerous
conditions and actions as well as legislative measures that secured passenger safety.66 As
one citizen argued, “the credit of our State, as a well governed republic demands it.”67
More important still was an informed and active American public that spoke with a
strong voice. America’s public discourse about the dangers of steam travel was indeed
disaster-driven; steam disasters brought newspaper coverage and opened windows during
which the broader threats facing travelers could be discussed among an excited public.
This was not lost on the press. “The heart sickens at these oft-repeated tales,” one writer
said of disaster coverage, “but they must be told, they must be repeated, until our sleeping
people awake in their own defense.”68 The ongoing tragedy of steamboat and rail deaths,
many said, demanded a vigilant press and the collective voice of an activist traveling
public. An anonymous “passenger” urged this after the Yosemite explosion in 1865: “let
the press, the proclaimed guardian of the people’s interest, manfully and independently
maintain their rights in this matter,” and “let the public be united and determined to
investigate the circumstances thoroughly.”69 Safety legislation was the typically
expressed goal, but while the government might not act, one writer argued, the press and
65 Harper’s Weekly, August 7, 1869.
66 Brian Balogh writes about the rise of the judiciary as the major force of federal intervention in the late
nineteenth century in A Government Out of Sight, Chapter 8.
67 Article, untitled newspaper, “The Yosemite Explosion,” 1865, Huntington Library.
68 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, August 13, 1859.
69 “The Yosemite Explosion.”
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the broader public could not be silent.70 If the public did not speak, wrote another, “we
may as well resign ourselves hopelessly to the admission that we have no rights railway
companies are bound to respect.”71
In the second half of the century the American press ceased to be just the
deliverer of information on the risks of steam transportation, making Americans aware of
the pattern of danger and transforming disasters into events of national concern. Now, it
actively positioned itself as a critical observer of the transportation industry. The press
was both the embodiment of the public and its protector – the “interposition” between the
traveling public and the threats it faced on American rivers and rails. Railroad companies
had a definite interest in preventing large-scale disasters, which were potentially costly in
terms of liability payments. However, the publicity the press brought to disasters also
shaped and generated action, influencing both the rise of regulatory impulses and the
particular approach to railroad regulation in the United States. Every disaster exposed
different system issues and engineering problems, and by making these causes part of the
national conversation, the press helped build the pressure for targeted reform.72
The significant role of public opinion and disaster publicity is demonstrated by
the efforts of Charles Francis Adams Jr. and the Massachusetts Board of Railroad
Commissioners. Long envisioned by Adams, the commission began in 1869 with the
stated goal of monitoring railroads for the public good, and then it received its first major
test with the 1871 rail accident at Revere, Massachusetts, that killed twenty-nine and
injured dozens more. The Commission launched a full state investigation of the accident,
70 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, August 13, 1859.
71 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, September 16, 1865.
72 Aldrich, Death Rode the Rails, 98; 129.
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with Adams authoring the major report. Without any actual regulatory power, the board
instead pushed for railroad companies to make safety reforms voluntarily. The board
gathered railroad companies to a conference shortly after the Revere disaster and Adams
skillfully used public opinion evident in the press to secure an agreement on new rules of
railroad operation. “In effect,” says Thomas McCraw, “he manipulated public outrage to
serve the ends of the commission, the railroads, and the public.”73
Adams applied this strategy to the board’s activities generally, arguing that with
the commission, the “otherwise scattered rays of public opinion could be concentrated to
a focus.”74 As a member of the board, Adams consciously spoke to public concerns and
sought to educate the general public on railroad matters. The commission and public
opinion functioned together; public accident investigations filtered knowledge and the
language of accident causes into the public discourse and disaster-driven public
grievances allowed the commission to exert pressure on companies. The commission was
an evolution of the earlier local committees that had investigated disasters and asserted
the authority of public opinion. Its approach of giving accidents publicity and pressuring
railroad companies to improve safety became a model for other similar state commissions
– a form of what historians have called “soft” regulation that often stood in place of
legislative action.75
Beyond its political influence on the regulatory system that scholars have
documented, the press’s role as a tool of surveillance over public transportation also
73 Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation: Charles Frances Adams, Louis D. Brandeis, James M.
Landis, Alfred E. Kahn (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 20-30. On the Massachusetts Board
of Railroad Commissioners also see Aldrich, Death Rode the Rails, especially 71-96, and on the
investigation of the Revere accident see Brockmann, Twisted Rails, Sunken Ships, 181-206.
74 Quoted in McCraw, Prophets of Regulation, 20.
75 McCraw, Prophets of Regulation, 20-56; Aldrich, Death Rode the Rails, 71-96.
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represented a cultural and psychological adaptation to the ongoing threat of danger on the
nation’s transportation highways. A vigilant press offered at least the perceived comfort
that a collective public was always watching. In the face of corporate power, the press
could publish the names of those parties it deemed responsible, as Leslie’s did after an
1859 accident on the Albany, Vermont, and Canada Railroad: “all that we can do is to
proclaim to them and to the world, that the men whose names are attached are morally
guilty… and if they escape the laws of their country, they cannot the detestation of their
fellow-men.”76 If government did not act, the traveling public could oversee the
conditions of their own travel and make dangers known. Harper’s Weekly reported in
July 1865 that passengers on the Erie Railroad had observed the practice of planting
willow trees along the line for decoration, but one had recently fallen and nearly caused a
crash. The paper urged travelers to report such potential dangers, suggesting that “it is in
this kind of observation and public report that the daily travelers by railroads into the city
can exercise a wholesome supervision of their condition and management.”77 After the
tragic railroad disaster at Angola in 1868, the paper pushed readers to report every
accident, even smaller ones; “many a traveler has knowledge of many a mere escape and
mishap, which, if published, would compel the public to demand some action upon the
subject.”78 Informing the American public about the dangers they faced collectively as
travelers, and thus broadening the circle of those affected by a disaster to a national
public whose opinion held substantial weight, offered the best possibility of effecting
change.
76 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, August 13, 1859.
77 Harper’s Weekly, July 15, 1865.
78 Harper’s Weekly, January 11, 1868.
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Another Harper’s Weekly editorial published in April 1868 demonstrates the
growing value placed on the role of the press regarding traveler safety. The paper
reported on a libel case then underway between the New Jersey Railroad and the
newspaper The Nation, which had been commenting on the railroad’s apparent criminal
carelessness. The Harper’s writer argued that “the Nation, in strict pursuance of its duty
as a public journal, exposed the conduct of public agents to whom the lives of hundreds
are daily intrusted.” The case was of interest not only to other newspapers but also to a
traveling public that depended on a protective press; “if comments like those of the
Nation should be judged libelous, the public would suffer very much more than it does
now.”79 This editorial and others reflected a long-established truth, that “as all Americans
travel more or less, we are all peculiarly interested in making travel safe,” but by the
second half of the century they more frequently completed the idea: “nothing tends to that
result so surely as the publication of the accidents and carelessness of management which
travelers observe.”80 In other words, reporting on disasters and a public discourse on
steam power’s dangers actually made travel safer. A traveling public that convened in
print and supervised modern travel would assure its own security.
Seen within the larger context of various discussions about modern transportation
and American values, the efforts of the American traveling public are especially
significant. Americans had long wondered what effect steam-powered transportation and
the high-speed mobility it brought might have on the nation’s revered republican identity.
An improved, efficient transportation system appeared to be the solution to early
79 Harper’s Weekly, April 4, 1868.
80 Harper’s Weekly, November 17, 1866.
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concerns about the survival of a vast republic, but steam power, and machine technology
generally, marked such a jarring change that questions arose. John Kasson summarizes
the cultural dilemma:
Could modern technology expand the possibilities for creative power and human
liberty, free Americans from drudgery and deadening routine, and bring them into
closer communication with one another and with nature? Or might technology
instead blunt people’s imaginations and ethical sensibilities, alienate them from
their environment, and perhaps even serve as a new instrument of tyranny?81
As editorial responses reveal, the rampant death caused by steamboat and rail disasters
exacerbated concerns about the compatibility of modern technology and America’s
republican experiment. And yet, in confronting the dangers of steam travel Americans
achieved and modeled a vision of republicanism fit to a modern, technological society.
Disaster provoked the creation of an interested and informed public that assembled in
person, petitioned elected representatives, and used the press as a vehicle for shared
knowledge and supervision of changing industrial realities. The emergent republican
vision asserted the rights of the individual within a massive system of public
transportation, called for protecting individual liberty against powerful corporations, and
declared the public’s sovereignty over its own mobility. In this adaptation to steam-
powered transportation and its concurrent dangers, Americans consistently proclaimed
the value of individual rights and the shared public good.
The idea of an activist press and public ensuring its own safety reveals the
optimism that was integral to the broader rhetoric of the traveling public. The pursuit of
security for the users of steam technologies rested on the notion that the risks steamboats
and trains posed were fixable problems. That hope for change paradoxically coincided
81 John F. Kasson, Civilizing the Machine: Technology and Republican Values in America, 1776-1900
(New York: Hill and Wang, 1976), 110.
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with a degree of fatalism that increasingly ran through the discourse that followed
disasters. Perceptions that steam travel was unsafe were given credence by the press,
which often repeated the idea that it was “a very serious thing for any one to leave home
even upon the shortest of journeys.” After the 1868 Angola disaster, in which a train had
derailed off a track and burned when a heating stove spilled fire into the wreckage, a
Harper’s writer echoed the common refrain that this would surely not be the last tragedy:
“frost will touch and snap iron next week as it did last, and when the car goes over the
stove will go with it, and fire will still burn, and horrors be piled on horrors.”82
Illustrations and cartoons published in Harper’s and Leslie’s punctuated the
troubling reality that Americans faced. A full-page illustration in Harper’s September 23,
1865, issue shows a dark train hurdling forward, crushing writhing bodies as it proceeds
unchecked. At the controls is a frightening personification of death, shrouded in black,
overlooking the slaughter. Surrounding the train are smaller details of various disaster
scenes – a burning ship, an exploding steamboat, two trains colliding, and a train
cascading off a bridge. The text adjoining the image underscores the sense of inescapable
danger: “Death appears to have set his mark upon the traveler… and every man or
woman who steps out of a railway car or steamboat at the termination of their journey
unhurt does so with a feeling of sensible relief.”83 A similar image printed in 1873 after
the Meadow Brook rail disaster, called “Death on the Rail,” depicts Death destroying the
track to send the approaching train to its doom. The event goes unnoticed to a sleeping
82 Harper’s Weekly, January 11, 1868.
83 Harper’s Weekly, “The Horrors of Travel,” September 23, 1865.
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watchman nearby.84 These images reveal a pervasive fear and a heightened sense that
danger always accompanied steam-powered travel.
Many continued to respond to disasters with faith in the technology, like the
commenter on the Yosemite explosion who argued that “a properly constructed boiler, of
good material, properly supplied with water, with proper working safety valves, and
carefully attended to, will never explode.”85 At the same time, though, public responses
showed an emerging acceptance of accidents. A doctor and author of a pamphlet, “On
Medical Provisions for Railroads,” argued about rail disasters that “it is useless to say
that all this is unnecessary and may be avoided.” Unforeseen accidents were going to
continue, the doctor insisted, so he advocated for provisions on trains that would allow
for quicker medical care for those injured in a potential crash.86 “It may not be possible to
avoid all accidents,” one editorial writer said, “but it is possible to do something to
prevent them.”87
The resignation that disasters would continue was therefore not antithetical to, but
rather often a necessary condition of, the optimistic pursuit of reform. To suggest
provisions for quick relief to the injured, there had to be an acknowledgment of the
likelihood of more train crashes. Newspaper coverage that revealed a consistent pattern
of danger and enhanced perceptions of a broad threat against travelers spurred claims of
passenger rights and public calls for change. Thus, even as cultural discourses cemented
the association of steam transportation and danger in the public mind, they constructed a
84 Harper’s Weekly, “Death on the Rail,” May 10, 1873.
85 “The Yosemite Explosion.”
86 Edmund S. F. Arnold, “On Medical Provisions for Railroads as a Humanitarian Measure…” (Albany:
Weed, Parsons and Company, 1862), 4. HL.
87 Harper’s Weekly, November 13, 1869.
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widespread idea that the risks of steamboat and rail travel could always be limited. With
confidence in a watchful traveling public that defended stated rights and occasionally
prompted the adoption of new safety measures, Americans could perceive themselves as
safe despite ongoing disasters. Printed complaints about danger and assertions of the
rights of the traveling public were not denunciations of steam-powered travel – they were
expressions of faith in progress and efforts to strengthen the technology that was such a
desirable aspect of modern life.
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Chapter Seven:
Accepting Unlikely Events
“It is as much a necessity of their lives as the food they eat and the air they
breathe,” Charles Francis Adams Jr. wrote of Americans and the railroad. Adams was a
student of railroads and a public authority on their management. He was also the
grandson of John Quincy Adams and great-grandson of John Adams. Across four
generations of prominent public figures, that spanned the whole of the nineteenth century,
the storied American family had witnessed the rise of steam-powered machines that
transformed American life. By the final decades of the century, high-speed transportation
had become an entrenched feature of modern American society. This, despite what
Charles Francis Adams Jr. called “a vague but deeply rooted conviction… that the
railroad has created a new danger; that because of it the average human being’s hold on
life is more precarious than it was.”1
Adams explored that conviction in his 1879 book Notes on Railroad Accidents,
the culmination of his many years studying them. Disasters of steam transportation had
certainly given Americans a new experience of danger, and after decades of exposure to
countless tragedies, the association of steamboats and railroads with danger was strong.
Adams believed, however, that perception had outpaced reality:
The fact is that when a railroad accident comes, it is apt to come in such a way as
to leave no doubt whatever in relation to it. It is heralded like a battle or an
earthquake; it fills columns of the daily press with the largest capitals and the
most harrowing details, and thus it makes a deep and lasting impression on the
minds of many people. When a multitude of persons; traveling as almost every
man now daily travels himself, meet death in such sudden and such awful shape;
1 Charles Francis Adams Jr., Notes on Railroad Accidents (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1879), 232-
233.
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the event smites the imagination. People seeing it and thinking of it, and hearing
and reading of it, and of it only, forget of how infrequent occurrence it is.2
Adams’s words highlight two significant conceptions of technological disaster
present in American culture by the end of the nineteenth century. On the one hand, the
relationship between high-speed travel and danger had become fixed in the American
mind. The public’s encounters with and responses to steam-related disasters had bred a
common familiarity with the catastrophic events and awareness of American travelers’
universal subjection to the perils of modern mobility. Popular discussions about the threat
posed by American steamboats and railroads focused on the horror of disaster, the
shortened lives of the victims, the apparent shameful disregard for human life, and the
necessity of preventing such terrible tragedies. The grievances voiced by the American
traveling public emphasized the right of individual travelers to secure conveyance. All
the while, the ongoing pattern of disaster, printed response, and public commentary
normalized steam transportation’s dangers and made them an evocative cultural category
for Americans, most of whom would never experience those dangers directly. The
dangers of steam travel and the concept of the transportation disaster developed alternate
figurative connotations and broader cultural salience that reveal a general ease with the
reality of these incidents as features of modern life, even as new disasters continued to
prompt hopeful calls for reform.
Another attitude emerged, however, which acknowledged danger as part of all
modern travel and looked to control it rationally. Rather than characterize the threat as
one of danger and disaster, this discourse dealt with risk, a manageable measure of the
dangers incident to travel, and accidents, labeled as failures of a complex human-
2 Adams, Notes on Railroad Accidents, 232.
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technological system. Instead of using anecdotal evidence and emphasizing the individual
traveler, proponents of this discourse approached the problem from a systemic
perspective, using statistical analysis and scientific information to study risk and
prescribe appropriate solutions. The insurance industry, growing in significance in the
second half of the century, was one major sphere of American life that brought this
narrative to the forefront. Alongside insurance was an analytical approach to railroad
accidents modeled by Adams’s work, privileging science and statistics over sensation.
The statistical evaluation of risk and the scientific approach to improving railroad safety
through technological innovation helped make the railroad what Anthony Giddens calls
an “expert system” – a technological system structured by professional, expert knowledge
that allowed users to expect consistency from the system across time and space.
Proponents of this adaptation to transportation’s dangers urged prudent preparation for
the possibility of accidents and trust in a system run by sophisticated technology and
trained human operators.3
Historians have detailed the rise of systems of risk in nineteenth-century America,
identifying insurance, statistical analysis, and rational approaches to safety as significant
adaptations to industrial capitalism.4 In its relationship to modern travel, though, the
development of a risk culture is best understood as closely intertwined with popular
cultural responses to disaster. Cultural conceptions and shared public meanings of steam
discourses filtered through the language of risk, and together, these responses formed an
3 Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 27-29.
4 Literature on risk as a modern concept in America is vast. Great recent studies include Jonathan Levy,
Freaks of Fortune: The Emerging World of Capitalism and Risk in America (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2012); Arwen P. Mohun, Risk: Negotiating Safety in American Society (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013); and Dan Bouk, How Our Days Became Numbered: Risk and the
Rise of the Statistical Individual (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015).
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emerging modern mentality on the relationship of danger to high-speed transportation
and advanced technology. They aligned in understanding and accepting technological
disasters as both inevitable and unlikely. Catastrophic disasters confronted Americans
with a prevalent force of destruction, but that confrontation had largely taken place in
print – newspapers, visual depictions, and public conversations that familiarized
Americans with the threat and provoked fear, but at a level removed from actual personal
danger. Adams and others accepted the reality of transportation accidents, but they
identified statistical unlikelihood as the accidents’ most defining feature. Disasters were
expected, they said, but their tragic consequences could be limited with proper planning,
continued scientific study, and technological development. As the age of steam
approached its end, then, Americans had come to know transportation disasters as
pervasive but rare; threatening but not personally so; easily imagined but reasonably
dismissed.
By midcentury, with steamboat disasters at their peak, railroad disasters
increasing in severity, and newspaper circulation continuing to grow, Americans
confronted news of transportation accidents with regularity. Steam disasters had also
become deeply incorporated into the mentality of nineteenth-century Americans.
References to steam disasters appeared in a wide array of nineteenth-century historical
records, as three diverse examples illustrate. First, an educator “of the deaf and dumb,”
describing in an 1839 report differences in syntax between spoken English and sign
language, gave this example of signers’ inverted sentence structure: “If relating an
account of a particular steamboat accident, they say, ‘steamboat explosion, killed so
294
many at such a time and place.’”5 The example of a steamboat disaster also showed up in
instructions given to 1850 census-takers about recording cause of death: “When
unknown, state ‘unknown,’ where by accident, as steamboat explosion, so state.”6 And
finally, there is the offhand remark of a character in an 1856 novel, Caste: A Story of
Republican Equality, written by Mary Hayden Green Pike under the pseudonym Sydney
Story Jr. A son explains to his mother why he has delayed in courting the woman he is
interested in:
If I was a little less decided I might do better; but I am not the man to say ‘Will
you?’ more than once, to any woman; and being undecided what she will say, and
tolerably sure that a negative would make me feel like patronizing the first
railroad accident, or steamboat explosion, or any other speedy and genteel method
of shuffling off this mortal coil, I have been waiting.7
Thus had steamboat and rail disasters become part of the American cultural fabric,
pervasive enough that they were seen as characteristic of modern life (and death).
A shared national consciousness and familiarity with steam-related disasters
allowed them to be intelligible and useful in representations of the American experience.
In his famous commentary on modern life, Walden, Henry David Thoreau occasionally
mentioned the actual train that ran near his pond-side retreat but he also frequently called
upon trains and rail accidents to represent his thoughts on the problems of American
society. “We do not ride on the railroad; it rides upon us,” wrote Thoreau, commenting
on the unnecessarily rapid pace of the society as a whole. Elsewhere, Thoreau wondered
if the supposedly broad benefits attributed to railroads and other technological advances
5 “Thirteenth Annual Report of the Trustees of the Ohio Asylum for the Education of the Deaf and Dumb.
To the Legislature of the State of Ohio. For the Year 1839.” (1839), 14, American Antiquarian Society.
6 “Instructions to Marshals and Assistants,” Seventh Census of the United States (1850), xxiii, AAS.
7 Sydney Story Jr., Caste: A Story of Republican Equality (Boston: Phillips, Sampson, and Company,
1856), 80.
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might be more limited than most believed: “though a crowd rushes to the depot, and the
conductor shouts ‘All aboard! when the smoke is blown away and the vapor condensed, it
will be perceived that a few are riding, but the rest are run over, - and it will be called,
and will be, ‘A melancholy accident.’” Death and injury by rail were for Thoreau
analogous to a deeper injury suffered by Americans caught in the unceasing forward
movement of the national destiny. Thoreau’s acquaintance with transportation disasters is
evident throughout Walden in references to pervasive disaster reports in newspapers and
the author’s use of standard newspaper language – the “melancholy accident” – to
explain his thoughts about modern American society to an audience he knew could
follow along.8
Thoreau’s figurative usage of railroad dangers suggests the polyvalence of steam
transportation disasters, which also made them useful in political commentary.
Particularly in political issues involving railroad companies, railroad disasters came to
stand in for the various other problems critics of railroad corporations exposed, including
the exploitation of railroad workers, the inordinate economic and political power wielded
by railroads as models of concentrated capital, and the general disruption railroads
brought in particular to urban residents.9 An 1840 broadside urged Philadelphians to
protest the extension of the Camden and Amboy Railroad through the city. The
cautionary line “Mothers Look Out for Your Children!” underscored an illustration
8 Henry David Thoreau, Walden (New York: Signet Classics, 2012), 44; 75-76.
9 For a general survey of railroads and labor conflict, see Gerald G. Eggert, Railroad Labor Disputes: The
Beginnings of Federal Strike Policy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967). A good overview of
anti-corporate sentiment is James L. Huston, Securing the Fruits of Labor: The American Concept of
Wealth Distribution, 1765-1900 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1998), especially Chapter
10. David Stowell argues that the physical disorder and hazards railroads brought to urban streets as a
principal factor in the 1877 Railroad Strike. David O. Stowell, Streets, Railroads, and the Great Strike of
1877 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).
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showing a locomotive labeled “Monopoly” barreling through a city street sending men,
women, and carriages scurrying away in fear. The image of a train crushing city residents
tapped into an actual physical danger posed by trains but also reduced the broader anti-
Camden and Amboy message, based in concerns about Philadelphia becoming a “suburb
of New York” to the detriment of its citizens’ livelihood, to a more tangible image of
fear.10
An 1872 Thomas Nast cartoon similarly explored concerns about railroad
corruption and political power through disaster imagery. Entitled “Justice on the Rail –
Erie Railroad (Ring) Smash Up,” the illustration showed the personified Justice switching
the track to send the Erie Railroad ownership group led by Jay Gould cascading over the
cliff with the cars.11 Gould’s control of the Erie Railroad Company had been secured with
legislative assistance from Boss Tweed’s political machine, but in early 1872 the ring had
been broken and a new board took over the company. Nast, a frequent critic of Tweed’s
political corruption, illustrated the fate of the company with the imagery of danger; the
Gould ring meets its demise in a deadly derailment while the new board, represented as
an oncoming train, proceeds toward a clear track.12 A year later a Frank Bellew cartoon
on the front page of the Daily Graphic highlighted fears about railroad corporations’
perilous influence over the U.S. economy by showing several locomotives, portrayed as
monsters, running over individuals and heading toward a cliff labeled “National
10 Broadside, “Mothers Look Out for Your Children!” (1840), accessed online at
https://imagespublicdomain.wordpress.com/category/transportation/.
11 Thomas Nast, “Justice on the Rail – Erie Railroad (Ring) Smash Up,” in Harper’s Weekly, March 30,
1872.
12 On Nast and Tweed, see especially Renée Lettow Lerner, “Thomas Nast’s Crusading Legal Cartoons,”
Green Bag Almanac (2011).
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Bankruptcy.” A small background figure, a personification of the press, waves a
cautionary “DANGER” flag in anticipation of the catastrophic accident.13
The tactic of using train disaster imagery to criticize railroad companies was a
logical one – the power and momentum of a moving locomotive was an obvious symbol
for the influence railroad companies had on late-nineteenth century society. These
illustrations suggest how significantly danger had become integrated into the American
conception of railroads. Americans frequently saw trains represented in one of two ways,
as symbols of solid strength or as monstrous purveyors of destruction.14 Railroad
accidents were an easily decipherable metaphor for other negatively perceived features of
the growing rail industry.
While disaster and danger metaphors were a natural cultural tool in discourses
about the transportation industry, their utility extended to other issues as well. An anti-
slavery song from the 1840s called “Get Off the Track” described emancipation as an
unstoppable train. The lyrics were written from the perspective of a locomotive conductor
representing the pro-emancipation position. The narrator repeatedly yells “sound the
alarm” and warns all those attempting to block the train, representing opposing political
voices, to “jump for your lives” and “clear the track” or else get run over. A cover image
for the song’s sheet music, created by the Thayer Lithography Company, shows train cars
bearing the words “Immediate Emancipation” pulled by a locomotive, the “Liberator,”
itself topped by a ringing liberty bell warning of the oncoming train. In the background,
other trains crash and explode, including one labeled “Clay” (a reference to Henry Clay’s
13 Frank Bellow, “The Ride to Ruin,” in The Daily Graphic, April 2, 1873.
14 These two categories of depiction of trains are discussed in Chapter Three.
298
advocacy for gradual emancipation).15 A pro-Union cartoon published during the Civil
War used the concept of a derailment, showing a personified locomotive falling off the
track with a caption reading: “Jeff Davis, the engineer, reports that his secession train ran
against some rails that Abe Lincoln split, and was thrown off the track.”16
Similarly, an 1860 Currier and Ives print played on the idea of a railroad “smash-
up” to profile the politics involved in the 1860 presidential election. Aboard a locomotive
labeled “Equal Rights,” Abraham Lincoln and Hannibal Hamlin yell “Clear the track”
and “Look out for the Engine.” The train is nearing a collision with a wagon, the
“Democratic Platform,” being tugged in opposite directions by human-faced donkeys. On
the left, Stephen Douglas and Herschel Johnson carry a Native American driver labeled
“A Squatter Sovereign,” who warns of the sound of the oncoming train; on the right, the
John C. Breckenridge and Joseph Lane donkeys carry “Old Buck” who says “I’d rather
the Machine would be smashed than have them run away with it.”17 Eight years later
Currier and Ives reused virtually the same image for an 1868 election print called “An
Impending Catastrophe,” showing President Grant driving the locomotive
“Reconstruction” on the Republican Railway toward his opponents, Horatio Seymour and
Francis Blair. John Adams Dix, aboard the train, says “if any man obstructs the track, run
him down on the spot.”18
15 Sheet Music, Jesse Hutchinson Jr., “Get Off the Track,” 1844. Cover image by Thayer & Co.
Lithography, Boston, Jay T. Last Sheet Music Collection, Huntington Library.
16 Imprint, “Jeff Davis, the engineer, reports that his secession train ran against some rails…” (Philadelphia:
1861-1865), AAS. The imprint also calls to mind the literal destruction of railroads as a military strategy
during the Civil War. See James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1988), 512-515.
17 Print, “Progressive Democracy – Prospect of a Smash-Up,” (Currier and Ives, 1860). American Satirical
Prints Collection, HL.
18 Print, “An Impending Catastrophe,” (Currier and Ives, 1868). ASPC, HL.
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The frequent public use of danger metaphors is suggestive of a culture that had so
deeply embedded steamboat and rail accidents into its collective consciousness that these
metaphors, in simplified form, likely appeared with as much or more regularity in more
informal and private settings. The diary of New England traveler Caroline Barrett White
offers a stirring example when White describes the repeated kisses of the young couple
sitting in front of her on the train as “collisions,” but harmless ones unlike the destructive
“collision of Engines.”19 Linguistic influence, to the extent it can be measured,
underscores steam danger’s cultural significance. Beginning early in the nineteenth
century in England and America steam ushered in a number of new phrases, such as
“putting on steam,” “blowing off steam,” and “letting off steam,” in which steam was
used figuratively to describe human energy and a notion of driving power.20 The
dangerous qualities and safety features of steamboats and trains filtered in as well.
“Safety valve” was used nearly from the beginning of the steam era figuratively to
describe a means of releasing pressure or limiting danger.21 The satirical cartoons and
illustrations from Harper’s Weekly, Currier and Ives, and others point to ways that the
language of steam transportation and disaster – tracks, smash-ups, or the verb “derail” –
might be applied in diverse situations. The continued figurative use of such phrases and
idioms as “steaming mad,” “trainwreck,” and “runaway train,” reveal steamboat and rail
disasters’ lasting effect on the American lexicon.
Humor provides another fascinating window onto the cultural currency of
transportation dangers, as they were often the subjects of jokes. Nineteenth-century
19 The Papers of Caroline Barrett White, entry dated August 1, 1851, AAS.
20 “Steam,” The Oxford English Dictionary.
21 “Safety Valve,” The Oxford English Dictionary.
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newspapers sometimes had “Humor” sections filled with various one-line jokes or longer
comedic stories. Some simply used the frame of a transportation accident for an unrelated
punchline, like one from the publication Brother Jonathan in 1843: “We learn by one of
our exchanges, that ‘two cows were cut into calves by the railroad train.’”22 Some found
situational humor in accidents, like a joke in Scientific American in 1849:
In a recent case tried in Cincinnati to establish the precise time of the death of a
man who with his wife, were blown up by a steamboat explosion, an Irishman
was put on the stand who was also blown up, but escaped. – Said the attorney to
him, “When did you last see the gentleman alive?” “Sure, your honor, as me and
the stovepipe were going up, we met him coming down.”23
Making light of the frightening situation of a steamboat or rail disaster was one
way Americans might collectively cope with a new threatening force and for the press to
draw attention to the pervasive problem. Take an 1859 Harper’s cartoon, for example.
Entitled “Scene. Office of the Railroad Company,” the cartoon shows the company
President responding to a query from an applicant for the Brakeman position. The
President asks the bookkeeper, “Mr. Jones, has there been a Brakeman killed on the road
within a day or two?” After receiving a negative response, the President tells the
applicant, “Well, my man, call next Monday, and by that time I guess there’ll be a
vacancy.”24 In an 1854 issue, the satirical periodical Yankee Notions published “Hints for
Railroad Accidents,” a list of tips for passengers to ensure that they would experience an
accident. Among the suggestions: “Always get into the car next to the locomotive, so that
when there is danger you will not be far off; or into the rear car which, in case of a
collision stands a good chance of being smashed up;” “While travelling, jump in and out
22 Brother Jonathan, September 2, 1843.
23 Scientific American, March 24, 1849.
24 Harper’s Weekly, November 12, 1859.
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of the car as often as you fancy. Its of no especial benefit, but then its very risky;” and
“Always select night for travelling purposes, and if you can foggy ones.”25
What we might call “disaster humor” was possible because of Americans’
familiarity with the dangers of steam transportation. Steamboat and rail disasters were
current and widely known, so they made easy fodder for jokes. More importantly, these
jokes reveal the ubiquity of such accidents and even suggest a level of ease with the
reality of danger in modern life. Some jokes indicate an implicit acceptance of the
inevitability of accidents, making attempts to avoid or prevent them humorous. From the
Spirit of the Times in 1849: “What is better than Presence of Mind in a Railway accident?
Absence of Body.”26 Or decades later, another joke from Harper’s Weekly:
Mr. Snoozle: “It appears that in railroad accidents the first and last cars are always
the ones injured.”
Mrs. S.: “Why not leave them off the train?”27
That Americans could joke about death and injury aboard steamboats and trains does not
mean that public fears were not still significant, or that the public would fail to advocate
for reform after disasters. Rather, it suggests what disaster had become in the public mind
– less a source of real, paralyzing fear than a social problem and a worst-case-scenario
event, easily imagined, but distant from most people’s daily existence. Humor or
metaphor helped defuse and moderate what was perceived as a significant threat. Once
filtered through these alternate discourses, transportation dangers retained their finality
and emotional power but lost the jarring trauma that could come with news of actual
tragedy in the world.
25 Yankee Notions, July 1, 1854.
26 The Spirit of the Times, June 30, 1849.
27 Harper’s Weekly, August 13, 1892.
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The same held true for fiction, as two turn-of-the-century short stories illustrate.
In Kate Chopin’s “The Story of an Hour” (1894) and Willa Cather’s “Paul’s Case”
(1905), both authors employ a train accident as a plot device bringing finality and release
to their troubled protagonists. As the title says, “The Story of an Hour” takes place in a
single sixty-minute period, during which a Mrs. Mallard hears of her husband’s death and
then learns that the news was mistaken and her husband is, in fact, still alive. At the start
of the hour, Mrs. Mallard, who suffers from “heart trouble,” learns from her sister and her
husband’s friend, Richards, that her husband, Brently Mallard, was among those killed in
a railroad disaster. Stricken with grief, Mrs. Mallard retreats to her room and weeps, but
soon her grief fades into joy when she realizes the freedom her husband’s death will
provide her. She imagines “a long procession of years to come that would belong to her
absolutely,” and “she opened and spread her arms out to them in welcome.” For Mrs.
Mallard, the train accident brings momentary sorrow but ultimately an apparent
transformation. At the story’s end, Mrs. Mallard, back downstairs, finds her husband
alive and unaware that there had even been an accident; her heart stops immediately and
she dies.28
In “Paul’s Case,” Willa Cather explores the transformational journey of Paul, a
high-school student whose non-conforming sexuality and artistic interests breed
disillusionment with his middle-class family, unimaginative schooling, and mundane life
in Pittsburgh. Paul steals a sum of money and travels to New York City, where for
several days he finds happiness embracing a bohemian lifestyle. Paul’s adventure is
doomed, however, when he learns that his father is on his way to New York to bring him
28 Kate Chopin, “The Story of an Hour,” in Kate Chopin, The Dover Reader (Mineola, New York: Dover
Publications, 2015).
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home. Unwilling to face the prospect of returning, Paul ends his life by jumping in front
of a train. While the train disaster happens away from the action in “The Story of an
Hour,” here the crash is at the heart of it, and Cather describes it in language
characteristic of the disaster imagery found in newspapers and published narratives: “He
felt something strike his chest, and that his body was being thrown swiftly through the
air, on and on, immeasurably far and fast.”29 In both stories, train accidents serve not as
signs of modern problems themselves but as sources of release and liberation from other
struggles. Danger, more broadly, becomes a transformative force, instrumental in the
modern experience.
Thus, even as transportation disasters continued to fill the newspapers and
provoke widespread concern, they also became prominent in the realm of the figurative
and imaginative, where they could be more easily accepted and experienced vicariously.
A living version of the jokes and fiction played out daily at Coney Island in the first
decade of the twentieth century. Among the popular rides and “technological sensations”
at the Dreamland amusement park was the Leap Frog Railroad. The ride placed
passengers in a rail car and sent them flying down a track while another car full of
returning passengers moved on the same track in the opposite direction. Just as the cars
seemed poised to collide and riders shuddered in anticipation of disaster, one car leaped
over the other on rails equipped to create just such a moment.30 The Leap Frog Railroad
capitalized on consumers’ shared fear of and familiarity with rail disasters to create the
thrill of catastrophe that was imagined but not realized. This kind of amusement could
29 Willa Cather, “Paul’s Case,” in Paul’s Case and Other Stories (Mineola, New York: Dover Publications,
1996).
30 Kathy Peiss, Cheap Amusements: Working Women and Leisure in Turn-of-the-Century New York
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), 131.
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only be successful in a culture acquainted with danger but comfortable with it as an
unlikely threat. Disaster was paradoxically always near and always distant; the idea of a
steam disaster was virtually inseparable from cultural perceptions of high-speed mobility,
but actual danger was absent from the lived experience of most American travelers.
The presence of steamboat and rail disasters in American culture as a concept
with deep resonance demonstrates Americans’ collective recognition of a new
phenomenon – the potential threat posed by steam technology. As the reality that
transportation disasters were not a passing threat became clear, the transportation industry
and individual travelers adapted by seeking greater security against the risks of travel,
and the concept of insurance provided a path. Beyond death and injury, steamboat and
rail disasters brought potential financial consequences to individuals injured, to families
who suddenly lost a member and source of income, and to people using those steamboats
or trains to transport goods and property. The pattern of repeated disasters therefore
forced the various parties invested in travel and transportation to anticipate possible
disaster and properly account for it.
The term “risk” itself derives from associations with the perils of the sea and the
business of marine insurance – “risque” was a commodity purchased by merchants
insuring themselves against loss of property shipped over the oceans.31 Early in the
development of the steamboat trade in the United States, steamboat owners followed
earlier examples from maritime trade and insured their boats against destruction. As
steamboat disasters became frequent and the lifespan of steamboats proved short,
31 Levy, Freaks of Fortune, 3.
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insurance grew to be one of steamboat companies’ most significant expenses. Following
traditional legal doctrines developed for maritime transportation, steamboat companies
were initially responsible for any losses except those that resulted from “the act of God or
the public enemies.” Eager to avoid responsibility for losses that resulted from potential
accidents, steamboat companies included specific language stipulating their liability on
bills of lading, which were documents outlining conditions of delivery and receipt for
transported goods that had long been a part of maritime trade.32 The often mysterious
causes of steamboat disasters, especially boiler explosions, challenged traditional
interpretations of liability. Early court rulings declared boiler explosions a result of
negligence and exempted them from insurance, but a shifting legal climate, beginning in
the 1830s, sought to encourage economic growth and enabled common carriers like
steamboats and railroads to create contracts limiting liability in more expansive ways.33
Tracking the changes in the boilerplate language used for bills of lading over the
course of the nineteenth century provides one of the clearest illustrations of Americans
recognizing and adapting to technological dangers. Eighteenth-century bills of lading
typically named the ship and its captain, the departure and arrival city and dates of the
trip, the goods to be transported, and often the price to be paid for the goods upon receipt.
The key clause in the contract followed a set format with blanks to be filled in for each
new bill, as in this 1761 example:
32 Louis C. Hunter, Steamboats on the Western Rivers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), 363-
368.
33 Hunter, Steamboats on the Western Rivers, 365; Morton Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law,
1780-1860 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 202-204.
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Being marked and number’d as in the Margent, and are to be delivered in the like
good Order and well Conditioned at the aforesaid Port of _______ (the Danger of
the Seas only excepted) unto _______ or to _______ Assigns.34
The line “the dangers of the seas excepted” was standard for these documents. Shippers
could make adjustments to the language; a 1780 bill for a tobacco shipment has the word
“only” crossed out and “& Enemy” handwritten in.35 For the most part, though, the
language was broad and inclusive enough to account for the failure to meet a contract due
to various disasters at sea.
With the introduction of steam power, that significant parenthetical statement
changed. Here is the language from an 1840 bill for a steam-powered tow line:
Marked and numbered as per margin, which we promise to forward, (danger of
navigation, fire, breakage, leakage, and other unavoidable dangers and accidents
excepted…)36
As steamboat disasters piled up over time, bills of lading came to include more
possibilities. By the 1850s most said something like “dangers of fire at sea or on shore,
accidents from machinery, boilers, steam, or any other accidents and dangers of the seas,
rivers, and steam navigation, of whatever nature or kind soever excepted.”37 This was not
simply a result of continually refined and exacting language; “dangers of the seas
excepted” remained the stipulation for sailing ships through the rise of steam
navigation.38 The differences in language reflect transitioning legal doctrine on liability
and contracts but also a response to new technology and the range of new potential
disasters that it added to existing dangers from natural circumstances and acts of God.
34 Bill of Lading, August 25, 1761, Jay T. Last Maritime Collection, Series 1, Binder 3, HL.
35 Bill of Lading, September 24, 1780, JLMC, Series 1, Binder 6, HL.
36 Bill of Lading, August 20, 1840 JLMC, Series 1, Binder 3, HL.
37 Bill of Lading, September 9, 1853, JLMC, Series 1, Binder 3, HL.
38 Bill of Lading, November 20, 1818, JLMC, Series 1, Binder 3, HL. Examples continue into the 1870s.
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Steamboat bills of lading were an implicit statement about the dangers of steam
navigation, simplified on an 1867 bill as “the incidental dangers of steamboats.”39 These
bills of lading reveal an acceptance of danger as a reality of modern travel; the companies
and individuals drafting them had to expect disaster even if it was improbable.
The growth of the insurance industry offered individual travelers the opportunity
to do the same. The rise of insurance involved what Dan Bouk calls the creation of the
“statistical individual in modern America.”40 Insurance companies recognized danger and
sought to manage it scientifically, calculating various risks and assigning value to the
consequences of disaster. The insurance industry proved to be a significant cultural force
in late nineteenth-century America, bringing together existing attitudes about danger and
transportation with an emerging conversation about risk. While newspaper editors and
other observers eager to locate causality sometimes condemned the use of the term
“accidents” to describe steamboat and rail disasters, the insurance industry embraced it,
avoiding popular terminology like disaster or catastrophe. Instead of danger, which
implied a fearful threat, they dealt in risk, which could be managed and reduced. The
discourse of insurance conveyed an approach to disaster that was less about fear and
horrific destruction, but instead understood it as something incidental to modern life.
The life insurance industry in America began in 1812 with the charter of the
Pennsylvania Company for Insurances on Lives and Granting Annuities. The concept of
commercial life insurance grew out of traditional fraternal societies that provided burial
funds for deceased members. In the industry’s early years, lack of statistical information
on death in the United States limited its influence. Insurance was also burdened initially
39 Bill of Lading, December 21, 1867, JLMC, Series 1, Binder 6, HL.
40 Bouk, How Our Days Became Numbered, xix.
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by associations with immorality and illegitimate behavior, and religious concerns about
individuals refusing to accept the will of God.41 Nevertheless, the industry steadily grew,
particularly after the 1840s and the emergence of mutual insurance companies that spread
profits to policyholders. Insurance companies saw a dramatic rise in policies sold after
the Civil War, especially as Americans became much more attentive to mortality.42
For each policy they sold, life insurance companies evaluated and commodified
individual lives, and as the industry developed, calculations of risk became ever-more
exacting and scientific. For most of the century, insurance companies primarily sold to
middle-class men, convincing them of the necessity to replace their incomes and secure
their families’ livelihoods in the event of death.43 But even as their calculations became
scientific, companies sold policies by invoking shared cultural assumptions about the
unpredictability of modern life. Advertisements printed on small cards, calendars,
pamphlets, and posters emphasized the certainty of death and the possibility of
misfortune with messages like “Delays are dangerous,” and “Tomorrow may be too
late!”44 Potential buyers read that purchasing insurance was the only responsible choice
in an unpredictable world. Insurance cards frequently quoted Proverbs, “A good man
41 The religious response to life insurance is explored in Viviana A. Rotman Zelitzer, Morals & Markets:
The Development of Life Insurance in the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979).
Nan Goodman explores Mark Twain’s objections to insurance and the broader relationship between
insurance and individual responsibility in Shifting the Blame: Literature, Law, and the Theory of Accidents
in Nineteenth-Century America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).
42 Sharon Ann Murphy, Investing in Life: Insurance in Antebellum America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2010). On the effect of the Civil War on conceptions of death and mortality, see Drew
Gilpin Faust, This Republic of Suffering: Death and the American Civil War (New York: Vintage Books,
2008).
43 Bouk, How Our Days Became Numbered, xxii.
44 Life Insurance Card, Prudential Insurance Company of America (1886), Jay T. Last Insurance Collection,
Binder 6, HL; Life Insurance Card, The Western and Southern Life Insurance Company, JLIC, Binder 6,
HL.
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leaveth an inheritance.”45 A series of illustrated cards from Sun Life Insurance drove
home the message to American men. Entitled “Benefits of Sun Life Insurance,” the cards
had two panels, one featuring a family enjoying the fruits of the man’s forethought – a
summer beach vacation, a luxurious home – and the other showing the family of the dead
man who had not purchased insurance, destitute and unhappy.46 With a life insurance
policy, American men could lessen the blow that sudden death so often had on a family.
In addition to life insurance, nineteenth-century Americans bought property
insurance and accident insurance, which focused specifically on unexpected occurrences
like fires, floods, and shipwrecks. As the insurance industry matured in the second half of
the century, steamboat and rail disasters were among its concerns as some of the more
prominent examples of sudden, accidental death. Another card in the “Benefits of Sun”
series displayed a flaming train collision in the left panel with the caption “Killed in an
unforeseen accident;” on the right, a grieving widow and her daughter, a “Family well
provided for,” visits the Sun teller to claim a five thousand dollar policy.47
Travel risks were significant enough that travel insurance became a category unto
itself. Founded in 1864, the Travelers Insurance Company began as an effort to provide
insurance to rail passengers and eventually served as a broader accident and life
insurance company. Travelers and other companies sold policies and even individual one-
day insurance tickets that guaranteed the holder compensation in case of death or injury.
Insurance cards and posters featuring images of boats and trains reflect the industry’s
designation of travel as a distinct arena of risk. One typical Travelers poster shows a
45 Life Insurance Card, United States Life Insurance Company, JLIC, Binder 6, HL.
46 Life Insurance Cards, Sun Life Insurance Company, JLIC, Binder 6, HL.
47 Life Insurance Card, Sun Life Insurance Company, JLIC, Binder 6, HL.
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colorful river scene with steamboats and a ship traveling on the water, carriages on the
shoreline, and a train going across a bridge.48 The industry also capitalized on the
pervasiveness of steamboat and rail accidents in American society and culture. Many
advertisements presented Americans with the images of disaster that had become
standard emblems of steam transportation’s dangers. An 1882 insurance card featured a
railway collision scene resembling the common illustrations in Harper’s Weekly and
Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, with bodies being pulled from smoking
wreckage.49 Another card for the Mutual Accident and Endowment Association of New
Orleans similarly recalled popular imagery of an exploding steamboat with bodies flying
in the air and victims floating in the water.50 These images were fairly simple – scaled-
down versions not meant for drama but for consumers to recognize quickly a familiar
danger. Insurance advertisements made steam disasters emblematic of the broader risks
of travel and of modern life. On several colorfully illustrated Fidelity and Casualty
Company cards, train and steamboat accidents feature among a collage of potential
risks.51
Insurance advertisements reinforced and focused Americans’ attention on the real
dangers they regularly read about and occasionally witnessed. If imagery did not already
remind consumers of the nation’s disaster record, companies sometimes did so explicitly:
“think of the frightful accidents as at: Ashtabula – New Hamburg – Spuyten Duyvil.”52
These were not just place names but entries in American collective memory, established
48 Insurance Poster, Travelers Insurance Company, JLIC, HL.
49 Insurance Card, The United States Mutual Accident Association (1882), JLIC, Binder 6, HL.
50 Insurance Card, The Mutual Accident and Endowment Association of New Orleans, JLIC, Binder 4, HL.
51 Insurance Card, Fidelity and Casualty Company, JLIC, Binder 2, HL.
52 Insurance Card, Fidelity and Casualty Company, JLIC, Binder 2, HL.
311
by newspaper coverage and public commentary, that evidenced the pattern of danger on
railroads. The world imagined by these advertisements featured the kind of unrealistic,
exaggerated sense of danger – in one fictional story told month-to-month on an 1875
insurance calendar the protagonist survived several different travel disasters within the
year – but still a danger rooted in a reality with which Americans were familiar.53 The
message to potential consumers was clear and often repeated in advertising taglines:
accidents will happen.54
Companies for travel and other forms of insurance also emphasized that accidents
could happen to anyone. “In accidents the unexpected always happens, and from the
President downwards all are in danger,” read one advertisement, a truth that had been
verified each time a prominent name like Franklin Pierce appeared among disaster
victims.55 Some advertisements even playfully mocked the belief that one could be
immune from risk:
Do you know a man who never walks the streets, who cannot slip upon the
pavements, who does not travel… whom fire will not burn, water will not drown,
whom dogs will not bite, nor lightning strike, and who cannot fall from anything,
or never can be sick? That man does not need Accident and Health Insurance. All
others should apply to The Massachusetts Mutual Accident Association.56
This card placed travel among a host of daily threats. An 1882 card used a train crash as a
specific example; it showed a man injured in a rail collision, his wife despondent because
he did not have a policy to cover the injury.57 The man is labeled “Not a member,” and
53 Insurance Calendar, Hartford Accident Insurance Company (1875), JLIC, Binder 2, HL.
54 Insurance Card, Fidelity and Casualty Company, JLIC, Binder 2, HL.
55 Insurance Card, Fidelity and Casualty Company, JLIC, Binder 2, HL.
56 Insurance Card, The Massachusetts Mutual Accident Association, JLIC, Binder 4, HL.
57 Insurance Card, The United States Mutual Accident Association (1882), JLIC, Binder 6, HL.
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another caption reads “Never had an accident before,” a clear address to the many
Americans who might think themselves safe.
The expansion in clientele for the insurance industry from male professional
heads of households – bankers, lawyers, merchants, doctors – to the working class,
women, and families is therefore especially significant in terms of travel insurance. The
change reflects the recognition of an inclusive traveling public; steamboat and rail travel
had been fairly democratic from the start, and only became more so as the century
progressed. The risks of travel were broadly spread, exposing women, children, and
working-class men to the same dangers that middle-class men faced. In a Harper’s
Weekly cartoon from 1879, a woman points out this shared assumption of risk to her
husband: “What! Do you mean to say you’ve had yourself insured against any railroad
accident, and left little Effie and me to take our chances?”58 Insurance advertisements
declaring that “all Travelers should Insure Against Accidents” reflected an inclusive
modern identity that had become associated with subjection to danger.59
To convey their message, insurance companies also summoned statistical facts
demonstrating the random, unavoidable nature of accidents to consumers. An insurance
card from the United States Mutual Accident Association asked consumers, “why insure
against fire and not accidents? Is your dwelling or warehouse more valuable than
yourself? Are they more likely to be burned than an accident to happen to your person?
Statistics say not.”60 Another Fidelity advertisement laid out the numbers for the year
1888: 1,602 railroad accidents, 585 killed, 1,889 injured. In both cases, statistics proved
58 Harper’s Weekly, August 23, 1879.
59 Insurance Card, Railway Passengers Assurance Co. of Hartford, Connecticut (1876), JLIC, Binder 6, HL.
60 Insurance Card, United States Mutual Accident Association, JLIC, Binder 6, HL.
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the fundamental point printed in large letters on the Fidelity card, that “Accidents do
Happen!”61
This insurance narrative thus coincided with the longstanding idea, sparked by
sudden, indiscriminate steam accidents, that all travelers were subject to danger. The
message of travel insurance was another iteration of a familiar warning to Americans
voiced by those commenting on steamboat and rail disasters since their beginning:
anyone might die. That message had joined others over the century – that Providential
design was unknowable and all must adequately prepare for death; that Americans faced
danger because they were travelers; or that shared susceptibility to death created a shared
authority to reform the industry. Blending these messages, the discourse of insurance
once again impelled Americans to prepare for death in a thoroughly modern way – by
purchasing insurance and limiting one’s personal risk.
Insurance therefore offered a way to turn emotional fear into a rational
preparedness for the unlikely worst. Insurance companies would eliminate the traveler’s
worry by managing their risk scientifically. Travel insurance broke down the life of the
American traveler into discrete periods of risk. Passengers could purchase insurance
tickets at rail stations – 25 cents for one day or 4.50 for thirty days, for example.62 Then,
companies translated accident casualties into monetary values – “3,000 dollars in the
event of death, 15 dollars per week for disabling injuries.”63 Insurance simplified
travelers’ own determination of risk, making it a limited, individual decision. The more
61 Insurance Card, Fidelity and Casualty Company, JLIC, Binder 2, HL.
62 Insurance Card, Travelers Insurance Company (1893), JLIC, Binder 6, HL.
63 Insurance Card, Railway Passengers Assurance Co. of Hartford, Connecticut (1876), JLIC, Binder 6, HL.
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difficult assessment of the widespread threat was left to a company that had its eye on the
transportation system as a whole.
By relying on scientific data, then, accident insurance purportedly freed the
individual from concern for both his or her own security and the national problem of
steam power endangering travelers. Acknowledging the complexity of the insurance
business, one advertisement said policyholders “cannot fully explain the reasons for their
conduct,” but they “intuitively” knew the importance of their investment. The
advertisement went on: “they cannot count their chances of escape from peril, and they
are willing to leave to some one else the dismal questions of how many will be taken
home bruised or mangled this year, how many will be run over, etc.; they well know that
accident insurance has a sound scientific basis.”64 Rather than seeing danger as a cultural
problem, advertisements like this identified a manageable system of risk. Its scale and
complexity was too grand for any one individual to comprehend, so insurance companies
asked individuals to place their trust in a scientific, statistical assessment of their risk.
Purchasing insurance was thus described as another prudent middle-class approach to the
dangerous modern world not unlike Rollo’s father’s instructions in the children’s book
Rollo’s Travels not to fret about danger, but instead to rely on others to manage a
complex system. Trust in larger systems based in expert knowledge was an instrumental
part of the emerging narrative on risk.65
The investment in insurance was particularly advantageous, companies said, when
little else was working to make steam-powered travel safer. As a Hartford Accident
64 Insurance Card, Fidelity and Casualty Company, JLIC, Binder 2, HL.
65 Jacob Abbott, Rollo’s Travels (Philadelphia: Hogan & Thompson, 1845), AAS. Sharon Ann Murphy
discusses the importance of life insurance as a marker of middle-class identity in Investing in Life.
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Insurance Company calendar read, “unless something can be done to stop these railway
accidents, the best thing for an individual to do is get insured. In fact it is best to take a
policy and then endeavor to stop accidents.”66 Such insurance messages seemingly
countered the mentality of a collective traveling body acting for the public good with a
more individualistic notion that travelers needed only worry about themselves. But in
another sense, insurance was a collective action, a system based on the principle that risk
was diminished if shared among a large body of travelers. A Fidelity and Casualty
Company advertisement captures this point, telling customers that it was wiser “to pay a
company, organized upon the laws of average, a small premium rather than assume the
risk yourself.”67 Individual travelers, in securing themselves with insurance policies, also
served the collective, spreading the risk among many. Companies framed accident
insurance as a more prudent and effective weapon against the threat of steam-powered
disasters than either legal pursuit of compensation or public advocacy for reform.
Insurance companies provided a service that reduced one’s monetary risk in the
event of an accident; to a certain extent, however, the rhetoric of insurance equated
managing risk in a financial sense with managing danger, both as a physical and
psychological threat. One elaborate insurance card folded out to form an image of an
elderly couple occupying a seat in a rail car. The woman looks nervous but her husband
is content, as he holds a case that reads “We are all right, Maria;” the case labels them
“Insured in the United States Mutual Accident Association.” Of course, there was still no
guarantee that Maria would be alright. Even though purchasing insurance did not prevent
66 Insurance Calendar, Hartford Accident Insurance Company, JLIC, Binder 2, HL. This line is reminiscent
of the standard airline advisory telling passengers to secure their own oxygen masks before helping others.
67 Insurance Card, Fidelity and Casualty Company, JLIC, Binder 2, HL.
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accidents, or have any effect on the outcome of the journey at all, the implicit statement
of the advertisement was that insurance made passengers safe. Pitched by agents and
bought by policyholders as a responsible safety measure, insurance joined the discourse
of the traveling public as an adaptation that had tangible results like monetary security
and regulatory action but also provided a rhetorical sense that danger was controlled.68
A late-century Travelers card conveyed this perceived sense of security by
reaching deeply into American railroad history. The card depicted the first locomotive
built for service in the United States, the “Best Friend of Charleston,” and provided the
date of its debut – January 15, 1831. Below, the card told the locomotive’s story: “The
Negro Fireman, annoyed by the blowing off of steam from the safety valve, fastened
down the valve lever and sat on it, with the result of an explosion, that killed him and
scalded the engineer.” Trains, the story suggested, were dangerous from the start. On the
other half of the card, however, was the “First Excursion Trip of the ‘West Point,’” an
engine built to replace the Best Friend. This train now had a “barrier car” loaded with
cotton bales between the engine and the passenger cars. The implication – insurance
tickets, advertised at the bottom of the card, served a similar purpose, as a barrier
between you, the passenger, and the dangerous machine.69
Far from downplaying the threat of accident, then, insurance allowed for it. In
fact, there were those who worried that insurance even encouraged dangerous behavior
and lack of individual responsibility – another way, perhaps, that steam’s dangers became
naturalized.70 Regardless, insurance companies argued that the real danger was not
68 Insurance Card, United States Mutual Accident Association, JLIC, Binder 6, HL.
69 Insurance Card, Travelers Insurance Company, JLIC, Binder 6, HL.
70 Goodman, Shifting the Blame, 91-92.
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expecting risk, so the rational move was to prepare for disaster, however improbable it
was. The entire industry required events that were inevitable but unlikely – if accidents
never happened there would be no reason to buy insurance; if they happened too
frequently the business was not feasible. In this lay the driving message of the travel
insurance industry. Travel entailed measurable risk – the statistics proved as much.
Americans were unlikely to face disaster on their journeys but they might, so they had
better be prepared.
While insurance companies assessed the risks of modern travel for their
consumers, experts within the transportation industry like Charles Francis Adams Jr.
analyzed accidents with the goal of limiting danger. After years at the forefront of the
railroad regulatory debate, Adams published Notes on Railroad Accidents in 1879. The
study is scientific, prescriptive, and historical in nature. As the title suggests and Adams
admitted, the book has an unfinished feel; it is a compilation of somewhat unstructured
notes and reports on accidents, much of it dry analysis of the causes and potential
remedies for past accidents. Adams nevertheless explicitly intended the audience for
Notes to be “both the traveling and general public.”71 Amid a long campaign to reform
railroads, Notes was an effort to reshape public opinion and educate the public on
accidents.72 The book’s thesis is straightforward – railroad accidents were incredibly
tragic, but they were also uniquely instructive, having the long-term effect of compelling
71 Adams, Notes on Railroad Accidents, vi.
72 Public education was a major aspect of Adams’s work with the Massachusetts Board of Railroad
Commissioners, as discussed in Chapter Six.
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gradual reform and actually making the entire rail system safer.73 With his own analysis,
Adams sought to enact that conclusion and effect the full adoption of numerous safety
measures.
The vision for improvement Adams demonstrated in Notes on Railroad Accidents
is primarily a technological one. Adams suggested a variety of reforms; for example, he
recommended the system of expert accident investigation in use in England as opposed to
the untrained coroner’s juries that often produced inadequate results in the United States.
It was in technological solutions, though, that Adams placed the most faith. Chapter Five,
“Telescoping and the Miller Platform,” explores the particular American hazard of
telescoping, in which, because of American car construction and coupling techniques that
left car platforms at different heights, trains suddenly halted in a collision often sent cars
directly through those adjacent to them. Adams described the workings of the Miller
Platform, an 1866 innovation that brought cars back to the same height and coupled them
so as to maximize the strength of resistance in each, eliminating the likelihood of
telescoping. In other chapters, Adams examined the Westinghouse Brake and the
automatic electric block system. Already in use by 1879, the Westinghouse Brake was
controlled from the locomotive rather than by a rear brakeman who had to be signaled
from the front, thus radically improving stopping times and reducing the possibility of
rear-end collisions. Automatic electric blocking systems, Adams explained, were under
development but would provide a consistent signaling method that relied on electricity
73 Adams, Notes on Railroad Accidents, 1-2.
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rather than human signal-men, which Adams argued would lessen the risk of collisions
with various obstacles.74
Beyond promoting specific innovations, though, Adams advanced a broader
philosophy that advocated trusting expert analysis and technology over popular authority
and human operation. That is not to say that Adams held train operators responsible for
accidents; in fact, he argued strongly that they should not incur blame. Adams saw
accidents as symptoms of a systemic problem based in the failures of company leaders to
employ means of operation that maximized safety. He lauded the work of operators
throughout the book but argued that there would always be limits on the capabilities and
awareness of human operators, “no matter how intelligent they may be.” The risks
assumed by employees and the requirements placed on them also seemed to enhance
passenger danger; as Adams quoted from a report by British railroad inspector Henry
Whatley Tyler, “it is difficult to prevent men who are in constant danger themselves from
doing things which may be a source of danger to others… and which impede them in
their work.”75 Railroad lines relied too much on humans who were neither “angels nor
machines” and naturally got tired, weak, and inattentive. Adams expressed surprise and
displeasure with a system that “at this late day,” in an age of technological innovation,
counted so heavily on employees to care for the lives of passengers.76 In Adams’s
account, technology was not a flawless savior of humanity – accidents were still sure to
74 Adams, Notes on Railroad Accidents, 86; 50-51; 199-215; 159-181.
75 Henry Whatley Tyler, quoted in Adams, Notes on Railroad Accidents, 178.
76 Adams, Notes on Railroad Accidents, 63; 162; 167-173; 155.
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happen even in the best systems – but it presented the safest path for the future of railroad
travel.77
Adams also expressed frustration that, occasionally, misinformed public opinion
exerted undue influence on railroad reform. Narratives propagated in the newspapers, by
focusing popular outcry on improper technical fixes, had the tendency to “divert public
attention from the true lesson of the disaster” and unnecessarily hinder railroad
operation.78 Bridge disasters in particular seemed to mystify the public. Adams described
various bridge disasters and resulting attempts to create laws that would require all
engines to stop at draw bridges. These public proposals, Adams said, were “of the crudest
conceivable character,” at best imposing “a most absurd, unnecessary and annoying delay
on travel” and at worst taking attention from the obvious solution – implementation of
effective signaling technology. Adams understood the power of public opinion, especially
in America, but hoped that expert voices could infiltrate public discourse and reshape
opinions about accidents, as he looked to do with Notes on Railroad Accidents.79
Despite being a book about disaster, then, Adams’s Notes is a progressive
narrative. The thousands of lives that had been sacrificed on American railroads “were
not lost in vain” because every accident revealed new problems, galvanized the will for
reform, and supported technological innovation in the drive for safety. The result was, as
Adams argued in his first pages, “that each year, and in obvious consequence of each
fresh catastrophe, travel by rail has become safer and safer, until it has been said, and
77 Arwen Mohun argues that railroads represented the first major example of “complex socio-technological
systems” that are “characteristic of modern and postmodern risk societies.” Railroads helped teach
Americans to manage risk in such systems. Mohun, Risk, 92.
78 The tendency of newspaper coverage to amplify incorrect public assumptions and force regulation is
discussed in Chapter Two.
79 Adams, Notes on Railroad Accidents, 94; 108-109.
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with no inconsiderable degree of truth too, that the very safest place into which a man can
put himself is the inside of a first-class railroad carriage on a train in full motion.” This
was not just blind faith – it was a mathematically verifiable truth. So, Adams devoted his
final few chapters to surveying statistics of railroad accidents in an effort to demonstrate
to the American public that railroads were actually safe.80
Adams understood this was a tall order considering prevailing associations of
railroads with danger, which he attributed largely to “the modern newspaper, with its
perfect machinery for sensational exaggeration.” Seeing what popular culture had made
of railroad disasters, Adams wanted to flip the script. Instead of letting dramatic, deadly
catastrophes absorb all coverage, he would throw the attention onto the millions of miles
traveled every day without accident. He could accomplish this with statistical analysis,
which allowed a God-like view of railroads as a massive, complicated system, its pieces
all moving at once. “The vast machinery moves along, doing its work quickly, swiftly,
safely,” Adams wrote; “no one pays any attention to it, while millions make daily use of
it.”81
In Adams’s retelling, the story of the railroad was of a technology that arrived in a
world already full of dangers. Railroad accidents may have been dramatic but they were
not out of the ordinary. In fact, he argued, railroads made travel safer. He surmised, based
on French data, that in the early railroad years stagecoach accidents outpaced rail
accidents sixty to one, if measured compared to total passengers carried. Later, Adams
compared one year of railroad deaths in Massachusetts, which kept the most reliable state
data, to numbers for other accidental deaths in Boston, finding fewer deaths from railroad
80 Adams, Notes on Railroad Accidents, 155; 2.
81 Adams, Notes on Railroad Accidents, 233.
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accidents than from falling out of windows, falling down stairs, or scalding. As for the
precise risk of suffering a railroad accident, Adams posed the question, how many miles
are traveled on average for every injury or death? Adams acknowledged that intermittent
disasters created such variance year to year in casualty rates that analysis was always an
approximation, especially with the sample size of a small state like Massachusetts. To be
conservative in his estimation, Adams used numbers from the state’s most deadly year on
record, 1871. During that year in Massachusetts, the average number of miles traveled for
each death was eleven million. If numbers from the entire decade were used, the average
was eighty million miles traveled for one death.82
Adams’s claim that railroad accidents were statistically infrequent was not a new
one. Similar statistical arguments had been made by early respondents to steamboat
disasters and had played a role in legislative arguments on the subject. Moderate
newspaper editorials about rail accidents sometimes voiced the idea that “at every hour of
the day and night there are thousands of human beings thundering along upon the rails,
yet, upon the whole, how few are hurt!”83 Both the federal and state governments, and of
course insurance companies, had been keeping and using records for many years. The
ubiquity of claims based in statistical data is suggested by a somewhat lighthearted
passage in Harper’s Weekly:
The curious old speculations are revived that, according to the statistics of railway
travel, every man who has traveled a certain number of miles is liable to have his
arm broken; a few more and his leg is in danger; and after a certain number of
82 Adams, Notes on Railroad Accidents, 231; 242; 235-238. Notably, Adams did not include passenger
injuries and deaths that resulted from their own “carelessness.” Arguably, these could be still be considered
casualties incident to rail travel, and would have raised Adams’s calculated casualty rate.
83 Harper’s Weekly, November 19, 1864.
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miles traveled his neck may be broken at any moment to keep the inexorable
statistics straight.84
Adams, though, developed the argument more fully than anyone before, devoting a
significant portion of his career to spreading the message about the safety of American
railroads through newspaper editorials, books, and public lectures. A review of Notes in
the New York Times praised the book’s approach and pushed its claims that railroads
were safe.85
Adams’s systemic, scientific perspective defined the way he understood
accidents. In Notes, he consistently and solemnly mentioned the human tragedy, but said
accidents were both important case studies for reform and data points revealing systemic
issues. Adams described the major railroad disaster near Revere, Massachusetts, in 1871,
one he had investigated for years, as the product of “undeveloped strength” and “hidden
weakness.” His narrative of the accident reads like a lengthy tale whose ending is already
known, and Adams as the author laid out the obvious weaknesses and “mischances” that
came together to bring danger to a largely safe means of transport. As with the insurance
language, Adams’s terminology suggests a sharp departure from earlier understandings of
disasters as divine judgments or acts of reckless murder. Toward the end of the book, he
defined accidents in perhaps the most scientific way possible, as “inequalities of
movement” within the vast and complicated transportation system.86 John Brockmann
correctly notes that Adams included some thrilling description clearly influenced by
disaster narratives like those in Lloyd’s Steamboat Directory or S. A. Howland’s
84 Harper’s Weekly, December 10, 1864.
85 R. John Brockmann, Twisted Rails, Sunken Ships: The Rhetoric of Nineteenth Century Steamboat and
Railroad Accident Investigation Reports, 1833-1879 (Amityville, New York: Baywood Publishing
Company, 2005), 238.
86 Adams, Notes on Railroad Accidents, 127; 137; 270.
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Steamboat Disasters and Railway Accidents, but the author of Notes on Railroad
Accidents would be more accurately termed an “anti-Howland,” attending to the rational
over the emotional, safety over danger, and the massive, functioning transport system
over the anomalous disaster.87
It was the nature of these accidents – products of systemic operating weaknesses,
unpredictable mischances, human carelessness or inattention, but accidents – that made
them, in the end, unavoidable. Even as he continually pushed to make railroad travel
more perfect, Adams accepted the reality of a limited risk. “It is to be constantly borne in
mind,” Adams stressed, “not only that the railroad performs a great function in modern
life, but that it also and of necessity performs it in a very dangerous way.” He continued;
“A practically irresistible force crashing through the busy hive of modern civilization at a
wild rate of speed, going hither and thither, across highways and by-ways and along a
path which is in itself a thoroughfare,” could not be expected to work flawlessly. Danger
was built into the modern American transportation system, and in this, railroads were not
unusual. Adams identified a technological society that brought progress along with
limited risk, in which railroads deserved no more censure than “all other functions of
modern life.”88
Railroads were unusual, though, in their relative safety compared to the potential
for danger, Adams argued. In Notes, Adams sometimes referred to early skeptics of
railroads, who could not imagine how railroads could be made safe, and called the
skepticism “wholly justified.” Adams wrote:
87 Brockmann, Twisted Rails, Sunken Ships, 240.
88 Adams, Notes on Railroad Accidents, 248-249.
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As it plunges into the darkness it would seem to be inevitable that something must
happen, and that, whatever happens, it must necessarily involve both the train and
every one in it in utter and irremediable destruction. Here is a body weighing in
the neighborhood of two hundred tons, moving over the face of the earth at a
speed of sixty feet a second and held to its course only by two slender lines of
iron rails; - and yet it is safe!
Here was Adams’s closing point – his twist on the standard progressive narrative. “There
are few sights finer,” Adams said, than standing on a platform and watching a train rush
by. Their sublime catastrophes had long stirred the American imagination. And yet,
Adams wrote, “it is not, after all, the dangers but the safety of the modern railroad which
should excite our special wonder.”89
Adams’s claims were echoed by others. A report on an 1893 train wreck in Frank
Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper reveals a significant tonal shift from the paper’s standard
coverage of prior decades. The article, entitled “Eccentricities of Railway Casualties,”
reflected Adams’s language, calling the accident “an interruption of the laws of motion.”
Then the writer expressed a similar wonder, “that in the accidents inevitable under the
best and most efficient management, and especially in those involving the total
destruction of trains, so few passengers sustain serious or fatal injury.”90 For Adams and
those who shared his view, disasters had ultimately made travel safer, and with each new
advancement in railroad safety, accidents became more unlikely and less destructive. The
steam engine, the locomotive – these were unfathomable achievements and testaments to
human reason, not in spite of accidents but also because of the human triumph those
accidents revealed. As Adams argued, a book detailing transportation disasters was not,
as James T. Lloyd said, evidence of that “mismanagement of steam power… so
89 Adams, Notes on Railroad Accidents, 176; 269; 234.
90 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, September 28, 1893.
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eminently perilous and destructive of human life” but rather the greatest evidence of
modern scientific progress.91 Adams concluded, “there is no more creditable monument
to human care, human skill, and human foresight than the statistics of railroad
accidents.”92
No matter how unlikely transportation disasters were, or how normal they had
become, as long as they continued they would be troubling. Adams knew this. “Railroad
accidents continually take place, and in consequence of them people are killed and
injured, and of these there may well be some who are then making their first journey by
rail,” Adams wrote. “Any person as he may be reading this page in a railroad car may be
killed or injured through some accident, even while his eye is glancing over the figures
which show how infinitesimal his danger is.”93 Statistical evidence suggested that
suffering a railroad accident was incredibly unlikely. Insurance policies could add a sense
of financial security in the event of an accident. Rail accidents nonetheless remained a
prevalent, real source of danger in the modern world. Decades after her first train ride,
Caroline Barrett White wrote in her diary that her son Charlie was traveling by rail
westward to Chicago: “Now the beloved son is speeding (let us hope safely) over the
long road between this and Chicago.” Three days later she received word “showing the
long journey safely ended – and I am thankful in these days of frequent accidents.”94
White wrote these entries just a month after reading of a local rail accident; her fear does
91 J. T. Lloyd, Lloyd’s Steamboat Directory, and Disasters on the Western Waters (Cincinnati: James T.
Lloyd & Co., 1856), iii.
92 Adams, Notes on Railroad Accidents, 171.
93 Adams, Notes on Railroad Accidents, 239.
94 The Papers of Caroline Barrett White, October 30, 1983 and November 2, 1893.
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not appear all-consuming, but Charlie’s travels brought accidents to her mind. In a larger
sense, transportation accidents were so embedded in American culture they were an
easily-imagined archetype of worst-case-scenario danger. An illustration in an 1881 issue
of The Wasp called “Dreaming” showed a girl seated by the hearth, asleep. Filling the
page around her are various fanciful and fearful things that fill her mind, and at the top, a
girl is crushed under a moving train.95
“Few persons, probably, start upon any considerable journey, implying days and
nights on the rail, without almost unconsciously taking into some consideration the risks
of accident. Visions of collision, derailment, plunging through bridges, will rise
unbidden.”96 Adams thus summed up a lasting effect of steam power’s dangers. Adams,
like many others, worked to ensure Americans could enjoy the benefits of modern travel
as safely as possible. Accidents happened, though, and many died on America’s rivers
and rails. Charles Francis Adams Jr. may have discovered that truth at a young age
listening to a story from his grandfather, John Quincy Adams, who had survived the
nation’s first fatal train wreck. Limited risk, the unlikely disaster – these were the natural
partners of the machines that conquered space and time.
95 The Wasp, December 23, 1881.
96 Adams, Notes on Railroad Accidents, 234.
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Epilogue
In 1867 Charles Francis Adams Jr. called the United States a “child of steam.”1
This was, in many ways, an appropriate characterization of the nation in the nineteenth
century, as the possibilities and consequences of steam power pervaded American
society. In the century’s first decade, steam power and its application to transportation
arrived to a people that, somewhat unknowingly, desired and even required it. The
vastness of the American continent, the country’s difficult terrain, and its underdeveloped
infrastructure made long-distance journeys challenging and dangerous, severely limiting
the mobility of individual American travelers. On a national scale, distance and difficult
travel imposed significant obstacles to the functioning of an American economy that
would require integration, an American society that leaders sought to unify, and an
American government that demanded representatives from distant locations travel to
meet in a central capital. Steam-powered transportation offered a solution to these
escalating problems with the promise of faster, more efficient, and safer travel.
Almost from their debut, however, steamboats and trains exhibited a new form of
danger and destruction wrought by deadly explosions, fires, collisions, wrecks, and
crashes. Many Americans suffered the costs of these disasters directly, but many more
encountered them from a distance, mediated through printed materials. News coverage of
disasters raised their profile, established a pattern of danger, and suggested to the
American public and the nation’s governing bodies that the perils of steam transportation
demanded real attention. A substantial public discourse grew around steam dangers and
disasters, made up of news coverage, editorials, disaster narratives, visual
1 Charles Francis Adams Jr., quoted in Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation: Charles Francis
Adams, Louis D. Brandeis, James M. Landis, Alfred E. Kahn (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984).
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representations, disaster sermons, and popular literature, that made the dangers of steam
transportation a shared experience among Americans who increasingly incorporated the
new reality disasters represented into their collective mentality. Through these various
responses to and interpretations of disasters, Americans framed the dangers of steam as a
profound social problem but also as a spectacular and meaningful feature of modern life.
Steamboat and rail disasters provoked widespread and deep reflection about the meaning
of disasters apparently caused not by God or nature but by technologies that humans
created and by the humans who failed to control them properly. Disasters also forced
Americans to evaluate whether technological progress, represented by the speed and
power of steam transportation, was an unequivocal good, and what danger on American
rivers and roads meant for the health of a republic that so valued the benefits of expanded
mobility.
Americans continued to embrace steam power and seek technological progress
while adapting to and attempting to limit their deadly consequences. Printed materials
connected the American reading public through a common knowledge about the nature of
steam transportation’s dangers, and they also connected readers to the victims dying on
steamboats and trains. Disasters consistently proved that all travelers were subject to
death and injury, and the aftermath of disasters created moments during which the
American reading public became a concerned traveling public, meeting in person and
using print to voice grievances and to argue that safe conveyance was a right of all
traveling citizens. Even as efforts to combat danger through the discursive, legal, and
political arenas continued, by the late nineteenth century Americans had also gradually
come to accept the dangers of transportation technology, both as familiar cultural
330
phenomena and as inevitable risks of modern life. American culture’s exposure to steam
disasters, mediated through printed materials, had made the horrific tragedies intelligible
events that most Americans consumed at a distance, the actual danger remote from their
lives. Scientific and analytical approaches to transportation disasters also emerged that
evaluated the risks of travel, advised Americans to prepare adequately for the worst, but
encouraged the public to trust an advanced technological system that would keep
catastrophe unlikely and travel safe. By the end of the century, a modern mentality was
evident that recognized transportation dangers as fearsome and sensational, but unlikely –
the accepted cost of high-speed mobility.
As Americans closed the nineteenth century and entered the twentieth, the age of
steam was also coming to a close. The primary herald of its end was the creation of a new
system for powering movement – the internal combustion engine. Steam engines
operated on external combustion, meaning the fuel burned outside the cylinder and steam,
a mediating agent, drove the piston. The internal combustion engine, perfected in the
final decade of the nineteenth century, burned fuel within the engine and the resulting
energy powered motion directly.2 The steamboat trade on American rivers had long been
in decline due to the success of railroads that penetrated the continent, but the internal
combustion engine marked its ultimate end.3 Steam-powered ocean liners continued to
operate in the twentieth century but were also overcome by ships operating on diesel
engines. Steam locomotives were replaced by electric and diesel locomotives.
2 Ruth Schwartz Cowan, A Social History of American Technology (New York: Oxford University Press,
1997), 225-227.
3 Louis C. Hunter, Steamboats on the Western Rivers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), 640.
331
More significantly, the new source of power inaugurated a new transportation
regime dominated by the automobile and powered flight. Much like a century earlier,
Americans eagerly embraced the possibilities of these machines. A new magazine called
Horseless Age wrote of the automobile in 1895, “the growing needs of our civilization
demand it; the public believe in it, and await with lively interest its practical application
to the daily business of the world.”4 The influence of the automobile reflects another
manifestation of America’s distinct ambition to conquer its vast space, as the new
machine became symbolic of American national culture in the twentieth century.5 The
automobile also shifted the nature of travel partly back to an individually-designed and
directed venture. Commercial air travel, on the other hand, reflected the latest iteration of
public mass transportation, one that annihilated space to a new degree and fully destroyed
what Wolfgang Schivelbusch calls the “mimetic” relationship of travel and landscape.6
New modes of transportation brought fresh hazards and inspired new fears. In
1904 Caroline Barrett White, who had written of her initial experiences on steamboats
and trains and of her fears for her son’s safety on a railroad journey, recorded her disdain
after witnessing a near auto accident – “Oh! Those horrid automobiles.”7 Cars crashed
with increasing frequency, and between 1945 and 1965 the U.S. Government reported
that annual deaths from automobiles rose from 30,000 to 50,000. Public agitation,
including Ralph Nader’s popular book Unsafe at Any Speed, urged regulation despite
industry defenders’ claims that the rate of accidents was going down, and in 1966 the
4 Quoted in Cowan, A Social History of American Technology, 227.
5 On automobile culture in the twentieth-century United States, see especially James J. Flink, The
Automobile Age (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988).
6 Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space in the Nineteenth
Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 9.
7 Caroline Barrett White Papers, Vol. 26, entry dated April 25, 1904. American Antiquarian Society.
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National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act became law.8 The federal government had
been involved much earlier in regulating passenger safety on airlines with the 1926 Air
Commerce Act.9 Of course, despite safety measures, accidents from these modes of
transport would not be completely eradicated. Nor did accidents on older modes of
transport go away, as the 1912 Titanic disaster demonstrates. Fatality rates on railroads
declined sharply in the twentieth century; still, train accidents are rare but familiar events
even in the twenty-first century.10
The mentality evident at the end of the age of steam continues to characterize the
responses of Americans to the benefits and dangers of twentieth-century transportation
technologies, though the form has shifted slightly based on the particularities of each
mode of travel. When they are not in the news, transportation disasters, both old and new,
continue to pervade American culture, appearing in films, television shows, television
commercials, literature, and music, as evocative images of danger and effective
storytelling devices. Auto accidents and plane crashes, real and fictional, are familiar to
us all, but most of us maintain deep, often unconscious, faith in modern political and
human-technological systems to keep travel safe.
8 Cowan, A Social History of American Technology, 239-240. Public agitation seems to have followed the
patterns of response established by nineteenth-century Americans regarding steamboats and trains, as
Cowan says that for the public, statistical arguments on auto accidents “paled to insignificance when
compared with the mounting toll of dead children, paralyzed teenagers, totaled cars, and failed brakes.”
Ralph Nader’s book exposed the “designed-in dangers” of American automobiles and the automobile
industry’s reluctance to implement safety measures. Ralph Nader, Unsafe at Any Speed: The Designed-In
Dangers of the American Automobile (New York: Grossman, 1965). For a recent study of early automobile
danger, see David Blanke, Hell on Wheels: The Promise and Peril of America’s Car Culture, 1900-1940
(Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2007).
9 Cowan, A Social History of American Technology, 256.
10 Mark Aldrich, Death Rode the Rails: American Railroad Accidents and Safety, 1828-1965 (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 323-325.
333
The onward march of modernity has also only accelerated the compression of
time and space.11 Along with the automobile and the airplane, other technologies of the
late nineteenth-century and the early twentieth century, like the telephone, wireless
telegraphy, the cinema, electric lighting, and more, continued the reorientation of
Americans’ spatial and temporal experiences. New ideas in science, such as Albert
Einstein’s theory of relativity and Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalysis, and new trends in
literature and art, such as stream-of-consciousness writing and Cubism, reflected and
reinforced evolving conceptualizations of time and space and made simultaneity a
definitive concept of twentieth-century modernity. As they did in the nineteenth-century,
communication technologies continued to influence how humanity experienced distant
events, including transportation disasters. Stephen Kern writes that “the sinking of the
Titanic was a simultaneous drama played out on the North Atlantic as its wireless distress
calls filled the skies,” and while hundreds of survivors “witnessed visually” the sinking,
“it was also witnessed electronically by telegraph operators in numerous ships at sea and
by wireless operators in telegraph and newspaper offices across North America and
Europe.”12 Modern life continues to be marked by such simultaneous connections across
space.
Technology, of course, has been a prime facilitator of these transformations.
America’s national obsession with technology persisted through the twentieth century,
11 I subscribe to the theory that “postmodernity” is not a distinct period from “modernity,” but rather, that
the present moment simply marks a more advanced degree of the conditions of modernity, particularly
time-space compression. This approach can be seen, for example, in Anthony Giddens, The Consequences
of Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990) and Stephen Kern, The Culture of Time and
Space, 1880-1918, Second Edition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003). Marc Augé labels the
present age “supermodernity.” Marc Augé, Non-Places: An Introduction to Supermodernity, trans. John
Howe (New York: Verso, 1995).
12 Kern, The Culture of Time and Space, xii-xiii. Kern’s study is a masterful analysis of the complicated
reorientation of space and time at the turn of the twentieth-century.
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and experiences of technology certainly still provoke a similar unifying awe and wonder
to what early nineteenth-century Americans felt when confronted with steam power.13
That many modern technologies have proven dangerous as well as beneficial only
enhances that sublime experience and the prominent role of technology in the American
psyche. Danger was an unintended consequence of America’s embrace of steam power in
the nineteenth century – a sign of the double-edged nature of modern technology.
Advanced technology, by nature, occasionally breaks down, fails, or threatens its users,
and it consistently raises questions about a society’s collective values and the potentially
harmful influence of progress on traditional social relations and cultural norms.14
New innovations will bring the same complicated issues to bear. American
society currently confronts another potentially seismic shift in transportation with
autonomous automobile technology. Already, many cars feature autonomous elements,
and self-driving cars are highly-anticipated to bring potential “enormous reductions in
highway crashes and deaths” and to revolutionize the capabilities and convenience of
modern mobility.15 Autonomous transportation raises fascinating questions for America’s
mobile, technological future. How might a new iteration of passenger transportation
13 David Nye, American Technological Sublime (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994).
14 Ruth Schwartz Cowan cleverly uses the story of the sorcerer’s apprentice to talk about the unintended
consequences of technology, specifically in relation to the automobile. A Social History of American
Technology, 224-247. The theme of unintended technological consequences has received the most attention
in terms of twentieth-century technology and in broad theoretical studies. See, for example, Edward
Tenner, Why Things Bite Back: Technology and the Revenge of Unintended Consequences (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1996); Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society, trans. John Wilkinson (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1964); Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-Control as a
Theme in Political Thought (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1977).
15 “U.S. Department of Transportation Releases Policy on Automated Vehicle Development,” National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (May 30, 2013). Accessed online at
http://www.nhtsa.gov/About+NHTSA/Press+Releases/U.S.+Department+of+Transportation+Releases+Pol
icy+on+Automated+Vehicle+Development. See also Lawrence D. Burns et al., “Transforming Personal
Mobility,” The Earth Institute, Columbia University (2013), accessed online at
http://sustainablemobility.ei.columbia.edu/files/2012/12/Transforming-Personal-Mobility-Jan-27-
20132.pdf.
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transform public expectations of safety and the overall experience of travel? How will
Americans respond to technological failures and deadly accidents caused by computer
error? What unimagined social effects will arise when humans cede ever more control to
technology?
In an 1860 essay entitled “Power,” Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote, “All the
elements whose aid man calls in will sometimes become his masters, especially those of
most subtle force. Shall he then renounce steam, fire and electricity, or shall he learn to
deal with them? The rule for this whole class of agencies is, – all plus is good; only put it
in the right place.”16 Emerson’s words were significant, written in the heart of a century
during which steamboats and trains, America’s celebrated destroyers of time and space,
were destroying human life to a terrifying degree. They continue to be relevant more than
a century and a half later. American society remains one that understands technological
development and innovation as progress. It is unlikely that Americans will ever renounce
the machines and devices that have made their daily existence faster, more efficient, more
convenient, and more connected. Almost certainly, though, there will continue to be deep
reflection and vibrant conversation about how, exactly, to fit these technologies into their
right place.
16 Ralph Waldo Emerson, quoted in John Kasson, Civilizing the Machine: Technology and Republican
Values in America, 1776-1900 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1976), 134.
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